Peace in International Relations

This book examines the way in which peace is conceptualised in International Relations (IR) theory, a topic which has until now been largely overlooked. It explores the way peace has been implicitly conceptualised within the different strands of IR theory, and in the policy world as exemplified through practices in peacebuilding efforts since the end of the Cold War. Issues addressed include the problem of how peace efforts become sustainable rather than merely inscribed in international and state-level diplomatic and military frameworks. The book also explores themes relating to culture, development, agency and structure, not just in terms of the representations of the world, and of peace, presented in the discipline, but in terms of the discipline itself. It explores the current mantras associated with the ‘liberal peace’, which appears to have become a foundational assumption of much of mainstream IR and the policy world. Analysing war has often led to the dominance of violence as a basic assumption of, and response to, the problems of IR. This book aims to redress this balance by arguing that IR now in fact in a position to offer a rich basis for the study of peace.

This book will be of great interest to students of peace and conflict studies, politics and International Relations.

Oliver P. Richmond is Director for the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, School of International Relations, University of St Andrews.
Peace and Security in the Postmodern World
The OSCE and conflict resolution
Dennis J.D. Sandole

Truth Recovery and Justice after Conflict
Managing violent pasts
Marie Breen Smyth

Peace in International Relations
Oliver P. Richmond
Peace in International Relations

Oliver P. Richmond
Sapere Aude

‘There is scarcely any peace so unjust,
but it is preferable, upon the whole, to the justest war.’

1
Contents

Acknowledgements viii

Introduction: peace in IR 1

PART I
Towards an orthodoxy of peace – and beyond 19

1 Peace and the idealist tradition: towards a liberal peace 21
2 A realist agenda for peace: survival and a victor’s peace 40
3 Marxist agendas for peace: towards peace as social justice and emancipation 58
4 Beyond an idealist, realist, or Marxist version of peace 73
5 The contribution of peace and conflict studies 97

PART II
Post-positivism and peace 119

6 Critical contributions to peace 121
7 Post-structuralist contributions to peace 134

Conclusion: an agenda for peace in an inter-disciplinary IR 149

Notes 166
Bibliography 195
Index 214
Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the many people who have assisted me in various ways during the research for this book, including Roland Bleiker, Costas Constantinou, Jason Franks, AJR Groom, Zeliha Kashman, Mike Pugh, Roger MacGinty, Necati Polat, Nick Rengger, Bahar Rumelili, Ian Taylor, Alison Watson and Andrew Williams. Thanks also to my colleagues at the University of St Andrews for tolerating my extended absences while writing this book. I would also like to thank the institutions that hosted me around the world during this project, and the many people who I discussed it with or interviewed. Much of this book was written during two idyllic summers at Middle Eastern Technical University in Ankara, and Koc University in Istanbul, as well as at the University of St Andrews. These institutions can be thanked for any insights in this study, and the lack thereof can be blamed on too much time spent in transit, airport lounges and nondescript hotel rooms! Thanks also to my students who were forced to tolerate my attempts to experiment with IR theory. Given the enormity of both the primary and secondary range of literatures that this ambitious study draws on, I apologise if I fail to do them justice. Any errors remain mine and mine alone. This book forms a sister volume to Transformation of Peace (Palgrave 2005). It also draws on the research done for a major project on Liberal Peace Transitions, 2005–7, funded by the Carnegie Trust, and Terrorism and Liberal Peacebuilding, 2007–8, funded by the British Academy, and the University of St Andrews. Finally, thanks, as ever, to Laura and to a fair menagerie of friends.
Introduction

Peace in IR

‘You cannot simultaneously prevent and prepare for war’

Introduction

Mainstream IR theory has been in crisis, if not anomie, for some time. Looking at the discipline through the lens of a search for peace (one or many) underlines this state. Partly because of this, IR has found it very difficult to attract the attention of those working in other disciplines, though increasingly IR scholars have themselves drawn on other disciplines. Even those working in the sub-disciplines of peace and conflict studies, for example, an area where there has been a longstanding attempt to develop an understanding of peace, have often turned away from IR theory – or refused to engage with it at all – because it has failed to develop an account of peace, focusing instead on the dynamics of power, war, and assuming the realist inherency of violence in human nature and international relations. Utopian and dystopian views of peace, relating to contemporary and future threats calculated from the point of view of states and officials, often delineate the intellectual extremes of a linear typology of war and peace inherent in mainstream international thought. The peace inferred in this typology is concerned with a balance of power between states rather than the everyday life of people in post-conflict environments. Even the ambitious peace-building efforts of the post-Cold War environment in places as diverse as Cambodia, DR Congo, the Balkans, East Timor and Afghanistan among many others testify to this shortcoming. Yet, as Erasmus and Einstein famously pointed out, peace is both separate and preferable to war.

This raises the question of what the discipline is for, if not for peace? For many, IR theory simply has not been ambitious enough in developing an ‘agenda for peace’ in addition to investigating the causes of war. Axiomatically, Martin Wight once wrote that IR was subject to a poverty of ‘international theory’. He also argued that its focus is the problem of survival. Such arguments are commonplace even in the context of more critical theoretical contributions to IR theory. These usually support the argument that liberal polities, notably in the Western developed world, are domestic oases of democratic
peace, and obscure the possibility that such liberal polities are also likely to be engaged in a constant struggle for survival, or a war for ‘peace’. How might war and peace coexist and why such a singular lack of ambition for peace? Thinking about peace opens up such difficult questions. Yet, many approaches to IR theory routinely ignore the question – or problem – of peace: how it is constituted and one peace or many? Yet, even ‘successful’ empires have developed an interest in an ideological and self-interested version peace, whether it was a Pax Romana, Britannia, Soviet, American, religious, nationalist, liberal or neo-liberal peace.

Many hoped that science would, as Hobbes wrote, open the way for peace. Hobbes wrote, in the aftermath of a bloody civil war, *Leviathan* (often held up to be the epitome of tragic realism in IR) to illustrate that peace was plausible in spite of hatred, scarcity, and violence. Of course, he also developed the notion of the Leviathan as a way to moderate the ‘natural state’ of war. IR has instead focused on the latter (war as a natural state) rather than the former (peace as a natural state), despite the fact that so much of the ground work has been done in peace and conflict studies, anthropology, sociology, in the arts, in branches of several other disciplines, such as economics or psychology, and via the more critical approaches to the discipline. The supposed Freudian death instinct has seemed to resonate more powerfully through the discipline than notions of peace. Yet, as Fry has argued a vast range of anthropological and ethnographic evidence shows that peace, conflict avoidance and accommodation are the stronger impulses of human culture. War is significant part of Western culture as well as others, but not of all cultures. Indeed, it is notable that in Western settings war memorials are frequent, particularly for the First and Second World War, but peace is rarely represented in civic space unless as a memorial of sacrifice during war. Similarly in art, aspirations for peace are often represented through depictions of war and violence, such as in Picasso’s *Guernica* (1937) or Goya’s *The Third of May, 1808: The Execution of the Defenders of Madrid* (1814). Lorenzetti’s *The Allegory of Good Government* (1338–40) and Rubens’ *Minerva Protects Pax from Mars* (1629–30) are notable exceptions. Further afield one could point to the Ottoman Topkapi Palace’s *Gate of Peace* in Istanbul, and the *Gate of Heavenly Peace* leading into the Imperial City in Beijing (though these were, of course, associated with both diplomacy and imperial wars).

Peace can be seen in more critical terms as both a process and a goal. This opens up a particular focus on the process by which peace as a self-conscious and reflexive goal may be achieved. If peace is taken as a strategic goal it would tend towards a focus on mutual preservation and never move beyond preliminary stages relating to security, but there are further, more inspiring, possibilities.

This book examines the implications of the multiple understandings of this underdeveloped, but heavily contested, concept from within the different accounts of IR theory. IR theory is deployed in this study through fairly crude representations, using rather unashamedly the orthodox approach of separating
IR theory into ‘great debates’, and into separate theories of realism, idealism, pluralism, liberalism, Marxism, critical theory, constructivism and post-structuralist approaches, as well as various connected or sub-disciplines, such as IPE or peace and conflict studies. It is clear that there is much that is problematic with this approach, but it provides a mechanism through which to view the implications for a concept of peace, and the theorisation, ontology, epistemology and methodology suggested by each approach. This connection between theories, the ways of being, the knowledge systems and research methodologies they suggest allows for the possibility of evaluating each theory in terms of the notions of peace they imply.

This is certainly not to dismiss the importance of mainstream IR, but to caution against its representation as a ‘complete’ discipline, which it clearly is not. Indeed, there is a serious question as to whether aspects of orthodox approaches (by which I mean positivist debates derived from realism, liberalism and Marxism) to IR are anti-peace, sometimes purposively, and sometimes carelessly. The three main orthodox theories are often taken to offer determinist grand narratives: realism offers an elite and negative peace based on inherency; liberalism offers a one-size-fits all progressive framework of mainly elite governance with little recognition of difference; and Marxism offers grassroots emancipation from determinist structures of the international political economy via violent revolution. Yet, as this study shows, in the context of peace other possible narratives emerge.

This study is informed by an attempt to establish a broader, interdisciplinary reading of peace and to embed this within IR. It is worth noting that peace has preoccupied a broad range of thinkers, activists, politicians and other figures in various ways, often to do with an interest in, or critique of, violence, influence, power and politics. These include, to name but a few, Thucydides, Hobbes, Machiavelli, Kant, Locke, Paine, Jefferson, John Stuart Mill, Gandhi, Freud, Einstein, Lorenz, Mead, Martin Luther King, Thoreau, Foucault, Galtung, Boulding, Freire, Tolstoy and Camus. Many other public figures, religious figures, cultural figures, politicians and officials, as well as many obscured from Western post-Enlightenment thought by their linguistic or cultural difference, also turned their hands to describing peace. Yet, there remains a surprising lack of an explicit debate on peace in IR theory.

This study does not claim to cover or explain IR theory comprehensively – it is already perhaps over-ambitious – or to move beyond its Western corpus (as it probably should) but it endeavours to be particularly sensitive to the claims of IR theory about the pros and cons of even having a debate about peace. It is inevitable in a study such as this that much emphasis is on ‘great texts’ and key concepts and theoretical categories (though this is a syndrome that the author would prefer to refute). Later chapters do try to avoid this, in the context of the critical ground established to make this move in earlier chapters. What is important here is the attempt not to reject IR as a discipline, as some critical thinkers do in the extremes of their frustration with its limitations, but to redevelop it to reflect the everyday world, its problems, and opportunities for a wider
peace in everyday life. This endeavour is a crucial part of the attempt to escape mainstream IR’s rigid and narrow, post-Enlightenment representation of specific reductionist discourses as reality, rather than exploring contextual and contingent interpretations. Theory indicates the possibility for human action and ethical and practical potential, meaning that the study of peace must be a vital component of engagement with any theory. The focus on peace and its different conceptualisations proposed in this study allows for the discipline to redevelop a claim to legitimacy which has long since been lost by its orthodoxy’s often slavish assumptions about war, strategy, and conflict and their origins. It seeks to go beyond the objectivist and linear display of knowledge about who and what is important in IR (international elites, states, policymakers and officials (normally male), the rich, the West) and reintroduce the discourses of peace, and its methods, as a central research area, specifically in terms of understanding the everyday individual, social and even international responsibilities, that orthodox IR has generally abrogated.

More than ever, research and policy informed by a contextual understanding of peace is needed, rather than merely a focus on fear reproduced by worst case security scenarios stemming from a balance of power or terror derived from military, political or economic analytical frameworks that assume violence and greed to be endemic. Indeed, in the contemporary context it is also clear that any discussion of peace as opposed to war and conflict must also connect with research and policy on development, justice and environmental sustainability. These are the reasons why, for example, the liberal peace – the main concept of peace in circulation today – is in crisis.

Much of the debate about war that dominates IR is also indicative of assumptions about what peace is or should be. This ranges from the pragmatic removal of overt violence, an ethical peace, ideology, to a debate about a self-sustaining peace. Anatol Rapoport conceptualised ‘peace through strength’; ‘balance of power’; ‘collective security’; ‘peace through law’; ‘personal or religious pacifism’; and ‘revolutionary pacifism’. Hedley Bull saw peace as the absence of war in an international society, though of course war was the key guarantee for individual state survival. These views represent the mainstream approaches and indicate why the creation of an explicit debate about peace is both long overdue and vital in an international environment in which major foreign policy decisions seem to be taken in mono-ideational environment where ideas matter, but only certain, hegemonic ideas.

With the exception of orthodox versions of realism and Marxism, approaches to IR theory offer a form of peace that many would recognise as personally acceptable. Realism fails to offer much for those interested in peace, unless peace is seen as Darwinian and an unreflexive, privileged concept only available to the powerful and a commonwealth they may want to create. Most realist analysis expends its energy in reactive discussions based upon the inherency of violence in human nature, now discredited in other disciplines, which are ultimately their own undoing. This is not to say that other approaches do not also suffer flaws, but the focus on individuals, society, justice, development, welfare,
norms, transnationalism, institutionalism or functionalism offers an opportunity for a negotiation of a form of peace that might be more sustainable because it is more broadly inclusive of actors and issues. In other words, parsimony, reductionism and rationalism run counter to a peace that engages fully with the diversity of life and its experiences.

**Methodological considerations**

Any discussion of peace is susceptible to universalism, idealism and rejectionism, and to collapse under the weight of its own ontological subjectivity. This study is indebted to a genealogical approach that can be used to challenge the common assumption of IR theorists that peace as a concept is ontologically stable, in terms of representing an objective truth (plausible or not), legitimating the exercise of power, and representing a universal ethic.\(^\text{17}\) To rehearse this, a genealogical approach allows for an investigation of the subject without deference to a meta-narrative of power and knowledge in order to unsettle the depiction of a linear projection from ‘origin’ to ‘truth’. The camouflaging of the subjective nature of peace disguises ideology, hegemony, dividing practices and marginalisation. In addition, it is important to note the framework of negative or positive epistemology of peace, as developed by Rasmussen, which indicates an underlying ontological assumption within IR theory as to whether a broad or narrow version of peace is actually possible.\(^\text{18}\) Many of the insights developed in this study of IR theory and its approaches to peace arise through the author’s reading of, and about, and research in, conflict resolution, peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the context of the many conflicts of the post-war world, the UN system, and the many subsequent ‘operations’ that have taken place around the world.

The investigation of discourses indicates the problematic dynamics of positivist approaches\(^\text{19}\) and allows for a deeper interrogation reaching beyond the state than a traditional positivist theoretical/empirical approach.\(^\text{20}\) This enables an examination of competing concepts and discourses of peace derived from IR theory rather than accepting their orthodoxies. Peace, and in particular the liberal and realist foundations of the liberal peace, can be seen as a result of multiple hegemonies in IR.\(^\text{21}\) Deploying these approaches allows for an identification of the key flaws caused by the limited peace projects associated with peace in IR, and for a theoretical and pragmatic move to put some consideration of peace at the centre of what has now become an ‘inter-discipline’.

For much of the existence of IR, the concept of peace has been in crisis, even though on the discipline’s founding after the First World War it was hoped it would help discover a post-war peace dividend. In this it failed after the First World War, but it has been instrumental in developing a liberal discourse of peace after the Second World War, though this in itself has become much contested (as it certainly was during the Cold War). Even peace research has been criticised for having the potential to become ‘a council of imperialism’ whereby telling the story of ‘power politics’ means that researchers participate and
reaffirm its tenets through disciplinary research methods and the continuing aspiration for a ‘Kantian University’. This effectively creates a ‘differend’ underlining how institutions and frameworks may produce injustices even when operating in good faith. This requires the unpacking of the ‘muscular objectivism’ that has dominated IR in the Western academy and policy world, allowing an escape from what can be described as a liberal–realist methodology and ontology connected to positivist views of IR. The demand that all knowledge is narrowly replicable and should be confirmed and implemented by ‘research’ in liberal institutions, organisations, agencies and universities without need for a broader exploration is not adequate if IR is to contribute to peace. Thus, underlying this study is the notion of methodological pluralism, which has become a generally accepted objective for researchers across many disciplines who want to avoid parochial constraints on how research engages with significant dilemmas, and who accept the growing calls for more creative approaches to examining the ‘great questions’ of IR. To gain a multidimensional understanding of peace as one of these great questions, one needs to unsettle mimetic approaches to representation that do not recognise subjectivity, rather than trying to replicate an eternal truth or reality. IR theory should fully engage with the differend – in which lies its often unproblematised claim to be able to interpret the other – that its orthodoxy may be guilty of producing, and open itself up to communication and learning across boundaries of knowledge in order to facilitate a ‘peace dividend’ rather than a ‘peace differend’.

The critique developed here is not ‘irresponsible pluralism’ as some would have it, but an attempt to contribute to the ongoing repositioning of a discipline now increasingly concerned with IR’s connections with everyday life and agency. In this context, each chapter of this book interrogates the theoretical debates in IR as well as their theoretical, methodological and epistemological implications for peace. The nature of international order is heavily contested in theoretical, methodological, ontological and epistemological terms, meaning that the consensus on the contemporary liberal peace represents an anomalous agreement rather than a broad-ranging consensus.

Rather than support this unquestioningly, IR requires a research agenda for peace if its interdisciplinary contribution to knowledge – and speaking truth to power – is to be developed. IR needs to engage broadly with interdisciplinary perspectives on peace if it is to contribute to the construction of a framework that allows for the breadth and depth required for peace to be accepted by all, from the local to the global, and therefore to be sustainable. Like social anthropology, IR needs to have an agenda for peace, not just to deal with war, violence, conflict, terrorism and political order at the domestic and international level, but also incorporating the interdisciplinary work that has been carried out in the areas of transnationalism and globalisation, political economy, development, identity, culture and society, gender, children, and the environment, for example. Yet where social anthropology, for example, has elucidated this agenda clearly, IR has been more reticent, despite the claims about peace made on the founding of the discipline. As with anthropology, IR should ‘uncover
counterhegemonic and silenced voices, and to explore the mechanisms of their silencing. Of course, this happens in the various areas, and especially in the sub-disciplines of IR. Where there have been efforts to develop peace as a concept, this is by far counterbalanced by the efforts focused on war, terrorism or conflict. Concepts of peace should be a cornerstone of IR interdisciplinary investigation of international politics and everyday life.

For the purposes of this study, peace is viewed from a number of perspectives. It can be a specific concept (one among many): it infers an ontological and epistemological position of being at peace, and knowing peace; it infers a methodological approach to accessing knowledge about peace and about constructing it; and it implies a theoretical approach, in which peace is a process and outcome defined by a specific theory.

**The concepts of peace**

What is peace? This would seem to be an obvious question deserving an obvious answer. Yet, the reluctance to open this debate could be merely an oversight, it could be because the answer is too obvious to waste time upon it, or it could be because once opened up, the debate upon peace offers all kind of possibilities, liberal, illiberal or radical, and possibly subversive. This is not to say that there is a conspiracy of silence when it comes to peace, because two World Wars and the Cold War would seem to have settled this basic question of modernity in favour of the ‘liberal peace’, made up of a victor’s peace at its most basic level, an institutional peace to provide international governance and guarantees, a constitutional peace to ensure democracy and free-trade, and a civil peace to ensure freedom and rights within society. This, in Anglo-American terms, places the individual before the state, though in Continental varieties it sees the individual as subordinate to the state (a little noted, but significant point). Both variations rest upon a social contract between representatives and citizens. Yet, events since 1989 indicate that peace is not as it seems. There may be a liberal consensus on peace, but there are many technical, political, social, economic and intellectual issues remaining, and the very universality of the post-Cold War liberal peace is still contested in terms of components, and the methods used to build it (from military intervention to the role of NGOs, international organisations, agencies and international financial institutions).

One approach to thinking about peace that is commonly used is to look back at its historical, international, uses. These generally include the following: an Alexandrian peace, which depended upon a string of military conquests loosely linked together; a Pax Romana, which depended upon tight control of a territorial empire, and also included a ‘Carthaginian peace’ in which the city of Carthage was razed to the ground and strewn with salt to make sure it would not re-emerge; an Augustine peace dependent upon the adoption and protection of a territorial version of Catholicism, and the notion of just war; the Westphalian peace, dependent upon the security of states and the norms of territorial sovereignty; the Pax Britannia, dependent upon British domination of the seas, on
trade and loose alliances with colonised peoples; the Paris Peace Treaty of 1919,
dependent upon an embryonic international organisation, collective security, the
self-determination of some, and democracy; the United Nations system, depend-
ent upon collective security and international cooperation, a social peace entail-
ing social justice, and the liberal peace, including upon democratisation, free
markets, human rights and the rule of law, development, and, perhaps most of
all, the support both normative and material, of the United States and its allies.

Though peace was supposed to be one of IR’s key agendas when the discip-
line was founded in 1919, and certainly was explicitly part of the main institu-
tional frameworks of the modern era, IR as a discipline tends to deal with peace
implicitly, through its theoretical readings of international order, of war, and
history. The empirical events that mark IR tend to be associated with violence,
rather than peace. Even such an attempt as this study, ambitious though it might
seem in its attempt to recast IR theory, is indicative of further and perhaps
crucial weaknesses in both the discipline and its author’s capacity to speak on
behalf of anything other than the developed, Eurocentric and enlightened dis-
course of IR. To attempt to speak on behalf of those from other cultures, reli-
gions and so-called underdeveloped regions, would assume the viability of
sovereign man’s discourse of the liberal peace, which is exactly what is thrown
into doubt by a consideration of peace. Most thinkers in a Western, developed
context assume that they know peace and would never take on an ontological
position that violence is a goal, though it may be an acknowledged side-effect.
This adds the sheen of legitimacy, not to say legality, in both a juridical and
normative sense to the discipline, despite its very limited engagement with
peace.

The following dynamics are characteristic of the way in which peace is often
thought of and deployed in IR:

1. Peace is always aspired to and provides an optimum, though idealistic, point
   of reference;
2. It is viewed as an achievable global objective, based on universal norms;
3. It is viewed as a geographically bounded framework defined by territory,
   culture, identity and national interests;
4. It is presented as an objective truth, associated with complete legitimacy;
5. It is related to a certain ideology or political or economic framework (liber-
   alism, neo-liberalism, democracy, communism or socialism, etc.);
6. It is viewed as a temporal phase;
7. It is based upon state or collective security;
8. It is based upon local, regional or global forms of governance, perhaps
defined by a hegemonic actor or a specific multilateral institution;
9. It is viewed as a top-down institutional framework or a bottom-up civil
   society-oriented framework;
10. There needs to be little discussion of the conceptual underpinnings of peace
    because it is one ideal liberal form;
11. Most thinking about peace in IR is predicated on preventing conflict, and at
best creating an externally supported peace, not on creating a self-sustaining peace.

These dynamics have meant that the most important agenda in IR has not been subject to a sustained examination. Even in the realms of peace and conflict studies, the focus has been on preventing violence rather than on a sustained attempt to develop a self-sustaining order. Where attempts have been made to reflect on a viable world order in a number of different quarters, the liberal peace has often emerged as the main blueprint approach. What is most important about this treatment is that as an objective point of reference, it is possible for the diplomat, politician, official of international organisations, regional organisations or international agencies, to judge what is right and wrong in terms of aspirations, processes, institutions and methods, in their particular areas of concern. The liberal peace is the foil by which the world is now judged, in its multiple dimensions, and there has been little in terms of the theorisation of alternative concepts of peace.

How does international theory develop concepts of peace? This happens only indirectly in most cases. Implicit in thought and practice relating to the international are multiple perspectives on the nature, scope and plausibility of certain kinds of peace. What is more, in this age of globalisation the deferral of a debate on peace in favour of reductive and expedient debates on war, power, conflict and violence, is dangerously anachronistic if IR theory is to be seen as part of a broader project leading to viable and sustainable forms of peace.

Perspectives on peace in IR theory

Realism implies a peace found in the state-centric balance of power, perhaps dominated by a hegemon. Peace is limited if at all possible. Idealism and utopianism claim a future possibility of a universal peace in which states and individuals are free, prosperous and unthreatened. Pluralism, liberalism, internationalism, liberal institutionalism and neo-liberalism see peace as existing in the institutionalisation of liberal norms of economic, political and social institutionalisation of cooperation, regulation and governance. These approaches offer functional networks and organisation, and transnationalism, between and beyond states, and the ensuing liberal peace is believed not to be hegemonic, but universal. Structuralism and Marxist approaches see peace as lying in the absence of certain types of structural violence, often in structures which promote economic and class domination. Cosmopolitanism extends the liberal argument to include the development of a universal discourse between states, organisations and actors for mutual accord. Constructivism combines these understandings, allowing identities and ideas to modify state behaviour but retaining the core of realism which sees states as underpinning order and peace as limited to institutional cooperation and a limited recognition of individual agency. Critical approaches see peace as a consequence of a cosmopolitan, communicative transcendence of parochial understandings of global responsibility and action.
Post-structuralism represents peace as resulting from the identification of the deep-rooted structures of dominance and their revolutionary replacement as a consequence of that identification by multiple and coexisting concepts of peace which respect the difference of others.

One common thread within many of the implicit debates about peace is its use as something close to the Platonic ‘ideal form’. In *The Republic*, Socrates argued that truth is found in an ideal form, associated with ‘goodness’ rather than in subjective perceptions and interests. This type of thinking indicates that there could be an objective reality of peace, but because it is an ideal form it is probably not fully attainable. Yet, it is often assumed that history is driven by a linear, rational, progression towards that ideal form. The notion of peace as an ideal form has different implications for different approaches to IR theory, spanning the implicit acceptance that peace is a guiding objective even though it cannot be achieved to a belief that rational progress will lead to peace.

Debates about peace span both classical and contemporary literatures, and a range of intellectual debates. These include what modern realists often described as the realism of Thucydides, Augustine, Hobbes and Schmitt, in which peace was to be found in bounded and often tragic strategic thinking in which unitary actors delineate their own versions of peace within the framework provided by sovereign states. The tragedy of these approaches lies in their unitary internal assumptions of a shared peace within political units based upon common interests and values, and the difficulties in maintaining peaceful relations with other external polities that have their own notions of peace. Peace in these terms is derived from territorial units determined to protect their identities and interests, and is therefore extremely limited. For this reason, an international system comprising states pursuing their interests is said to exist, which denotes few shared values beyond domestic politics, and rests upon the hierarchical ordering of international relations. This is based upon relative power and alliances derived from shared interests rather than shared values. Peace is conceptualised as very basic, or as a utopian ideal form, which is unobtainable.

A less harsh version of peace is to be found in the idealist, liberal and liberal-interventionist strands of international thought. These also focus on territorially bounded identity and interest units – mainly states – but see their interests defined in terms of cooperation and shared norms rather than power. Consequently, these approaches engender a concern with the nature of the domestic polity and the best way of creating domestic political harmony to ensure peaceful relations between polities at the same time. This type of thinking has given rise to major projects to construct international regimes, laws, and norms to limit war and engineer peace between polities, including states and multilateral organisations. Here questions of justice begin to emerge at a normative level in relation to peace between and within political units. Subsequent debates about justice revolve around the discovery and construction of legal frameworks based upon universal norms and so acceptable to the majority of states within an international society or community. This latter concept denotes the liberal belief that shared values at the international level indicates a community of states rather
than merely a system of states as realists would have it. For those interested in what happens inside states rather than between them, peace may rest upon the preservation of a socioeconomic order, or the use of a particular type of constitution, or the construction of an equal and just society. Democratic peace theorists are able to extend this domestic peace to an international community. The liberal peace is the widely used term to describe this broad framework.

Lying behind such thinking is one of the core implicit debates in IR theory. Peace is seen to be something to aspire to though it is perhaps not achievable. This failure rests on human nature for realists, or the failure of institutions for liberals, and is reflected in the nature of states and organisations, which at best can attain a negative peace. This is the hallmark of conservative and realist thought, though for liberals, a positive peace is plausible through the adoption of certain domestic and international practices that are aimed at guaranteeing the rights and needs of individuals. For some, idealism could also be pragmatic, and merely rest upon the discovery of the obstacles to peace, and then upon the deployment of the correct methods required to overcome these obstacles. The Westphalian international system represents a compromise upon both positions. This is indicative of Galtung’s negative and positive peace framework, which is the most widely used conceptualisation of peace.\textsuperscript{36} This can be extended, as Rasmussen has indicated, into a negative and positive epistemology of peace, meaning that ontological assumptions are made about whether a negative or positive peace can exist.\textsuperscript{37} The dominant mode of thought, however, which informs most IR theorists and policymaking today is that ‘the logic of strategy pervades the upkeep of peace as much as the making of war’.\textsuperscript{38} In other words, a negative epistemology of peace arises from strategic thinking, and even the application of force or threat. War can even therefore be seen as the ‘origin of peace’ by exhausting opponents and their resources.\textsuperscript{39}

The Marxist-derived orthodoxy offers a concept of peace relating to the international political economy, the problem of economic exploitation of its weakest actors, and the subsequent need for radical reform. It posits that the international economic system defines the behaviour of its key actors. From this perspective, peace can be seen in terms of development and the just division of resources. Social and economic justice provides the dominant focus of significance for peace within Marxist-influenced approaches in IR. This raises the issues of the emancipation of the individual, the provision of welfare and the sharing of resources equitably across society without regard to political, economic or social hierarchies. Beyond the state, Marxist-inspired approaches focus on the division of resources through an equitable international economy and the reform of neoliberal strategies of trade and development, as well as transnational approaches to global political and social communication designed to produce fairer communication, dialogue and interaction.

For contemporary realists such as Waltz or Mearshimer, peace is very limited, delineated by a natural confluence of interests rather than a mechanistic reform or management of interests or resources. For contemporary and broadly liberal thinkers like Falk or Keohane, or pluralist thinkers like Burton, the latter
provides the basis for a more humane peace guided by liberal norms and human needs. For English School thinkers, and for constructivists, peace is equated with the liberal nature of the state, which provides security and manages equitable and transparent transnational mechanisms of exchange and communication. In terms of social constructivism, peace could be both pragmatic and ideational, and constructed by actors with the resources and broad consensus to provide both social legitimacy and material value. To some degree, critical theorists and certainly post-structuralists see more ambiguity in peace and war and recognised that peace would only be achieved in pluralist forms by uncovering the relationship between power and discourse, and the ways in which behaviour is constrained and conditioned by the hidden exercise of hegemonic power. Peace is impeded by hegemony, ‘Orientalism’, or by methodological, ontological barriers erected by the tradition of liberal-inspired post-Enlightenment rationalism and institutionalism. Critical theorists and post-structuralists are interested in identifying the structures of hegemony and domination and, in the case of the former, neo-liberal creating universal programmes providing a cosmopolitan response.

A major criticism of the ‘agenda for peace’ in IR is that it has been strongly influenced by idealism or utopianism, rather than reflecting a pragmatic engagement with the problems of IR. However, the democratic peace project, and the broader forms of the liberal peace, illustrate that this is not the case. The now dominant concept of liberal peace has practical implications, and can be conceptualised without necessarily entering into the realms of fantasy. Yet this has occurred without much debate about the possible variants of the concept of peace. Because thinking about peace is dominated by a set of key assumptions, most theorists, policymakers and practitioners assume that the concept of peace they deploy is ontologically stable. By extension this means that peace can be engineered in environments where it may not yet be present. As a result peace is constructed according to the preferences of those actors who are most involved in its construction. This confirms the pragmatism inherent in an agenda for peace, but also the interests that may lurk behind it.

For a complex set of reasons, it has become the orthodoxy that attaining peace is a long-term process, which is probably not achievable but is worth working towards. As a result, intellectual energy tends to be focused upon problem-solving from the perspective of achieving a minimalist version of peace in the short-term. This then provides the basis for a longer term refinement of the concept. In the short-term, stopping violence and providing basic security is often the focus, with more sophisticated attempts to provide rights, resources and democratic institutions seen as a longer term process. The hope is that the short-term peace will be superseded in the longer term by a self-sustaining peace according to a universally agreed formula. International theorists, political scientists, diplomats, officials, politicians and citizens rarely question whether they understand these short-term and long-term concepts of peace, but instead take them a predetermined givens, which should simply be implemented when the opportunity arises. Certainly, amongst groups united by common interests, this appears to be a plausible position. What becomes clear when one examines the
views of actors that are divided by interests, culture, conflict, ideology, religion, or other forms of identity, is that these assumptions of peace break down very easily. An assumption of peace tied up in the framework of a group’s position on a particular piece of territory, or the superiority of one culture, identity or religion over another, can easily become a source of conflict. One could make a strong argument that IR is actually about conflicting images of peace, as opposed to conflicting interests.

