


palgrave
macmillan

The Global Legitimacy Game

Civil Society, Globalization, and Protest

Alison Van Rooy



- Establishing the mechanisms by which governments and the market can be held accountable by the public (Siegel and Yancey 1992).

Of course, just because CSOs *can* do such things does not mean they necessarily *do* carry them out. Not surprisingly, there are a host of exceptions to the correlation between strong civil societies and democracies. Fisher (1998) reviews the evidence and fails to find a strong correlation (let alone a causal one); Salamon (1993) is similarly agnostic, and Ottaway and Carothers (2000) are likewise doubtful. Still, the weight of popular opinion (and, as we shall see, foreign-aid funding to civil society organizations, should that be an important measure) assumes that a strong and organized civil society is necessary for democracy to flourish.

Social capital

Civil society is also thought to be of ethical importance because it builds social capital: that level of community trust and goodwill that improves not only our personal well-being, but also our national economy. The 1990s' enthusiasm for the idea of social capital, propelled into public prominence by Robert Putnam's *Bowling Alone* (2000), has led to increased attention to the vehicles of social capital: civil (or civic) organizations. The argument here is that when people form into community groups (of even the most pedestrian kind, such as bowling leagues), a host of happy social outcomes follow: lower crime, greater health, more happiness, and greater employment (Van Rooy 2001).

The idea of social capital is not Putnam's alone; Jacobs (1961), Coleman (1988) and others wrote about it years ago. However, the Harvard academic's treatment of the topic hit a raw nerve in mid-1990s America:

Politicians of all stripes picked up and ran with the disaffection theme. Conservatives said citizen cynicism was the fault of a huge and oppressive federal government, one that suffocates grass-roots volunteer efforts. Liberals were attracted to the cynicism thesis because its call for a renewal of civic engagement sounded like a plea for social activism and greater communitarian spirit (Flint 1996: 16).

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Putnam's correlation between civil society and social capital has come under scrutiny. Is his data for American civic participation wrong (Lemann 1992, Schudson 1996, Fukuyama 2000)? Does he ignore other factors that contribute to social decay

and rejuvenation (Skocpol 1996)? Spurred rather than deterred by such critiques, further research is underway (at no less than the World Bank) to trace the links between what civil society does and what social capital is earned.

Social justice

A third public good associated with civil society is the provision of social justice: the more equitable distribution of power (and sometimes real redistribution of material goods) among the globe's inhabitants. It is from this vantage point that many globalization activists take their inspiration.

The link is made in the following way: in the shadow of power-seeking governments and profit-seeking corporations, the common person is abandoned to a fate of immiseration. This democratic and market failure requires alternate means to provide welfare for all (to put food on the table) *and* alternate political empowerment (to change the circumstances whereby food disappeared from the table in the first place). Such alternate means come in the shape of CSOs. *Globally-active* CSOs, the topic of this book, are seen to have a special role in pursuing social justice by working internationally. According to one commentator, global civil society is thus composed of those organizations that:

- Address political issues that were largely ignored (or opposed) by all the mainstream political parties at the time; growing popular concern could not therefore be channeled through conventional political routes.
- Address issues that are truly global and which concern large-scale disparities of power.
- Seek three goals: to influence public policy, reform institutions, and change public attitudes.
- Pursue two strategies: mass campaigning and the use of the mass media to demonstrate force of numbers and win hearts, and skillful research and advocacy to win the intellectual case.
- Constitute global movements; they deliberately seek to create international networks and derive enhanced legitimacy from them, promote an ethos of internationalism, and favour simultaneous action at the local, national, and international levels (Clark 2001: 17–18).

As (potential) purveyors of democracy, social capital, and social justice, we see those global CSOs as Davids throwing stones, literally and figuratively, at the Goliaths of globalization. This normative imagery is

one of the hallmarks of today's debate on legitimacy, civil society, and globalization.