War and peace are seen as separate concepts, which are the antithesis of each other, particularly for pluralists, liberals, constructivists and critical theorists (peace may masquerade as war for some post-structuralists). Yet, this separation has always been weak. For example, in the debate on peace-enforcement or humanitarian intervention, and on state-building, there has been much tension. This is partly why the debates over state-building in Afghanistan and Iraq in the early 2000s have been so controversial. The contemporary concept of the liberal peace, which is expressed in different ways throughout much of IR theory, also makes this separation. The liberal peace provides the ‘good life’ if its formulas are followed, for all, and without exception, and even if it rests on a coercive introduction through invasion or peace enforcement. This has occurred within a Western context, which immediately points to a major flaw in thinking about peace (and indeed in the capacity of this study), which is firmly rooted in a critique within this Western, secular context. Peace rests upon a set of cultural, social and political norms, often dressed up as being secular, though closely reflecting the non-secular religious writings on the issue. The Christian notion of crusades for peace, or the use of force to construct peace, is taken for granted in this context. Lawful self-defence and just war remain integral to the preservation of this tranquil order, once all peace efforts have failed. From this have sprung the great peace conferences that marked the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and which contributed to the emergence of the United Nations. Also visible have been the various social movements, charities and NGOs campaigning for human rights, voting rights, the banning of certain weapons, and more recently advocating and practical multiple forms of humanitarian assistance in conflict and disaster zones. Yet, where and when IR theorists do attempt to engage with peace as a concept, they often focus upon ending war, or preventing war, and in the context of units such as states, IOs or even empires. The role and agency of individuals and societies in the creation of peace tends to be less valued, the focus instead being on grand scale political, economic, military, social and constitutional peace projects undertaken beyond the ken and capacity of the individual.40

The liberal peace is closely associated with the orthodoxy of IR theory, and can be seen as an outcome of a hybridisation of liberalism and realism. This can be described as axis denoting liberal–realism in which force, controlled by states, underpins the democratic and liberal political, social and economic institutions of a liberal polity. This axis explains both violence and order, and how they are related in the maintenances of domestic and international order. Structural thinking adds to this a concern with social justice and legitimacy, but this is mainly dealt with in a liberal–realist context by democratisation rather than the
promotion of social justice. So while the structuralist or Marxist agenda has been partially incorporated, it lacks the affinity of liberal–realism, where hierarchies, states and groups accept certain levels of dominance and intrusive governance in order to also receive related, progressive freedoms. Equality is not a key issue, rather security and stability discursively construct international life.

A number of strategies for the conceptualisation of peace can be identified in the literature on IR, and its sub-disciplines. These can be summarised as follows:

1 Idealism depicts a future, complete peace incorporating social, political and economic harmony (of which there are no examples) represented by internationalism, world government and federation. This type of peace is represented as desirable but effectively unobtainable. It is an ‘ideal form’, though for idealists this does not mean that attempts to achieve it should be abandoned. Some idealists saw the League of Nations, and later the UN, attempts at disarmament, and the outlawing of war, as an attempt to attain this peace.

2 Liberalism, liberal–internationalism/institutionalism, neo-liberalism and liberal imperialism, and ultimately liberal–realism depict an achievable general peace derived from international institutions and organisations representing universal agreements and norms. This provides a basis for individualism, and social, political and/or economic rights and responsibilities, based upon significant levels of justice and consent. It is generally acknowledged that this form of peace will probably be marred by injustice, terrorism, secessionism or guerilla warfare perpetrated by marginalised actors which do not accept the norms and frameworks engendered in such universal agreements. Still, this represents a form of peace that is believed to be plausible and achievable, though often geographically limited by boundaries that exclude actors who do not conform to such a view of what is essentially an international society. Peace in this framework can be constructed by actors with the necessary knowledge and resources, probably resembling a Kantian ‘Perpetual Peace’. This is commonly referred to as the liberal peace, embodied in the UN system and a post-Cold War ‘international society’.

3 Realism (and other power/interest focused theories) represents IR as relative anarchy managed by a powerful hegemon or an international system, which produces a basic international, though not necessarily domestic, order. This imposes a limited temporal and geographically bounded order, which attempts to manage or assuage border conflicts, territorial conflicts, ethnic, linguistic, religious (and other identity) conflicts. The resulting type of peace rests upon the balance of power, or domination, perceptions of threat and the glorification of national interest in relation to military might. There have been many examples of this type of peace, from Alexander’s conquest of the ancient world, the Pax Romana (and the destruction of Carthage), the Pax Britannia and the Paris Peace Treaty of 1919.

4 Marxist inspired structuralist insights into peace represent it as resting on social justice, equality and an equitable system of international trade, where states and actors are not hierarchically organised according to socio-
economic class indicators. Peace in these terms is achievable, but probably only after massive, and probably revolutionary, upheaval in the international economy and in traditional class and economic hierarchies and systems which reorder states and the international in a way which better represents in the interests of workers and society, rather than wealthy elites.

Critical theory and post-structuralism, resting to some degree upon the intellectual legacy of points 1, 2 and 4, depicts an emancipatory peace, in multiple forms, in which consideration of forms of justice, identity and representation allows for marginalised actors (such as women, children, and minorities) and environmental factors to be considered. Critical theory seeks a universal basis to achieve such an outcome through ethical forms of communication, whereas post-structural approaches are wary of accepting its plausibility in the light of the dangers of universalism, the problem of relativism and the genealogical scale of the obstacles to emancipation. Hypothetically, both approaches concur that marginalised actors and discourses should be recognised, and discourses and practices of domination should be removed through radical reform. Whether there can be a universal peace or multiple states of peace, reflecting pluralism/relativism is heavily contested. However, there is still a strong sense that peace as an ideal form could be achieved within critical theory. Post-structuralism certainly does not deny the possibility of peace, but sees it reflecting difference, everyday life, hybridity and personal agency.

One peace or many peaces?

One of the ways in which IR theory and international practices related to the ending of war can be evaluated is by opening up the conceptualisation of peace by asking the question, one peace or many? Clearly, the liberal peace is the dominant conceptualisation deployed in these processes, and represents an amalgam of mainstream approaches to IR theory, though IR theory and associated debates also offers a powerful critique of this conceptualisation, and offers a glimpse of alternatives. These alternatives are as yet not comparable to the liberal peace in their intellectual conceptualisation, and have had little impact on the policy world. However, the liberal peace is far from being uncontested and indeed is theoretically rather incoherent. A debate between it and other forms of peace, and a negotiation between the different actors, levels of analysis and many issues involved is necessary. Indeed, for IR to contribute to its original agenda for peace it must become more fully involved in this process of theorisation of peace and a negotiation between its possible concepts. By developing a clear idea of the type of peace that each theoretical perspective envisages, and also developing theoretical approaches in the light of this debate, this process of evaluation and development could begin, setting peace and its variants at the centre of IR theory rather than at its periphery, as is currently the case. For this process to be meaningful, however, there also needs to be a debate about what basis such evaluation would rest on. Would it aspire to a cosmopolitan and universal set of basic norms? Would it aspire to a communitarian version of peace?
Would it give rise to one peace or many peaces? If the latter, how would the *via media*, or process of negotiation and mediation, between them operate? Would peace be limited simply to the prevention of open violence, or would it aim to respond to structural violence, inequality, domination and marginalisation? What are the factors that create a sustainable peace in this case, how might such a peace be theorised, and then constructed? Or, perhaps, even more ambitiously, how can a self-sustaining peace be created?

As shall be seen during the course of this study, IR theory, conflict theory and, indeed, policy debates often make the mistake of assuming that the project of peace is so apparent as to not require detailed explanation. This is part of the problem of peace. What is peace, why, who creates and promotes it, for what interests, and who is peace for? IR theory makes a number of key assumptions across its spectrum of approaches. The essentialisation of human nature regardless of culture, history, politics, economy or society, is common. The extrapolation of state behaviour from a flawed view of human nature as violent assumes that one reflects the other. This also rests on the assumption that one dominant actor, in this case often the state, is the loci around which power, interest, resources and societies revolve. In this sense, IR is often perceived to be immutable, reflecting the forces which drive it and their permanence, ranging from structures, the state, IOs and other key influences. Alternatively, these immutable forces may simply disguise an intellectual conservativism in which individuals as agents simply repeat the errors of old as they believe that nothing can change. This ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ argument is often reflective of both an acceptance of the key difficulties of IR, as well as a reaction against them. Furthermore, all of this assumes that there can be value-free investigation in the discipline. Or is all knowledge effectively discursive and ideational? By attempting to understand and interpret peace, are we empowered to bring about change, or destined to be confronted only by our inability to do so?

This study underlines the view that a universal, single form of peace will inevitably be seen by some as hegemonic and oppressive, and though there may indeed be a dominant version or agenda for peace in IR theory and in practice (currently the liberal peace) this reflects the intellectual limitations of the orthodoxy of the discipline, its culture, ontology and methods, rather than its achievements. It is clear that peace is essentially contested as a concept. Inevitably, and following on from this, it is a subjective concept, depending on individual actors for definition, different methods and ontologies, and indeed different epistemological approaches. Its construction is a result of the interplay of different actors’ attempts to define peace and according to their relative interests, identities, power and resources. For this reason, different approaches to IR theory produce different discourses about peace, some within the liberal peace framework, and some outside of it both as rhetorical devices and as practices. In the context of such inter-subjective concepts, theory is inevitably intertwined with practice, and cannot merely be read as representing an orthodoxy, hegemonic or otherwise. In practice, in different political, social and economic environments around the world, there are rich variants of peace known to other disciplines or
perhaps awaiting discovery. Yet, the liberal peace has become a hegemonic concept.43

To counter this universal and hegemonic discourse, peace might instead be contextualised more subtly, geographically, culturally, in terms of identity, and the evolution of the previous socioeconomic polity. This means that one should be wary of a theoretical approach, or an empirical analysis, or a policy, which suggests that the institutions, norms, regimes and constitutions associated with peace can be applied equally across the world. There needs to be a differentiation between international order and peace in a global context, as well as local order and peace in a local or indigenous context. This means that peace as a concept can be subjected to very specific interpretations, determined by politics, society, economy, demography, culture, religion and language. It should not merely be a legitimating trope applied to bolster a specific theory, policy or form or organisation, but conceptually and theoretically, should represent a detailed engagement with the multiple dynamics of conflict, war and disorder as well as the social, political and economic expectations, practices and identities of its participants. Engaging with the multiple concepts of peace forms the heartland of IR’s quest to contribute to an understanding of stability and order and the ‘good life’.

Outline of the book

Part I examines the development of explicit and implicit debates on peace arising from the development of a positivist orthodoxy. Chapters 1, 2 and 3 examine idealist, realist, liberal and Marxist contributions to the debate on, and formulations of, peace. Chapter 4 sketches a shift beyond positivism, examines the development of the liberal peace, and attempts to move beyond this. Positivist derived contributions all claim to varying degrees to represent scientific knowledge, which once perfected allows for prediction. They rest on omniscient sovereign actors, able to develop an analysis objectively, while disengaged from the subject under scrutiny. These positivist claims that the social world follows the natural world and that facts can be identified in a value free manner,44 if accepted allow for a discussion of IR as a zone of instability resting on power, cooperation and resources, but once refuted undermine its claims to anything but a limited form of peace – if that. Thus, there has been a rich tradition of approaches that have underlined the limitations of these approaches. Chapter 5 examines the development of concepts of peace deployed more specifically in literatures associated with peace and conflict studies.

The next part of the book engages with post-positivist, critical debates. It develops accounts of peace drawing on critical theory and post-structural approaches, and their foci on meaning, identity and emancipation and the problems that emerge with the Western-centric foundations and focus these uncover. Chapters 6 and 7 examine inferences of peace derived from critical theory and post-structural approaches to IR. This draws on a hermeneutic engagement with texts, and the ontological questions that these approaches raise. As with Gadamer, this indicates that understanding and meaning are embedded in history.
and language, meaning that truth and reason, contrary to the arguments of positivists, are subjectively located. Critical theory develops an account leading to emancipation, through Habermasian communicative action. Discourse ethics, developed in this context, are based upon developing a universal form of emancipation. Feminist theory has also been a key part of the post-positivist move in IR theory, allowing for an understanding of the ‘social location’ of knowledge which could contribute to a more sophisticated understanding of peace. Beyond this, post-structural approaches perhaps open up the most space for a rethinking of peace, derived from the work of Foucault and Derrida among others. The relationship between power and knowledge, in Foucaultian terms, might also mirror the relationship between knowledge, power and the construction of peace. Similarly, the logocentric nature of the current debate on the liberal peace constructs, rather than interprets, peace (to paraphrase Steve Smith), according to the view of hegemons rather than local communities. Finally, the Conclusion attempts to develop an agenda for peace that is more central to the study of IR.

In contemporary IR an ambitious version of peace is increasingly expected, which includes security at the domestic, regional and global level, a fair, equitable and meritocratic distribution of social, political and economic resources, prospects of advancement for the world’s population, and respect and assistance for others. The contest over peace, its theorisation, methods, ontology and epistemology is one of the underlying narratives in IR, and in this study. The vast majority of the world’s states’ foreign and domestic policy objectives, of the mandates of regional and international organisations and institutions, ranging from the UN, OSCE, EU, World Bank and IMF, and many agencies and NGOs, encompass such goals. Yet, this study illustrates how any investigation has to recognise its multiple natures, and therefore face the question of whether it is sufficient to enter into the project of building a normative, empirical and theoretical case for a particular conceptualisation of peace. This opens up ontological questions related to the everyday experience of peace.

Conceptually, this may restore the early promise of IR’s agenda, rather than being held hostage by accounts that focus upon the ‘realities’ of the moment, the banality of power, a jingoistic national interest constructed by sovereign man, narrow, cultural obsessions with artificially limited discourses, reductionism and parsimony, and the glorification of power, institutions and parochial moral codes over human and everyday life. Peace is not ontologically prior to experience or learning, but it is socially constructed and influenced by trends, methods and responses to a subjective world, and is forever ‘becoming’. To make peace a research agenda central to the discipline, as well as the many different contexts that peace might have, draws together different, critical strands of the discipline and beyond, aiding in the rediscovery of its central role of remaking the world as a better environment for all, by their common consent, and in their name. Indeed, the challenge of inserting a consideration of concepts of peace into the centre of the discipline represents such significant potential that even the most parsimonious and positivist approach can surely not afford the risk of rejecting it.
Part I

Towards an orthodoxy of peace – and beyond
1  Peace and the idealist tradition
Towards a liberal peace

The day of conquest and aggrandisement is gone by . . . The programme of the world’s peace, therefore, is our programme; and that programme, the only possible programme, as we see it, is this.¹

. . . peace as well as war, requires preparation.²

Introduction: idealist utopias?

This chapter examines the idealist aspect of the first ‘great debate’³ in IR in which idealism and liberalism opposed realism and its inherency orientation, to offer an ambitious, ethically oriented account of peace through liberal-internationalism and governance. It focuses on its implications for the conceptualisation of peace that led to a discussion of ethics, interdependence and transnationalism. This pointed to the blurring or domestication of international politics, though this rests on what occurs inside states.⁴ Perhaps somewhat surprisingly, liberal thought represents one of the largest bodies of work on peace that exists in IR theory, drawing on earlier idealist thinkers such as Zimmern, Bailey and Noel-Baker, and functionalists and pluralists such as Mitrany and Burton and, most famously, the approach of Woodrow Wilson at Versailles after the First World War, as well as that of famous advocates such as Bertrand Russell.⁵ Normative positions on state behaviour in an international context, as opposed to interest and power-oriented ontologies, point to an ambitious peace, which is universal though perhaps unachievable.

The terms ‘utopian’ and ‘idealist’ are often used from a realist perspective to cast aspersions upon the claims of the thinkers in this broad area.⁶ Indeed, so-called idealists who called for disarmament, the outlawing of war, adopted a positive view of human nature and international capacity to cooperate, were often accused of being unable to focus on facts, understand power, or see the hegemonic dangers of universal claims⁷ (despite the fact that realism itself makes a universal claim of being able to expose objective truth). Yet, the idealist tradition is often taken to be the founding tradition of IR.⁸ Many thinkers of the day, and some more recently, saw elements of this group’s work – such as supporting and developing the League of Nations or other later international
organisations, or Mitrany’s work on functionalism – as pragmatic rather than utopian,⁹ and certainly far more so than realism. Idealist thought offered the possibility of a single peace in which all conflict would end. Liberalism, by extension, offered the possibility of linear and ineluctable progress that would lead to the achievement of this peace, eventually.

Though idealist approaches have lost their currency partly because they are linked to a discredited absolute form of pacifism and the failed Treaty of Versailles in 1919 (and the subsequent League of Nations), and pluralist approaches are often ignored in the disciplinary orthodoxy that is deemed to be the ‘mainstream’, liberal approaches drawing on thinkers such as Kant, Locke, Paine, Bentham and others who added variants to this debate are now an orthodoxy of the discipline. The European peace project formed the focus of this idealist attempt to consider international order as a potential utopia, added to which are its later permutations of liberal–internationalism, pluralism and functionalism.

The view of peace from the context of the so-called the first ‘great debates’ in IR contain both major contrasts and elements of hybridity in its evolved, liberal guise. Idealist contributions to the debate on peace were altogether more ambitious than those in the realist tradition, and much more nuanced and pragmatic than often thought. Pluralist and liberal contributions combined realist frameworks as the discipline moved into a second ‘great debate’ with the aim of both proving the existence of an ‘international society’, functional networks, or transnationalism, derived from the inherently positive nature of humans, and of building a peaceful international system on its basis. Yet, this is also underpinned by defensive military might (easily translatable into offensive force). Idealism, pluralism and liberalism, by contrast, have endeavoured to develop an alternative and pragmatic approach to creating peace in opposition to the tragic and often flimsy intellectual claims of realism. Indeed, these agendas emerged partly as a reaction to the bleak realist conceptualisation of peace, partly in tandem with them, and partly because of other more humanistic agendas.

**Idealist and liberal agendas for peace**

Idealist thinking about IR rested upon various notions of internationalism and interdependence, peace without war, disarmament, the hope that war could be eradicated eventually,¹⁰ the right of self-determination of all citizens, and the possibility of world government or a world federation. In this sense it saw itself as eminently practical rather than utopian, reflecting an ontology of peace and harmony. The international organisation of sovereign states, in this case the League of Nations, was central to the idealist agenda, though it was also recognised that the spirit of international organisation (internationalism, democracy and trade) might be more important than an actual organisation itself.¹¹ Underpinning this is the optimistic argument that human nature is not intrinsically violent and, even if it is, social and political norms, regimes and organisation can prevent violence. By the early 1930s, the optimism of these idealist agendas was replaced with concern over the rise of Fascism and Nazism.¹²
This idealist agenda drew on and reflected early liberal thinking of which there emerged three main strands. Locke focused on individualism and Bentham on utilitarianism; Adam Smith provided the foundations for the arguments for free trade and pacifism; and Kant developed a republican internationalism. These provided the foundations for human rights and international law, though these were disputed amongst these thinkers. The core liberal assumptions are of universal rationality, individual liberty, connected with the idealist possibility – if not probability – of harmony and cooperation in domestic and international relations, and of the need for enlightened, rational, legitimate domestic government and international governance. There latter conditions were tempered, of course, by the Millian understanding that government was a necessary evil. Idealists and liberals assume that war is of no interest to peoples who operate under the assumption of harmony and cooperation, that political pluralism, democracy and a broad distribution of rights and responsibility, are crucial to peace in IR. Incorporated into this are ideas associated with economic liberalism, derived from Adam Smith. The notion of free markets and trade as a ‘hidden hand’ that would build up irrevocable and peaceful connections between states also became part of the liberal agenda for peace through interdependence. Effectively liberalism developed a moral account of free individuals in a social contract with a representative and benevolent government, framed by democratic and transparent institutions that reflect these principles. There would be no arbitrary authority, there should be a free press and free speech, legal equality and freedom of property. Social and economic rights of welfare are also a concern, though this is balanced by a tendency to avoid highly centralised states. The implication of this is that individuals prefer peace, freedom, rights and prosperity, and that IR is, or should be, a zone of peace. Idealists, liberals and pluralists concur on this, offer a positive epistemology of peace as well as institutional support and normative concurrence for liberals, together with scientific proof on the part of pluralists.

Aristotle wrote that we may have to ‘make war that we may live in peace’. Spinoza argued that ‘peace is not an absence of war; it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition for benevolence, confidence, and justice’. These views help frame the liberal dilemma: in order to attain an approximation of an idealist view of peace that would provide peoples and states with rights, security, prosperity, and lead to disarmament, there first has to be a suitable foundation. This can be a clean slate (terra nullis), a victory, an agreement, ceasefire or treaty. In other words, violence often precedes peace, and indeed provides a foil for an ensuing peace that can then be created with liberal and pluralist tools. This creates a significant doubt about this specific idealist–liberal–pluralist approach to peace that masquerades as ideal, but is based upon the ‘enforcement’ of supposedly universal political norms, appeals to a limited pluralist theoretical scientific approach based on human needs and transnationalism, and in fact shares some characteristics with a realist version of peace (though it offers a much more developed account).

Erasmus also discussed peace in his famous text, The Complaint of Peace.
For him, war was to be avoided at all costs as it provided pretexts for crime, murder, brutality and self-interest. He helped establish a genre of peace plans, and from Erasmus onwards there was a long line of similar writings (including those of Emeric Cruce, the Duc de Sully William Penn, Abbe St Pierre, Rousseau and, of course, Kant) aimed at avoiding war in Europe, often resting on the creation of a federation of states with a federal council that would act to prevent war between its members, as well as to promote free trade.21 These were seen as idealistic plans, though their authors regarded them as pragmatic.

Locke, one of the fathers of modern liberalism, saw human reason as the key to controlling the state of nature. What was crucial for him was the development of a social contract through which subjects and rules developed mutual constitutive roles in order to protect life, liberty and private property (this influenced Thomas Jefferson and the American Declaration of Independence).22 This, combined with Bentham’s view of the need for liberal institutions as opposed to imperialism and competitive tariffs, led into a discussion of the qualities of the liberal state,23 which many idealists saw as the basis for an international peace.

The Kantian ‘Perpetual Peace’ is perhaps the archetypal version of these agendas, and their influential status in IR and in thinking about world politics and peace more generally. It is indicative of a common impetus, shared by idealist, liberal and pluralist approaches to overcome the negative epistemology and ontology of realism, which at best provides for a domestic and international peace that is subservient to defensive requirements and preparedness against potential threats. In the post-Enlightenment world, however, the major agenda for a new peace came to be associated with overcoming these ‘primitive’ notions of peace in IR, through liberal–internationalism, liberal institutionalism and the modernist era, through what were supposed to be more scientific forms of pluralism. Whereas realism presents war as part of the ‘fall’ of humanity, and a necessary stabilisation mechanism for international order, idealism and liberalism sees ‘fallen man’ as retrievable through suitable planning and organisation. This involves the rejection of the negative epistemology and ontology in realist IR. Idealists, liberals and pluralists concur on the creation of institutions and safeguards to protect key norms and to provide for individuals, so cementing a social contract which preserves the polity.

Kant presented perhaps the most comprehensive representation of a liberal and, some would argue, idealist, understanding of an international order which could be termed peaceful in liberal normative terms. He developed an account of peace that rested upon his belief that a ‘categorical imperative’ existed as an innate and universal moral law, specifically at three levels: domestic, international, cosmopolitan.24 As Geuss has pointed out, this was little more than a ‘half-secularised version of . . . theocratic ethics’.25 This dictated that human beings should be treated as ends rather than means, and required just laws that would be reflected in a republican political order, which would also extend to international relations.26 Kant argued that war was brought about by the absence of an international rule of law and democracy, and that trade enabled peaceful relations. Accordingly there was a general will to adopt codes of conduct that
minimised violence, creating a ‘law of peoples’. This system was preferable to world government (which might lead to despotism). Kant believed that there were acceptable limits for behaviour established by the categorical imperative, but also that the international system should not be made vulnerable to despotism by imbuing it with the tensions inherent in the existence of autonomous governments for separate states, all controlled by a common normative system. Consequently, *Perpetual Peace* established a vision of a liberal order, rested upon the notion that human behaviour is motivated by social learning rather than merely nature and that peace did not preclude defensive wars, which was later to be repeated in UN Charter. The only universal rule was one of hospitality to others, and war came about because of the failings of non-‘Republican’ states.

Kantian strands of liberalism also gave rise to the contemporary ‘democratic peace’ thesis, as well as the concept of human rights. As already alluded to, Kant also pointed to a significant problem inherent in these more idealist readings of peace: ‘peace’ might be used to disguise domination or hegemony.

Kantian thinking represented an emerging cosmopolitan ethic forming the basis of a number of European peace projects. The most well-known influence on Kantian thought, for example, was the *Project for Perpetual Peace* developed by Abbe de St-Pierre (1713). This was followed by many others, including those of Kant, Rousseau, Bentham, and Penn. They all sought to establish a pragmatic process by which political relations in Europe were pacified. These often drew upon (or in the case of Rousseau, critiqued) Abbe de Saint-Pierre’s peace plan, which had argued in what now seem very familiar terms for a European treaty leading to a federation of states, based upon justice, equality and reciprocity between both Christian and Muslim sovereigns. This federal organisation would not intervene in the affairs of member states but would have intelligence and self-defence capacities, and would be able to militarily intervene in other states if it was necessary to preserve the peace. This version of peace represented a consensual order between states mature enough to be able to see that cooperation was a viable expectation and that conflict led to more conflict. Via other additions to this genre of European peace projects, it was a short step to the idea of an embryonic European parliament. In a prescient work, Penn demolished a key classical realist assumption that international organisation would undermine the sovereignty of princes. In stating the obvious – that peace would prevent bloodshed, save the reputation of Christianity ‘in the sight of infidels’, save money, preserve cities and towns, allow movement and create friendship – he made an important connection between peace and liberal governance (this has become the core assumption of the contemporary liberal–international order).

Even so, it still proved intellectually difficult to resist realist assumptions about the nature of state interests, power and the resulting international system, mainly because of their simplicity in determining states as unitary actors, with simple interests, determined by the collective capacity to act upon them from which would emerge a limited peace. By contrast, liberal thinking represented a much more complex peace system requiring social, political and economic
organisation, across several levels of analysis. John Stuart Mill conceded, for example, that a ‘Leviathan’ was still required, though it should be legitimate (meaning it should draw on a broad consensus) and protect individual freedoms.38 Jeremy Bentham similarly argued that peace would need to be constructed partly through disarmament39 but also through state maximisation of the interests of its citizens.40 This genre of peace plans was essentially based upon a Christian, liberal ethic and set of norms, and offered liberals and idealists alike hopes of a sophisticated, sustainable, form of peace. A significant contribution to this emerging discourse on peace was Grotius’ notion of natural law, founded in the right of self-preservation and private property, which are extended to states that protect themselves in the context of norms and rules. This pointed to the morality of coexistence and non-intervention, resting on states’ rights of self-defence and the concept of ‘just war’.41

The conduct of the Napoleonic Wars were indicative of realist order defined as by Hobbes, but the ensuing Congress of Vienna of 1815 was an attempt to develop a formal liberal–international order.42 Fixed meetings between representatives of the ‘great powers’ were to be instituted on a regular basis in what came to be known as a ‘conference system’, which would be ‘most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations and for the maintenance of the peace of Europe’.43 Of course, this was also underpinned by a reconstituted balance of power and mutual guarantees between its proponents. In essence this version of peace rested upon the capacity to intervene, or refrain from intervening, in the affairs of other states as well as cooperation in order to continue the pre-war notion of peace which the victors of the Napoleonic Wars had aspired to.44 It was indicative of the conservative and liberal debates of this era about peace and war. For conservative thinkers peace lay in the preservation of the existing order, perhaps through the use of war. For liberal thinkers, peace would arrive via a transformation brought about by economic and social progress.

Obviously, the development of international norms, cooperation and organisation could not be unilaterally undertaken, and would require some form of international organisation and law whereby the interests inherent in the international may outweigh those of the parochial (as formulated by Grotius’ work on natural law, based upon human sociability and international norms guaranteeing self-preservation).45 Yet, in a common counterargument, the romanticism of political community described by Herder46 indicated the danger that nationalism posed towards such liberal–internationalism, especially in the expression of self-determination symbolised by the French and American Revolutions.47 Ironically, self-determination, originally a prescription for liberal freedoms and associated with the idealism of a common community, was to give rise to conflicting claims over territorial sovereignty – in other words inter-state or anti-colonial conflict. Self-determination aimed at constructing a just peace but instead, it underlined the impossibility of a type of justice built upon the redistribution of territory and sovereignty according to [ethno] national identity. Yet, it rapidly became an antidote to imperialism and colonialism. This version of peace rested upon rampant self-determination and nationalism, and was in fact no peace at all.
Early attempts at self-determination, which appealed to such contradictory idealist and liberal sentiments, such as that of Greece from the Ottoman Empire, strove to create a ‘peaceful’ nation state through violence. By 1871, this was the order of the day in Europe, in combination with the frantic search for empire. Nationalists took control of this agenda, which for conservatives was to preserve their wealth and power, and for liberals had become a civilising mission. These two aims combined in a tumultuous period during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, during which nationalism, imperialism and industrialisation appeared to combine to offer a future, utopian peace in the minds of many – a new peace. Liberal imperialism softened the notion that profit could be made from virgin territories, supposedly establishing a responsibility through which the imperial or colonial power should aid in the development of that territory and its peoples. For example, in the late nineteenth century British Prime Ministers Disraeli and Gladstone had opposed each other on the ‘peace project’ that was derived from British imperialism, with Disraeli believing that the empire only had responsibility to itself (meaning Britain itself), while Gladstone had a vision of liberal imperialism through which the empire spread the ‘benefits of peace’ to its subjects. Formal and informal colonial rule continued this trend towards a basic consideration of the legitimacy of such adventures. But there was a growing tension between occupier and local inhabitants over whether this could be termed ‘peace’ given the cultural and racial attitudes of superiority normally adopted by the coloniser, such as in ‘British India’ and in the light of the political developments outlined above, imperialism and colonialism lost their legitimacy amongst both the states and peoples of the world in the twentieth century.

The impact of idealism

While these phenomena were establishing the roots of future conflict, the idealist dynamic of IR began to form, along with an embryonic liberal ‘international community’. This was established within a more sophisticated notion of peace, in which a Grotian discourse on natural law began to emerge, indicating a right of self-preservation and to own property on the part of the individual, which could be extended to states. This allowed for a framework of norms and rules to emerge to provide the conditions for a norm of coexistence and non-intervention to be adhered to by states. In extremis this also allowed a secular ‘just war’ in which war could be used legitimately in order to defend this order. It required that a commonly agreed liberal peace between states be negotiated, which in the worst case scenario could then be defended or extended through the use of force. This rested upon universalism, and the belief that a specific liberal order was of more significance than other orders. As Guess has argued this was later regarded as a form of liberalism: ‘Ex poste, a legitimising prehistory of liberalism is constructed in which Spinoza, Locke, Montesquieu, Adam Smith, and others are made to feature prominently as theoretical precursors’. As a result both realist and liberal versions of peace coexisted somewhat uncomfortably in a space somewhere between nationalism, liberal imperialism and liberal-internationalism.
In practice, nationalism and imperialism were rife, as were economic protectionism, and discriminatory practises in civil society, institutionalised by state and society, especially with respect to issues like identity, gender and class. Concurrently, the balance of power still drove many state relations and geopolitics and economic acquisition drove imperialism. Much of the liberal and idealist thinking of this era revolved around the ‘restoration’ rather than creation of peace, framed in the context of preserving, perfecting and sharing a Western value system.

Yet the development of a liberal concept of peace did occur, as a compromise between realpolitik and idealism, illustrated by a range of dynamics. These included the French and American revolutions, pointing to rights, self-determination and the franchise. The British attempt to end slavery, and the formalisation of international humanitarian law by the Geneva Convention of 1864 followed. Conversely, the failure of the many peace and disarmament movements during the period before and after the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 did much to discredit the liberalisation of international politics, though by this point the Geneva Convention had irrevocably delineated what was lawful in war and had led to the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), founded to care for war victims. The ICRC, the oldest humanitarian organisation, now became the guardian of international humanitarian law by international treaty. These developments continued with the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, which led to the establishment of the International Court of Justice and, later of course, to the League of Nations. Norms, regimes, law and institutions were to be the reality of the new liberal version of peace, though in practice this was led by the dominant actors of the international system, and was based upon the Western and supposedly secular norms of the then imperial powers. Yet, the idealist inspired, liberal version of peace had captured the imagination of many groups around the world, and inspired civil society actors to attempt to resist the reborn ideologies of power. In 1910 a Universal Peace Congress examined the need for international law, self-determination and an end to colonialism, and in 1913 another focused on disarmament to mark the opening of the Peace Palace in The Hague. However, liberal approaches abandoned the notion of a world government or federation in favour of liberal constitutional frameworks for states. They also modified the positive epistemology and the ontology of peace that idealism had offered, indicating that these were possible but only with the rational intervention and institution-building carried out by liberal states.

Added to these developments were the growth of social and advocacy movements, peace and disarmament movements, and resistance movements, which generally emphasised elements of these three components in their campaigns from one ideological standpoint or other. These movements may have been religiously inspired, or liberal–internationalist, associated with cosmopolitan movements, disarmament, democratisation, or campaigns against conscription, ideological and feminist movements against war. Later similar campaigns for nuclear disarmament and environmental reform would follow. Perhaps the
most prominent contribution of liberal thought to the contemporary conceptualisation of peace lay in the development of a human rights discourse, now argued to be vital to peace and justice. This became directly related to the understanding of peace as universal natural law tradition, and as a particularistic, contractual and legal framework.

Such developments also had an impact on the conduct of imperialism which in the twentieth century endeavoured to take on a more humanist, liberal benevolence towards the colonised subject. This was reflected in the Mandate System which, after the First World War, tried to devolve power to local inhabitants. Liberal thinking brought together the components of self-determination, international organisation and human rights to form an orderly international system, in which the liberal peace was now recognisable. It was recognisable in different strands of idealism, in internationalism and international law, and increasingly it was recognisably liberal in its Lockean and Kantian aspirations.

During the period leading up to the First World War, international actors, ranging from multilateral organisations to advocacy movements, formed networks focused upon collective security, international law, democracy and free trade within some states, while non-state actors were increasingly becoming involved in campaigning for self-determination, an expanded franchise, an end to slavery, children’s rights, the development of international law, disarmament and, of course, world peace. These developments engendered some important changes in assumptions of peace, indicating a more far-reaching and ambitious concept than realist approaches could countenance. Many of these developments had important consequences for sovereignty, especially in its Westphalian form. Equating justice, humanitarianism, disarmament and intervention with world peace meant that Westphalian sovereignty was being modified towards an interdependent framework based upon collective security and cooperation, rather than upon domination and hegemony. However, the line between these two sets of competing concepts soon came to be seen as rather more indeterminate than often thought.

These dynamics were seized upon by idealists, who were keen to contest realism (and fascism) in the interwar period. Norman Angell had argued in 1912 that a growing interdependence meant that war would now only despoil all. Even the victors in war in his view would now bear its costs, and would be unable to profit from territorial or material gains formerly associated with war. As Hedley Bull pointed out, idealist thinkers such as Zimmern, Noel-Baker and Mitrany were not necessarily insistent upon a moral dimension to IR, but did focus on progress that would lead to the progressive transformation of the international system into a peaceful and just world order. Indeed Ashworth has argued that idealism shared much with realists in these areas. Democracy, internationalism, the League of Nations, were all indicators of such progress. Zimmern made such an analysis in his work, arguing that the pre-First World War system had to be consigned to the past and replaced with a progressive system revolving around the League of Nations. This was also reflected in
Thompson’s much later argument that idealism rested upon institutionalism as a way of changing people’s behaviour, provide justice and the ability to distinguish between good and evil.67

**Connections with pacifism**

Pacifism is a strong underlying influence of idealist thinking,68 and also plays a moderate role in liberal thinking. In its most basic form pacifism is defined by opposition to war and other forms of violence. Paradoxically, this has done much to discredit pacifism in IR because of its tendency towards an acceptance that violence is endemic. Indeed, it is now noticeably absent from teaching in universities and from academic orthodox and mainstream discourses. In the contemporary, implicit debates about peace moderate forms of pacifism are linked to aspects of the liberal peace and its attempts to restrain violence. Pacifism is closely associated with idealist notions such as internationalism, anti-war and disarmament sentiments, advocating for international governance (for idealists via the League of Nations) and, more ambitiously, world government. This has now been displaced by liberal approaches which focus on pluralism, transnationalism, human rights, the rule of law, the possibility of a form of global democracy, and global governance. Indeed, one might make a strong argument now that the liberal–international community has generally accepted a pragmatic form of pacifism as one of its integral norms.

Pacifism is believed to be morally desirable, and conducive to human welfare, as opposed to the use of violence which is neither. It is most widely known as an absolutist condemnation of any form of war or violence, but it is rather more complex and nuanced than this.69 It is associated with a moral repugnance of war, killing and other forms of violence. In intellectual terms, pacifism can be divided into principled and pragmatic, or radical versions.70 An overt and principled stance against violence combined with an acknowledgement that it may at times be necessary is very common. It is relatively rare though to find radical pacifism where proponents argue against the use of violence under any conditions, even those associated with an extreme threat. However, an ideal form of peace is generally seen to be plausible by pacifists, given the proper circumstances, and war is seen to be abnormal and unnecessary. Peace is also seen to be universal both in aspiration and in ontology. Generally, pacifism indicates that communication should be used to deal with conflict leading to compromise and that there should be a general ‘moral renunciation of war’.71 As Atack argues, this position can also be connected to Kantian or cosmopolitan theory because it envisages the replacement of the Westphalian sovereign system with cosmopolitan democracy and global citizenship,72 and accepts of the use of force under very specific circumstances.

The key aims of pacifism have generally been to stop or prevent war through the creation of a climate favourable to peace, and dealing with the potential causes of conflict inherent in such factors as socioeconomic competition, ethnic identity, religion, culture, the quest for power and fear of foreign domination.
Means for the settlement of disputes must be provided, and ways must be found to ensure observance of the settlements that are made. It was aimed at these objectives that the likes of Penn, Abbe de St Pierre and Kant developed their peace proposals. Pacifism became associated with organised peace movements and civil society advocacy and actions. The development of ideological and social movements in the nineteenth century, as well as industrialisation, social problems and the emergence of anti-colonial movements, drew on pacifism as a form of resistance. In the years running up to the First World War, civil disarmament movements developed in response to the threat increasingly perceived from newly industrialist states pursing territorial expansion and the domination of others through military preponderance. The emergence of new forms of communication and transportation allowed such movements to become transnational and far more effective in their advocacy. After the First World War pacifist sentiment became not just a popular civil sentiment but also entered into the realm of international relations, though fascist and communist states such as Italy, the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany endeavoured to ban it on the grounds of the Hegelian argument that individuals found their fulfilment in war. The idea that states did not have to conform to the personal ethic of non-violence on the grounds of national interest, its sole control of the means of violence, and survival, even through just war approaches, as Wight argued, meant that a ‘double morality’ was strongly critiqued by pacifists. Many emerging civil society actors and advocacy groups now saw war as another expression of class oppression and elitism, especially after the experience in the trenches of the First World War. Increasingly, pacifism was associated with radical movements and issues, such as the suffragettes, or intellectuals responding to the post-war crisis of idealism, such as Virginia Woolf or Aldous Huxley. Pacifism now came to be associated with conscientious objectors who refused to fight in particular wars (from the First World War to the Vietnam War). Pacifism also, of course, became associated with the idealist development of a system of collective security, through the League of Nations. This was followed in turn by the establishment of the UN, with its much more elaborate institutional machinery for keeping the peace. By the advent of the Second World War it was clear that pacifism was unsustainable in the face of a determined enemy which had little compunction about their aggression. Neville Chamberlain’s ‘Peace in Our Time’ famously proved not to be the case and it was not until the 1960s, in particular influenced by the nuclear stand-off between the US and the USSR, and by US experiences in Vietnam that pacifism again became influential. It was apparent, however, that a majority would not be in opposition to a war they deemed to be justified – for example, the Second World War. However, in the more recent case of the war in Iraq, major public demonstrations, indicative of a pragmatic or relative pacifism at the very least, in many of the capitals of the world involving millions of people seem to have had little effect on the decisions of some Western governments to invade Iraq and depose the Baathist regime.

Pacifism has always been a concept easily associated with idealism and liberalism, and undermined by the discursive practices of realism. For example, some
have argued that an unwillingness to countenance war means the individual and the state is left at risk by the pacifist. Tolstoy, a Christian pacifist who was influenced by Thoreau’s work on civil disobedience, argued that pacifism and anarchism were intimately connected because the state was often the source of violence. The most famous exponent of non-violent resistance, Mahatma Gandhi, drew on this idea in his own campaign against British imperial rule in India in the 1930s.

A liberal compromise?

Even during the early twentieth century an idealist or liberal–internationalist world peace looked unlikely as nationalism, authoritarian and fascist dictatorships began to emerge. Certainly the dream of a world federation and disarmament, which had been the focus of many early liberal–internationalists, was by 1914 little more than an aspiration. Though many states, such as Germany, Japan and Italy, were to ignore the liberalisation of international relations for reasons of expediency vis-à-vis their leaders’ definition of their national interests, there is little doubt that this modified the discourse of peace suggesting an ideal form of mutual international cooperation following liberal norms was a viable alternative to realpolitik. However, though discussions of international social, economic and political systems had highlighted the need for prosperity, political representation and an embryonic form of human rights, these were not as yet widely adopted in practice. Such ideals had first to encounter and overcome pre-existing political, economic and social systems that favoured certain elites over the vast bulk of the population, historical enmities between states and peoples, and the imperial race for territory. The wide circulation of the resulting aspirations for a supposedly utopian or ideal form of peace through liberalism clashed with such elite driven sentiments of realpolitik that soon were to be associated with the extreme ideologies of fascism, Nazism and communism, which in practice saw ‘might as right’ and sidestepped the development of liberal aspirations for a peaceful international order. Yet, it was clear even at the time liberal and idealist aspirations were the foil by which such extremist ideologies were to be judged, and by which realism comprehended its own tragic dimensions.

The First World War made it clear that large scale industrialised war could not be won decisively without incurring such costs, as Angell had argued, as to make a victor’s peace unattainable and unprofitable. It also highlighted major problems with the sustainability of the victor’s peace as the Versailles settlement and the associated League system illustrated. However, this move towards international organisation survived the failure of the League system and eventually mutated into the production and reproduction of a liberal–international system, with the creation of international organisations and the recognition of self-determination as a limited right. The end of the First World War saw a general liberal agreement that democracy could be extended and a new international order created, though many states were reluctant to see this extended as fully as
US President Wilson’s Fourteen Points indicated. The new peace was idealistic in its aspirations – especially for self-determination – though it very soon became clear that it was vague, untested and lacked any guarantees, from the US in particular. The importance of US President Wilson’s Fourteen Points at Versailles in 1919 cannot be underestimated as idealist versions of peace made the transition into liberal versions of peace, however. This phase of thinking about IR offered a notion of peace that rested upon a neo-Kantian, ‘liberal, reformist zeal’. The most important twist to the new version of peace was that territorial adjustments should be via the principle of self-determination, which soon became a process of the territorial self-determination of former colonial units (regardless of the artificiality of their boundaries and the broad range of identity groups contained within them). Within this package lay the liberal rights and constraints of the new peace.

In addition, Wilson believed peace would be organised and enforced by a community of states. It would be a liberal peace in the image of the states that had imagined it, though he argued that this did not mean it was a victor’s peace or indeed that it was idealistic. In this way, utopian thought on an ideal form of peace was overtaken by the liberal peace which would, in theory and practice, rest on a set of common pragmatic elements and institutions. It required a hegemon who would construct the peace in its image: rights for all of its actors would be delineated, provided, enforced and patrolled, according to a set of core values, based on just war thinking, self-determination and democracy, international law and an embryonic form of human rights, and the norms of cooperation and consent. Realists scoffed that even this liberal version was a utopian peace, but in practice this is what the ‘long twentieth century’ gave rise to.

This type of peace did not preclude domination, structural violence and hegemony. However, liberal–democratic states, which provide rights for their inhabitants, and conducted ‘peaceful’ international relations as a result for the reasons Kant famously outlined, would be the only choice for the structure of international relations. Once this had been accepted all other reasonable rights would follow. Because this was a universal norm anyway, there were apparently no other voices to learn from. For the time being, self-determination and its problems would be the major architects of the new international system. This was based upon the core assumptions of liberal thought – rationality, a belief in progress, liberty, and the checks and balances on otherwise unchecked power. The notion of universal human rights, later enshrined in the UN framework, made it clear that peace did not just belong to or result from states, but also to individuals. States now had responsibilities to individuals, who had rights and agency.

The most sophisticated of these debates developed the various formulations of liberal–internationalist and liberal institutionalist debates, in which nationalism was rejected in favour of internationalism and transnationalism as the basis for international order, and through which international institutions would be developed to create consensus. For example, Wright sought to develop an internationalist project for peace, which aimed at a multidimensional understanding
of war and therefore to open up a debate on how it could be realistically abol-
ished. Wright argued that war was not an inevitable dimension of history and
that peace represented an equilibrium of many different forces.\textsuperscript{81} Others, such as
Mead, saw war as a social invention.\textsuperscript{82} Mitrany and his work on a ‘Working
Peace System’ was indicative of liberal thought in that he saw what he called
functional institutions as vital in contributing to a broader and sustainable peace
in the international system.\textsuperscript{83} Mitrany argued that the development of inter-
national administration, such as embodied early on in the International Postal
Union, and The Hague Conference constituted the system required for a sus-
tained peace.\textsuperscript{84} In addition, any peace needed to be a ‘working’ peace and not
‘protected’, by which he meant that peace should be self-sustaining.\textsuperscript{85} His argu-
ment was also that peace should also be universal in nature.\textsuperscript{86} As with Galtung
later on, he began to distinguish between a positive and negative peace,\textsuperscript{87} the
former which was to be built by the UN, political actors, and also social and
economic agencies. Mitrany is just one of several scholars who, through a liberal
lens, was able to construct an argument in which a very sophisticated version of
peace was seen as an ambitious though viable project, which did not, as Marx-
ists and their followers suggested, require a revolutionary overthrow of capital-
ism, but rather additional layers added to the already existing international
system. Mitrany was prescient in his understanding of the development of an
elaborate intellectual and policy framework to preserve and protect peace.
These liberal debates were effectively about domestic and international gov-
ernance, and about which forms of governance might be the most peaceable and
sustainable, untainted by war and self-interest. This implies that a liberal peace
could be engineered and brought to all requiring the construction and socialisa-
tion of the state and its international relations. This formed the basis for the
liberal peace that emerged after the Second World War and has been consoli-
dated after the Cold War, which as Clark has argued became both a
regulative and distributive hegemonic peace.\textsuperscript{88} These strands allowed for the
development of an institutional approach to peace, whereby international organi-
sations could construct peace from the ‘top down’, and also to a civil under-
standing of peace, whereby the consideration of the human subject was
necessary if peace was to be successfully created. The creation of international
architecture aimed at keeping the peace and guaranteeing security amongst
states paralleled the emergence of non-state, non-governmental actors and social
movements developing a specific agenda that would, it was hoped, lead to a sus-
tainable peace not resting on the presence of the threat of force. By the founding
of the UN, the liberal paradigm of top-down governance defining the limits of
good behaviour in a legitimate contract with citizens was now being widely
adopted in IR theory as providing the underlying theory, ontology and epis-
temology of peace. This could be seen in its key international elucidations,
which included the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
in the establishment of international organisation and international financial
institutions, and in the emerging Cold War bipolarity between the US and the
USSR. The creation of security, political and economic arrangements amongst
the core Western industrial countries and their protégés was also significant in elucidating what appeared to be a zone of liberal peace.

The UN system became by far the most significant (and maligned) mechanism of this liberal peace as it developed after the Second World War, via the Security Council, General Assembly, Secretariat, international agency and international financial institutions. Indeed, the tension between utopian hopes for a ideal form of peace in the future, liberal notions of limited and regulated freedoms, and realist concerns with the need for a strong security architecture are all part of the UN framework, as is immediately obvious from the UN Charter, and the roles of its institutions and agencies. Effectively, the liberal peace required governance at a global and local level, and this is what the UN was tasked to do, because of its universal membership and claims to represent universal norms, but of course without overriding the sovereignty of its member states. Very quickly, however, it became clear that this broader notion of peace now being represented by the UN system had even broader implications. If inter-state war had been rejected, so should civil war and imperialism. If poverty, development and human rights were to be on the agenda, then they should not just be identified and discussed, but also ameliorated. In this sense, with an increasingly identified ‘right’ to peace also came the responsibility to create and support it. This represents the classic liberal conundrum – in the light of a failure to discover a universal consensus, a more limited consensus must be found for the basis of a peace for most, which will be imposed on those at the margins who may resist it.

The Bretton Woods system was also developed with this in mind. Its aim was to facilitate economic growth development and trade after the Second World War, based upon the assumption that a stable economic order was necessary if there was to be a sustainable peace. ‘Embedded liberalism’ became a core assumption of the varieties of liberal thinking that now moved to the forefront of IR’s offerings for a concept and theory of peace. This projection and consolidation of liberal values is exactly what the UN system was intended to do: both negotiate and represent a universal consensus for peace, as well as patrol it and fulfil the non-military tasks for its construction. Liberal thinking about IR now came to be represented by a debate on how to create a rule-dominated, ordered, liberal society, resting on an ‘entrenched multilateralism’.

From the realms of peace research and conflict studies (influenced by structuralism) Galtung provided liberal thinkers with an explicit statement on negative and positive peace. This was adopted by liberal thinkers to represent the divide between realist and liberal versions of peace. Indeed, his argument that a positive peace existed when structural violence was removed has been deployed to legitimate liberal approaches to peace. From the realms of conflict studies, Burton’s work on pluralism added substance to this move with his work on human needs and the ‘cobweb’ model of IR, which depicted the complex interdependence which was increasingly being recognised by the second half of the twentieth century. Human needs effectively depicted a liberal view what motivates complex interdependence at its most basic level, the denial of which was the main obstacle to a broader peace – which he saw as a ‘world society’. This
recognised both the diffusal of power in the international system, and the growing role of multiple non-state actors. Though this version of pluralism was supposed to be empirically based rather than normative, it did clearly share much with the liberal value system, and was successful in challenging realism and formed one part of the so-called inter-paradigm debate of the 1980s.

Transnationalism, non-state actors and fragmented states, and a growing interdependence and the concept of the "global commons" were now increasingly taken to be the dominant dynamics of IR by those who opposed the claims and limitations of realism and aimed at the construction of an inclusive and sustainable world society. These now offered a broader, not necessarily easily manageable, but more dynamic view of the causes of conflict, and the positive, peaceful possibilities that IR could offer. As Little has made clear, these dynamics, and in particular the impact of pluralism upon the so-called idealist, and later the liberal debates, have been far greater than often thought. However, the different strands of thought represented here also raised doubt about the 'governability' of the international system in that interdependence, transnationalism and the fragmentation of states, and the counter-reaction of states attempting to reassert themselves, produced an unstable system that liberals and pluralists might have to accept required a benevolent hegemon to govern, according to broadly shared interests, but to the benefit of the hegemon. This was some way from the idealism of earlier approaches. Rosenau, for example, argued that both a state-centric realist environment and a bifurcated, multicentric environment of pluralism could now coexisted. Rosenau was now concerned about the viability of any future emergence of a world society. Keohane and Nye likewise had tried to offer a synthesis of realism and pluralism in their work on complex interdependence and the development of regimes which modified state behaviour.

The legacy of idealism was a more ambitious version of peace. This drew the discipline, and indeed policy, away from narrow and extreme forms of tragic realism, and instead offered rational approaches to the construction of a liberal peace. This expansion drove the inclusion (and some would argue, co-option) of public and private issues and actors and the emergence of a positive epistemology in which the root causes of conflict had to be addressed if a sustainable peace was to be created. This represented an important move away from the realist position that conflict was inevitable and immutable, and also implied a break with the implication that peace could only exist as an ideal form, and was therefore unlikely ever to exist at all. The implications of these new debates and practices were that peace could be constructed, albeit in a reasonably limited, but cosmopolitan form. What was required was a scientific understanding of the structures, agents and methods of peace, allied with a universal normative understanding of its commonality and applicability across humanity. Peace could be constructed by those who had the material resources and normative legitimacy. Indeed, the resources necessary for waging war could also now be transmuted into the creation of the new peace, as pluralist, liberal, structuralist and realist thinking increasingly began to point to.
Much of the focus in these debates was upon how a positive peace might be achieved, rather than explicitly stating its nature, dimensions and implications, which was assumed to rest upon liberal norms and social justice. Indeed, this underlying liberal consensus on peace was to condition the shift of the discipline towards a positive epistemology of peace. This was the underlying theme of Hinsley’s contribution, which envisioned peace through political theory and political philosophy102 as well as Aron’s conceptualisation of three types of peace, ranging from equilibrium, hegemony and empire.103 This was also reflected in Ceadal’s contribution, which associated peace with defencism, pacifism or pacifism, militarism and crusading.104

It was through liberal and idealist contributions to thinking about peace that three conceptualisations arose of a liberal peace. The most important of these was the constitutional peace, derived from Kantian thought, and based on democracy, cosmopolitanism and free trade. Indeed, in its North American theoretical guise, during the Cold War liberal–democratic peace theory (also taken up by many peace researchers) posed a major challenge to realist thought. Derived from the emerging human rights discourse was the civil peace that gave individuals both rights and agency, through advocacy, campaigning, social movements, self-determination and democratisation. Finally, and perhaps the most ambitious of the three, was the attempt to construct an institutional peace, through the construction of international frameworks, legal, normative and organisational, including the League of Nations, later the UN family, and of course the development of international law.

Conclusion

Given that idealism made such grand ontological claims, it was relatively easy to denounce, given the failure of the idealist-influenced Versailles settlement in 1919 and the outbreak of the Second World War – a war it was supposed to prevent. This catastrophic event decisively put an end to the first great debate of IR, which was effectively over whether peace rested upon a negative or positive epistemology, in favour of realism. This was determined by the context of the day – the advent of the Second World War – rather than a far-reaching intellectual victory. Yet, idealism and liberalism were gradually to come together to form a hybrid, which also incorporated elements of pragmatic forms of pacifism. Idealism provided the foundation for this move, which came to be enshrined in the liberal–international system that was emerging after the Congress of Vienna at an institutional level and influenced the emergence of international law and human rights. Idealism offered the intellectual ideal of a form of peace, which liberalism enshrined in a Lockean social contract and a Kantian international system of peace. After the First World War, idealism’s legacy continued in the form of the more moderate approach of variants of liberalism, which is generally associated with individualism, liberty and generally agreed restraints, defined and policed by benevolent hegemons in a hierarchical system. These elements coexist in liberalism’s IR guise where, like realism, it depends upon the state as
the organising unit of the international system and as a shell for the government of a specific territory in a consensual contract with its peoples. These agendas have contributed to the liberal peace agenda—a grand narrative which offers a self-governing form of peace within and between states. Idealism leads to liberal readings of international politics, and liberalism’s vision of peace claims to approximate the utopianism inherent in idealist understandings of peace, while recognising the dangers of war and aggression. Indeed, this mode of thinking also addresses some of the dynamics and issues derived from Marxist themes and in particular the problem of social, political and economic systems and their relationship with power, knowledge, rationality and justice. From this emerging synthesis, as later chapters attest, critical approaches drawing on social theory emerged in IR theory.

The ontology offered by these debates indicated that there was a human and social potential for a more sophisticated peace though, of course, Kantian-derived approaches also indicated an often violent tension with non-liberal states and systems that implies a liberal imperialism. An epistemology of this peace was required which could be engineered in a pragmatic manner, resting on the normative foundations offered by liberalism. This can be found in the literatures that emerged on international organisation, internationalism and functionalism, as well as on norms, regimes and global governance. This fertile ground for thinking about peace has been one of IR’s strongest influences, despite the common focus on realpolitik. This infers an ontology in which governance and international organisation can be used to develop peace as a common good for all, through which a specific epistemology and methods can be practically deployed to create progress towards an ideal of peace. This process depends upon a peace that can be created by those with specialised capacities suitable both for themselves and for others. Peace is represented as both process and outcome defined by a grand theory resting upon territorial sovereignty and international governance, which every theoretical and conceptual stage should work towards in a linear and rational fashion, offering the liberal claim of a ‘peace dividend’. All of this is strongly influenced by a mixture of Western cultural and historical normative frameworks, which claim some degree of universality. Its normative underpinnings dictate inclusivity, equality and pluralism, while at the same time recognising difference, within the confines of an imagined ideal state of IR, a standard which automatically delineates the limits of its pluralism.

Yet, it is clear that the hybrid of idealism, pacifism and liberalism has offered a formidable, progressive framework for peace. This unashamedly aspires to offer a positive epistemology of peace—even if there is an internal tension over the plausibility of an ontology of peace—which has been adopted, in ideological, methodological and epistemological terms, by many contemporary states (particularly in the West), donors, international organisations, agencies (such as the much of the UN family, the EU and the World Bank), and officials. It is able to see beyond the tragedy of a state of nature, and has been able to engage with context and the need for planning and practical solutions to the problems of IR. This account of peace offers a practical and ontologically posit-
ive version. However, this is not been unproblematic, as later chapters attest. In the following chapter, for example, the relationship between this emerging liberal version of peace and realist debates on power, state-centricity and violence, as well as ontological and methodological similarities, will become apparent.
A realist agenda for peace
Survival and a victor’s peace

They make a desert and call it peace.¹

Political theory and law . . . are the theory of the good life. International theory is the theory of survival.²

Introduction: realist silences

The implications of the realist tradition for a concept of peace are associated with a victor and its norms, institutions and perspectives of social, economic and political systems. It is also seen as a foil for the idealist and liberal hybrid version of peace that was partly being contested in the first ‘great debate’. Where idealist and liberal versions offered a positive epistemology of peace, realism offered a negative epistemology based upon survival as Wight argued, and a victor’s peace that Tacitus might have recognised. The resultant version of peace and its sustainability are dependent upon a victor’s hegemony. Realism sees IR as a state of war that cannot be overcome by anything other than a Leviathan.³ It is a debate rather than a concrete argument, but it suggests a continuing cycle of violence and coercively induced stability (which is the nearest it comes to peace), as opposed to liberalism’s progressive view. It rests upon what Jim George has argued to be a set of crude characterisations of the thought of the likes of Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Rousseau, Morgenthalau and Carr,⁴ who are represented both as the founders of realism and of the discipline of IR. Common assumptions are shared across the spectrum of realist thought that draws together a selection of ‘great texts’ specifically about the problem of anarchy because of the lack of an overarching power, and the eternal laws of self-interest that govern human and state behaviour. There are many subtle differences between what are known as classical, scientific positivist, neo- realist and structural realist strands of the tradition, of course. However, power, sovereignty, national interest and human nature are taken to be perennial and tragic, reflecting the Augustinian notion of ‘fallen man’ and, of course, the whole range of normative assumptions upon which this was based.⁵

According to Wight and others, the state ensures survival in a system of international anarchy, and security for some inevitably means insecurity for others.
Thus, there can be no general welfare or security. This has been the tragedy of the realist representation of IR. This chapter examines how this modern realist tradition has developed a limited concept of peace that many would find either pragmatic in the light of inter-state relations, or unacceptable on pragmatic, normative, ethical and ontological grounds, and would only accept if there was no other choice other than war. Yet, realism establishes this environment – a state of nature – as a basis for IR via a specific interpretation of a wide range of thinkers. Indeed, from this perspective realism appears both anachronistic and silent on the concept of peace.

Classical realism and the first great debate

According to Buzan, realism represents an: ‘ever-changing discourse about the nature, application and effect of power in an ever-changing historical environment’. Yet the ever-changing discourse appears not to change because its focus is on power rather than discourse. Indeed, the deep differences between claims of realism to describe the world and more interpretative reflections means that it hardly even makes sense to talk of a debate between positivist and post-positivist debates in the discipline. Peace is a concept which highlights this difficulty in extremis.

For realism, peace is zero-sum. The implications of the work of key realist thinkers for the conceptualisation of peace underlines rejection of a universal ethic of peace and an acceptance of a limited understanding of peace contained within state boundaries, and projected by powerful actors according to their own interests. Within the realist tradition there also exists an implicit version of peace, unobtainable and probably undesirable because of its equation with imperialism or a Leviathan and its implied exchange of insecurity for domination in order to receive security in exchange, but by which the inadequacies of the international order can be measured. At their most basic level realist debates represent a peace that is at best an absence of open violence between self-interested states, but not an absence of threat. Hobbes argued that:

For every state war is incessant and lifelong against every other state … For what most men call ‘peace’, this is really only a name – in truth, all states by their very nature are always engaged in an informal war against all other states.9

For realism this confirms that insecurity is the central problem of IR, framed by Hobbes’ framework of sovereignty, broken contracts and fear. According to Hobbes, the law of nature demands that humans seek peace, which is based upon the establishment of contracts. In order to prevent the ‘natural’ impulse towards breaking those contracts, a commonwealth is formed that uses its sovereign authority, provided by a social contract, to ensure its survival through creating a fear of punishment by the Leviathan. Commonwealths are founded on institutional agreement or forcible acquisition, and sovereignty – equated with
the sovereign knowledge of truth required to ensure a civil peace – may rest on
democracy, or more feudal frameworks for governance. Hobbes’ civil peace
works best according to him through monarchy, where there is no chance of dis-
agreement over policy. Because the international is an anarchic state of nature,
the implication is that war can lead to an international peace only if a victor is
capable of imposing its will on all other states. This results in a limited peace
focused upon survival and resting on one state’s – or an alliance of states’ –
hegemony – perhaps more familiar as imperialism. This envisages a constant
struggle for hegemony to quote Hobbes: ‘the nature of War consisteth not in
actual fighting: but in the known predisposition thereto, during all the time there
is no assurance to the contrary. All other time is Peace.’ Peace is therefore
limited by the requirement of a constant state of domestic preparation for war.
Yet, the nature of the domestic polity is also assumed to be subject to a more
ambitious concept of peace, based upon shared values, identity and interests,
within a homogenous community. This indicates that the dominant realist line of
thought about peace is heavily influenced by perceptions of threat though it also
offers a possibility at the domestic level of a ‘minimally liberal’ peace in which
liberty is ensured by a Leviathan, but only when individuals submit to the rules
and contracts of the commonwealth.

Yet, in practice states have been subject to an internal peace that may be self-
sustaining, viable and far-reaching domestically, even if this is heavily con-
strained by the need for the state to be geared towards war with other states,
either for survival or for the pursuit of grander interests. Paradoxically, Hobbes’
representation of a lifelong state war for every state beyond the domestic level
may be misleading because it divides the domestic from the international and
more importantly ignores the broader implications of his suggestion of a com-
monwealth: states have long realised the potential derived from domestic
stability and from international cooperation, despite the fact that their domestic
situation is likely to be partially based upon the requirements for a permanent
preparedness for war. Hobbes, writing in the context of the English civil war,
was well aware of this problem as his discussion of the need for a civil peace, a
social contract and a commonwealth indicated. This paradoxical and modern
realist interpretation, not to mention contextualisation, courtesy of the trauma of
the wars of the twentieth century, underlines one of the signal failures of the
realist tradition: its projection of a violent and fragile future for many indi-
viduals and states within the international space, while claiming it offers a
pathway to domestic stability and liberty upon submission to a sovereign.