1.2 Scoping the phenomenon

If the preceding survey of civil society definitions is too broad to be helpful, then it may be useful to look at some specifics. Despite the ambiguity of definitions, a range of estimates for the numbers of internationally-active NGOs/CSOs has been drawn up, as well as guesses for the numbers working within national borders. And, while it would be impossible to give a country-by-country history of CSO origins (though have a look at the Institute for Development Studies project [IDS 2001] and the work of Salamon *et al.* 1999), there is a growing set of accounts about their global counterparts. These empirical efforts are important in sketching out the scope of the civil society phenomenon; a crucial factor when we come to discuss the legitimacy debates around them.

1.2.1 How many?

Counting CSOs is an imprecise and time-consuming art. The only 'hard' numbers are those collected by the Union of International Associations (UIA) in its yearbook of international organizations. In 2002, for instance, the yearbook recorded 38,000 international NGO associations; 529 'universal membership organizations'; 1050 intercontinental organizations; 4100 regional (subcontinental) organizations and networks; a host of informal, transnational associations and networks; 850 transnational religious orders; 2700 'semi-autonomous international bodies'; and another 4500 internationally-oriented national organizations (UIA 2002). Of course, these agencies are only the ones who have submitted information, or that the compilers come across in some other way, and there is no way of determining the importance of any one over another: Is this indeed the catalogue of a new global civil society? Still, almost all the studies of INGOs (and of 'transnational civil society' writ large) are based on number crunching from this set of data.

Mind you, the UIA data is as good as it gets. Putting a number on CSOs *within* a country is far more difficult. Do we count only groups registered with the government? Only those with staff, budget, and office? Only those that work in some kind of public-benefit capacity? What about the host of far more 'informal' bodies that often escape our notice? (see Vakil's effort to classify NGOs for an example of the problem, 1997). Understandably, the few brave

efforts to quantify domestic CSOs are all over the map. Fisher's partial survey of more than 80 countries racks up some 71,000 organizations without including grassroots organizations (Fisher 1998). Elsewhere, Slovakia counts 12,000 registered NGOs (EWI 1998: 6); some 78,000 registered charities are on the books in Canada (Canada, Revenue Canada 2003: URL) and 175,000 in the UK (Adair 1999: URL); India has some 70,000 development NGOs alone (let alone other CSOs, Mohan 1998: URL); the US may have as many as 1.5 million NGOs of all stripes (McGann 2001: 4). The cumulative totals are staggering.

Moreover, further studies on INGOs show these numbers are increasing in recent years. Smith's study of the UIA data demonstrate that more than 60 per cent that were active in 1993 came into being after 1970, and that the average organizational age continues to decline – that is, a greater number are newly formed (Smith 1997: 46; see also Sikkink and Smith 2002: 41–2). Even more importantly, (1) membership (whether of individuals or other member agencies) *within* those INGOs has increased at a still-greater rate: well over a third of current members joined after 1990, and (2) INGOs themselves are more and more connected with each other and to international institutions like the United Nations and Bretton Woods Institutions (Anheier *et al.* 2001: 2; see also Anheier and Themudo 2002).

From such domestic and international trends come stirring conclusions of a worldwide 'associational revolution' (Salamon 1994), and predictions that 'NGOs may serve as the basis for, or actually become, nascent forms of transnational governance' (Rosenau 1995: 23). While such pronouncements might be enthusiastic (I do not fully believe that 'NGOs can push around even the largest governments,' Mathews 1997: 53, for instance), this empirical work waves a red flag to international relations pundits who once ignored 'non-states' (for a review of the 'non-state' and 'return to the state' debates, start with Almond 1988 and Mitchell 1991). Such counting work has led to '(a) the realization that there is a rapid and sustained growth in their numbers across the globe; (b) the recognition that they are becoming increasingly prominent in an ever growing number of areas; and (c) their concurrent "discovery" by scholars and international institutions' (Najam 2000: URL).

Having thus discovered civil society, analysts are now asking a range of interesting questions about what the phenomenon may mean. For instance, what about the size and capacity of those organizations to muster membership, money, and political sway? If there is an increase in one-person-with-business-card agencies, one would ask different

questions than if each represented a vast membership of active global citizens. Of the growing number of INGOs in the 1990s,

Many of the larger ones, such as Care, control budgets worth more than \$100 m. Membership of the Worldwide Fund for Nature has increased nearly tenfold, to 5 m, since the mid-1980s; it has 3,300 staff and an annual budget of more than \$350 m. Greenpeace has nearly 2.5 m members and 1,142 staff. Amnesty International has 1 m members in 162 countries. Friends of the Earth has 1 m members in 58 countries (Bond 2000: URL).

Of course, few of the tens of thousands of INGOs are in the multi-million dollar (and multi-million member) league, and fewer still are focused on globalization issues. Sikkink and Smith's catalogue of 'trans-national social movement organizations,' extracted from the 1993 UIA data, includes 685 agencies involved in human rights, peace, women's rights, environment world order/international law, and development/empowerment (Sikkink and Smith 2002: 30): probably a pretty reliable number. In another listing, Elliott *et al.* describe about one hundred *economic* globalization advocacy groups that they deem important (Elliott *et al.* 2002). In any accounting, however, there seem to be a growing number who identify themselves under the globalization banner (pro, anti, and otherwise). It is evidently a population worth watching.

1.2.2 From whence?

Where, however, did such multitudes come from? Smillie (1995) provides a good potted history of many of the organizations now active on globalization: in Western countries, they arose largely within the last 200 years from churches, temples, and mosques. By the 19th century, they had added secular charitable work to their missionary activities (examples include the Anti-Slavery Society and the International Red Cross) and by the 20th century, had extended their humanitarian and 'solidarity' work still further (see also the country-by-country accounts in Van Rooy 1998, Salamon *et al.* 1999, and IDS 2001).

Yet even early on, there was a group of global-level activists. Remarkable social innovations grew out of sustained pressure by the (then small but growing) numbers of international organizations we would now call INGOs.

In the 1890s the Universal Peace Congress drafted a plan for an international tribunal to arbitrate disputes. In 1899 the Tsar Nicholas II

sparked the First Hague Conference where internationally motivated citizens rubbed shoulders with diplomats and challenged the European arms race. The Socialist International, organized and re-organized in the second half of the nineteenth century represented for many the ideal of internationalism and a world beyond states. A number of the emerging 'world' movements were influential in the development of the vision of the League of Nations, organized by governments following the disasters of World War I (Foster 2001: 2).

The difference today is that we are now witness to a tidal wave of activity rather than occasional instances. How did this come about? Is such proliferation a side effect of economic globalization? Of the democratic 'third wave' of the late 20th century? Of communications advances, including the Internet? An examination of some of the characteristics of today's globalization activists – and activism – provides some answers.

1.3 Identifying four characteristics

Generalizations, by their very nature, are full of holes. In few enough cases can a broad description of a *very* disparate set of players be of much help, but there are some that ring true. Four adjectives could be used to describe today's globalization movements: horizontal (in structure and communication), global (in efforts to 'frame change,' alter policy, and reshape institutions), high-profile (in strategy), and ideological.

1.3.1 Horizontal

The globalization movement – or more accurately, *movements* – are horizontal inasmuch as they have no particular or permanent leaders, no encompassing strategy, and loose and shifting organizational structures. Describing a movement as horizontal does not mean, of course, that the organizations or individuals within them are necessarily non-hierarchical, or that there is necessary virtue in such a structure. It does illustrate, however, the remarkable outcome of institutional innovation on the one hand, and the magic of the Internet, on the other.

Institutional innovation

Civil society organizations have been generating horizontality by coming up with variants of new kinds of organization: issue networks and world forums among them.