This is also rooted in an essentialist understanding of human nature as inher-
etly evil, which is consequently then reflected in the nature of political and
social organisation. Amongst homogenous populations in a domestic order, a
limited peace is possible, but this is not the case at the international level. This
ontology and methodological binary formed the basis of a general realist accep-
tance that international and domestic order revolves around constraint and
enforcement according to the interests and ideology of the powerful. Human
nature, the imperatives that national interest and security place upon states that
pursue incompatible interests, the belief that the balance of power is probably the only structural constraint available in IR, and that every state is subject to, and driven by, a security dilemma, mean that the peace on offer from this perspective is delineated and enforced by the Westphalian, Weberian state. In the context of the states of the twentieth century, the best this territorial entity can offer IR is to amass power and resources, control the means of violence to govern or coerce its population where necessary, to protect it from the predations of other states.

If it can be disregarded that this account rests upon a distinct and flawed division between the international and domestic and supposes that a domestic peace can survive international stress, this means that any international peace is fleeting and limited, rests on the capacity for violence, and can never become self-sustaining without a hegemon. Even at a domestic level, the nature of the international system provides an obstacle to peace. Of course, in maintaining the capacity for violence states ensure that the means of violence could, at some point, be deployed directly. Even if this is not the case, defensive capacities for violence reproduce threats and fear. Much of the modern realist tradition therefore focuses its energy on the conditions necessary for violence to be deployed. It takes as read that self-defence is a sufficient reason for this, but self-aggrandisement, ‘national interests’, and pre-emption of future threats, remain more controversial areas in the realist canon. There is little subtlety about how large the margins that might repulse security threats might be before they begin to exacerbate those threats. Thus, the escalation of threats and insecurity is reproduced by realism, which is then taken as an ontological reason for realism’s objective claims. But the ontology of escalation and violence realism offers as a ‘victor’s peace’ is of course constructed through its generally positivist reading of historiography, which provides some basis for an understanding of war between states, but little basis for an understanding or construction of a broader peace.

Doyle has outlined four main aspects of realism: fundamentalist versions stem from Machiavelli, complex versions from Thucydides, constitutional versions from Rousseau, and structuralist versions from Hobbes. Complex realism sees IR as a state of war and anarchy. Fundamentalism versions see all humans and states as driven by the quest for power. Structural versions see all states as similar in goals, but not in capacities. Constitutional versions add a concern with cultural, social, economic and politic variations. These variations offer a narrow concern with moral issues (Thucydides), the probability of imperial expansion (Machiavelli), rational and unitary states which engage in war for survival or at best short-term balancing alliances (Hobbes), and a combination of just social contracts, national interest, isolation, defence and democracy, which may mitigate the general state of war (Rousseau). The traditional linear historiography of realism reaches back to Thucydides to show that conflict and violence outweigh cooperation in IR because states can do little other than pursue power and influence if they are to survive. Thucydides is often taken to have offered a universal reading of what powerful actors may do in his infamous
Melian dialogue which is generally interpreted to be a pragmatic endorsement of such practices. In this milieu of the inherency of violence in humanity and states, as Machiavelli pointed out, there is little room for moral codes and cooperation, but rather cynicism and amorality, through which realism is deployed to read history and to explain IR as a Hobbesian state of nature. For Machiavelli, human nature was self-interested and morality and justice could be nothing more than a reflection of the hegemony of great powers. In a similar vein, Rousseau is represented as focusing on the darker side of human nature.

These texts have been appropriated in certain ways by the realist canon and methodology to prove that power and violence underpin the workings of the international system in an ahistorical and irredeemable way. History and politics prove there is no alternative, and so given this position, IR is about managing interests, balancing power and at most making alliances between ‘like-minded’ states. As Hobbes infamously pointed out, peace was extremely limited, and war extremely far-reaching. His notion of a ‘state of nature’ posited that a disposition towards war in international relations was simply a reflection of human nature. What is more, for Hobbes and for realists since Hobbes, this approximated a scientific law – the nature of the individual is reflected by the international state of nature. It is from these strands that contemporary realist thought has drawn upon a tradition of states as unified, and rational, and able to act as one in their pursuit of a ‘national interest’ thereby maximising their latent capacity for both defensive and offensive international engagements.

Of course, as George has pointed out, these readings are particular to modern realism because of its methodological approach: other, perhaps more optimistic, though just as subjective, readings can also be gleaned from the same texts. Indeed, the rationalisation of fear that Hobbesian thought offered can be taken as a starting point for thinking about peace. Though Hobbes saw peace as limited he also argued that it could be achieved through a commonwealth overseen by a Leviathan, representing a civil peace and social contract. Indeed, Hobbes offered education rather than the use of force as a path to peace. This is a rather more sophisticated account than a balance of power between states in which peace is simply the fragile moment in between conflict. In other words, Hobbes is concerned with a peace within and between societies, even if his prescriptions for a Leviathan appear to lead to anarchy or authoritarianism rather than freedom. Indeed, for Hobbes, peace was a state of non-interference in the lives of others in a commonwealth where a civil association existed, which appears to reflect the modern liberal state very closely. This begs the question as to why realism focuses on the anarchy offered by Hobbes’ work, and why it assumes that a domestic peace can coexist with international instability. The assumption is that international instability interferes with domestic peace, rather than the possibility that the commonwealth Hobbes envisaged might tame the international: “Injustice, Ingratitude, Arrogance, Pride, Iniquity, Acception of persons, and the rest, can never be made lawful. For it can never be that War shall preserve life, and Peace destroy it.” However, on balance, the sum of his thinking seems to indicate that a basic level of peace is the best that could be aspired to in the
absence of a commonwealth. He was also aware of the dangers of universalism, and the claim that there was universal framework that powerful actors could then deploy through war and violence to their advantage, on the assumption that other actors and states could be coercively assimilated. This would mean an imperialist victor’s peace, and Hobbes was clear that he would rather see a limited peace that reflected the norms and sentiments of its local and integral actors. In asserting this position, Hobbes identified one of the key dilemmas in the consideration of peace for idealists, liberals and realists. The position that peace can only be very limited and every state or commonwealth defines its own version of peace has served as a reason why more sophisticated agendas for peace are not worthwhile in realist thought, because they are implausibly interventionary and not pragmatic, particularly given the limited resources of any one state, and competition between states. What is clear, however, is that even amongst the founding canon of realist works, there are also discourses of peace focusing upon the alleviation of the state of nature. Despite such subtleties, texts such as _Leviathan_ are taken to provide validification of modern realism’s denial of an ambitious peace, and the view that war is part of the ‘fall’ of humanity along the lines envisaged by Augustine.

Hegel offered another critique of peace. He argued that war maintained the ethical health of the nation and ‘prevents a corruption of nations which a perpetual peace would produce’. Yet, Hegel was also able to argue that generally individuals were concerned with the well-being of others as Kant was also able to see that perpetual peace might be subject to hegemony. Hegel’s account of the dimensions of ethical life in his _Philosophy of Right_, included the family and civil society, as well as the state. However, the state was the most significant component of this attempt to promote an ethical life and was duty-bound to retain its sovereignty and its capacity for war. Indeed, for Hegel war provided a context in which individuals might demonstrate their capacity for an ethical life in society. Peace for Hegel would produce a ‘corruption of nations’.

The view that war may be inevitable, and even desirable, became suffused throughout modern realism as it drew selectively on this canon, even though it also contained notions of peace. The notion of peace that emerges is bounded, spatial and temporally limited within specific states. It represents a victor’s peace, founded upon the use of force and a form of imperialism. Imperialism gradually became a key part of a realist notion of peace (and contributed to the later development of the liberal peace). The British Empire’s exploration of new sea routes during the Elizabethan era led to a rapid realisation of the potential for trade, and ultimately the financial and military benefits of territorial acquisition and control. In 1570, John Dee wrote his _Brytannica Republicae Synopsis_, which famously became the basis for imperial expansionism. It soon became acceptable to talk of imperial or colonial hegemony as a realist form of peace. Superior races, technology and expertise, probably God-given, became the intellectual and normative basis of Western imperialism across the world. The highest form of realpolitik had become imperialism, as Morgenthau was later to explain. The development of imperialism reflected the requirements of
capitalist states in the developing international political economy. This later developed into what was known as ‘liberal imperialism’ during the late nineteenth century in which the imperial power had a responsibility towards the development of subject people (who were implicitly seen as primitive and/or barbaric). However, the strongly territorial nature of imperialism meant that, along with its serious ethical problems, it was also very unstable, open to challenges from the colonised and from competing imperial powers.

These tensions within the realist tradition meant that in practice it was gradually modified by a more liberal notion that war should only be waged by a legitimate authority as a last resort and in response to an act of unjustified aggression. After the Congress of Vienna, for example, peace now depended upon territorial states and their international arrangements which preserved a patchwork of interests between states through the balance of power. This supported a peace resting upon international treaties and alliances, as was envisaged by the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and many others to follow. Territorial, secular, state sovereignty emerged as the guarantee and arbiter of territory and hence peace, envisaged as a balance of power between juxtaposed territorial units, which mounted a possible threat against others. This was the nature of what might be called the Westphalian peace. War was the painful process through which the balance of power mechanism corrected itself. Peace was more or less what existed in between such corrections. However, the view that war was part of the natural fabric of international life was increasingly displaced by the view that peace should be so, as was bitterly contested in the first great debate of IR. The realist hypothesis that peace could only exist as an ideal form in a utopian future ruled by a Leviathan was countered by the idea that a form of peace could and did exist in the context of well-governed nation states where a social contract existed. Yet, the notion that war was a normal part of international life continued to underpin the thinking of many of the elites who oversaw international relations.

What emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century was a continuation of an understanding of war as part of the ‘natural order’, now modified by the progressive agency of enlightened actors with liberal views and objectives for the relationships of both states and peoples. This drew on both Hobbes’ and Locke’s thinking, among others. Locke, for example, argued that a law-based government would produce consensus, legitimacy, and therefore a domestic peace. Soon, realist thought was under pressure because the peace it offered was unacceptable to a growing number of actors within states, and representatives of states. An understanding of IR based upon rational progress emerged, in which humanity was believed to be progressing towards a more or less utopian ideal via a growth in interdependence, international law, non-state actors, advocacy and lobbying for disarmament, enfranchisement and women’s rights, amongst others. Even statesmen seemed to believe, with the exception of a notable minority, that a version of peace of benefit to at least most of the visible world (from the perspective of Western imperial and colonial states) was possible. For a time, the realist interpretation of the world and of the texts it claimed seemed to have failed.
Yet, the idealist challenge broke down catastrophically with Hitler’s invasion of Poland in 1939. As a result, for much of the remainder of the century, realism provided both a mode of analysis and a modus operandi. The resurgence of realism, and of course, E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau’s famous studies, *The Twenty Years’ Crisis* and *Politics Among Nations*, respectively, revived the view that idealist versions of peace were simply too progressive, indeed dangerously naive, to be possible. State interests were generally focused on self-interest in economic, military and territorial terms, which defined international relations, and only alliances between states could induce a certain stability – through a balance of power – but this would be constantly undermined by competition between states. Idealist and even liberal views placed too much faith in the goodwill of other states.

Carr attempted to recast realism as the science of IR in the emerging methodological style of the day. This, as George has shown, was based upon the pre-eminence of ‘fact over value, is over ought, and object over subject’, though Carr was also well aware of the significance of the normative aspects of IR. Peace was seen to be a ‘value’, an ‘ought’, a ‘subjective’ concept, and therefore inferior to, or limited by the realist version of ‘fact’, ‘is’ and ‘objective’ approaches. Indeed, for Carr, a form of peace defined as morality at the international level was merely the projection of the interests of dominant states. Peace was merely a hope, though it must also be noted that he was concerned with the inseparable relationship between power and morality, and the problems of crude, amoral realism, and of universal claims for a specific morality:

the utopian who dreams that it is possible to eliminate self-assertion from politics and to base a political system on morality alone is just as wide of the mark as the realist who believes that altruism is an illusion and that all political action is based on self-seeking.

Bull also thought that ‘idealist’ claims simply rested upon a passionate hope for IR, rather than an understanding that had any intellectual depth.

For Morgenthau, a balance of power emerged from the struggle between states in order to regulate the worst effects of that struggle. This was developed in the context of a Weberian ‘verstehen’ approach to observing the role of statesmen in deploying ‘interest defined as power’ in international politics. Out of this came a very limited victor’s peace, theorised to reflect interest defined as power and the competition between ‘nations’, with little acknowledgement of its related value systems and norms. Morgenthau developed perhaps the most important explanation of realism from a philosophical and historical perspective, and of the inevitable ‘flouting of universal standards of morality’ (though later in his career he was particularly critical of the behaviouralist turn that realism had taken, and of realism itself in the context of its inability to go beyond the state of nature). Realism aimed at the control of war rather than its proliferation. However, even those realists that favoured a historical or philosophical approach disliked the pretences of a science of realism, which many felt did not take this aim far enough.
From out of these assertions developed a claim by realists that they described an eternal reality and had constructed a pragmatic approach to explaining and managing it. This recast realist canon again turned to earlier thinkers in order to support this claim, in the process often misrepresenting the subtleties of their claims because of their aspirations towards producing a science of IR. Yet such claims clearly objectified and essentialised, not to mention reduced, the key components and claims of IR, leading to the positivist realist depiction of an endless cycle of the historical repetition of war, interest and breakdowns in the balance of power. Realism revolved around the tendency of states to exist in their own moral universe, and therefore to compete even on a normative basis. Both Morgenthau and Niebuhr thought that any kind of universal ethical concern projected at the international level – as idealists and liberals called for – may indeed be a cause for war, rather than a cause of moderation.

From the perspective accorded by an examination of peace, the first ‘great debate’ of IR which seemed, by the time of the Second World War, to have been settled in favour of realism, appears to have been an artificial debate in which twentieth century realists interpreted canonical texts in the new context of the interwar period and the Cold War. This was in order to endorse a science of realism via commentary that was biased towards the view that only realism could explain IR, and to discredit idealist and liberal thinking on peace. This raises the question of whether classical realism and the first great debate is mainly an invention of a certain epoch of modern realist IR, imposed on history to determine the present and the future according to a negative epistemology of peace.

Realist science

During the second half of the twentieth century realist thought moved from a historical and philosophical base towards adopting the formats offered by behaviourism and positivism, as illustrated by Wolfers’ ‘billiard ball’ model, which represented a ‘scientific image’ of realism (culminating in the rational choice models which have dominated corners of realist and liberal theory). The move to place realism within the ambit of a science of international relations was part of a broader positivist movement in social science, focusing on the behaviouralist argument that observable behaviour was crucial. This so-called ‘second debate’ in IR was effectively an attempt to legitimate the assumptions realism was already based upon. Such rational actor models focused upon utilitarian calculations of interest and power (even offering the proposition that nuclear war might have utility) and endorsed the notion that state interest could be defined as power underpinned by a basic concern with self-preservation. There was little room for any discussion of peace in these approaches, during the Cold War, where in one period between 1983 and 1988 three trillion dollars were spent on weaponry by both superpowers. At the same time, issues such as famine, disease and civil war continued, often ignored by IR. Self-preservation was defined in terms not of the construction of a broader peace but in terms of the
preservation of the state as an umbrella for the nation. This endorsed the Weberian state control of violence to preserve its domestic integrity and its position in competition with other states.

Kenneth Waltz’s first major work continued along these lines and provided a structure more able to represent realist interpretations of scientific order in the latter half of the twentieth century. In *Man, the State, and War*, he argued that there are essentially ‘three images’, all of which are representative of the fragility of IR, and its propensity for violence. The first, human nature, is the root cause of war. The second, the state, dictates the clash of national interest between states. And the third, the international system, is structured in such a way that state behaviour is determined by this clash. According to Waltz, international anarchy is the cause of war and, as with his reading of Rousseau, the nature of social relations leads to war. In this system, there was little room for any peaceable alternative other than the brief absence of war at all or one of these three images of IR. Because all states operate within a balance of power, and are subject to a security dilemma vis-à-vis other states’ warlike intentions and selfish national interests, peace is simply a hiatus from violence and will always be limited, brief, tragic and illusory.

Martin Wight’s intervention in IR theory pointed to the paucity and moral poverty of IR’s orthodoxy and argued that IR was a realm of the repetition of war, but he also pointed to the potential of international government, if it existed, in promoting peace: ‘So long as the absence of international government means that Powers are primarily preoccupied with their survival, so long will they seek to maintain some kind of balance between them.’ This rested upon a limited notion of peace arrived at through his reading of three thinkers – Machiavellians who equate with realists, Grotians with rationalists and Kantians with idealists. Groian rationalism represented a middle ground between realism and idealism, but essentially, given its focus on states, law and a balance of power, merely represented a softer form of realism which always lay beneath IR. Such thinking was also reflected in Hedley Bull’s contribution, in which he argued that anarchy and society were central to IR. Bull developed an argument resting upon the assertion that international relations is derived from a ‘domestic analogy’ whereby:

the need of individual men to stand in awe of a common power in order to live in peace is a ground for holding that states must do the same. The conditions of an orderly social life, on this view, are the same among states as they are within them: they require that the institutions of domestic society be reproduced on a universal scale.

He argued for a move away from this in favour of an international society without a government, for the simple reason that international anarchy had ‘become intolerable’. Of course, such views effectively represented the experience and development of the European states-system as universal, and as the sole agents of coercive power, and therefore abstracted from this very
negative view of peace. Thus, the second ‘great debate’ about IR was not really a new debate, but simply a restructuring of the classical debate between idealism and realism on behaviouralist grounds.\textsuperscript{56}

In one of the most influential contributions to the realist tradition, though mainly in the North American context, which redefined realism as structural or neo-realism, Kenneth Waltz now sought to rescue classical realism from its reliance upon the state as the sole actor, to focus upon the international system as a whole and to place it upon a positivist footing – as was the order of the day.\textsuperscript{57} In this international system of self-help, the core of realist thinking remained intact, the problem of structure and agency was brought to the fore, as well as that of the question of which level of analysis was most influential in understanding IR. Waltz’s work marked a resurgent methodological shift from IR as an ‘art’ (often the ‘art of the possible’ on the part of statesmen and diplomats) to its claims as a science, therefore carrying the possibility of immutability, prediction and independent facts. Waltz made explicit the privileging of structural constraints determined by a mix of anarchy and state resources within the international system over agents’ – mainly sovereign states – strategies and motivations towards survival, as well as the comparison between the free market with its ‘hidden hand’ and the international system.\textsuperscript{58} However, the security dilemma still drives the international system and state behaviour within a balance of power. Unsurprisingly, in the Cold War context, a bipolar balance of power was deemed more stable that a multipolar balance. Certain interpretations of the dynamics of the Cold War were influential in validating this view of IR. The approach formulated in George Kennan’s identification of the inability of the Soviet Union to respond to anything other than the use of force or expression of power became a foundational assumption legitimating the new phase of realism.\textsuperscript{59} This absolute priority for IR trivialised many other issues and approaches that were equally, if not more, significant. Yet realist thought persisted, now couched within the framework provided by Westphalian states, though with the advent of the Cold War period its underlying subtext related to an analysis of relations between two alliances (some would also argue that these represented two empires) marked by proxy wars, a nuclear balance of power and the fear of ‘mutually assured destruction’.

Implicitly, in the state-centrically reproduced world now inscribed upon IR, any peace that was achieved would be underpinned by a dominant or hegemonic state. Human nature, and the resultant nature of states, still indicated that a better peace could not be achieved (despite the challenge posed by liberal–democratic peace theory and by neo-liberalism, which was discounted by neo-realists on the grounds that democracies loosely defined had fought wars in the past and cooperation was still unlikely). Neo-realism focused upon the present situation, upon balancing multiple states’ interests, and pre-empting future violence by constructing a militarised capacity that would make violence between states too costly for any one state to believe there could be a clear winner. This rested upon a cost–benefit analysis of the utility of force as an expression of interest, and meant that the canon of neo-realist thought ultimately stopped at the point
where a balance was achieved, and did not delve into the further possibilities that peace might offer.

Neo-realism was not without its critics. Within the sister field of IPE, the notion of ‘complex interdependence’ offered a more ambitious notion of peace. A connection began to develop here with neo-liberal thinking about the benefits of international trade, which could anchor international cooperation and allow states to transcend their security dilemmas. Yet states only take part in international regimes, organisations and institutions because these conform to their national interests. Limited cooperation effectively occurred only within the parameters defined by state pursuit of national interests. This neo-liberal challenge emphasised the cooperative aspects of state-centric IR. On the issue of hegemony, Keohane and Ruggie argued that cooperation between states is possible without the need for hegemony, implying the development of an ‘embedded liberalism’ which modifies the basic positions of realism. Yet, regimes, norms and principles were affirmed not to be significant in IR by Waltz (though Krasner and Keohane did not agree).

More critical work began to recognise the limitations of neo-realism, even during its heyday. More generally, George claims that Waltz’s 1979 study was a major step backwards for IR after more critical interpretative debates had begun to emerge in the late 1960s and 1970s (coincidental with the Vietnam War). He ridiculed realism’s attempts to represent IR, arguing that it was simply a subjective response to a set of values rather than a scientific epistemology. Critical voices such as Ashley pointed to the ‘poverty of structural neo-realism’ aimed at its reduction of IR to interest and order, and the subsequent limitations of such a parochial view of the discipline, in order to open up a discussion of a more emancipatory approach to IR than realism offered. Similarly, Cox pointed to the self-interested nature of realist theory, which he implied created theory to perpetuate a particular system and set of values, as all theorists, in his opinion, do. Keohane and Nye’s concept of interdependence was designed to show how regimes developed and changed, and also to point to the role of non-state and transnational actors responding to issues rather than to power. This allowed for a number of new themes to be developed and the discussion of international regimes, principles, rules and norms rapidly became a major debate. This also connected with earlier idealist, liberal and pluralist work and led to a widespread argument that realism had now become defunct in the face of the challenge of international regimes. Ultimately, this Grotian-based approach offered a more sophisticated view of peace that crossed over into liberal and neo-liberal debates.

In sum, neo-realist thinking continued to rest upon the assumption that there is a clear divide between subjective and objective thinking, between the domestic and the international, and that the objective world ‘out there’ is made up only of self-interested states that shape the international system from the top down in a hierarchy induced by relative power. Cooperation is a chimera because states are egoistic rational actors and regimes are at best an expression of coincidental utility between states. Neo-realism eventually produced the
offering, not of a sophisticated view of peace (though it moved towards accepting liberal hegemony at the end of the Cold War as a limited form of peace), but a view of civilisational conflict, of competition for hegemony between China, the EU and the US, and a continued logic of nuclear deterrence.\textsuperscript{70} Of course, the logic of the ‘war of terror’ after 2001, with attacks taking place across the world aimed at the liberal state and Western interests, falls outside of the realist paradigm of rational state actors pursuing a national interest, though the realism response that such violence can only be ended on the basis of a victor’s peace, through which states reassert their hegemony and their Weberian control of the means of violence, appears to have remained relevant to the debates in IR. However, as Gaddis and Hoffman both illustrated in their critiques of realism’s failures at the end of the Cold War, there were many serious oversights in such thinking and its influence on policymaking, not least the general implications for the conduct of the most powerful states during the Cold War, such as the US.\textsuperscript{71} So far realism has failed to offer a response to such problems, or to the broader question of the sort of peace its intellectual and policy frameworks might offer. Though the first great debate ended in the Second World War with a realist assertion that survival was the best that IR could achieve, neo-realism failed to respond to the end of the Cold War, or the ambition that developed for a broad, albeit liberal, peace amongst many thinkers and policymakers.

**A victor’s peace**

The underlying realist assumption that human nature, transferred to the state, is the basic constraining factor for peace in IR depends upon the equally questionable notion that human nature itself is not contingent on cultural, political, economic, social and historical contexts. Furthermore, it depends on the long discredited inherency argument that humans are basically violent creatures. Yet, these very shaky assumptions form the basis upon which the main version of peace in IR for realism emerges – the victor’s peace. Territorial states represent an a priori formulation of nations and their interests and in this immutable world of conflict, anarchy, the state of nature and the balance of power, allow for either minimal survival or a maximum of an imperial hegemony. All of this emerges from the assumption that the first task of individuals and states is security, and strategies are deployed against the inevitable threats of existential and physical challenges to their values, norms and resources. This amorphous set of challenges highlights a mode of thinking which establishes interest as power: the unit exercises power derived from its control of these resources in order to secure itself and its interests, and to reduce or negate current and future threats. Until these threats have been negated, the narrative of peace in realist versions of IR is extremely limited, and its absolute end goal is a victor’s peace in which all other actors are either subservient or are removed.

Almost exclusively, the forces that are seen to drive world politics are destructive, self-interested, and also predictable. Politicians and officials are constrained by national interests rather than laws and morality, and are ulti-
mately obligated only to their own constituencies, eternally defined as the citizens of their territorially sovereign state. These were the factors that a ‘science of international politics’ should focus on: experience had shown that international institutions and law merely provided camouflage for the realities of state power and competition. This meant that preparations for war were eternally required to make it more unlikely. Pacifism and preparations for peace through international law and institutions, while normatively desirable, merely underestimated the realities of power and resulting violence in international relations.

Implicit in these approaches is the notion that realism presents the world as it is. These claims to present an objective view of world politics, war and order imbued political realism with extraordinary claims of legitimacy and realist theorists with the ability to make vast and authoritative, but largely unsupportable, claims about IR. Ultimately they were a form of censorship which prevented an open discussion of a broader peace, deeming it naive and risking association with appeasement strategies, such as those preceding the Second World War. Yet, this itself was dangerously simplistic and naive; the focus on war meant little preparation for peace, lacking even the liberal or structuralist concern with building a world order marked by some form of justice – other than that of the victor. Because ‘reality’ dictates there can in practice be no peace, as peace has never been extant in anything but a limited form, realism theorises a world order in which little more than a cold peace might ever exist. Yet, realism appeared to claim it had settled all of the key methodological and epistemological debates, and indeed represented ontological stability, while yet all around in IR and other disciplines these battles still raged. Realism, and its extension into neo-realism, was indicative of the ‘backward discipline’, still engaged in the search for objective laws even in the context of complex and fluid, social, economic and political dynamics and the tension between individuals and their identities and political organisation. Realism – and mainstream IR – clung to its simplistic, reductionist and hegemonic representation of the world, and of a victor’s peace.

A form of this thinking is offered by Mearsheimer, who sees possibility for anything other than a realist form of peace without a sovereign power to oversee the activities of states in an anarchic international system. Nuclear weapons are therefore described as an agent of peace because of the terrible consequences of their use! Increasingly, however, the sanctity of such thinking was underpinned by strong challenges within liberal quarters, for example from those working on the ‘democratic peace’ project. Even so Mearsheimer argues that liberal and liberal institutionalist visions of international order are fatally flawed because they underestimate how deep the roots of realism run in the international system.

What is remarkable about this style of debate is that it assumes that the nature of peace is incontestable, even if it cannot be achieved. Peace is an uneasy truce between states or civilisations, at best moderated hegemonic states, mainly dependent upon military and economic power and interest. Within this structure, the realist tradition suggests a multiplication of types of peace in domestic
settings, in an uneasy truce with each other. This suggests that a domestic peace can exist even while the international sphere is organised for war. This binary of war and peace, connected and disconnected, is of course an unlikely proposition. The problem here is that a domestic aspiration for peace, which one must assume would rest on an amicable arrangement and social contract between inhabitants and government, results in a general aspiration for international power and interest, which emerges above and beyond that promoted by the requirements of defensive national security. This leads to an interpretation of an offensive national interest from the perspective of other states even if security is discursively constructed as ‘defensive’ (this has been a recurrent theme within the domestic debate on reforming Japan’s ‘peace constitution’ since its sovereignty was restored in 1952 after the end of US occupation). In addition, history and the contemporary world are replete with examples of states which did and do not pursue power even in this easily misinterpreted defensive sense. Thus, the assertion that anarchy drives the actions of states and thus produces the dynamics which realism describes is only relevant for some states. For these states, realism describes a dynamic whereby in the absence of a commonwealth, a small number of aggressive states constantly destabilise the international system either in the discursive or perceptual realms, in order to survive or assert their hegemony.

In this eternal world, history preaches that peace is limited and war is inevitable while at the same time noting that if the lessons of history are ignored, perhaps by those with a more utopian outlook, the outcome will be more, rather than less, violent. In this view, sovereignty lies with the powerful, always within the state framework and the only way out would be through like-minded states forming a club for mutual self-defence while at the same time being wary of each other’s capacity to default from this club. In this tautological world, peace might be guaranteed by a central authority, though this is unlikely because no state would allow another to exert hegemony.

Examining the realist tradition via the mechanism of peace accentuates problems with its focus on the state as the unit of analysis, as a rational actor in pursuit of power, influence and security in an insecure environment. This means that there is no room for normative debates, or for other actors and their issues, identities or interests. Peace is limited and constructed according to the post-Enlightenment culture of European diplomacy. State preparedness to use force may guarantee survival but also it also hints at the anarchy which limits it, and a possible attempt to create a victor’s peace: this is the paradox of Bismarck’s realpolitik. This is a recipe for conflict rather than peace. State-centricity ignores the agency of non-state actors such as rebels, secessionists and terrorists. It may also emphasise their concerns. Territorial sovereignty and its association with recognition and representation issues leads to the assumption that territories can be simply represented by sovereign actors, and inhabited by homogenous identity groups, without giving rise to competing claims for its control or identity conflicts. Individual agency, culture, identity and ‘non-rational’ aspects of life are automatically discounted as irrelevant. In this way, realism presents a highly
simplified cartographic version of the world, and tragically establishes the conditions in which even a limited peace is unlikely. Indeed realism’s presentation of international relations and international politics as ‘eternal’ and, of course, tragic, effectively negates historical development and evolution: when arguing that we must learn from history to understand IR, realism focuses on history’s conflicts. Indeed, it is shaped by such a negative view of human nature and human history – and of power – that it neglects much in order to prove a simple point – that domination and hegemony are the only true conditions of peace, and that where this is not possible, anarchy will prevail. Where peace is envisaged it is normally a version of the victor’s peace.

Despite this, many thought that at the end of the Cold War a ‘liberal moment’ had arrived that would bring to an end a tragic period of realism, though underlying this liberal moment was the basic logic of political realism. For example, for the most part societies and individuals, as well as issues such as poverty, equality, development and human rights, secondary, remained hidden in IR. Peace was also represented as of benefit to others if it spread, delineating a crusader mentality. Perhaps one of the most visible early attempts to retain the logic of realism in the post-Cold War environment as mainstream IR shifted towards a liberal/neo-liberal framework, was Huntington’s work on the ‘clash of civilisations’. In this now almost mythical statement on post-Cold War international relations, Huntington saw ‘civilisations’ as the new ‘state’, representing units that formed a core cartography of enmity in IR. He argued that coexistence between them is fraught with difficulty because of inalienable differences over interests, power, identity and culture. This reprise of political realism defined civilisations as the new state-like units locked into escalating conflict over interest and power, which might culminate in a systemic clash of civilisations (which in the final pages of his book leads to an apocalyptic war). Here peace is viewed as dependent upon homogeneity within civilisations, and based simply on an uneasy truce between inevitably clashing others, rates of development, interests, identities, cultures and religions. It is in these areas that realism bridges with liberal thought. This implies that international institutions, norms and law have potency when backed by force: liberalism may occasionally dispute the necessity of enforcement, but it concurs if force supports international institutions and law according to common norms, behaviour, consent and consensus. This underlying ‘liberal–realist’ axis has now become a new orthodoxy of mainstream approaches to the discipline.