Prominent are networks of organizations devoted to a particular set of issues. These issue networks are more than temporary coalitions: many

are organizations unto themselves, with a permanent identity and often with offices, publications, and long-term leadership. Prominent examples include WEDO (Women's Environment and Development Organization, very prominent during the UN conferences of the 1990s, based in the US), TWN (Third World Network, a prolific publisher of opinions on economic globalization, based in Malaysia), DAWN (Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era, an active feminist voice on globalization, based in Fiji), and PAN (the Pesticides Action Network, a worldwide advocacy grouping started from Malaysia). Significantly, many of these are based in (and formed in) Southern 'developing' countries, but have extended their memberships and branches throughout the world (see also Krut *et al.* 1997).

World forums are another institutional innovation of growing popularity. Of course, many globally minded organizations have traditionally gathered around the UN: so much so that the UN Secretary-General said, 'NGOs are an essential part of the legitimacy without which no international activity can be meaningful' (Rice and Ritchie 1995: URL). Yet, increasingly, we are witness to *alternative* world forums – the *Global Civil Society* yearbook found that 40 per cent of the 'parallel summits' held by CSOs in 2001 had, indeed, nothing to do with official meetings at all (Glasius and Kaldor 2002: 6).

Of such experiments, perhaps the most reported is the World Social Forum, begun in Brazil in 2001 as an alternative to the Swiss meetings of the business-dominated World Economic Forum. At its inaugural meeting, some 15,000 people, including labour activists, environmentalists, human rights workers, and others held workshops and issued manifestos on the 'predatory aspects of globalization' (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2001: 23). Its third meeting saw 100,000 people: 'Never had so many citizens come forth for meetings on a global scale' (Scholte 2003: URL). With the Social Forum and other such meeting places, there are more and more opportunities for the like-minded to join forces.

The magic of the Internet

Of course, the largest meeting place of all is the Internet. Incredibly fast, remarkably cheap, and absolutely suited to the dynamics of networks, the Internet may have made some movements possible in the first place. Describing their notion of Netwars, Acquilla and Ronfeldt document how activists (as well as criminal organizations) use information technology to fight their battles in an altogether different form. Their examples draw not only from the Burma, Zapatista, and Seattle campaigns, but also from the conflict in Chechnya and Serbia, and the successful

work of criminal drug cartels (Acquilla and Ronfeldt 1996, 2001; see also Wehling 1995).

How are these Net campaigns any different from older forms? As information speeds around the globe, decision-makers come under greater pressure, from more quarters, far more quickly. This narrowing of the timeframe can make for real changes in the policy process: 'If a negotiator says something to someone over a glass of wine, we'll have it on the Internet within an hour, all over the world.... If we know something that is sensitive to one government, we get it to our ally in that country instantly. I don't think governments will ever be able to do these kind of secret trade negotiations again' (quoted in Beierle 2000: 19). Similarly, reporting on the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), Scott argues that: 'The Internet was one of the key ingredients which enabled such a multifarious movement to execute an agile and rapid strategy of countering opponents and critics, and persuading would-be allies (be they governmental, the media or other NGOs)' (Scott 1999: 5).

Not only speedy, the Internet allows for fabulous breadth of reach, greatly facilitating the distribution of information and coordination of logistics at near-zero cost. Lori Wallach, the coordinator of Public Citizen's trade program, told this story in a recent interview. When asked whether the same outcome could have been achieved in Seattle (the site of large demonstrations against the WTO in 1999) without the Internet, she responded:

Well, the internet certainly made it a lot easier, and faster. For instance, when we were working on the Uruguay Round in 1992, we finally liberated a copy of the text. It was on Christmas Eve; I got someone to take it out of the copier room at the GATT headquarters, put it on KLM. They flew it to Dulles International Airport, outside of Washington; I drove to Dulles, I drove back to Capitol Hill. I sent it to the Kinko's copy shop on Pennsylvania Avenue, they made me 30 copies, I ran it to Federal Express – because it was Christmas Eve – and I sent it to my coalition partner in Japan, who also was responsible for getting it to Thailand, just as the guy in Malaysia was supposed to get it to Indonesia, and the person in France should have gotten it to Spain and Portugal, etc., all by mail. So there was this whole *meshugas* of trying to mechanically make copies of an 800-page text and mail it, at \$50 a pop. It took a week and a half before anyone had it in their hands, by the time all the running around and Christmas happened (Naim 2000: 33).

Moreover, it is not only speed and reach that mark the Internet as a crucial tool; its very structure encourages new forms of protest, including ‘umbrella coalescing’ (gathering many smaller organizations and individuals) and ‘spider-web organizing’ (permitting action along the spokes of the web without leadership from the hub). Norris highlights the mobilization potential that this structure encourages: ‘through the Internet you can subscribe to advocacy and lobbying groups, affiliate your organization, receive emailed policy newsletters and action alerts, send faxes or emails to decision-makers, circulate electronic petitions, learn about forthcoming street demonstrations, protest events, job vacancies and voluntary activities, as well as share effective strategies for activism, contribute short news items to the site, and participate in online discussions’ (Norris 2000a: 10–11). Everyone and anyone with a modem can participate.

Of course, such electronic novelties (including cellphones and video cameras) combine with the still-crucial person-to-person activities – face-to-face meetings, real-time debates over strategy, and trust-building experiences to produce some of the new pressures we are witnessing in the globalization debates. Brown and Fox, for instance, found that there was ‘no substitute for face-to-face negotiations in creating trust and mutual influence’ in the coalitions they studied (Brown and Fox 2001: 55), and Wallach similarly emphasizes face-to-face contacts in preparation for Seattle (Naim 2000).

So, while the hyperbole around the Internet’s impact could use a little downsizing – Ayres, for instance, wonders whether all these examples ‘warrant popularized claims about the supposed “deterritorialization of protest,” the emergence of “an alternative political fabric” or the rise of an “incipient global civil society”’ (Ayres 2003: 33) – it is hard to imagine the scope of today’s globalization movements without it. Moreover, the use of the Internet has added volatile fuel to the legitimacy debate. Musing on the Seattle demonstrations, one commentator argued in the *Washington Post* that ‘The Internet has handed these groups too much power to make their complete exclusion practical’ (Mallaby 1999: URL).

1.3.2 Global

A second major characteristic of the globalization movements is their (obviously) *global* focus. This focus shows up in at least three strategies: (1) changing the ‘frames’ by which the public and decision-makers understand global issues, (2) trying to change the specific policies and practices of global institutions, and (3) advocating for the reform (or invention or dissolution) of those global bodies themselves.

Frame change

The word 'frame' is used in sociological literature to describe the realm of self-evident thought: it is the perimeter around our conscious thinking that we no longer question. Anything that falls within it is natural, self-evident, and obvious; anything that falls outside does not even come up for consideration. Frames are not ideas, explains one author, but rather ways of packaging and presenting ideas (Khagram *et al.* 2002: 12). The whole history of the idea of human rights, for instance, is one of frame change. Our current acceptance of human rights as self-evident grew out of conscious efforts in the last century to turn one set of ideas into a universal and 'obvious' set of truths by which subsequent behaviour is judged, rewarded, and punished (see also Thomas 2002). Another, smaller, example is found in the changed attitudes around large dam projects: 'they have gone from being seen as obvious and natural tools for (and symbols of) development and modernity to being seen as increasingly controversial and problematic projects' (Khagram 2002: 13). These are powerful but rare examples: other efforts – women's rights, labour rights, and environmental norms – still come into battle with 'powerful opposing discourses' (Sikkink 2002: 303). Not all such norms are yet self-evident.

For today's activists, 'the construction of cognitive frames is an essential component of networks' political strategies' (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 17). When the campaign against the Multilateral Agreement on Investment was being assembled, considerable discussion was invested in the choice of framing:

Corporate rule was accepted as a universal theme but *national sovereignty* struck a discordant note in Australia, and some European countries, especially Germany, with its Nazi past. After consulting [sic] Maria Mies and others in Germany, Clarke substituted *popular sovereignty* for *national sovereignty* and the former became a general formulation for activists (Laxer and Halperin 2003: 182; see also Warkentin and Mingst 2000: 244).