Yet realism is attractive to policymakers and officials who see their role as located in the realm of pragmatism and expediencies, and need quick solutions, even if they are short-term, to crises and pressing problems. Because of this, Buzan sees realism as capable of overcoming the challenges presented by alternative approaches, including Marxism, liberalism, critical theory and post-modernism, by incorporating their insights into its core, though he also acknowledges its inherent fatalism and failure to offer any hope for a sustainable peace in the longer term. Here lies the failure of realism’s grand narrative as a project for peace in IR.
Conclusion

Realism offers a domestic peace limited by the need to be prepared for war, and victor’s peace at the international level. It eschews any kind of positive normative debate (as Thucydides is often famously argued to have upheld and despite the possibilities offered by a Hobbesian commonwealth of fear). As an agenda for peace, the realist tradition offers little, particularly in its positivist, neo-realist incarnation, that would be rhetorically accepted to today’s political leaders or officials in IR beyond the limited order of the Westphalian, territorial, sovereign peace. As a research programme, it failed to foresee the end of the Cold War or explain multipolar frameworks for IR, and appeared to advocate a belief in unstable balances of power and deterrence that in a nuclear context is extremely dangerous.79 As Booth has pointed out, realism failed in the Cold War as well as at the end of the Cold War,80 and it never inhabited an uncontested space, given the importance of idealism, liberalism, liberal–internationalism and liberal institutionalism at various stages of the discipline’s development. Indeed, it might be said that the first great debate was a debate over the epistemology of peace, with realism’s negative view strongly supported by the World Wars, and the Cold War.

Realism has come to be determined mainly by North American positivism, and formulaic methodologies designed to reduce IR to key actors, dynamics and issues. As a consequence of its rejection of subjectivity, it slavishly reproduces an ‘objective reality’ and represents a cult of anti-peace thinkers, who reject both a universal or pluralist basis for peace, or that interests and peace might be linked. As Vasquez argued realist theory led to war over peace.81 Indeed, Walker points out that political realism entails the evasion of the necessary skills to understand the ‘reality’ of IR.82 Certainly, this appears to be the case with the so-called second debate, in which realists sought to provide a scientific basis for their objectification of the dynamics of order in world politics.

Realism is little more than the story of war between states, and how this dominates IR. While this is an important story, the way it only represents one perspective, fails to move beyond the politics of fear (despite occasional mention of a commonwealth of a world government), and concentrates on this perspective in order to provide an agenda for peace is clearly futile. It is akin to driving dangerously so one can learn how to make oneself a safer driver. The realist tradition is tautologous, paradoxical, and rests upon a blinkered version of human political history, constructed to perpetuate the predominance of state, elite and official discourses about the world. Because it depends on official actors and official records it only reflects their own professional interests as representatives of states, and so misses an enormous amount of information, other histories, and other representations, in its analytical framework. Realism only explains peace as a result of hegemony or collapse. This is defined by a negative ontology and a tragic epistemology relating to realism’s inherency view of human nature, the state of nature, and their tragic repetition. It offers a narrow methodology that legitimates a perspective based upon binary inside/outside
structures. These effectively reify the incommensurability of different identities and sovereignties. Even during the height of realism there were powerful discursive frameworks which illustrated another story of IR, and one which was deeply influential and had important implications for a far more sophisticated version of peace than the victor’s peace realism offered. Realism has offered an important set of tools to understand security frameworks for states: these insights are an important part of any discussion of peace – but only a part. Realism’s ontological and methodological assumptions, which have grown up around it, need not be accepted as they have proven to be an obstacle to anything more than a negative peace.
3 Marxist agendas for peace
Towards peace as social justice and emancipation

simple laws of morals and justice [...] ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations.¹

Introduction: structural determinism
This chapter surveys the implicit conceptualisation of peace inherent in orthodox structuralist explanations of IR, from its interrogations of imperialism, world order and world-systems, class, conflict and capitalism, to its proposals for the construction of an international order in which economic and social justice prevail. From here arose the broader critical contributions of the debates on emancipation, hegemony, social justice, language and identity. An inevitable part of the debate on peace implicit in orthodox structuralist approaches to IR theory revolves around the problems of agency and structure. This often implies that structures are exploited by the rich and powerful in order to deny the agency and freedom of the individual through hegemonic domination based upon an unequal distribution of material resources, or via race and class. From this underlying concern with the construction of structural hegemony, particularly through realism and liberalism, it offers arguments pertaining to the reform or removal of such structures by the realisation of the actual agency of individuals to create justice, as Marx argued.² In extreme cases this revolves around revolutionary action against hegemony, though the more influential version of this debate aspires to empowerment of agency through reform, or simply through discursive responses to the identification of such structures of hegemony.

Structuralist thinking opened up both the determinism inherent in the workings of international structures and the problem of powerless or weak subjects, and how they were influenced, dominated or exploited by structures formed by powerful actors, economic structures, geopolitics and other hidden political, social and economic frameworks that define the individual within their context. This agenda has survived the political collapse of socialism and communism. In this sense, structuralism has been concerned with the identification of frameworks that disguise power over subjects, as well as dialectical forces of history that induce change. Indeed, a broad range of schools of thought, including
notably liberalism, accept that the former identification of structural violence
must be part of any attempt to build a sustainable peace. The implied empower-
ment of subjects over structures indicates an ambitious desire for peace through
equality, empowerment and some form of justice relevant to individuals as
opposed to merely states or elites. In its different guises, of course, such a peace
has not been achieved as structuralism has also been allied with ideologies of
power. Its goal of replacing structures that dominated agency instead merely led
to their replacement often by worse forms of domination in the many states
around the world where communism was practiced during the Cold War period.
This chapter examines how such debates have contributed to a problematic,
deterministic, but also more diverse understanding of peace.

Marxism and a classless peace

In its most famous form, structuralism offers the view that the global economy,
world trade and global economic relations are structured to the advantage of
small elites and social classes and are chained to their control of state and inter-
national institutions, leading to global injustice and the disempowerment of
much of the world’s population. Accordingly, the elite’s status and resources
depends upon the disempowerment of the many. Peace in these terms cannot
exist while such structures exist. The question here arises as to whether the
agency of the masses can overcome injustice caused by elite political and eco-
nomic structures, and replace them with a ‘revolutionary’ form of economic
justice, either through a peaceful reform or coercive measures. Alternatively, the
question arises as to whether such structures are created by elites for their own
ends, and whether structures in fact create adverse relations between individuals
and elites within states and more broadly around the world. This raises the ques-
tion of whether structural injustice and inequality can be resisted to create a
more ambitious peace, or whether they are innate at the international and
domestic levels, not to mention whether this framework can be couched within
the concept of territorial sovereignty. Underlying this debate is a concern with
the emancipation of the disadvantaged. Clear similarities can also be seen here
with both realist and liberal thinking in that the international and domestic
divide and the role of states are still crucial, though a global alliance to resist
injustice is also plausible. Yet, structuralism and Marxist approaches were mar-
ginal in the first great debate in IR, and appeared only as a foil of enmity by
which realism and idealism could assert their claims. Indeed, there is a
surprising paucity of literature directly relating IR theory to Marxism, often put
down to the argument that Marxism had little to say about the international and
much more about the domestic (though this criticism rests on the now discred-
ited national–international divide of realism). Indeed, Marxism had much to say
about the transnational, and this has, of course, been very influential in some
quarters.

According to Marx, structuralism indicates that change arises through the
materialist dialectic – the Hegelian principle that a thesis will become its
antithesis – and that human nature is fluid and responds to its environment, societal dynamics and historical experience. This indicates the contradiction that can be found within a class struggle, which is the engine of social and political life. Thus, materialism indicates economic relations are the basis of political and social life. This might be taken to imply an embrace of inter-subjectivity through a focus on society and labour, but Marxism claimed a scientific status and offered objective and deterministic claims about forces that influenced the course of history because of its focus on materialism. History is seen as teleological, and mutually constituted by undifferentiated domestic and international processes resting mainly on the capitalist world economy and its control by elites, elite classes, and the structures they develop or respond to: ‘The bourgeoisie ... [i.e. capitalism] creates a world after its own image.’

Marx and Lenin’s version of structuralism was based upon the dynamics produced by the private ownership of property and the pursuit of profit and material interests. Because capitalism is driven by the desire to accumulate surplus value it is inherently unfair and unjust, is of benefit to elites, and leads to the exploitation and marginalisation of the masses, thus reproducing a class system. This was a critique of the liberalism of the day which, as Lenin pointed out, generally defended the privileges of elites. The economic base of the system would support political and social institutions – called in Marxist terms the ‘superstructure’, which would reflect these problems. In Marxist historical materialist terms, human history and social development are driven by economic factors and structures so as economic systems developed from agrarian to industrial, social relations developed from feudal to bourgeois. Because of these dynamics, any capitalist system would eventually collapse because it was riddled with internal inconsistencies, and was fundamentally unjust, as both Lenin and Luxemburg argued. Marx argued that this was a scientifically observable set of phenomena, meaning that history was determined by capitalists protecting and expanding their resource base and so leading to revolutionary reactions. This injustice would lead to a violent and revolutionary overthrow of an elitist and conservative system, and a new and revolutionary form of peace, based upon justice and economic equality – effectively the abolition of private property upon which so much conflict had previously been derived. Though Marx did not extend his analysis fully to the states-system there is clear potential for the use of this framework to understand the sources of violence, and of peace in the international system, without necessarily accepting Marxist positions on private property (as a range of critical and post-structuralist scholars have). Indeed, Marx and Engels argued that there could only be ‘real personal freedom’ in a classless society where there would be no exploitation of labour.

Marx offered an understanding of relations between classes in the context of capitalism and their implications for both domestic and international relations. He argued that for mutual interest to emerge, which was a prerequisite of the form of peace implied by Marxism, capitalist property relations must be abolished in order to remove the exploitation that occurred between ‘nations’, leading to social justice. The class framework enabled a transnational view of
IR in which a struggle over the nature of order takes place not just between states, but also between mobilised classes aiming at economic justice and equality (by taking control of the means of production and removing private property). This was not only concerned with developing a form of peace (in the form of a classless society) through communism or socialism, however, but also with the problem that the brunt of any war or conflict was borne by the working classes (a subtle addition to Kant’s position), implying a need for peace between states, even if they were capitalist. Indeed, what was most significant in this approach to international relations was that the transnational organisation of the masses who would take discursive and practical action to resist elite structures of exploitation was actually possible and represented a viable alternative to the top-down and state-centric nature of domestic and international politics. This emancipatory discourse is one of Marxism’s most important contributions, if ironic, to IR’s approaches to peace.

Lenin argued that imperialism made peace impossible, preventing any progress towards social democracy. This is where the paradox of Leninism and Marxism is often located, whereby to bring about this version of peace, violent resistance (revolution) may be required, echoing strands of both liberal and realist thinking. Though he argued that international capitalist expansion was linked with inter-state conflict, he thought the capitalist system was more durable than Marx had thought, despite the conflict it produced. Because of this the injustices and inequalities it harboured would generally be perpetuated, and the drive to expand markets would provide the resources necessary to perpetuate imperialism. Lenin made the argument that ‘imperialism was the highest stage of capitalism’ (this was also reflected in Morgenthau’s assertion that imperialism was the ultimate outcome of realism). This linkage provided a radical Marxist–Leninist critique of the international system, in which small economic elites also controlled political and military power enabling them to take actual control of the large parts of the world through imperial and colonial practice. These were, of course, inherently violent, unrepresentative, offered little in the way of social justice, and were merely an expression of political and ideological hegemony related to capitalism. Lenin believed that imperialism would lead to the collapse of capitalism. In addition, the theory of uneven development, advanced by Trotsky to explain Russia’s development problems, indicated that conflict between states would occur because capitalism only created an uneven process of development for the mythical ‘world in its own image’.

From such perspectives, an implicit conceptualisation of peace can be inferred and has influenced a wide range of theory, including development theory, critical theory and others. Marx’s contribution was that if historical materialism can be reconfigured to be of benefit to the masses so that they controlled the means of production and escaped from class conflict determined by private property, then a classless peace without structural violence and with inherent justice might emerge. The capitalist system was an obstacle to such a form of peace, which should include social justice and equity and would not rest merely on peace treaties between states or on the self-appointed elites which
controlled material and political resources. For Lenin, this could be carried onto the international stage, whereby capitalism fed imperialism, which prevented a Marxist–Leninist version of peace. This would emerge through revolutionary resistance from the proletariat, facilitating the collapse of capitalism and imperialism. Furthermore, imperial powers could never be in anything more than a truce with each other.

There were, of course, many communist revolutionary movements agitating for such a revolution following that of Russia in 1917. Yet, during the Cold War, most communist regimes emerged, after Marxism’s mutation into Stalinism, via the sponsorship of Moscow as top-down entities rather than as popular movements. Popular movements were often instrumental in expressing their aspirations for social and economic justice, and agitating along these lines, but the Marxist attempt to reformulate the social contract between elites and citizens, workers, or peasants, to one of equality and social justice simply led, in communist and socialist states, to power being concentrated in the hands of new, often Stalinist, elites, which often focused on their own interests – partially through domestic repression, somewhat predictably – rather than on social justice and equality. Often, these elites cited the structural conditions of world politics which forced them to compete with other, aggressive states. Popular movements, political parties, and advocates and activities of communism proved able to undermine governments and agitate at a low level for long periods of time, but communism proved to be most resilient, but by no means permanent in the control of governance from the top down in Soviet-sponsored states. In other words, communism led to nationalist states that competed along with other such states.

For these reasons, during the Cold War, this contradictory ideological framework appeared to be aggressive to non-communist states, and a recipe for war, even if it claimed to offer equality and social justice within the revolutionary state. For this reason, capitalist democracies bitterly contested the implied claims that Marxist-derived approaches created a better, more just, society (and hence, peace). Ironically, however, this version of peace claimed it provided social justice, in particular economic equality, through resisting and overturning feudal and imperially supported class structures (effectively structural violence), which prevented the proper valuing of labour and so of social justice. The irony of achieving peace and justice through a recourse to violence – a mark of many such theories – was clearly present in this framework. Indeed, many left-leaning intellectuals, artists, writers and thinkers of the 1930s and 1940s actually adopted communism because of its prioritisation of social and economic justice, including the likes of Picasso and Orwell, but were later to reject it because of the aggressive and warlike practices of the Soviet Union in satellites such as Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of 1968. Indeed, the ideological struggle between capitalism and communism is notorious for its violence and proxy wars, for issuing claims and counterclaims against their adherents of imperialist and neo-imperialist tendencies, suppression, and an empty rhetoric of peace. Of course, it should be noted that the attraction of
Marxist–Leninist based ideologies was based not on its practice, but on its aspirations for change and reform and, as with idealism, liberalism and realism, should be contextualised by the inequalities, development differentials and structural violence they were aimed at. These may have been significant contributions to an understanding of what peace may entail, though of course, as it became clear what existing communism really entailed, the positive epistemology of peace that it apparently offered was little more than a chimera. Revolution, reform and the resistance to capitalism offered an ideal of peace but in practice was far more brutal than the negative epistemology of peace that realism offered.

The critique of empire that was associated with Marxist thought can be linked with anti-colonialism and many anti-colonial resistance movements. Marxist–Leninist guerrilla movements were a common feature of the Cold War world, particularly in places such as El Salvador, Nicaragua, Colombia and Angola, as well as many others. Clearly, the international structure of imperialism and colonialism in which developed states occupied and governed non-developed states, and used them both as producers and markets for the economic well-being of the colonial power can be seen as a class-based structure analogous to the relationship between elites and masses inside a state. This enabled Marxist-influenced thinkers to point to the fact that IR has been dominated by hegemons or empire – for example, the UK and US in modern times – projecting world orders commensurate with their own elite level interests. It is no surprise that many anti-colonial movements were Marxist because such an approach provided them with the tools through which they could explain the oppression they had suffered and extract an argument that helped them legitimise their own resistance via an appeal for a more localised, indigenous form of peace – globally connected and cognisant of social justice, which they would ultimately own and benefit from. Anti-colonialism became an accepted norm in the international system by the 1960s. Any type of colonial relationship, or discrimination on the grounds of class or race also came to be rejected with UN General Assembly resolutions legitimising the use of force against colonialism, implicitly endorsing the civil rights movement in the US, and later the ending of apartheid in South Africa. Other colonial, racial, class or feudal type political systems also gradually collapsed.

The importance of such debates for developing an alternative understanding of the factors influencing peace in IR has been eloquently captured by Rosenberg:

it is at the international level that the extraordinary drama of modernity rises up to its full height. It is at this level, and this level alone, that we can glimpse the process of the capitalist transformation of humanity as a whole: the rise of the West, the engulfing of the non-European world, the globalising of the sovereign-states system and the world market, and the mighty world wars and revolutionary struggles which this development has brought in its train.28
The impact of structuralism on positivist IR

Mahan and McKinder had, even before the first debate, incorporated structuralist thinking into diplomatic and realist strategy by arguing that territorial and sea control defined geopolitics both for regions and states.29 This deployed structuralism as a methodological approach in which dominant structures (in this case strategic and geographic) were seen to influence or deny the agency of key actors. Because of the highly politicised and ideological nature of structuralist associations with variants of Marxist–Leninism, particularly during the Cold War, unsurprisingly it only became more directly influential in IR theory with the development of dependency theory in the 1960s and 1970s.

Dependency theory, initially focused on Latin America, represented an alternative reading of IR from the perspective of the new wave of post-colonial and developing states, and scholars concerned with obstacles to ‘modernisation’ and development30 which were associated with North American positivism and neo-liberalism (and derived from Marxist and Leninist contributions). In the context of a global capitalist system, and in particular its resultant class system, dependency theory showed how certain labour groups, from developing states and regions, were marginalised and exploited by the global economy and its hegemonic states. Some aspects of dependency theory proffered nationalism as form of protection from predatory neo-liberalism, while others such as Wallerstein and Galtung31 adapted it to develop a Marxist reading of the international political economy and the marginalisation of certain regions and populations.

Dependency thinking underlined how the unequal distribution of resources and modernisation favoured economic elites, or in international terms, how imperial and colonial control of colonies may have ended at the political level but that the structure of the international economy meant that there was a continuing relationship of dependency between the developed and developing worlds.32 This was termed neo-imperialism and neo-colonialism, through which the developed world continued to treat the developing world as subservient to the needs of the developed world’s economy, and remained politically and culturally subservient to them. Dependency theory offered an implicitly critical view of a peace where the developing ‘third world’ was simply abandoned to the bias introduced by the Western-dominated global economy and transnational capitalist groups. It indicated that the stability of the global economy was based upon the hegemony of the developed economies, and that developed states acted purposively to created dependency in their relations with developing states in order to control their resources. Thus, any peace that existed depended upon the survival of a global economic and related political hierarchy in which the poor would remain poor.

These insights became influential in certain quarters of IR. Wallerstein, for example, developed structuralist theories relating to historical cycles of power and dependency oriented world-systems approaches.33 Wallerstein’s ‘world-systems theory’ transcended the generally narrow focus on the West.34 A historical world system is governed by the same logic and rules that social groups are
subject to in their relations with each other. Ultimately, this system revolves around labour and the accumulation of capital, which Wallerstein charted back 400 years or so. Along the lines of dependency thinking, a capitalist world economy is dominated by states, social classes, peoples and households, all of which are shaped by the global economy. Thus, international relations can only be understood by examining the world system and its historical trajectory. This teleological position indicates a belief in a progressive (or anti-progressive) superstructure or force which in the best-case analysis projects a future peace comprising economic justice. Wallerstein also introduced the notion of a ‘semi-periphery’, whose role was to mediate the relationship of domination by the core of the periphery, outlined by dependency theorists. The role of the semi-periphery is effectively to mediate the interests of the periphery in favour of the core, however. He argued that labour and products were exchanged unequally within the core/periphery relationship, which itself is marked by periods of ‘blockage’ leading to economic recession. The world-system favours the already wealthy and powerful who in turn establish institutions and norms, such as the UN and its agencies, the IMF and World Bank, which legitimate their relative advancement. Peace in these terms is undermined by economic injustice and exploitation, which in turn reflects political and social inequality and injustice.

Indeed, Wallerstein illustrates one of the crucial antinomies around which IR turns: universalism on the one hand, but binaries such as racism and sexism on the other, endorsed through the capitalist system. Underpinning this are the ideologies, knowledge systems and ordering process of liberalism (which Wallerstein calls ‘geoculture’). These perpetuate conflict as opposed to order and rational change. Indeed, the whole edifice of an epistemic community, founded upon liberal democracy and capitalism, is essentially viewed as producing a limited, perhaps even realist version of peace, at the expense of the proletarian classes on a global scale who have little chance of betterment. For dependency theorists, and other structuralists, realist and liberal approaches combine to dress up inequality in an institutional guise that bears a strong resemblance to a feudal order, but is now projected globally. Of course, this is an inherently unstable system, pointing towards revolutionary change, rather than a victor’s peace or a liberal peace. This ‘hegemonic cycle’ veers between a world empire dominated by the wealthy and anarchy caused by the marginalised, with an optimum position being when a hegemon is able to intervene in such cycles.

Structural theories often take as their antonym the liberal peace, or at least various forms of liberalism, and are essentially a critique of the hierarchical, post-Enlightenment ontology and epistemology of order that liberalism propagates. In particular, Wallerstein points to the polarisation caused by capitalism, limitations of liberal development, democracy and welfare demands, ecological waste, and the limits of technology. Similar and other themes can be found in orthodox versions of peace studies and feminist studies, which also draw on structuralist approaches to conflict and gender respectively, often developing
accounts dealing with poverty, exclusion and masculinity. Structuralism in these forms generally infers that poverty, underdevelopment, exploitation, marginalisation and discrimination are key causal factors of conflict, and that the very governments, organisations and international financial institutions designed to alleviate such problems actually make claims about their roles that cannot be fully accepted. Instead they reflect the ideology and economic hierarchies of their major state members or elite groups. Yet, where states and groups attempt to resist the perceived inequality and injustices present in the world economy by establishing alternative systems (such as has been the case with Cuba) they are often severely sanctioned. What this raises is the problem of how states, institutions and organisations respond to what Galtung, who in the 1960s was developing a structuralist framework of understanding and responding to the causes of conflict, has defined as ‘structural violence’.43

This sort of argument has become very important in understanding resistance from social groups and developing states to neo-liberalism, to global capitalism and, of course, to globalisation, and especially intellectual resistance to the common liberal attempt to describe such structures as forces for ‘peace’. From this perspective, even the pluralist notion of interdependence is challenged for merely endorsing a system of global inequality. By inference, world-systems theory offers a notion of peace related to global economic equality and the redressal of the structural violence present in the global capitalist system, and in international institutions. This would require the redistribution of global wealth on a just basis, encapsulated in the arguments made for a New International Economic Order in the 1970s, which in particular called for the restructuring of world trade to the benefit of the ‘Third World’. Peace was envisaged as dependent upon a world in which all had adequate economic opportunity, and where rich states supported poor states.44 Of course, such initiatives have continually foundered upon the basic problem that the already rich states were unwilling to give up their economic advantages. This echoes the dilemma of Marxist approaches, relating to how one disentangles inequality without using coercion or force to remove economic advantage from the hands of a conservative economic and political elite. At a national level, this might mean a revolution from below carried out by the disadvantaged masses, rather than peaceful change, but a reform of the world trade system and the global economy might be plausible if only incrementally and over a long period of time.45 However, the capacity to reform the global economy would remain in the hands of officials and political elites, which tend to act in their national interests or might instead prioritise local interest groups like farmers, or wealthy elites (as has constantly happened in various World Trade Organisation rounds of negotiations).46

Though structuralism encouraged the incorporation of alternative actors and issues in IR, such approaches were still effectively state-centric, dependent upon the state as the instrument of oppression and marginalisation in the hands of a socioeconomic elite. Indeed, the institutions of state – the army, policy, judiciary, executive, and the capitalist economic system upon which it often rests are seen to be conservative forces, providing for the retention of power by tradi-
tional elites. Within earlier forms of structuralism, there was an important debate on how much autonomy the state may or may not have from these tendencies, which resulted in the treatment by the state of its citizens as subjects. More recent debates accept that states may well be separated from the vicarious interests of their dominant ruling elites, though it is hard to see how far this argument can be upheld when elites control the resources and institutions of a state. What is more, the system of sovereign lending and debt means that states, international and regional organisations and agencies control the flow of international capital, again possibly replicating the interests of those elites that dominate states. Thus, problems relating to political, social and economic exclusion within the state, to the flow and control of global capital, as well as the control of major resources such as oil, are raised by the version of peace offered by structuralist approaches. Clearly where such issues are present, peace can at best be defined as a negative peace where overt violence is not present, but structural violence is ever-present. The emancipation offered by Marxist–Leninism involved a great deal of violence, structural or otherwise, but it is also clear that capitalism is in itself often a process that induces structural violence. This can be observed in events such as the debt crisis in Mexico in 1982, the 1973 oil crisis, and the ongoing problems faced in the developing world where such dynamics are relatively common.

Power remains a key concept in structuralism, though it is not related to the contestation by states of their relative power, but lies hidden in society, in the state economy and in the global economy, and is wielded by the conservative elites who control or comprise these different structures. Structuralist thinking is predicated upon a necessary tension between the structure, whether it is economic, political, social or geographic, which is inevitably material in some way, and the agency of the individual. Especially in Marxism there is little escape in this dualism from an imbalance between elite hegemony or the dynamics of revolution. In essence, this offers a realist version of a victor’s peace, in which the two vie for control and domination over each other, but are not able to construct relations of cooperation. Emancipation is offered as a reward for resistance, leading to a future form of peace based upon economic and social justice. This means that as opposed to realism and in common with liberalism (despite its rejection of both) structuralism claimed to offer a positive epistemology of peace, if only after a long period of turmoil and resistance. These dynamics are inescapable and represented as truth, meaning that its determinism reduces or negates the very agency of those it implies it will emancipate.

Thus, the relative power of those who control the structure, or operate as part of the structure, and the agency of individuals culminates in hegemony without their awareness of its limitations. This was the basis upon which Gramsci developed his account of hegemony to explain why the anti-capitalist revolutions of Marxist approaches had not, for the most part, occurred in Europe. One of the key insights that was later taken up by critical and post-structuralist theorists such as Cox or Foucault, was that this hidden power could be uncovered, even if it was generally perceived to be part of a natural order (such as
those denoted by capitalism, colonialism or imperialism, racism or feudalism). The underlying assumption here implies that structures will generally be captured and hijacked by selfish actors who are determined to gain control of power and resources according to their own interests. Such actors will be in the minority, but by virtue of their elite status they will dictate a life of structural violence to be experienced by the vast majority. It is clear here that there are many similarities within realist thinking and the inherency of self-interest in human nature, which is reflected in the nature of states. For structuralists this is reflected in the nature of all structures, with one major exception. Where individuals and groups come together to express a majority decision to overthrow such structures of oppression they can do no wrong, and such a mass exercise of power should lead to social justice as the basis for domestic, transnational and international peace.

The notion that hidden structures are instruments of power, whether in the hands of an economic oligarchy, a ruling class, or because of geopolitics, reflected negatively on the class system that set individuals above others by divine right, or by virtue of birth, land ownership and resource monopolisation. It awoke the peripheral masses to the problem that though their political rights might have been legitimated to varying degrees, their economic rights now needed to be addressed. At the same time, it also injected into the debates in IR a new dynamic with respect to the problem of peace. Could structures ever be overcome? Did social groups have enough agency to avoid marginalisation by structures, let alone ruling and wealthy elites? It also struck a chord with some versions of realism which saw that anarchy itself was a structure which could never be overcome, only fended off. Liberals also began to borrow from its focus on marginalisation and emancipation in order to build a case for a more proactive normative vision, which would legitimate both freedoms and interventions to bring about those freedoms more specifically for marginalised groups within society. Both of course resisted the notion of a cycle of revolution and counter-revolution.

In all of these approaches, IR is seen to be heavily influenced by the forces and interests inherent in the capitalist world economy, which determines both violence and peace. States, MNCs and elites control national interests and national and international resources, leading to a fundamentally unjust socio-economic order that leads to periodic crises within and beyond states, during which the processes by which wealth is redistributed are often challenged and modified by transnational and domestic social unrest and advocacy. The challenges raised and the implications of structuralism sparked one of the most intense and confrontational ideological discursive conflicts ever seen. Yet, incredibly, orthodox IR theory was largely isolated and resistant to the possibilities and challenges raised particularly by Marxism (thought they were influential in areas such as peace research, development and gender) until the 1980s when the ‘third debate’ led to a critical moment that challenged its ontological and methodological assumptions. This was partly in response to a structurally rooted challenge to its accepted wisdom, which raised epistemological questions and opened normative windows hitherto firmly closed. The Cold War, being an ideo-
logical conflict, was in many ways a conflict over the nature of the new peace (often described as ‘order’) to be installed post-Second World War in diverse places around the world, in each superpower’s sphere of influence. Perhaps most importantly, this illustrated that orthodox IR, including idealism, liberalism and realism, was a servant of a very narrow, state-centric sphere of the international. Much of mainstream IR theorising – mainly in the West – fell firmly into the democratic capitalist camp, underpinned by the belief that democratic representation and capitalism provided sufficient normative legitimacy for there to be no negotiation or engagement with revolutionary ideologies or with the range of theoretical issues that Marxist approaches opened up.53

This reflected a grand narrative offering a utopian peace in the distant future if class could be overcome; but it was similar to a realist peace in which political, economic and military power determines international order. Peace might be a worthwhile aspiration, but conflict was inevitable in the interim. However, the notion of social justice became an intellectual aspiration of some IR theory, modifying the inherency approaches of realism, and connecting with the liberal concern with freedom and rights (later seen in and the emergence of the so-called ‘third debate’, critical theory and post-structuralism).

**Emancipation**

Perhaps one of the most significant contributions of structuralist approaches to the mainstream understanding of peace (leaving aside Marxist–Leninist notions of utopia and the revolutionary violence needed to attain it) is derived exactly from the agency present in the relationship between structures and the vast majority of actors which constitute societies or peripheries, and therefore IR. The uncovering of the significance of the conventionally defined ‘powerless’ subject in IR has given rise to a clearer understanding of the significance of peripheries and ‘grassroots actors’, the processes by which they are marginalised, how resistance occurs, emancipation, and of ‘bottom-up’ perspectives in IR. This represents an advance on the grand narratives of inherency, of liberal–internationalism, and represents a limited positivist epistemology of peace (if the structures of global oppression or marginalisation could be successfully overthrown by individual action). Despite structuralism’s determinist grand narratives relating to the instability and injustice of capitalism, these indicate that individuals and social groups, and social and economic issues, are constitutive of IR, rather than merely states and international organisations. In this way ethnic groups, social groups, linguistic, cultural and religious groups that are marginalised even by democratic processes, the status of the poor, the underdeveloped economies, and the role of women and children, and gender, and even difference and culture, suddenly all become constitutive of IR (depending of course on the abandonment of the Marxist notion that individuals are constituted mainly by their labour or economic productivity).

Yet, as has often been pointed out, nationalism and other forms of identification based upon religion, culture, ethnicity and language have generally been
ignored or ascribed by early Marxist thought and in the practice of socialism to ‘false consciousness’. Later on, as anti-colonial forces emerged espousing Marxist ideologies it became clear that nationalism was a mechanism of resistance to imperialism for social classes and peripheries. Yet at the same time nationalism had become the embodiment of many of the forms of oppression that structuralism was attempting to identify and undermine. Western imperialism replicated colonial interests across the world and through this gender, identity, culture, language, ethnicity and economic opportunity were arranged to the benefit of the elites that controlled the imperial world. During the post-colonial expansion of new states, these powers and capacities to marginalise were passed into the hands of new ‘national’ elites, though by now non-state actors and societies more generally had grown to expect and exercise their own individual agency, and partially through Marxist influences, had developed a language through which they could express their aspirations for justice, making such dynamics issues for IR, perhaps for the first time.

Many of these debates were developed in one of the more critical strands of Marxist thought – the Frankfurt School, working from the 1920s onwards. They opposed a simple and rigid materialism and associated dialectic, as was integral to mainstream Marxist orthodoxy. Instead they attempted to develop an interpretivist and social insight into ‘emancipation’ in terms of society and culture. This argued that emancipation arose not through revolution or opposition to capitalism necessarily, but by reflection on the relationship between knowledge, power, communication and hegemony (cultural or otherwise) and a subsequent praxis aimed at social emancipation. This established an influential research agenda for the second generation of critical theorists, most notably Habermas who sought to rebuild the emancipatory project while avoiding its totalising implications.