In other words, the biggest advocacy battles are won when an idea becomes self-evident. So powerful are these frame-changing efforts that some even declare that they are 'restructuring world politics' (Khagram *et al.* 2002). They certainly are changing the nature of international law: Risse argues strongly that 'in the absence of sustained campaigns and lobbying efforts by INGOs and particular individuals, probably not a single human right would have been written into international law' (Risse 2000: 184).

When ideas are not framed in the right way – wrong for the intended audience – they fall by the wayside. ‘Venue shifting’ of one idea, by placing it next to another of more salience, is one way of trying to make an audience buy into one’s proposed new frame. In the world of environmental campaigns, for instance, ‘urban pollution issues are often framed in terms of public health’ while ‘Brazilian rubber tappers recast a land conflict into one over forest conservation’ (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 121). Similarly, ‘frame bridging’ or ‘frame amplification’ helps explain the efforts of the women’s movement to recast the debate, as we shall see later, in terms of women’s rights as human rights (Khagram *et al.* 2002: 16).

As we turn to the legitimacy debates later on, the notion of frames re-occurs often. ‘Legitimacy’ measured by one frame may not be so credible in another.

Change in policy and practice

Once frames are at least partly accepted, strategies for changing the policies and practices of target players – particularly of national governments – become viable. For many active in today’s globalization movements, the world of international policy advocacy began with their introduction to the United Nations jamborees of the 1990s.

That decade saw a good handful of major UN events (and many more smaller ones) that attracted mass civic attention: the World Summit for Children (New York 1990); the World Conference on Education for All (Jomtien, Thailand 1990); the Conference on Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro 1992); the World Conference on Human Rights (Vienna 1993); the International Conference on Population and Development (Cairo 1994); the Fourth World Conference on Women (Beijing 1995); the World Summit for Social Development (Copenhagen 1995); the United Nations Conference on Human Settlements – Habitat II (Istanbul 1996); and the World Food Summit (Rome 1996). Of course, there were UN conferences prior to 1990 – most notably for NGOs, the 1972 Stockholm conference on the environment – but the 1990s saw the ramping up of interest and the explosion of numbers. Writes one conference watcher,

Many NGOs view the world conferences of the 1990s as the most open and democratic international processes they have witnessed on a global plane. Many doors opened for NGOs, permitting them to consolidate their organizations and networks locally, regionally and globally, and to play a central role in defining problem areas and in pressuring their governments to implement agreements on solutions.

The conferences also allowed national and regional NGOs from the South to establish useful links and networks and counterparts in the North (de la Rosa 1999a: 204).

Indeed, one might well argue that the *most* important part of that busy decade was the conferences' role in helping INGOs to frame problems collectively and to begin working together face-to-face. It is not that NGOs had no other impact on the proceedings: advocacy did alter final conventions and declarations, although none in monumental ways. Among other successes, the Convention Concerning the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage and the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), for instance, came out of NGO efforts; a legally binding treaty on persistent organic pollutants came out of NGO work at Rio, as did the establishment of the Intergovernmental Forum on Forests; and the Cairo declaration recognized abortion (as well as other controversial reproductive health issues) largely due to NGO lobbying (Bichsel 1996: 249, de la Rosa 1999a: 224–34).

Moreover, the UN itself underwent changes. The international body's rules for NGO consultative status at United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) were considerably expanded in 1995; a Non-Governmental Liaison Service was established to help NGOs navigate their way through the UN system; NGOs are much more easily accredited to international conferences; NGOs now play substantial (not just ornamental) roles in the Steering Committee of the Commission on Sustainable Development, the Climate Change Action Network, the Global Environment Facility, and Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS), among other UN bodies; and many UN agencies (most notably United Nations Development Programme, or UNDP) have civil society programmes meant expressly to improve UN–civil society relationships (Adams 1999, Altman 1999, de la Rosa 1999b, Foster and Anand 1999b: 6, Oliver 1999, Richmond and McGee 1999, Willetts 1999). Moreover, there are NGO sections in various UN bodies, an NGO coordination office sits in the Assistant Secretary-General's Office, an interdepartmental working group on NGOs beavers on, and so on. While the picture is not one of perfect transparency or collaboration – there remain real limits on nongovernmental participation (Paul 1999) – the record is remarkable.

Still, for those seeking world transformation, such successes are small consolation. By the end of the 1990s and the tailing off of the 2000 Millenium Assembly, many activists had understandably given up on the UN circuit as a prime focus of their work. The endless process

of disputing textual minutiae eventually burned out its participants, NGO and official alike.

Yet, that history meant that international debates (in and outside of the UN) now *cannot* be held without some kind of nongovernmental participation – the frame that decides who counts as relevant players had changed. Smouts argues that,

The proliferation of special conferences that devote part of their agenda to civil society and its major groups marks a basic transformation in multilateral activity. Henceforth the driving forces of civil society are involved in developing law; they have become incontrovertible partners in the elaboration, implementation and enforcement of recommendations that result from these big jamborees (Smouts 1999: 307–8).

As the next chapter illustrates, the lessons learned from efforts to change national policy and practice via the UN are now being applied to other (more powerful) international organizations.

Institutional reform, reconstruction, and invention

A final element of CSOs' global-mindedness has been a common goal to reform, eliminate, and re-invent global institutions. While gatherings around the UN may have petered out, steam has only built up behind campaigns around the other big names: the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in particular (all later described in much fuller detail).

Again, the unsurprising consensus here – as with many of the policy advocacy campaigns – is that monumental change has not been achieved (O'Brien *et al.* 2000, Fox and Brown 1998). Incremental change, however, ought not to be discounted: it signals nascent frame-change through alterations in staffing (NGO liaison units have been set up at the World Bank and IMF, for instance), procedural policies (such as the WTO's formal guidelines for its relationship with NGOs, or the Bank's guidelines on participation), and change in language (to include terms such as 'civil society' and 'partnership'). While not useful as a mobilizing tool ('Come join us to alter the IMF's wording in its communication strategy!'), such changes are worth watching. As the next chapter describes, there is no shortage of efforts to push the agenda much further.

1.3.3 High-profile

A third important characteristic of today's globalization movements is a deliberate strategy of high-profile activity to raise public consciousness

and media interest. This strategy shows up in serial protesting, debates over insider/outsider tactics, and direct-action controversies.

Serial protesting

Perhaps most prominent among tactics are the demonstrations conducted around the regular meetings of a particular organization; a species of serial protest. In the past decade, the annual joint World Bank and IMF meetings, the large WTO congresses, and the yearly G8 get-togethers have been the main focus (although the meetings of the private sector World Economic Forum have also been dignified with demonstrators). Usually large-scale and visually media-worthy, these protests are meant in part to raise public awareness about what are (for most people) little-known international institutions and policies. After 1999,

roving protests continued the agitation that exploded in Seattle. In the United States, Boston (Biodevastation), Washington, D.C. (A16), numerous cities on May Day (M1), Milwaukee (animal rights), Detroit and Windsor, Ontario (OAS), Philadelphia (Republican Convention), and Los Angeles (Democratic Convention) were visited by what protesters called the 'spirit of Seattle.' Around the world, protests took place in Bangkok, London, Prague, Melbourne, and other cities (de Armond 2001: 201–2).

There is, not surprisingly, debate within the movements about such an approach. Naomi Klein writes, 'someone posted a message on the organizing e-mail list for the Washington demos: "Wherever they go, we shall be there! After this, see you in Prague!" But is this really what we want – a movement of meeting-stalkers, following the trade bureaucrats as if they were the Grateful Dead?' She argues these demonstrations neither have the prospect of shutting down the Bank and Fund (one of the organizers' goals), nor of conveying 'sophisticated ideas about the fallacies of neoliberal economics to the stock-happy public' (Klein 2000: URL). Echoing similar concerns, authors from the Bretton Woods Project wonder about changes to such an 'Everest mentality':

Other campaigners however wonder if hammering on the doors of the multilateral institutional framework is effective and question if groups, particularly advocacy and lobbyist NGOs, would be better off consolidating alliances with broader social movements. 'We may want to take time to reflect on our 'Everest mentality',' suggests one

campaigner. 'Do we have to go to every World Bank summit or every WTO meeting?' (Bretton Woods Project 2000: URL).