Conclusion

Structuralism, and particularly Marxist approaches, claims to speak for the peripheral, the poor, marginalised and oppressed, but like liberalism it effectively nominates someone who is qualified to speak for them against the structures that oppress them. Its representation of peace is subject, at least in its early ‘unreconstructed’ forms, to similar problems as that of realist and liberal approaches. However, structuralist influences on IR opened up important questions of social justice, economic equity and agency. They raised the issue of how international and domestic structures created or impeded social justice and equality, and in this way enabled liberal versions of peace to respond by considering issues relating to the redistributive obligations of states. Though structuralist approaches pointed the way to new understandings of marginalisation and domination by elites and unjust structures, their main focus continued to be on class in the global capitalist system and their negative effects in the context of the tension between social justice, power and imperial practices. These provide the basis for the structuralist understanding of war and conflict, which are
derived from and result in the replication of socioeconomic divisions in society and in the global economy. Indeed, Marxism generally views conflict and social division as ubiquitous, though not necessarily eternal truths. Ultimately, because such marginalisation is rooted in the structures of the international system itself, any view of peace through a structuralist lens is heavily influenced by a pessimistic belief that conflict is far too endemic to ever be successfully settled without a massive and perhaps unlikely reform or revolution in the global capitalist system and in domestic political systems. The structural ontology peace rests upon an environment of hierarchical exploitation and self-interest by elites, which can only be curtailed by social actors aiming at social justice, whereby a new ontology would come into existence.

Consequently, structuralist approaches offer a concept of peace that emphasised that a civil peace (borrowed from idealist and liberal thinking) required social justice and equity – a classless peace. This developed a theory of peace resting upon local and transnational resistance to structures that dominated and oppressed (in this case, international economic and class structures). It claimed to offer a more pluralist ontology and epistemology of peace in which its construction was not merely a result of elite decisions and knowledge systems, but began to encounter everyday life and its issues. Indeed, thanks to Marxist and structuralist thinking, IR was eventually opened up to a world beyond the West, the state, and even to the shortcomings of liberal institutions. Given its influence more generally, it also opened IR up to developments in other disciplines. But it followed a similar pattern to the realist victor’s peace, though this would not come about through state hegemony, but through social revolution leading to a structural peace and social justice.

Because structuralist approaches point to the enormous inequality created by an essentially imperial international system, peace would be attained by dismantling the imperial international system, and the global capitalist system, resulting in equality and an equitable distribution of resources. Marginalisation and domination would be replaced by social justice. At a methodological level the imbalance between agency and structure which produces such injustices would finally be resolved. Yet, inevitably, the question of who would be charged with overseeing such revolutions within states and reform in the international system meant that structuralism did not provide an alternative from an elite-dominated social system in the interim at least. A reliance on the creation of foolproof structures that took agency out the hands of the supposedly emancipated working classes and provided equality and economic and social justice simply ignored the fact that power and resources would be placed in the hands of centralised authorities which might only act upon their own interests, coloured by their own biases. Peace, from this point of view, proved to be a chimera, and perhaps even more negative than a realist peace, especially in terms of the way it was actually experienced by the millions of people who lived in systems influenced by socialism and Marxism (though not in the context of the West’s ‘social democracies’). While structuralist approaches identified the existence of hidden, structural violence, existing furtively in the very
assumptions, institutions, norms and frameworks of IR, in practice Marxism merely perpetuated structural violence through its reforms, its new elites and its attempts to redistribute resources. Because of their determinism, orthodox structuralist approaches seem to undermine the very impulse underlying an emancipatory form of peace. Because actors are effectively determined by the structures in which they live, like realism, structuralism assumes that these structures are such that, left unchecked, life would be ‘nasty, brutish and short’ for its actors. Thus, while it underlines the need for agency for actors to overcome such violent structures, this high level of determinism, like realism, underlines how difficult resistance and emancipation would be. Thus, the project of peace is subject to key ontological and methodological tensions that interfere with its overall goal of emancipation.
4 Beyond an idealist, realist, or Marxist version of peace

Of course, rational conduct is always an endeavour for peace.¹

Introduction

Drawing on both idealism and realism to support the delivery of a universal norm of peace to willing and unwilling recipients, liberal universalism has become a foundational orthodoxy for the contemporary dominant conceptualisation of the liberal peace. Rationalism has only marginally been modified by reflectivism in this context, as Keohane famously pointed out,² implying an Oakshottian connection between rationality and the search for peace.³ This is founded upon the framework offered by realism, which through parsimonious selection of which variables in IR are of significance, projects an order based upon the victor’s peace and the specific order and value system projected through the security architecture this promotes. This is modified by the liberal assumption that commonalities outweigh differences and so forms a basis for a dominant and institutionalised universalism capable of toleration.⁴ This indicates that the ‘ideal form’ of one universal concept of peace has actually been implicitly converted into an explicit and realisable normative and discursive form – combining a victor’s peace, a liberal peace, or peace as structural emancipation, a peace with normative dimensions in international society, a peace that is socially constructed, a peace with economic dimensions, a peace based upon regionalisation or globalisation – rather than relegated to a utopian and impractical notion.

The notion that humanity shares common norms is echoed throughout orthodox IR, in both negative and positive forms, as is the idea that power can be used for universal ends, to achieve a minimum form of order, international governance or emancipation. These require a political hierarchy and a social contract. This political hierarchy represents the consensus of its domestic constituencies but also is guaranteed by the Weberian notion that states should monopolise violence and regulate the worst excesses of behaviour. In return the state provides security and the necessary freedoms to provide the ‘good life’ and it is these freedoms that persuade citizens to accept the role of the state. Offering
desirable freedoms for the many and maintaining effective government at the state level is the key to the liberal argument for the creation of a sustainable peace.

Between these two main axes of realist and liberal orthodox IR theory, a concurrence has arisen on liberalism, the centre ground of which allows for the moderation of orthodox realist and idealist thought, and the cooptation of structuralist claims about social justice and emancipation. Where realists may argue anarchy is our ultimate destiny, liberals offer sanctuary in democratisation and international organisation, which may represent a temporary reprieve. Where idealists argue that a future harmony, indicative of a peace with justice and legitimacy, is possible, democratisation and international organisation are its essential building blocks. Where structuralism argues that international political economy produces marginalisation, liberalism intercedes to remove the revolutionary impulse towards emancipation by offering its own rights and freedoms. Interpreted through an understanding of peace, since the end of the Cold War, these debates have effectively concurred that the liberal peace, as defined by democratisation, the rule of law, human rights, development, in a globalised economic setting, guided by liberal hegemons, satisfies the core concerns of these theoretical debates. This is the liberal–realist hybrid basis for alternative strands of IR theory that tried to respond to the security, institutionalist, normative, social and economic problems inherent in its orthodox approaches, offering a more sustainable version of peace for states and citizens. This chapter briefly examines the development of alternative strands of IR theory in this context, their efforts to move beyond its orthodoxy, and implications for an understanding of a more sustainable form of peace.

**Peace through international society**

The so-called English School debates about an international society have offered an alternative to both idealism and more particularly to US-oriented – and contained – debates on various forms of ‘amoral’ realism5 (to the horror of some realists who reject its apparently naive turn away from positivism).6 English School approaches claimed to offer a via media between the two approaches, influenced by the non-pacifist strand of Christian ethics and ‘just war’ theory,7 reflecting historical and diplomatic concerns with international order.8 As Buzan has argued, it was important because of its openness to methodological pluralism and historicism, from which it developed its understanding of an international society (indeed, Buzan sees the English School as offering a ‘return to grand theory’).9 This was particularly significant in a behaviouralist era by offering at least the possibility of a normative reading of the discipline and a normatively based ‘international society’ in which cooperation and order could be maintained by focusing on the role of the state as a representative of domestic harmony and international cooperation. As with Carr’s seminal attack on idealism,10 peaceful change is seen to be the key problem that needed to be addressed in IR.11 Thinkers within the English School were always aware that the norms of
international society were limited\textsuperscript{12} though Hedley Bull, one of its main proponents, was able to be critical of both realism and of universalism.\textsuperscript{13} The notion of an ‘international society’ based upon shared values and interests between states as a framework for peace between states follows a narrow path between a balance of power and stable social relations between states and within their societies. In the international environments from which the various figures associated with the development of the English School were drawing empirical data, international society played a role as alternative realist readings of superpower relations and Marxist–Leninist notions of the instability of capitalism. The assumption of an international society – now often referred to as an ‘international community’ – now has wide currency.

The legacy of the English School for constructivism and for more critical approaches, is far-reaching. Its normative reading of IR indicated the importance of norms associated with the principles of democracy and of self-determination, which have become ‘settled norms’.\textsuperscript{14} The English School intervention in the discipline occurred during a period when rationalism, positivism, realism and structuralism had abraded to explain the Cold War. The development of an international society focused on inter-state relations, however, so sovereignty remained a key component,\textsuperscript{15} representing both the institutional ordering system of the international system, and the domestic constitutional ordering system necessary to ensure the stability of states, shared values and cooperation between them. Thus, the English School saw the use of force as only relevant under specific conditions of defence, associated with just war thinking. This meant that although it has been associated with both realism and idealism, and in particular their different approaches to the questions raised by sovereignty, territoriality and intervention, Buzan argues that it transcends them:

\begin{quote}
The English School . . . an opportunity to . . . cultivate a more holistic, integrated approach to the study of international relations. By this I do not mean the narrow ‘neo-neo’ synthesis that has settled around rational choice methodology and questions of absolute versus relative gains as a way of understanding international cooperation . . . the English School offers a basis for synthesizing that is both wide and deep enough to set up the foundations for a return to grand theory.\textsuperscript{16}
\end{quote}

For Bull, the main questions revolved around the balance of power, international law, diplomacy, great powers and war in an ‘anarchical society’. Consequently, a concept of peace remained merely a subtext, never closely developed, and implicitly dependent upon a harmonious confluence of these dynamics – in the same way that Bull also saw human rights.\textsuperscript{17} This of course, was an improvement on the bleaker realist view of a negative or victor’s peace. In this context, peace lay in the identification, development and expansion of international society, extended by the debate on human rights that developed in the context of the English School.\textsuperscript{18} Bull had argued that human rights would always be limited by the norms of sovereignty and non-intervention, meaning
that they were merely the luxury of those whose political conditions seemed to be more conducive to human rights.\textsuperscript{19} Vincent argued that human rights were the prerogative of transnational norms developed by individuals and non-state actors that now constrained the actions of political elites.\textsuperscript{20} Buzan characterised this argument as evidence of a shift from an international society of states to a world society of multiple actors.\textsuperscript{21} As the English School developed there was a movement away from seeing human rights, one of the core components of any liberal notion of peace, as subservient to power and interest, to the point where it became one of its core assumptions and driving dynamics. This was a step towards a liberal understanding of peace, contra realism, in which key issues and actors were not merely derived from states, but recognised that different forms of political organisation may transcend the states-system involving a much broader range of actors and the issues that arose from this move.

One of the paradoxes that this has highlighted for English School scholars has been that if human rights are universal then humanitarian intervention may be necessary against governments that do not provide their citizens with human rights, as has occurred since the end of the Cold War in Somalia in 1991 and Kosovo in 1999.\textsuperscript{22} Human rights were now being offered as an international normative standard and, where they were absent, coalitions of liberal states from within international or world society were now empowered to use force to make sure that they were provided. This created a difficult situation in which some actors have to assume the right and capacity to decide when an intervention occurs; for whom, why and at what level of abuse should a response occur. This then draws external actors into the local domestic political, economic and societal frameworks of another state, involving them in the governance of others in what appears to be a liberal form of trusteeship. As Wheeler has argued, the pluralist and solidarist versions of this debate offer different degrees of this capacity to decide what is best for others.\textsuperscript{23}

Implicitly, this means the concept of peace offered by the English School, which lay in the expansion of international society and human rights, meant exporting that peace. Thus, international society indicates a basic set of universal standards between states and within societies as its basis, upon which cooperation and social relations are based. This also raises the difficult question of whether this expansion of international society can be a basis for a sustainable peace — as the peacebuilding and state-building experience of the UN in the post-Cold War environment aptly illustrates.\textsuperscript{24} It has also laid bare inconsistencies in international society’s expansion,\textsuperscript{25} as the failure to prevent the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 famously illustrated. Indeed, some critics have argued that international society is a soft replacement for a colonial empire controlled by an imperial hegemon. In order words, English School thinkers simply developed a sophisticated veneer for a new neo-colonial or post-colonial international system that camouflaged its imperial antecedents especially for audiences from the US and the former colonies.\textsuperscript{26}

However, the English School enabled the development of thinking in other key areas, which offered a great deal towards thinking on peace. Indeed, the
move away from realism and from positivism was very significant. As Epp has shown, this was enhanced by the English School’s interpretative interest in the history of ideas, in decolonisation and its dynamics, including the developing world, and a notion that the international system was far too mechanical a framework to understand what was a ‘imprecise domain of culture’ (albeit a diplomat culture), as well as values and identity. Indeed, these concerns opened up areas later dealt with by post-positivist theory in IR. Consequently, the peace offered by the English School kept alive positive epistemology, incorporating an international society of states, liberal freedoms and human rights which had tentative encounters beyond the West, underpinned by a collective security agreement in which states dominate the means of violence and use them to protect international society, even during the pre-eminence of realist approaches. It signalled a consideration of norms, identities and human rights and, most importantly, created an opportunity to move beyond narrow reductionism and positivism in the consideration of peace. It has been very influential in the theorising of the liberal peace, and in more critical debates on peace.

Normative dimensions of peace

Normative theory, often originally associated with idealism in IR, re-emerged as a challenge to positivist liberal and realist debates at the end of the Cold War. It re-established a concern with the ethico-political aspects of IR, and revitalised debates about just war, humanitarian intervention, international norms, legitimacy, and international and distributive justice in IR. Reopening IR’s normative dimension also allowed for a reassessment of its orthodoxy. In this context, as Cochran argued, all theory is normative, so realism, idealism, liberalism and structuralism implied specific normative frameworks relating to their concerns with communitarian, cosmopolitan and emancipatory states and international frameworks. Normative theory focused upon communitarian and cosmopolitan debates, and the question of whether individuals (cosmopolitanism) or political communities (communitarianism) carry moral values, although both seek to ‘extend human freedom and moral obligation among persons in international practice’. Incorporating normative concerns directly into IR theory also enabled a framework by which to evaluate its orthodoxy. Hence, realism enabled domestic society to survive through mitigating the state of nature with little compunction to what happened beyond the state. Idealism and liberalism aspired to a much more complex and intrinsic notion of international norms that allowed for a complex institutional system of cooperation to emerge, as is also reflected in English School debates. Structuralism established emancipation from structural oppression as a normative goal.

As with the openings created by English School thinking, normative theory allowed for a more sophisticated notion of peace to be discussed in the discipline of IR – a challenge that led towards, and has been taken up by, critical theory. Perhaps the most convincing, and widely referred to, development in this area has been the emergence of cosmopolitanism as a specific normative
approach, associated with its converse debate, communitarianism. Cosmopolitanism rests upon the assumption that humanity represents one moral community in which individual and moral claim must be treated with respect and impartiality.\textsuperscript{36} Cosmopolitanism claims to represent impartiality, egalitarianism, individualism and universality, as well as a principle of reciprocal recognition.\textsuperscript{37} It does this in a state-centric environment but where moral obligations and rights transcend state sovereignty. As Kant argued, a transgression of these norms in one place reverberates across the world.\textsuperscript{38} Conversely, communitarian thinking implies the usually national bounding of these qualities in order to protect distinct political communities. This has focused upon ‘just war’ thinking.\textsuperscript{39} It is predicated upon defending a normative order through the legitimate use of force, therefore allowed for the emergence of \textit{jus in bello} and \textit{jus ad bello}, which extended this normative system in order to describe when war was legitimate, and how it should be conducted in order to retain its legitimacy.\textsuperscript{40} In this sense, and as Atack has pointed out, just war theory is morally ambivalent about war,\textsuperscript{41} though of course it seeks to prevent war from impeding peace, but rather uses it to support a specific form of peace. Both cosmopolitanism and communitarianism also take differing stands on the necessity of distributive justice,\textsuperscript{42} revolving around the defence or transcendence of state boundaries in providing assistance to others in need.

These debates are also reflected in English School thinking about humanitarian intervention in the post-Cold War environment, and in particular examining the differing normative underpinnings of so-called pluralist and solidarist forms,\textsuperscript{43} determined partly by a liberal understanding of distributive justice and human rights. It has been the cosmopolitan aspect of this debate which has captured the imagination of those intent on constructing an international society in which a broader responsibility guided by universal norms of care and duty to others are expressed internationally. In addition, concepts relating to normative theory include transnational civil society, cosmopolitan law enforcement (including international standing forces), and global institutions for governance. Yet, this discourse also reflect a liberal–realist hybrid balance, via its communitarian foil and debates on just war; states are still seen to the crucial actor, albeit divided between good and bad states, with those conforming to universal cosmopolitan claims enforcing ethical standards and acting on their universal responsibility to do so. Indeed, this view has become so prevalent that it has become part of policy discourse.\textsuperscript{44}

This conforms very closely to the liberal version of peace though of course it also crosses into more critical approaches IR theory. In particular it sees peace as derived from the creation and identification of a universal moral community, whether defined as a state or internationally. It offers the possibility that this may actually transcend state sovereignty and its Cartesian epistemic basis, instead focusing on development of a justice and peaceful global community.\textsuperscript{45} Normative approaches infer state-building even if they do contest how far shared values reach beyond the state. This implies an emphasis on the liberal institutions required for stability, order and justice within and between societies.
The response has been to construct these frameworks within the context of the liberal state, which is anchored in a system of global liberal governance, and emphasises the shared norms of a liberal domestic, transnational and international milieu heavily weighted towards ‘embedded liberalism’.46

Cosmopolitan versions of normative theory also provide a context for the concept of human security. The notion that the security of the individual comes before that of states, broadly defined as security from fear and want, reflects two main conceptual strands of human security thinking in the liberal peace context – institutional and emancipatory.47 Liberal state-building processes tend to focus on the provision of human security through the creation of top-down institutional structures from above. The concept of human security has the potential to focus far more on the agency and emancipation of individuals beyond states as its priority – and indeed it was intended to do just that.48

The reopening of normative debates reinforced the return to a positive epistemology of peace after the crudities of neo-realism, and after the end of the Cold War. By dealing with the problem of the extent of political communities, the ethical basis for the use of force, and the question of responsibilities to assist others (including through the use of force), from an ethical perspective it reiterated the need for concept of peace that extended far further than the negative, victor’s peace that had dominated the post-Second World War disciplinary environment. It this sense, it has been extremely influential, providing firm foundations for both the liberal peace framework, and for more critical approaches.

An institutional peace

Drawing on the work of Holsti, Keohane and Nye49 in this area, work on international institutions became a key meeting point of many thinkers from within different aspects of realist and liberal theory, derived from both rationalist and normative or sociological approaches to cooperation.50 This work focused upon the necessary conditions and processes of cooperation, and the institutions, rules and regimes that emerge because of them. Keohane cites Rawls’ work on rules, whereby rules are summaries of past decisions that determine future conduct and behaviour. Institutions form around these practices in order to enforce them.51 For some these institutions represent rational means of mediating state interests, whereas for others they represent the actualisation of inter-subjective understandings of interests and order. Often such work focuses on the UN and its family of agencies and represents effectively a normative attempt to construct a form of peace that is widely agreed and, as Ruggie has argued, embedded in the international order as a liberal foundation.52

The focus of work in this area has been to develop institutional capacity for regulation, governance and the building of the liberal peace based upon the assumption that this peace is both proven, transferable and universal. The criticism that has arisen on this project has focused upon its hegemonic ambitions, its inability to connect with local identities and groups, and its inefficiencies.
This has in particular been notably demonstrated in the work of Duffield, who sees the development of global governance as masking Western liberal hegemony, via a conflation of liberal state-building, Western epistemology, and a universal desire for some form of the liberal peace.\textsuperscript{53} Though these two positions on liberal institutions offer fundamental juxtaposed views of their impact, Keohane argues that what he calls the rationalist and reflectivist interpretations of them may at some point be brought into an agreement over the construction, operations and objectives of such institutions.\textsuperscript{54} However, to achieve this fully, institutions must reflect the identities, interests, values and objectives of all those individuals they affect, directly or indirectly. Negotiating a universal position on this basis represents a major project, and there is a little agreement even on whether this is possible. What is important in the discussion of international institutions in IR, however, is that these have become the cornerstone of liberal accounts of peace, replacing the Leviathan of realist hegemony with institutions based upon universal norms which build legitimacy and consent at the international level, and anchor states and peoples in an ‘institutional peace’ within liberal (or often neo-liberal) forms of global governance. This reflects an extension of the idealist agenda for peace, the English School’s work on an international society, and an engagement with the normative extent of political community. Ultimately, it focuses on the institutional anchoring of the liberal peace, reflecting a positive epistemology of peace in the context of a liberal–realist hybrid of IR theory.

The social construction of peace

The broad approaches of constructivism\textsuperscript{55} were born out the same reaction to the crudities and ‘eternal’ pessimism and violence of realism that idealism, pluralism and liberalism were critical of. At the same time it also represented a response to the powerful critique of orthodox IR theory mounted by post-positivist approaches, and in particular, critical theory. This necessitated a response from the discipline’s orthodoxy – a challenge taken up by constructivist approaches. Constructivism, especially as developed by Wendt, Kratochil and Onuf,\textsuperscript{56} shares many similarities in its treatment of the place and role of institutions in IR with the English School, though it has moved away from the claim that eternal anarchy underpins IR.\textsuperscript{57} It is also often represented as part of the broader critical turn in IR, and as drawing on critical theory more generally, though because of its underpinning state-centricity it falls short of critical theory’s post-positivist turn and its concern with emancipation.\textsuperscript{58}

This approach has been most heavily taken up in the United States academy because it offered a way out of, and also a way to build upon, the so-called ‘neo-neo’ debates. Constructivist approaches attempt to offer a compromise in the light of the highly polarised debates in IR, between the narrow, hierarchical and rationalist pessimism of realism, and the universalist, normative optimism and regulation of liberalism. In addition it also engaged with aspects of the spectrum of inter-subjective ‘post’ debates that take different approaches to the problem
of emancipation in IR (though the focus on emancipation is of a lesser concern than in critical theory). Constructivism accepts the inter-subjectivity of identity (though it is not thought to be free-floating as in post-modern approaches, but instead is ‘sticky’), the tension between structure and agency, and the importance and role of norms, of culture, and of international institutions. Perhaps most importantly, constructivism takes seriously the presence and role of the ideational in IR. These apparent shifts away from orthodox theory, and its methods and ontology, means that constructivist approaches offers the possibility of a positive epistemology of peace through its social construction, though this is dependent upon states which remain IR’s key actor.

Wendt has developed the most sustained and well-known constructivist reading of IR. According to him the social world is constructed, identities shift, norms influence the policy world and ideational factors in IR are as significant, if not more so, than rational considerations of political interests. This implies that actors in IR are to some extent able to create the world that they imagine. However, states are still the principal units of IR, though its key structures are inter-subjective rather than material. Yet, there is also a social reality, based upon identity factors, that has a material element allowing for a scientific approach to IR. Meanings provide the basis for action and policy, and meaning arises out of interaction. For Adler, constructivism offers a middle ground between different theoretical approaches to IR, from realism and liberalism to more critical approaches, as also for Wendt, who sees a very close relationship with liberal approaches. Adler argues that constructivism occupied a middle ground between an account of IR that is based upon the rational individual and structural accounts, which take away from individual agency. In this way, structure and agency are mutually dependent. This represents an attempt to accept the structure–agency debate while also noting the importance of structural constraints and the capacity of human and individual agency. This seems to be a useful contribution to the debate on peace in that a reading of peace for individuals might be counterbalanced by an understanding of structures that both contain and promote human agency, following Giddens’ structuration theory. Of course this begs the question of whether human agency can be maintained when one also accepts the overwhelming structural, ideational and material resources (which are inevitably linked) deployed by states.

In Wendt’s grandest statement on constructivism, he argues that it can also open up a middle ground between mainstream approaches to IR and post-modernism. Similarly, Waever attempted to develop constructivist approaches through a combination of post-modernism and realism. Some constructivists have followed Habermas in highlighting the importance of communication in understanding IR. As with critical theory, discourse ethics are deployed in order to establish an open dialogue to discover reasonable solutions to problems which are not susceptible to the hegemony of specific actors in the communicative process. This again implies that both structure and agency can be balanced by discourse ethics, which helps understand both how IR is socialised, and how its actors are both agents and recipients of this inter-subjective socialisation.
process. Again, this is an important window that opens up a more meaningful
discussion of peace in IR, and in particular its normative dimensions, though in
constructivist terms these are focused upon the development of sovereignty and
the norm of non-intervention, as well as norms associated with identity at a state
and sub-state level.

If ‘anarchy is what states make of it’,69 as Wendt has argued, then this implies
both that states control international relations, but also that ways out of anarchy
can be determined: effectively peace can therefore be built in the image of a
liberal state if one has access to the necessary formulas. Wendt argues that states
are not simply powerless in the face of anarchy, which is the subtext of realism,
but indeed do have some agency to mould anarchy. He argues that there are
three types of anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian, which represent a con-
tinuum of an ever-increasing capacity of states to resist anarchy, culminating in
a Kantian normative system.70 In this system, norms are broadly shared, and are
institutionalised in international regimes that ensure compliance through a
process of socialisation of their participants. This, as Finnemore has argued,
means that ultimately a state’s national interest is also partially determined by
this process of socialisation,71 offering a constructivist version of peace resting
on institutional, constitutional and civil components.

Constructivism is mainly concerned with the role of states as central to the
moderation of anarchy and the process of socialisation. As constructivist
approaches argue that state behaviour is determined by their identities and inter-
ests, this implies that their construction of peace is also determined by their
interests and their identities. Of course, there is an important proviso here – that
anarchy and interests may also change. This represents a picture of an identity
and interest-based peace deployed for others, on a normative and interest basis,
which may well fluctuate over time. The problem here, of course, is that norm-
ative change should be very different to interest-based change, and because con-
structivist approaches ascribe states as agents and actors IR, it is very difficult to
imagine them changing the peace they project. From this perspective, as socially
constructed states create or control international anarchy they also create and
control peace, and they do this according to their own values and interests. Often
values are dressed up as interests and vice versa. Socially constructed states
therefore socially construct a broader peace in their image, according to their
own identity, and within the broader international structure, which of course acts
as a constraining factor on their own agency. Their agency consequently
depends upon their resources, and in these terms constructivism bridges both
realist and liberal debates about peace. While constructivism emphasises the role
of identity in the politics of peace, it also endorses the role of the state as both a
provider and controller of peace. This means that constructivism envisages a
hegemonic actor, probably a state, which dominates both the identity of peace
and so its discussion and formation. This actor will probably form, drive, materi-
ally support and dominate any peace, clearly connecting a constructivist peace
with a liberal–realist hybrid peace.

Adler and Barnett have worked on questions relating to peace and security
derived from constructivism. They have developed the idea of ‘security communities’ in which states act in groups to establish a community with its own institutions aimed at providing a stable peace.\textsuperscript{72} In a pluralistic, transnational, security community, states retain their own sense of identity while at the same time sharing a ‘meta-identity’ across the security community.\textsuperscript{73} This raises the question of how the norms and institutions of a security community influence their member states and how states become socialised into a security community in the first place. As a consequence, constructivism has implicitly also become involved in the debate over increasing the breadth of IR’s understanding of security, though of course the focus is still on the state. Here the work of Waever and Buzan, and the ‘Copenhagen School’ on ‘securitisation’ has made the key contribution. This has effectively defined securitisation as a discursive process dependent upon societal and historical contexts leading to an existential threat to a particular community.\textsuperscript{74} This means that peace in these terms moves far from the pragmatic questions related to battle deaths and a status quo, ceasefire and ‘Cold War’, towards a discussion of the qualitative conditions of peace for those who actually experience them. This is an important step forward in IR’s engagement with the concept of peace, though it does not go as far as more critical approaches imply is possible in constructing a type of peace that would be acceptable to all – as Aradau’s work connecting emancipation with ‘de-securitisation’ illustrates.\textsuperscript{75}

The question here is posed as to whether it is possible for a state-centric formulation of peace beyond the state to do anything other than represent the interests of the most powerful states in the system – and to achieve emancipation? If so how would it be achieved and what would it look like? This is the case even though constructivists emphasise the role of institutions, which both establish and monitor common norms and replicate the interests and approaches of their dominant members, though in a moderated form. For constructivists, institutions aid in the development of practices, norms and patterns of behaviour that are beneficial and common to all of their members. Thus, constructivism represents a move beyond a liberal–realist hybrid in either theoretical or methodological terms for a concept of peace, but this is limited by institutional hegemony, where institutions become the ideational and interest mechanisms of their most influential members, or those actors with the most material resources. Constructivism instead appears to subject inter-subjective aspects of IR such as identity to the self-help strategies of states, resulting in securitisation, and depends upon the prior existence of cooperative tendencies between states for peace to emerge, rather than trying to find a basis for the de-securitisation and a more sophisticated framework for peace, as Aradou suggests.\textsuperscript{76}

Kratochwil has also engaged with this area, developing an understanding of norms and rules in IR expressed through language and speech acts and developed through a process of principled argumentation.\textsuperscript{77} This allows for inter-subjective understandings to become part of policy, developing a ‘moral’ perspective, though this depends upon a dominant value system, and reserves the right for coercive action where necessary by those with the capacity to take
‘authoritative’ decisions. Onuf has also taken up this theme, focusing on the relationship between IR and international law, in the context of the mutually constructed rules that are derived from human social relations. Rules make meaning and agency possible, within an institutional context which themselves depends on speech acts. IR is to some extent also determined by the limits set by the material and social realms which provide its context. This attempts to provide a balance between material capacities and state interests within a context of limited resources and the social construction of rules, norms and individual interests within an institutional context.

Though these accounts challenge orthodox approaches to IR on ontological and methodological grounds, they also arrive at a problem familiar to the liberal–realist canon. It is more a hybrid based upon rationalism and incorporating some aspects of more critical thinking. The state remains the central, dominant, actor, around which the understandings of peace revolve. For this reason the socially constructed peace, offered by constructivism, is conditioned by interstate relations, domestic politics and securitisation, which undermine inter-subjective factors such as identity and indicates a liberal and progressive ontology of peace, limited by governance, run by state elites and the rationalist bureaucratic and administrative power, which goes with statehood. Progress towards an emancipatory peace is tempered by the hegemonic, ideational power of its own foundational assumptions. However, in the context of the positivist approaches of IR’s orthodoxy, constructivism means that because identities and interests of actors are socially constructed, therefore peace might also follow suit, indicating its positivist epistemology. Because the state is still the key actor, despite its focus on non-material structures, the debate on peace mirrors that of the liberal–realist hybrid. But it also opens up key questions relating to identity, and the ideational and social construction of peace as a positive epistemology resting upon language, meaning, norms, states and institutions. From this, a far more comprehensive and critical engagement with the liberal peace, and beyond, is possible.

IPE, regional integration and globalisation

IPE has illustrated the material consequences of the global distribution of resources, the workings of the international economy and the influence of politics over both (and vice versa). As with normative theory and structuralism, it connects with the problems of distributive and social justice, equity and sustainability (in the areas of trade, development, and more broadly) ranging through Marxist to neo-liberal approaches. This has important consequences for IR’s understanding of peace, as has long been recognised. Kant, of course, noted the importance of trade and free markets for peace, as did, conversely, Marx. One of the key common concerns relates to how, or if, economic transactions create peace and justice, pointing to the issues of whether poverty in the developing world emanates from local conditions or indigenous practices, or from the workings of the global political economy. Liberal–internationalists after the First
World War made a similar link, and this has remained prominent in IR ever since. Neo-realist thinkers argue that material resources were part of the definition of state power and interests. Structuralists argue that neoliberall–international strategies are the cause of injustice, in particular reifying an elite class of workers and individuals, and leading to imperialism. Liberal thinkers also see the dangers of an unregulated global economy, and believe in limited governance in order to allow for cooperation and peace by not impinging upon the ability of markets to operate freely. Krasner has rejected any attempt to move beyond rationalism and positivism, meaning that any contribution to an understanding of peace is predicated more upon the preservation of a stable economic system, which might then progress towards economic and social justice. For him, the debate has revolved around neo-realism and neo-liberalism, between states and multiple actors, who calculate interests rationally. Liberals offer a benign image of a global economy replete with opportunities for all, as long as free trade and functional institutions operate unhindered.

Perhaps most significant, from the perspective of developing an understanding of peace, from this inter-disciplinary area, Robert Cox developed his famous, Gramscian intervention, opening the way for a much broader engagement with the role of IPE in replicating neo-liberal hegemony via international financial institutions such as the World Bank, and with IR theory more generally. A concern with the impact of neo-liberal globalisation, particularly on civil society and its capacity to resist these processes has enabled IPE to engage more fully with its own emancipatory project for peace – one that has been widely influential in IR.

Similarly, regionalisation and integration theory, drawing on functionalism, and often associated with the project of European economic integration, implied a removal of political tensions between those states, particularly those involved in last century’s World Wars. Following the idealist and liberal projects, functionalist theory, such as Mitrany’s ‘working peace system’, Haas and Deutsch’s work on functionalism and integration, an agenda was developed to show how cooperative relations spread from issue to issue, ‘form following function’, to understand the pacification of European state relations, the institutional integration of states, and the development of a cooperative transnational community. This has also opened up a research agenda moving towards a positive epistemology of peace through rational, institutionalist and social processes of the regional integration of states or intergovernmentalism, offering a similar version of peace to that which has also been developed in constructivism. This has also led to a more critical research agenda focusing in integration and identity in Europe and further afield. This has taken on a normative dimension, and on both theoretical and empirical grounds implies an ambitious integrative and enabling dimension of peace, redefined in more critical terms in the context of the issues that the EU has faced in resolving its own ‘border conflicts’.

Similarly, thinking about globalisation has opened up discussions on the pros and cons of trade and development, dependency and conditionality, in a neoliberall world in which protection and centralisation is to be frowned upon and
barriers to movement, communication and trade are dissolving. It is associated with the spread of technology, communication and, of course, a dominant neoliberal economic model taken to be unifying processes that build upon the liberal argument of peace through trade. Its dynamics reflect processes of internationalisation, liberalisation, universalisation or de-territorialisation, all of which provide alternative perspectives of peace and of the methods used to create it. It is clear, however, that globalisation is a key agent and structure through which a liberal peace has been constructed, there being an obvious convergence between globalisation and the Western liberal agenda that is implicit in the post-Cold War liberal ‘triumph’. From this perspective globalisation is seen as contributing to peace because of its inherent qualities which promote liberalisation, democratisation, development, human rights and free trade. This is also the basis for a neo-imperial critique of globalisation. The dynamics associated with globalisation have also highlighted the limited and essentially Western nature of the liberal practices deployed to spread peace. Globalisation therefore represents both a liberal homogenisation, an emerging global society based on the Enlightenment belief in the similarity of humanity and a resultant interdependence, and what Bull might have described as a counter-impulse towards neo-medieval fragmentation. This latter dynamic rests upon the tension between the beneficiaries of interdependence, new technology, free markets and a form of voluntary association leading to the ‘good life’ and those who perceive globalisation to rest upon the economic and political dominance of the hegemonic West and capitalism.

This draws on the debate between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism. Held, for example, argues that the key cosmopolitan principles of ‘egalitarian individualism, reciprocal recognition, consent, and inclusiveness and subsidiarity’, have directly led to the 1948 UN Declaration of Human Rights, the Nuremberg and Tokyo War Crimes Tribunals in 1945–8, the Torture Convention of 1984, and of course the statute of the International Criminal Court of 1998. These instruments form part of a framework of cosmopolitan multilateralism in which an eventually reformed UN General Assembly, regional parliaments and governance structures, among other structures, would create a global cosmopolitan system of governance, regulation and law enforcement. This stems from the wide agreement that globalisation contributes to a liberal–democratic peace far beyond the state.

Though such thinking often appears to equate peace and globalisation (or regionalisation) it is generally recognised by globalisation theorists that globalisation cannot be assumed to represent a ‘pacifying process’. Indeed, many critics argue that globalisation emphasises inequality, marginalisation and resistance to liberal hegemony. However, as Scholte has argued, there is some evidence that globalisation provides disincentives to war and promotes humanitarianism and pluralism, though he also argues that it has produced conflict, as well as other ills such as environmental degradation, poverty and social disintegration. Kaldor argues this has led to a contradictory process involving homogenisation, integration, fragmentation, diversification and localisation.
The construction of peace allows the presence of a ‘global class’ of interventionary actors that bring their norms and values into the conflict environment, which in itself is indicative of the decline of sovereignty and its related focus on official and formal processes. This means that globalisation, as with integration theory, is seen as providing an avenue for peace, but also a set of problems which must be simultaneously addressed by governments, world markets, communicational facilities, civil society, IGOs and NGOs. ‘Grassroots globalisation’ leads to tension where this liberal and neo-liberal form of globalisation transgresses the norms, interests and cultures of a broad alliance of local groups.

These approaches have developed a positive epistemology of peace, offering normative, social, identity, cultural, technological and emancipatory dimensions, ranging from identity and civil society to the global economy. They have moved beyond the paradoxes of liberal–realism – freedom requires restraint, and restraining institutions and frameworks must be used by hegemonic actors to both govern, integrate, globalise and emancipate, offering an ontology and methodology through which peace can be constructed – though of course the underpinning of a liberal–realist concern with security and institutions also indicates their connections with the liberal peace project.

An environmental discourse on peace

Environmental discourses on peace have emerged as part of the radical environmentalist challenge to the neo-liberal allocation of non-renewable material resources towards activities associated with war and, over the last few decades, as part of a challenge to the way the global capitalist economy distributes resources while disregarding the environmental costs associated with the removal of resources that will be lost to future generations. An important rendition of this theme as a critique of liberalism in IR was provided in Fukuyama’s well-known work on the ‘end of history’ in which he argued that the triumph of liberal-democracy and its crucial component – capitalism – over communism meant that the battle over political ideology was now settled. Peace was henceforth liberal. The triumph of liberalism, and more importantly neo-liberalism, however, meant that the global political system would reduce individuals to consuming automatons that would eventually deplete the world’s natural resources. The sting in the tail of his argument about the triumph of liberalism was often ignored – that the environment could not support this victory in the long term. The environmental challenge offers a significant, though often ignored, insight into the ontology of peace. The issues of transnational interaction and the ethical and institutional implications of environmental calculations resonate with normative theory and other critical theories, and more broadly provide a critique of the liberal peace.

This is indicative of the fact that environmental discourses underline the problems faced by IR theories that are anthropocentric; that is to say they only value and analyse interactions between humans, and so ignore environmental concerns. Worse, because environmental costs are often not part of political,
economic or social decisionmaking, they are also often carried by innocent third parties, producing environmental injustice. This has prompted calls for ‘environmental democracy’, rights, activism and citizenship. This effectively expands the moral community and ethical range of environmental concerns in political, social and economic spheres, across generations, peoples, species, which orthodox IR normally discounts, and opens up an important new area in which to consider the concept of peace. This moves beyond order or the impacts of war and conflict, but also targets economic, political and social practices and their related methods, epistemology and ontology, which the liberal–realist hybrid takes to be incontestable. Security is redefined as environmental security: institutions, political and economic processes are provided with the responsibility of understanding and responding to environmental challenges and costs for future generations. This raises the requirements of broad representation and decision-making to share and carry risks democratically, and to advocate, legislate and enforce measures for the good of all as well as to compensate. These issues point to just how difficult it is for orthodox IR theory to grapple with dynamics that cannot be contained within the ‘international system’ of states, institutions or the free market, and have transnational and inter-generational implications.

Inevitably, environmental approaches represent a significant challenge for liberal, realist and structural thinking – relating to critical IPE – and instead points to the normative and also inter-subjective dynamics of how environmental resources are understood and distributed. This is a challenge to the realist race for resources between states which though rational within the states-system, irrationally discounts the environment. It is also a challenge to the liberal attempt to multilaterally govern behaviour politically, socially and economically to promote cooperation and an international society of states by basing its calculations of shared norms of representation, production, human rights and political and legal restraints. Liberalism does not include a concern with environmental constraints, other than through the neo-liberal pricing mechanisms set by demand and supply. Structuralist arguments fair little better as their focus on dismantling economic classes and inducing equality amongst productive individuals and at a global level relates to the distribution of resources rather than the environmental costs of their extraction, processing and distribution. Constructivist and critical strands of thinking about IR provide space for environmental issues, though instead these tend to focus upon norms, identity, emancipation and communication as central problems. Indeed, environmental discourses are predicated up the centrality of the problems caused by the fact that no provision is made in IR for the side effects of the value, usage and distribution of exhaustible resources, from raw materials to land, nature, water and the atmosphere, as well as problems brought about by pollution, population growth and disease. They illustrate how neo-liberal economics in a globalised world economy are unsustainable, thus challenging neo-liberal orthodoxies on the relationship of development with peace. Opinion is divided over whether such threats actually exist, are plausible, are more immediate, can be treated
incrementally, or demand radical and immediate reform in order to prevent an environmental catastrophe.107

The ecocentric response is that if humanity is to sustain itself, it must place itself after nature, the environment and the biosphere, meaning a fundamental reordering of the framework of the liberal–realist regimes that support the liberal peace, as they are dependent upon neo-liberal versions of development, free market capitalism, and global trade, with little concern for the environmental costs of orthodox security practices.108 Escaping from a Cartesian view of the world which see the human as sovereign, and by extension the state as sovereign, and seeing the embedded relationship of human beings and their political, social and economic structures within the environment offers an important contribution to IR’s understanding of peace: yet this is one where the human being is not necessarily emancipated, but instead must respect the structural constraints associated with readings of ecology predicated upon its fragility. Peace in this sense might mean accepting limitations on human capacity, not just to make war, but to develop. This represents a positive epistemology of peace, but one that challenges liberal assumptions of progress and also the critical and post-structuralist prioritisation of norms, identity and difference. However, some IR theorists working on environmental issues have argued that working on common environmental issues presents opportunities for peacemaking by building trust and cooperation.109

Much of the literature points to the role of transnational non-state actors, advocacy groups and NGOs in highlighting the need for consideration of the environment in political, social and economic thought and policy. This illustrates the importance of civil society in affecting decisionmaking processes which relates to broader questions of sustainability and peace in this context. This is another example of transnational space in which civil actors connect globally in order to raise and advocate for an issue which state institutions and actors are blind to. Indeed, environmental factors are becoming a key arbiter of the concept of a sustainable peace, allowing for the development of ecological security, sustainable development and environmental justice. This requires that states are conditioned to respond to its structural constraints in ways which are sensitive to the concerns of civil society, or alternatively in ways which imply severe limitations on liberal freedoms. In this way, the environmental challenge transcends the orthodoxy of positivism and liberalism, and increasingly is seen as part of a post-positivist, normative and critical challenge to IR and its dominant realist and neo-liberal assertions, often drawing on the work of Habermas in so doing.110 It also clearly connects with the debates about development as a process of modernisation, or as the provision of ‘freedom’ in Sen’s words,111 indicating how environmental debates span orthodox and critical approaches to peace.

The liberal peace

Kant, Schumpeter, and many other contemporary authors, have argued that liberalism has a pacifying effect through liberal, democratic principles which are
the basis for state institutions, and through its adherence to free trade and capitalism.\textsuperscript{112} Following Kant, Schumpeter saw these factors as having a key effect on society and the way in which resources were distributed, which consequently had a pacifying effect, leading to the emergence of institutions such as the Hague court. Kantian liberalism claims to offer peace, not just as a possibility, but as a normal condition of the interactions of liberal states. This is where liberalism and realism have formed a hybrid concept of peace that has been most influential in thinking and policy in recent times, as Doyle has famously argued.\textsuperscript{113} Others have argued that the democratic peace has now become the closest to a law that IR theory has ever known.\textsuperscript{114}

This ‘democratic peace’\textsuperscript{115} is focused mainly on the interactions between states, and rests upon an artificial division between domestic and international politics. Democracy is thought to be essential to peace between states, but this means that the focus of the democratic peace is essentially at an international level; of course there have been major critiques of the role in democracy in pacification of domestic politics. Indeed, some have argued that democracy may exacerbate conflict in some cases.\textsuperscript{116} Because democratic states may not fight each other this does not mean that they do not fight non-democracies, of course. Indeed, the democratic peace argument may create an incentive for coercion to spread democracy. This entire edifice places a high value on institutional democracy, but downplays subjective issues, such as identity and culture, and has generally accepted neo-liberalism – which has extended the tendency of economics that Keynes identified to become ‘a form of post-Christian theology’.\textsuperscript{117}

Doyle has developed a nuanced critique of liberalism and in particular its claims to have ‘pacific’ qualities.\textsuperscript{118} For Doyle, neither realist nor Marxist theories account for long periods of peace defined by liberal principles within and between groups of states. Doyle argues that the three main traditions of liberalism, which include liberal pacifism, liberal imperialism and liberal–internationalism all propose democracy as an essential component of peace. But they also make underlying normative assumptions about liberalism’s universality that, when confronted, leads to conflict between its supporters and those that reject its internal value system. Liberal states are prone to war with non-liberal states, making a separate peace amongst themselves, and have ‘discovered liberal reasons for aggression’.\textsuperscript{119} Liberal imperialism is derived from the fact that liberal states have an imperative of expansion because domestic liberty leads to increasing populations and demand. Doyle points to Machiavelli and Thucydides as supporters of this thesis which is aimed at glory through expansion to meet the needs of the population.\textsuperscript{120} At the same time a further imperative exists which is to compete with other expanding states. Finally, liberal–internationalism leads to the pacification of IR and the establishment of a Kantian zone of peace (supporting the democratic peace argument and the claims of liberal pacifism).\textsuperscript{121} Liberalism presents peace as lying in the pursuit of material interest (as with Schumpeter), or in ruling others for fear of being ruled (as with Machiavelli), or by laws that denotes the equality of all (as with Kant). In this sense,
the liberal principles of peace (especially democracy) may be conditions of
peace, but they are not the only conditions. In this synthesis, a focus on regime theory, cooperation and institutions as pathways to security developed a distinctly liberal approach to international order through with liberal hegemons developed an ordering and governing set of regimes and institutions to which all states and societies were to be bound. This then became the shape of what has become known as the ‘Pax Americana’ that developed after the end of the Cold War, reflecting a liberal–realist hybrid offering a positive epistemology but still limited by the capacity of liberal states to propagate their universal norms outside of their own international society or community. However, neo-liberalism reflects the important nuance of ‘hegemony’. This can be interpreted as ‘governance’ whereby such states control political and economic environments in order to induce hegemonic stability, through systems such as through the Bretton Woods system, derived from US hegemony. Of course, in parallel to this a set of critiques emerged from what Keohane famously termed the reflectivist school (as opposed to the rationalist ‘neo-neo’ school), which focused on the subjective construction of institutions and regimes by their dominant actors. These indicated serious weaknesses with the version of peace, derived from liberal institutions, offered by the ‘neo-neo’ debate – notably in its claims to objective hegemony through forms of governance dominate by some who claimed to know peace for all. Indeed, as Waever has pointed out, the bridge between rationalist and reflectivist approaches appear to lie in English School thinking, which offered a more historical and philosophical approach to the sorts of ethical issues that underlie this debate.

After the Cold War this liberal agenda was elucidated in terms of the destiny of human history – realist, idealist, pluralist and liberal thinking came together, even incorporating parts of the structuralist agenda, to provide a powerful explanation of IR and a possible peace. Fukuyama has made the most famous assertion: that the Kantian commitment to peace, international order and law triumphed with the collapse of the Soviet Union and its ideological foundations, and that capitalism and democracy had now become universally accepted liberal systems with all of their ensuing values. Some scholars even began to think in terms of the return of idealism as a useful mode of explanation for IR, and in terms of describing the new peace. Kegley, for example, claimed that the post-Cold War world looked very similar to the world as Woodrow Wilson would have remade it after the First World War. Like Wilson, he saw the opportunity to replace the realist paradigm of IR and its obsessions for the dynamics of democratisation, free trade, the UN system, arms control and humanitarians to remake a neo-idealistic peace. Kegley expanded upon the set of idealist assumptions to develop his neo-idealistic
understanding of peace. As human nature is good, collaboration and aid is possible. Progress is the basis of human development and is marked by concern for others. Social, structural and institutional reforms will bring an end to evil, and anarchy can be governed in order to eradicate war, using multilateral fora. Peace will be attained through these dynamics and development when international society has reorganised itself to eliminate the dynamics that block the natural progress of humans towards cooperation and harmony in society, and in international society.128

Debates on a democratic peace have been strongly criticised on the grounds that it also contains illiberal tendencies: majoritarianism leads to the marginalisation of small minorities and individuals; it undermines distinctiveness; and is susceptible to demagogues and entrepreneurs rather than rational calculation by constituents.129 Fischer has illustrated how liberalism and democracy contain important imbalances, whereby liberalism implies democracy, but democracy provides only limited liberal rights.130 Thus, the democratic peace is more strongly influenced by liberalism than democracy, and illustrates the other routes that liberalism opens up, including imperial benevolence, and a self-righteous belief that liberalism is rational and enforceable.131 From this perspective, the post-war European peace is based upon the utilitarian value of prosperity over military glory, which leads to a rejection of violence in favour of trade and a respect for human rights. Liberalism adds the dimension of institutionalism to this argument, in that institutions form a sum greater than its parts, allowing for the creation, observation and enforcement of common rules.

Furthermore, though liberalism clearly has a privileged position in relation to peace in modern, Western thought, it is, as Fischer has pointed out, not the only ethical system that aims at a type of peace as his exploration of Hindu, Muslim and Marxist thinking illustrates.132 However, liberalism is dominated by the canon of Western thought, from Aristotle to Locke, meaning that contemporary models for peace reflect a specific and often exclusive culture and normative framework, which though inferring pluralism, is biased towards a contemporary liberalism (that ironically may value prosperity more highly than glory and democracy).133 Liberalism considers these factors to be self-evident and universal; where they are not understood forms of enlightenment are required so that everyone will see their good sense. Yet, as Fischer has shown such logic does not apply in other cultural contexts (for example in Hindu societies) and perhaps most importantly, liberalism substitutes ‘rights for virtues’.134 Thus, constructing the liberal–democratic peace through state-building, forms of peacebuilding and conflict resolution, or more indirectly via the conditional effects of globalisation may mean a ‘loss of community’,135 trust and social ties.

These tensions can be clearly seen in the recent debates about the ‘new wars’ of the 1990s and the development of humanitarian intervention, which was seen as a route through which the liberal peace could be installed in many post-intervention settings around the world.136 This debate has increasingly highlighted the fragility of the norm of non-intervention where gross violations of human rights are taking place, and the ‘duty’ and rights liberal states have to
intervene to install the liberal peace as a response along pluralist or solidarist lines. These debates operate within the liberal discourse of peace, and commonly assume that humanitarian intervention should be perceived as just, be proportional, assured of success, and coincides with other national interests. Bellamy argues that the pluralist and solidarist approaches indicate that either intervention will not be undertaken unless national interests are at stake, or that a cosmopolitan international society can construct a conceptually sound response with both international and local consensus to carry it out. The *International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty*, for example, expressed the solidarist view that the right to intervene is increasing set against the ‘responsibility to protect’. Such assumptions represent the apogee of liberal–international thought through peace becomes a form of liberal hegemony. This creates an uncomfortable hybrid between liberalism and a ‘civilising mission’, and the defence of human rights, property, democracy, as well as international law, a notion of just war, and restraints on the use of violence, reflecting pragmatic pacifism but falling short of radical pacifism. Despite these paradoxes, liberalism is essentially the dominant ideology of the West related to peace, elevating the state while also trying to control and monitor its excesses, and incorporating pragmatic pacifism to protect human life, while also retaining the threat of force for just war purposes.

Liberal thinking frames its concept of peace in the context of preserving, perfecting and sharing an order based upon a Western value system. This has formed the basis for an ontology of peace for the discipline of IR which, by:

- eschewing accounts that seek to understand and celebrate difference in favour of explanations based upon a decidedly Western view of rationality,
- International Relations has effectively served as a handmaiden to Western power and interests. The ontology of the discipline has been that of the powerful, and the epistemology and methodologies that give rise to that ontology have reflected very historically and culturally specific notions of rationality and identity.

Orthodox IR has generally concurred with this project, though many idealist, functionalists, pluralists, peace researchers, normative theorists, conflict researchers and critical theorists generally have aimed to move beyond this. Within IR’s orthodoxy, difference, identity, social, political and economic processes, frameworks and dynamics, are only acceptable if they fit within what is an essentially liberal–realist paradigm. In this paradigm, inherency notions form the basis upon which liberal institutions create peace which must safeguard basic security in the light of self-interest on the one hand, while also producing the conditions necessary for a broader peace. As Little has pointed out, this means such approaches have increasingly become intermeshed with realism.

Liberalism offers a version of peace that is plausible within a liberal state and between liberal states, as well as a model to replace failed or non-liberal
systems. As a result, a far more complex version of peace has emerged, irrespective of strong realist opposition on ideological and theoretical grounds. Liberalism has proposed a basic tolerance and human freedom, allows for individualism unthreatened by arbitrary power, and assumes there exists a basic consensus based upon social, political or moral agreement. This is reflected in this more complex version of peace that concerns itself, as Rawls argued, with achieving a politically consensual form of justice. This provides space for international institutions to guarantee and patrol it, for states to adopt a liberal-democratic constitutional framework, and in which the civil peace could emerge. Underpinning these accounts is the understanding that there exists an objective peace that could be created with the direction of external actors, and the cooperation of insiders. This means that it is replicable (a key requisite of liberal policymaking), and that this should be confirmed and implemented by policy and ‘research’ in liberal institutions, organisations, agencies and universities without need for a broader ethical exploration. This secular notion of peace represents a simple binary prescribed by an elite level official discourse by state and government, which are also often the heirs of a victor’s peace. The liberal peace rests upon the ‘muscular objectivism’ that has dominated IR in the Western academy and policy world, and therein lies many of its problems. In addition, it claims universality, though this is mainly due to the political agendas of its main proponents. Yet, as Geuss has pointed out, liberalism was previously sceptical of universality because it represented a ‘struggle against theocracy, absolutism, and dogmatism’. This form of liberal peace has, as Jahn has shown, more in common with John Stuart Mill’s thinking, particularly in justifying imperialism, than it does with Kant and his concern for local consent. Thus, it is not local consent of target peoples which furnish legitimacy for liberalism’s actions, particularly intervention, but a ‘hypothetical contract that would be consented to by rational [liberal] persons’.

What is also clear here, however, is that the civil aspect of the liberal peace, and the acceptance of the agency and rights of individuals in the private sphere in IR, has given rise to some fundamental anomalies in IR, leading to a need to rethink the methodological, ontological and epistemological underpinnings of the liberal peace. This is certainly so if a social contract is to be reproduced between citizens, state and the international. This is especially problematic given the tendencies for liberal–international planners to think in terms of universal and top-down notions of governance, law, civil society, democracy and trade, and perhaps even more importantly on the requirement for international intervention if these are to be achieved. A utopian version of peace now seems somewhat quaint and representative of an era and ontology that could not be sustained. As criticism mounts of the liberal peace, similar issues may also emerge as more sceptical accounts of liberalism emerge (or are rediscovered) of liberalism’s tendency towards illiberalism. Indeed, IR theory’s orthodox may well now be concurring in an imperial liberal state-building tendency.

Ironically, a liberal thinker and a realist thinker became perhaps the most influential figures in the attempt to re-present the post-Cold War world. Hunting-
don had famously pointed to a ‘clash of civilisations’ predicted on culture, power, religion, population and development differences. In an infamous passage, he used realist thinking on escalation to show how these often underestimated elements of IR could lead to a nuclear exchange.\textsuperscript{154} It is notable that this discussion took up an apocalyptic tone rather than developing an account of how liberal systems might engage with such issues. The liberal agenda had also been mapped out in this context by Fukuyama.\textsuperscript{155} Here he pointed to the triumph of liberal political ideology after the Cold War, and somewhat ominously argued that all that was left for man now was the socialist nightmare – growing consumption until the world was environmentally exhausted. Courtesy of the distance between the current era and these contributions, they clearly mapped out a new liberal–realist debate, characterised by a clear continuity with early ‘great debates’ between these approaches. The implication for peace both rested on the victor’s peace, but differed in their prioritisation of the other aspects of the liberal peace – the constitutional, institutional, and civil, peace.

These contributions captured the new context of the post-Cold War environment for this ‘great debate’ but did not effectively advance the understanding of peace beyond what had gone before, and neither approach was really sensitive to the exigencies of conflict that now mark the new global and local contextual cartography. Fukuyama was indeed correct to show how the pervasiveness of liberal praxis would define the new era, as well as its fragility. Huntingdon had also shown this but, of course, his main concern was the cultural clash that would now arise between different civilisations as they contested power, and also the homogenisation that the liberal agenda created. Implicitly, both failed to see the abrasiveness of the liberal peace, and in particular the dangers of its growing neo-liberal cooption.

**Conclusion**

In the debates on peace outlined in this and previous chapters, there is very strong tendency to deploy a liberal–realist synthesis – territorial sovereignty and international governance as both an assumed framework and a problematique – as a basis for understanding a contemporary orthodoxy of peace, and its future construction in locations where it is not yet present. From this perspective peace is a hybrid of realist thinking about a victor’s framework for security, which supports a universal normative order that offers legitimate and consensual government for most, if not all. Liberalism’s flexibility allows for a wide span of theoretical approaches, though ultimately this breadth is often narrowed down to an argument in support of the liberal–democratic peace. Liberal realism combines the concepts of the victor’s peace, the institutional and constitutional peace, and civil peace, and produces a positivist and rational theory which balances these concepts with each other according to each context. It offers a progressive and rational ontology and epistemology of peace which it can be legitimately constructed for others, and has led to a methodological approach which legitimates this transferral of peace – often with little regard for local context and the social, political and economic systems of its recipients.\textsuperscript{156}
This requires a form of disciplinary liberalism – peace-as-governance. This indicates the establishment of a failsafe process of governance that regulates and frees at the same time, thus allowing for liberal constraints and freedoms. It is self-preserving and self-legitimating, and is comfortably built upon claims of universal foundations. Consequently, the emergent liberal–democratic peace offers the possibility of peace through its multiple components which in the Western imagination produce stability, an international society and normative framework. It offers a view of modernity in which peace progresses from a negative to a positive form according to a rational methodological and epistemological approach, producing an objective way of knowing peace and its methods. From a Western standpoint, there seems to be no realistic alternative to liberalism.\(^{157}\) Indeed, the development of Western liberalism (and indeed, neoliberalism) provides the foundation for any approach to peacebuilding, as George has pointed out, on the legacy of the canon of classical philosophy, art, culture and science, and Renaissance humanism and post-Enlightenment assumptions about knowledge, power and progress.\(^{158}\) However, the approaches discussed in these chapters all try in their different ways to address the problems that arise from this.

Yet in the pantheon of practical attempts to evoke the liberal peace through peace processes, humanitarian intervention, peacebuilding and state-building, this has often evoked strong resistance on the part of local actors and different interest groups. Liberal objectives often appear from this perspective as imperialistic to those outside of the developed countries, partly because it has, as Geuss has argued, been unable to prevent poverty or inequality.\(^{159}\) As Williams has argued in another context, there is a certain hubris about the exceptionalism that the liberal peace is treated with by many mainstream thinkers, which may well turn out to be its nemesis.\(^{160}\) This may be because of its economic weaknesses, its assumed cultural and developmental models, and its perceived imposition, which undermines local power structures and interests. Indeed, such approaches have effectively marginalised large numbers of people from ‘peace’ by assuming a restrained definition which does not preclude structural violence, poverty and oppression.
5 The contribution of peace and conflict studies

All Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered.²

1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.³

Introduction

Though peace has often not been explicitly theorised in orthodox IR theory, as previous chapters have discussed, this conceptual area was of more significance for the sub-disciplines of peace and conflict studies. While peace studies focused more on structural issues, and upon understanding the roots of conflict and responding with a democratic peace project, conflict studies has focused more on the implications of conflict resolution theory. In combination, it might be said that peace and conflict studies continued to work on the Enlightenment premise that peace might exist and could be created, and therefore that a notion of peace was indeed necessary for the broader discipline of IR, as was also implied in the UN Charter. Effectively, it might be said that peace and conflict studies was most succinct in offering a concept of peace that was widely adopted. This was partly because they concurred with the liberal peace framework that had implicitly emerged in mainstream IR theory, but were also important in providing an impetus for an ambitious version of peace that many peace and conflict scholars thought had been ignored in the mainstream discipline.

The interrelationship between IR theory and peace and conflict theory has also been instrumental in providing and refining the policy tools available for the development of the liberal peace. Within the context of the behavioural revolution that affected the discipline of IR, peace research, pluralism, conflict research and human needs approaches within the context of World Society,
attempted to provide a radical restructuring of the way in which the discipline saw the world. These were influential within IR theory more generally, but more importantly crucial in developing theoretical, conceptual and methodological approaches to peace that were widely used by researchers and in conflict and post-conflict environments. Within peace and conflict studies, two main theoretical strands emerged. Peace research focused upon a rationalist and structuralist explanation of conflict, which implied an attempt to engage with a ‘better’ peace than was being experienced in the Cold War context in particular. Conflict studies focused upon understanding the roots of conflict in the context of Burtonian human needs debates, and in particular looking at methods to end conflict, such as peacekeeping, mediation, negotiation and conflict resolution, or to transform conflict into a more positive force. From both there emerged an agenda which focused upon the widely used negative or positive peace. This led to the development of thinking about a more emancipatory notion of peace, and this body of work began to open up new ontological, methodological, as well as theoretical questions, which have affected not only peace and conflict studies, but also the broader discipline. This chapter sketches this evolution, and its contribution to a broader discussion of peace in IR theory.

The concept of peace in peace and conflict studies

The orthodoxy of IR has been that peace and conflict studies only deal with specific instances of mediation, conflict resolution, conflict transformation or peacebuilding, and that the broader questions of order, norms, structures, power and international organisation and governance were best left to ‘international theorists’. This, of course, is indicative of mainstream IR theory’s tendency towards reductionism (though at the same time it has quietly adopted many of peace and conflict theory’s approaches).

Despite this, what emerged from peace and conflict studies was the gradual extension of the sub-discipline to include areas such as human rights, development, reconstruction, gender, humanitarian assistance, IOs, agencies, IFIs, NGOs and non-state actors, broader approaches to peacebuilding, as well as the need for research methods such as ethnography, in order to understand violence, conflict, war and peace from the perspective of grassroots directly affected and not just from the perspective of states and elites. Of course, incorporating such issues and areas also meant that the discipline had to engage with both external literatures and policy approaches in these different contexts. As might be expected these approaches led to a significantly different, and quietly influential, view of the way peace is understood, though these also tended to be relatively marginalised in a discipline dominated by a discussion of the ‘classic’ texts of idealism and liberalism, realism and structuralism, and their discussion of power, interest, justice and sovereignty. Peace and conflict studies should therefore not just be seen as an attempt to investigate their sub-disciplinary areas in combination with mainstream IR theory (though many scholars did take this approach), but also to question the domination of the discipline of IR by what
many peace and conflict researchers saw as a self-fulfilling militaristic paradigm obsessed with power and violence, interest and status.\(^5\)

Indeed some of the concepts which were utilised and developed in these sub-disciplines challenged the more dominant frameworks of IR. Structural violence and the notions of negative and positive peace, developed by Galtung, illustrated the deficiency of realism and liberalism in understanding the extent of violence and its indirect impacts. The notion that the transnational networks made up much of international relations, and that within in this context security was based upon interdependence challenged key concepts such as the hierarchical balance of power which reordered states as the key actors in IR. The Burtonian presentation of a set of basic socio-biological human needs as navigation points for policy gave agency to individuals, implied that a general peace was not idealistic, and would rest upon the satisfaction of the needs of individuals rather than states in international relations. This provided an important avenue through which peace could be defined in terms of an absence of structural violence and a win–win situation for all concerned actors. Though there was little consideration of identity and some major assumptions made about the non-state or sub-state agency of unofficial actors, an alternative cartography of IR, and so peace, was made available to the broader discipline of IR. What is more, the vocabulary of peace research and conflict studies began to creep into the discipline to the extent that concepts like structural violence or positive and negative peace are widely used, even if only rhetorically.\(^6\)

In earlier work I have argued that there are termed four generations of theory relating to peace and conflict studies, and I follow this usage in this chapter.\(^7\) In brief outline, the first generation is derived from conflict management approaches that attempt to produce order without open violence by preserving the state and its relations. This reflects a realist view of peace. The second generation focuses on removing violence, structural violence and injustice, mainly for individuals. This combines elements of idealism, structuralism and liberalism. The third generation focuses on large-scale, multidimensional approaches to creating peace. This reflects the liberal peace discussed in the previous chapter, and incorporates liberal–realism, structuralism, and claims it aspires to provide emancipation from conflict. The fourth generation seeks ways of dealing with conflict that would not result in its replication in various forms, leading to a consensual, legitimate and discursive form of emancipation.\(^8\) The following section outlines the version of peace that each generation offer, and the broader implications for development of the discussion of peace in IR theory.