Particularly after the death of a protester during the Genoa 2001 G8 meeting, and after the 2001 attacks on New York and Washington, such large scale demonstrations against the intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) trailed off – until mass peace demonstrations started prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. As we shall see, both the size and character of street protest feed into the ongoing debate over CSO legitimacy.

Insiders and outsiders

Street protest is perhaps the most visible tactic of the globalization movements, but it is not the only bow in the activists' quiver. Where demonstrations are part of an outsider strategy, other methods – consultations, face-to-face meetings, research reports, and other collaborations – have become part of an insider strategy.

For some, a balance of insider and outsider tactics is important to the achievement of the overall goal (Oliviero and Simmons 2002: 82–3). In the following description from one activist, that goal is reform of the Free Trade Agreement for the Americas (FTAA):

The 'insiders' are those that attempt to work closely with the official process, sometimes compromising their demands so as to make them more politically viable. The 'outsiders' are those that exercise external pressure, articulating their demands in a more explicit manner and often against governmental positions. Opening the process of the FTAA negotiations undoubtedly will require continuing of both kinds – the 'outsiders' pressure and force openings or tendencies toward greater openness in the system, while the 'insiders' take advantage of these small opportunities – to push issues toward greater substance (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2001: 4–5).

Yet for others, working with the enemy on the inside track constitutes a legitimacy failure *within* the movement. Examples abound, particularly around corporate–nongovernmental arrangements. When the Environmental Defence Fund formed a partnership with McDonald's to reform the company's environmental record, 'many of the groups outside the project accused the EDF of selling out by working with McDonald's, of lending legitimacy to their business and trading their good name for minimal concessions on the part of the company' (Newell 2001: 193). Similar conflict was apparent at the Windsor meeting of the Organization of

American States in June of 2000, where an attempt was made to bring together insiders and outsiders working on human rights: 'This effort proved a total failure. Alianza spokespersons [the Hemispheric Social Alliance of Canadian, American and Mexican networks] claimed that the "insiders" were illegitimate and unrepresentative of civil society. In this context, the Alianza clearly stated that it has no interest in offers of collaboration' (Korzeniewicz and Smith 2001: 22).

In the context of the overall legitimacy debate, this insider-vs-outsider conflict is especially important. Those considered 'reasonable' by the big players can push for larger changes when the protesters in the street are advocating for larger changes still:

In what can look like a good cop–bad cop routine, the grassroots and public movement campaigns target their messages and raise expectations; the resulting demands and pressure make the political decision-makers insecure, which encourages them to turn to the incrementalists for 'reasonable' solutions and reassurance (Johnson 2000: 76).

Direct action

However, perhaps the most important dilemma for advocates of high-profile tactics centres on 'direct action' and 'diversity of tactics' – usually euphemisms for planned vandalism during large-scale street protest, but also sit-ins and other media stunts (climbing towers, occupying trees, and so on). These tactics are used, of course, because they quickly bring attention to the cause: 'Successful direct action campaigns work precisely because they attract the attention of the media and challenge the reputation and credibility of the corporation' write Oliviero and Simmons in their review, although 'the media can be a fickle audience: a tactic used repetitively can fail to qualify as "news"' (Oliviero and Simmons 2002: 84).

The dilemma focuses on the wing of direct action that includes vandalism (usually against brand-name retail outlets) and violence (usually throwing stones and bottles at riot police) as part of the repertoire. Again, these factors are *big* elements in the legitimacy debates held about the globalization movements as a whole. One insider commentator, Michael Albert, compares the arguments this way:

One side claims that tactics 'exceeding' nonviolence tend to be good in that they delegitimize authority, reduce tendencies to obedience, uproot accommodationist habits and culture, inspire participation among