### A negative peace: first generation and conflict management

The first generation approach to ending conflict, commonly equated with political realism, rests on the assumption that conflict is biological (the inherency argument), and a limited state-centric discourse that excludes non-state actors and ignores non-state-centric issues. Relationships between disputants are balanced, controlled or modified by the insertion and presence of neutral third
parties, or a third party operating on the basis of its interests, acting upon the basic interest of reducing violence. This modifies the classic friend–enemy distinction in favour of an externally managed balance between disputants. This provides third parties with a significant resource. It requires states, individuals, institutions or organisations to calculate their own relative interests in relation to the broader liberal goals of reducing and managing conflict.9

Because conflict management approaches are based upon the liberal–realist hybrid, their key issues, based on the tragedy of IR, pertain to the production of a basic minimum order without overt violence. This is argued to require neutrality and impartiality of the interveners, or a recognition of their interests in intervening and is aimed at a negative form or peace, or at least a very conservative or victor’s peace. This literature is also concerned with issues like trust, the timing and form of intervention (whether it is diplomatic, in the form of mediation, or coercive, in the form of peacekeeping, military intervention). Indicative of conflict management approaches and the ontological, epistemological and methodological frameworks they suggest is the literature on hurting stalemates and ripe moments.10 This literature argues that there are certain windows of opportunity where conflicts can be settled through conflict management strategies which aim at producing a basic peace, and the most obvious opportunity is presented when a hurting stalemate has been arrived at. This allows mediators, diplomats and peacekeeping operations to mobilise.11 This then raises the question of the techniques, resources, ‘power’ and capacities of the actors who then deploy these methods with these limited aims in mind. Peace is therefore understood to be dependent solely upon the outcome of the contest between the world’s most powerful states, played out through the military and diplomatic tools they control to maintain order. This suggests that managing conflict is a problem-solving process, which invokes sovereign man, who can then construct a limited version peace representing self-interest through the rational application of scientific knowledge.12

Consequently, much of this literature focuses on the different generations of peacekeeping, from very narrow operations which simply patrol ceasefires to much more complex, multidimensional operations which seek to impose a specific order (normally liberal) in the territory where it is located. It also focuses on mediation as a diplomatic or quasi diplomatic activity, requiring interactions between states over territory, alliances, constitutional agreements or boundaries, within the world of sovereign representation. Peace is therefore envisaged as being part of this world of sovereign states and their often insurmountable conflicts, and is constructed in a limited manner by quasi military or diplomatic activities between state representatives.

Traditional UN peacekeeping13 was designed to provide the UN with a cautious role in constructing a limited peace in places such as Cyprus, the Middle East and the Congo, as compared to the ambitious version of peace alluded to in its own Charter. As peacekeeping developed, the version of peace it was intended to create became more ambitious. Early forms of peacekeeping were essentially observer missions or disengagement missions. Later forms of peace-
keeping were intended to provide the conditions of stability in which diplomacy, mediation and negotiation could then be used to avoid any reliance on quasi-military forces. These indicated inherently conservative approaches to peace, which was assumed to be limited and fragile, dependent upon the impartial neutrality of interveners and perhaps most importantly the consent of disputants. The alternative (later to be called peace-enforcement when it was finally tried in Somalia in the early 1990s, though there were also shades of this in the early Congo mission) resembled the victor’s peace more directly and rested upon direct external military intervention, though traditional peacekeeping was also an attempt to moderate the victor’s peace.

These dynamics span most of the discussion and practice of conflict management, which failed to cope with the conceptual and practical problems derived from cases revolving around claims for representation, statehood related to disputed historical possession of territory, identity and culture. Even where such issues may not be priorities, the agents of first generation approaches work on the basis that this ambitious version of peace cannot be achieved in such conflicts. This limited peace is consequently based upon the fragile equation of state interests, issues and resources, and often depends upon external guarantors. This conceptualisation of peace was necessarily based upon the dominance of one disputant over another, or of a third party over them both – a victor’s peace. It rests upon a monodimensional and state-centric view of IR, based upon the ‘objective truth’ of endemic violence inherent in human nature and so inherent in state actors, and the need for military and diplomatic measures to combat the worst excesses of these. First generation approaches reflect the realist end of the liberal–realist hybrid in IR theory. On the other hand, conflict management approaches also recognised elements of the liberal agenda for the capacity of international alliances and organisations to bring a semblance of order through international cooperation over coercion. As a result, the fields of peace and conflict studies were internally divided over these approaches, often because they were deemed not to be ambitious enough in the form of peace they offered, though it is also often accepted that military security is the basis for all attempts at a wider peace.

An idealist or liberal peace: second generation and conflict resolution

A second generation of debates crystallised around the concept of conflict resolution. This took a more ambitious stance on peace, leading to the notion of a ‘win–win’ peace, and provided a counter to conflict management debates. The second generation approach perceived conflict to be psychological, socio-biological, or as a product of political, economic and social structures that deny or impede human needs. It was specifically focused on an understanding of the root causes of conflict from the perspective of individuals, groups and societies, and on mutual accommodation at this level of analysis. Hence, it offers a notion of a civil peace (and in doing so, relates closely to the liberal peace model).
This rests on the view that conflict arises out of a repression of human needs and is a social phenomenon as well as a psychological phenomenon. Relative deprivation theory, for example, identifies a sense of injustice as a source of social unrest, and the frustration–aggression approach sees frustration as a necessary or sufficient condition for aggression. What is most challenging about conflict resolution approaches is that they are derived from, and project, a civil society oriented discourse. Public and private actors, operating at the level of the group or individual, are empowered to construct a positive peace which directly addresses the societal roots of conflict, rather than merely its state-level issues. This means that violence is seen to be structural as well as direct or overtly expressed and structural violence is seen to be at the root of intractable conflicts. These are rooted in discriminatory, biased or inequitable social, economic and political structures.

This approach, when placed in the context of realist inspired conflict management, was a radical one, and was developed in the context of liberal, pluralist and Marxist approaches to the discipline of IR. Liberal arguments raised the possibility that conflict was not endemic nor rooted in human nature, pluralist arguments translated this into the context of Burtonian human needs theory and a ‘world society’, and Marxist approaches raised the issues of justice, equity and emancipation from class and socioeconomic discrimination for many contributing from the peace research school. By implication these contributions highlighted human needs over state security and structural violence and the need for alternative forms of communication to be developed which enabled the full representation of all voices and issues in conflicts, and prevented realist and state-centric approaches from imposing a self-fulfilling minimum level order in which the roots of future conflict might lie.

This approach to conflict has been crucial, not just in the contribution of new perspectives to peace that moves beyond simplistic notions of state security and state interests, but also in providing a conceptual and methodological framework for non-state actors (NGOs, for example) and civil society to respond to the misallocation of universal human needs for identity, political participation and security, which are non-negotiable because they are founded on a universal ontological drive. From this assertion it was a short step to the realisation that the repression and deprivation of human needs is the root of protracted conflicts, along with structural factors, such as underdevelopment. This equated development with peace offered a conceptualisation of peace based upon values and transnational networks shared by states, civil societies and international organisations. As a result of this line of thought, it emerges that peace can be built from the bottom-up by civil society actors along with states and transnational actors. This reflects the liberal–realist hybrid, though the focus is now on civil society discourses of peace and their impact on realist notions of peace.

Despite these radical differences with conflict management approaches, there is a certain amount of continuity between first and second generation approaches, in which both the inherency argument (realism) and liberal frameworks for the governance of social, economic and political conditions are con-
structed to ward off aggression, define the limits of individual and state behaviour while also retaining a level of individual freedom. The familiar contours of the hybrid liberal–realism emerge from this, especially as the debate on conflict resolution evolved towards ‘multi-track diplomacy’, peacebuilding and contingency approaches. This connects with liberal arguments about human security and the ‘democratic peace’, which are seen as a way to distribute political and material resources and, following on from human needs and structural violence theories, view conflict as socio-biological and derived from a structural suppression of a basic hierarchy of human needs. This means that the notion of a civil peace challenges the more limited constitutional or institutional peace offered by conflict management approaches, but does not necessarily replace it. On the other hand, these contributions to second generation thinking also imply that conflict requires social engineering on the part of third party interveners to remove the conditions that create violence.

Even though civil society actors and security issues pertaining to societies rather than states are foremost in this approach, it remains the role of state to distribute these human needs fairly and it is the role of the individual and civil society to provide indications of where such needs are required. Effectively, the peace represented by the conflict resolution and peace research debates is normative in character – though it adopted a positivist research methodology – because of its focus on the needs of individuals, and on the injustices caused by structural violence. Its underlying ontology is resistant to the notion that individuals are merely passive actors in international politics. Indeed, it is heavily predicated upon the understanding that individual agency should and can be exerted to assuage human needs and lead to social justice. Conflict resolution offers an alternative to the elitist diplomacy of conflict management approaches by focusing upon civil society actors and their transnational connections. Similarly, peace research approaches offer a critique of the structural violence inherent in the international system, particularly relating to the international political economy and social justice issues arising from a denial of property, political representation and productive capacities.

The peace implied by both is clearly an improvement on first generation approaches, but requires a fundamental reshaping of international praxis, which many would argue is either unrealistic, or a very long-term project. These approaches are often represented as a methodology through which citizens are able to deal with a conflict in a non-zero-sum manner, and are supposed to be non-threatening towards traditional high-level interactions. This fails to acknowledge the connection between civil society and constitutional or institutional versions of peace. Indeed, in providing a forum for the agency of individuals, and assuming that they will be in favour of a liberal form of peace, conflict resolution is also an inherently political approach which threatens elites who monopolise resources for their own alternative interests. Thus, second generation thinking provides a radical perspective of a peace dependent upon the agency of the individual and civil society, while also accepting the universal, liberal norms of pluralism and democracy, human rights and social welfare.
The understanding of peace that has emerged from these approaches focuses on one specific dimension of the conflict environment, be it the individual, group or structure. Because it is assumed that human needs are universal and that, effectively, conflict resolution leads to a peace that is not in need of cultural negotiation, second generation approaches fall short of examining some key issues related to the nature of peace. They assume that contact with the ‘other’ leads to a deconstruction, rather than reification of conflict, and that donors and facilitators are not self-interested but are neutral and benevolent. They also assume they have some impact upon official dialogues rather than the reverse (which is probably more likely given the dominance of states), and that the kind of human security discourse which emerges from second generation approaches illustrates how the roots of conflict can be addressed through cooperative means, rather than making participants more aware of the structural violence or injustice they may be undergoing. Despite this, a resolution of conflict and a positive peace presents a far more attractive policy and intellectual discourse about the sort of peace that would be the result of third party intervention.

The challenge offered by second generation approaches carries such discursive and normative power that what soon became apparent was the requirement for more sophisticated methods than either first or second generation approaches provided for in the construction of a civil peace. The impact of conflict resolution and peace research approaches has become a significant part of the contemporary understanding of peace across the discipline of IR. This is despite the fact that some of their claims are difficult to sustain, including the clear-cut distinction between a negative and a positive peace, the identification of human needs, the scientific rather than normative, cultural, or emotional aspects of conflict structures, their impact upon but separation from first generation approaches and conflict management, their complementary possibilities for official mediation, and claims of neutral facilitation. This positive peace, which has been conceptualised as a ‘cosmopolitan turn’ in conflict resolution, has also empowered non-state actors and NGOs to assist in the development of peace based on the identification and allocation of human needs according to the voices of non-state and unofficial actors. As Burton argued human needs are fulfilled through a transnational ‘cobweb model’ of transactions that form a world society. Conflict resolution debates owe much to a conceptualisation of peace derived from the empowerment of civil society and the individual, and the imaginary of peace it presents is constructed from the bottom-up, is not limited in geospatial terms, and is not greatly corrupted by realist obsessions with interests, state or power, or liberal obsessions with institutional frameworks.

Liberal peacebuilding: third generation

Peacebuilding was initially theorised in the peace research literature as a grassroots, bottom-up process in which a local consensus led to a positive peace. As the concept evolved it came to represent a convergence between the agendas of
peace research, conflict resolution and conflict management approaches. This convergence culminated in the contemporary peacebuilding project, which in itself has been subsumed within a liberal state-building enterprise. This rested upon an implicit agreement between international actors, the UN, IFIs and NGOs on a ‘peacebuilding consensus’ aimed at the construction of the liberal peace as a third generation response to post-Cold War conflicts, many of which revolved around collapsed or fragile states in the terminology of the day (meaning any non-liberal state that was subject to conflict). After the end of the Cold War this was in part based upon the development of more ambitious forms of peacekeeping. This evolved rapidly from multidimensional peacekeeping to state-building, at first with the consent of local actors and in a multilateral form, and now on occasion without governmental consent. As a result the demands on the role of the UN and its supporting actors multiplied and diversified.29

The peacekeeping operations in Namibia, Cambodia, Angola, Mozambique and El Salvador seemed to offer the hope that the peace engendered in UN intervention could go beyond patrolling ceasefires and would instead contribute to the democratisation of failing and failed states. In this way peacekeeping was linked to the liberal peace, meaning that interveners (peacekeepers, NGOs, donors and officials) were now required to focus on democratisation, human rights, development and economic reform from Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia, DR Congo and East Timor.30 Peacekeeping, and the complexity of tasks associated with it, became part of global governance, which now became the new imaginary of peace in the minds of policymakers, and peace and conflict researchers alike. Despite the combination of conflict management and conflict resolution approaches, however, peacebuilding still mainly focused on top-down, elite-led, official processes. Though peace was to be more than merely the removal of overt violence, the engagement of peacebuilding with the broader roots of conflict was still limited – in part by its inherent liberal ideology. In this way, peacebuilding represented a multilevel approach, attempting to incorporate the local, state and regional aspects of, and actors in, conflict. It also became multidimensional in nature in that it brought together a wide range of actors who were able to deal with the conflictual dimensions of a wide range of issues and dynamics.

These debates offered a sophisticated methodology through which peace could be rationally created through the scientific application of liberal knowledge systems. This widespread acceptance that the liberal peace could be created by the proper actions on the part of international agencies, actors and NGOs following the requisite procedures, required that liberal institutions should be created and that human needs should be provided for civil society actors. An important aspect of the liberal peace is the argument that conflict cannot really be ‘resolved’ unless the concerns of civil society are met and, furthermore, that there cannot be a liberal peace unless there is a vibrant civil society. It is generally accepted that peacebuilding approaches should be particularly sensitive to civil society actors’ expectations and needs.31 This means that peacebuilding is a multidimensional and multilevel process including
a broad range of actors, which must respond to political, social, economic and developmental tasks if an ambitious version of the liberal peace is to be established. Implicit in this discourse on peace is the cosmopolitan belief that a universal version of peace is normatively possible through a scientific perfecting of the strategies to be deployed. Contemporary debates on peacebuilding and statebuilding have appropriated these norms, approaches and frameworks, pertaining both to the understanding of peace and conflict inherent in conflict management, conflict resolution and peace studies, and produced a hybrid, third generation approach that has now been widely deployed in many of the post-Cold War environment’s conflict settings to construct the shell of the liberal state.

This third generation approach is heavily driven by the requirements and perceptions of policymakers, officials and actors involved in both a top-down and bottom-up vision of peace, and processes based upon both. Through these dual approaches, the ontology of the peace that has become the objective of the full range of peacebuilders became much more sophisticated in its conception of, and focus on, self-sustainability rather than merely on external forms of guarantee. The multiple interventions at multiple levels inherent in peacebuilding approaches represents a peace which is technically plausible, which can be constructed by external actors in cooperation with local actors, and thus can eventually be freestanding. This necessitates the redressal of some difficult issues which had not been accessible before, including the recognition of new, often non-state, parties. Peacebuilding requires multiple third party interventions aimed at redefining the discourses, practices and structures of the conflict environment and replacing them with the liberal architecture of the modern state. This is generally achieved through the deployment of multiple third parties engaged in the construction of conditional or coercive relationships with disputants. This is supposed to create cooperation and allow for the exertion of leverage over disputants in order to modify their behaviour, indicating that peacebuilders and the recipients of peacebuilding often have different understandings of peace, and different interests. Third generation approaches allow for this dichotomy because it is essentially a hybrid of different methodologies, actors and discursive approaches, which privilege the liberal peace.

In discursive terms, peacebuilding emphasises governance and top-down thinking about peace, rather than bottom-up approaches as originally envisaged. This accentuates reform processes associated with liberal–democratic free market frameworks, human rights and the rule of law, and development models. Guidance in, or control of, almost every aspect of state and society is provided by external actors, which construct liberal regimes through a mixture of consensual and punitive strategies. All of these approaches effectively combine an outside-in construction of peace whereby outside actors import the specialised knowledge, procedures and structures, with an inside-out approach, whereby disputants attempt to re-negotiate this process according to their own interests, culture and frameworks. This evolution has led to a consensus in orthodox IR theory, and in the policy work connecting liberal peace thinking, institutional and constitutional arguments about embedded liberalism, pluralism, functional-
is, liberal and constructivist arguments about states, societies, identity, and civil society and the need for a multidimensional and multilevel understanding of peace and a subsequent, problem-solving approach to its construction.

Third generation approaches gave rise to more comprehensive ambitions for peace, but also raise questions about the nature of the universal peace that they imply. The liberal peace requires multiple forms of intervention, which the theories of peacebuilding supply: UN peace operations, mediation and negotiation, development and humanitarian relief, and specialised reform aimed at meeting international standards in areas from the security sector, corruption, the environment, border controls, human rights and the rule of law. This effectively means that the liberal concept of peace revolves around the reform of governance, is highly interventionary, and has a rational, mechanical problem-solving character, and can be constructed by those in possession of such specialised knowledge as deemed necessary to pass on for its creation. Agenda for Peace, published in 1992, was an early blueprint for such a broad and ambitious project, though the nature of the peace it represented was still inherently constrained by the need to consider sovereign states as the main actors and the right of non-intervention by states in their affairs as well as, on a more theoretical level at least, its implicit claim that peace could be built according to a universal formula. As Chopra argued, it engenders a mechanism whereby the UN, regional organisations, member states and local actors take control or monitor the instruments of governance. This allows for the use of force as well as persuasion, and upon the hegemony of the discourse of conditionality between donor, coordinating actors and local actors. This reflects an amalgam of constitutional, institutional and civil components of the liberal peace packaged within a blueprint framework which provides both its institutional components and the methods and actors by which it is installed.

In this way, third generation approaches to peacebuilding are closely connected with the liberal peace and its underlying liberal–realist framework, and underlying methodological and ontological assumptions. This replicates the Kantian derived democratic peace argument and its focus on democratisation, adding a focus on development and marketisation, and on the rule of law and human rights. Yet, out of 18 UN attempts at democratisation since the end of the Cold War, 13 had suffered some form of authoritarian regime within 15 years, underlining the wider implications of peacebuilding beyond simplistic assumptions that the holding of free and fair elections mean that peace is automatically self-sustaining.

In addition, the role of international financial institutions (IFIs) has effectively driven economic structural adjustment and development projects through neo-liberal strategies. Over the years since the end of the Cold War, this has been somewhat modified in favour of including citizens in such calculations rather than leaving them to fend for themselves while the market develops. This has been based upon a recognition that leaving individuals in the position of being unable to have a productive life is a negative impact of the liberal peace project. However, given the institutions that run the neo-liberal project are
profoundly unaccountable and undemocratic this has been a slow process. There has been an acknowledgement of the need to reduce poverty and create social welfare and responsibility in order to complement their contribution to peacebuilding. Yet, this has been described as ‘poor relief and riot control’.

The relationship between peacebuilding and justice and the problems of establishing post-conflict justice has been controversial. This revolves around either the argument that justice needs to be incorporated into any self-sustaining peace, or that justice may have to be secondary in the short to medium term to the creation of peace. In the latter case, justice remains subservient to stability and a limited notion of peace because so many individuals and organisations in conflict environments are implicated in violence, corruption or crimes against humanity.

What this indicates, and as has been explored by Pouligny to great effect, is that liberal peacebuilding operations and the third generation of peace and conflict theory that they are partially derived from are mainly institutionally focused, see peace as lying in the institutions of governance, and generally fail to come to terms with the lived experiences of individuals and their needs in everyday life, their welfare, culture or traditions. What is more there is a monumental gap between the expectations of peacebuilding and what it has actually delivered so far in practice, particularly from the perspective of local communities. Liberal peacebuilding is predicated on the Western liberal–realist hybrid theory and experience of state reconstruction and peace processes. Knowing what ‘peace’ is, as both a process and goal, encompasses and empowers epistemic peacebuilding communities and the methods they apply. Yet, in the various contemporary peacebuilding operations there are several common complaints: that there are not enough resources available for the vast scale of what is essentially a state-building project; that there is a lack of local capacity, skill, participation or consent; that there is a lack of coordination and too much duplication amongst the agents of intervention; that the peacebuilding process is mainly owned by international actors rather than by its recipients; that the issues that face society in cultural and welfare terms are ignored; and that peacebuilding is mainly driven by neo-liberal marketisation and development agendas. Indeed, it is probably true to say that the cooption of peacebuilding by state-building approaches in the recent context of Afghanistan and Iraq have pushed its conceptualisation of peace from a liberal to a neo-liberal basis.

Such problems undermine the universal claims inherent in the peacebuilding consensus and has forced them to become more and more interventional. From Agenda for Peace to the High Level Panel Report, however, the assumption that liberal peacebuilding is both plausible and will lead to a self-sustaining peace has become the fundamental assumption behind dealing with conflict, through a mixture of conditionality, deferment, dependency, and offering local freedom, rights and prosperity at some point in the future. What lies hidden in these assumptions is that elements of the victor’s peace remain, that peacebuilders are not just engaged in constructing the liberal peace through institutional, constitutional and civil society formulations, but they are also involved in minor or major ways in renegotiating the nature of this peace and the nature of the ‘local’
through the establishment of multiple and normally external layers of ‘peace-as-
governance’, as inferred by a liberal conceptualisation of peace. This renegotia-
tion occurs between major international actors, donors and liberal states’
interests, capacities and objectives, as well as with local recipients of these
activities in conflict zones. Indeed, third generation approaches offer a peace
that is a product of multiple intervener’s objectives with perhaps only a marginal
renegotiation with its local recipients.

A fourth generation: critiquing peace-as-governance

The third generation peacebuilding project – and indeed the liberal peace or
even neo-liberal peace it aims to construct – has become a major research
agenda in peace and conflict studies, but it has also been criticised by a range of
scholars influenced by critical approaches to IR. These critiques have underlined
the intellectual incoherence of the third generation project in terms of its
emancipatory potential, its reification of state sovereignty and its difficulties in
dealing with identity issues, of coordination, and of resources. They have
pointed to issues with its universal claims, its cultural assumptions, its top-down
institutional, neo-liberal and neo-colonial overtones, and its secular and ration-
alist nature.

These aspects of the liberal peacebuilding project have led a body of theorists
to develop a critical fourth generation of thinking about peace and conflict
theory, which aims to develop approaches which move beyond the replication of
Westphalian forms of sovereignty as a response to conflict (see Chapters 6 and 7
for the theoretical basis for these developments).46 The critical strand of a fourth
generation implies an emancipatory form of peace that reflects the interests,
identities, and needs of all actors, state and non-state, and aims at the creation of
a discursive framework of mutual accommodation and social justice which
recognises difference. An everyday, post-Westphalian peace is its aim. The post-
structuralist strand of fourth generation approaches raise problems with the uni-
versal emancipatory project and its transmission into conflict zones, however,
focusing instead on questions of representation and sovereignty in the context of
debates about identity, boundaries, hybridity and culture and the binaries these
often rest upon. An everyday, post-sovereign peace represents the more exten-
sive aim of post-structuralism informed approaches to peace and conflict studies.
Such concerns connect both critical and post-structural IR theory in that they
focus on the question of how one can move beyond the installation of a hege-
monic peace, and move towards an everyday notion of peace sensitised to the
local as well as the state, regional and global. This is indicative of the contribu-
tion of peace and conflict studies towards an understanding of a ‘politics of
peace’ resting upon a just social order and solidarity, transcending that offered
by the liberal peace.47 This requires a critical interrogation of concepts like
peacekeeping, mediation, conflict resolution and peacebuilding, which aims to
provide a reflexive version of peace associated with a range of emancipatory dis-
courses.48 From this, and in association with a number of developments relevant
to developing a more complex account of peace in IR, a critical account of liberal peacebuilding can be developed.

The general agreement amongst key actors, from states, donors and IFIs, to the UN and NGOs about the broader objectives of peace in international relations, and their attempts to reproduce this through experimental forms of liberal peacebuilding, state-building, liberal and neo-liberal development and reform – effectively through peace-as-governance – are obvious in the many peace processes, transitional administrations, occupations and development projects taking place around the world. In these locations can be seen explicitly the pragmatic policy results of these varied implicit debates about peace, reflecting the argument that states are founded upon ‘soon to be forgotten’ violence, and once established they survive upon a ‘technology of governance’ increasingly driven by neo-liberalism. Effectively, this meant peace-as-governance became the post-Cold War objective and liberal norm in conflict zones around the world. Conflicts provided an opportunity for an epistemic community to intervene to direct these reforms, according to a general peacebuilding consensus which had arisen, which in third generation approaches are driven by the notion of liberal–democratic reform leading to the creation of liberal polities. Instead, fourth generation approaches illustrate how the neo-liberal cooption of this project has moved it away from an emancipatory approach which, they indicate, needs to be reclaimed by a more critical approach.

A further critique has been directed at governance, which is both a key tool and key objective in this theoretical and policy concurrence on the liberal peace. Fourth generation approaches argue that governance reform reflects the liberal mode for redistribution of power, prestige and ‘rules and rights embodied in the system’ led by a hegemonic actor, whereby the balance of power, hegemony and constitutionalism converge in the liberal peace. For critical strands of peace and conflict studies, governance must be reconstituted to provide and enable emancipation, reflected a discourse ethic. For more post-structuralist oriented thinkers, this represents ‘an era of “governmentality”’ in which peace is produced by sovereign governments, states and their institutions operating in a traditional top-down manner. Whereas critical theorists point to the importance of non-state, non-official forms of governance at the civil society level in constructing an emancipatory peace, post-structuralist critiques regard this as a form of biopower through which actors are empowered and enabled to intervene in the most private aspects of human life as their contribution to the development of the liberal peace. This governance is driven by dominant states and their institutions for its direction, represented as neutral, objective, benevolent for the most part, and yet at the same time is often also accused of effectively maintaining insidious practices of intervention upon host and recipient communities. It equates good governance with equitable development and neo-liberal economic policy, and political reform, and results in a relationship of conditionality between its agents and recipients. As Beck has pointed out, what emerges from the practices of liberal peacebuilding to reconstruct states is a ‘peace-war’ in which cosmopolitan thinking, defence ministers
and liberal states sanction violence to build peace, and also sanction the neo-liberal privatisation of many of the elements of state-building. This reflects the fourth generation critique, and the starting point for the critical project of rationally and discursively constructing an emancipatory peace also reflecting inter-subjectivity. The post-structural version endeavours to examine this without relying on universality, rationality or sovereignty, instead focusing on understanding how third generational approaches develop knowledge as power and seeking to develop an understanding of ontologies of peace, rather than merely its liberal episteme or methods.

Much criticism has also been aimed at the general adoption of neo-liberalism as a key framework for the liberal peace. This means that its cornerstones of democracy, human rights, the rule of law, marketisation and development have often become franchised concepts, which have increasingly been perceived as predatory and subject to a global peacebuilding market rather than to a renegotiation of norms by some of those actors who either deploy or receive liberal peacebuilding. For example, the recent consultation paper for the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) conflict policy (2006) recognised the close relationship between conflict and development and the importance of ‘culture’ but omitted the equally significant issue of social welfare during a transitional peacebuilding period. Yet, this recognition can be found as far back as the Declaration of Human Rights (Articles 22, 23 and 25) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Articles 6, 9, 11 and 13). The Marshall Plan provided an early example of how reconstruction might work and endeavoured in a Keynesian context to provide employment and assistance through massive investment to produce a peaceful modernity. Yet, where peacebuilding occurs – as it has in many post-conflict settings over the last decades – it is widely accepted that it must both create and promote a vibrant civil society. It also expects to receive much of its support and legitimacy on the ground from civil society and local actors, so civil society also acts as a crucial validation of peacebuilding strategy and objectives. While the civil peace denotes the indigenous nature of peace within local culture and traditional social frameworks, ‘civil society’ represents a Western view of non-governmental actors, citizens, subjects, workers, consumers and institutions which are empowered from above in order to represent themselves, exercise their own agency, lobby and advocate. It often conflates welfare and cultural rights in similar, but secondary, rhetorical categories. Empowerment therefore must be carried out in the shadow of ‘security’ and within the liberal–realist [read neo-liberal] ethic now dominant, and therefore must represent individual rights, economic freedom and independence, and access to politically representative institutions. An indigenous civil peace and civil society therefore actually often represents a dichotomy much noted by pluralist thinkers, and also by indigenous actors in conflict zones who often point scornfully to the gulf between them and the socially engineered and artificially promoted civil society imagined by international actors.

However, while these critiques underline the problems that the third generation approaches are subject to, it is also clear that liberal peacebuilding has built
into it some capacity for local actors, including officials, politicians and civil society actors, to influence its development. This often happens by local cooperation of the international actors, either through their employment of international staff, or through grassroots campaigns, such as the ‘Timorisation’ or ‘Kosovarisation’ campaign conducted in East Timor or Kosovo during the external administrations there.58 Yet, the liberal peacebuilding process has clearly enhanced this type of local agency, though it is heavily weighted in favour of certain local actors who have access to major international actors, thus creating a bias towards these official discourses of reform on which the liberal peace is predicated. This means that the problems of conditionality, dependency creation and the supposed erosion of local capacity are to some extent bypassed as local actors learn how to turn the liberal peacebuilding process to their own ends.

This does not bypass the problem that civil society, immediate concerns of economic opportunity, cultural recognition and social justice are generally of lesser significance in a liberal peacebuilding process. This is because it is heavily driven by top-down elite perspectives of political reform and democratisation and neo-liberal reform in which markets are supposed to deal with these issues. From Cambodia to Kosovo, high rates of poverty, unemployment and the continuing predominance of grey economies and subsistence during and since the peacebuilding operations they have been subject to, means that the majority of the population only experience an alleviation in their security concerns, do not play an active role in a free market, and do not pay taxes and so have little formal role in the state other than the occasional exercise of their democratic right to vote. Welfare and wellbeing are marginal concerns for liberal peacebuilders, meaning that its agenda has been redirected by a rather more predatory neo-liberal agenda within the economic domain which, incidentally, also has the effect of absolving international actors from institutional responsibility for individual welfare. This, in effect, means that the liberal peace is a virtual peace that looks far more coherent from the outside than from the inside, and effectively builds the empty shell of a state, but neglects any notion of a social contract between that shell and its constituencies. It is proving extremely difficult to persuade local actors to ‘move into’ such states, other than politicians, officials and local staff of international actors who benefit from high salaries and access to the sites of power in a peacebuilding operation. These are in many ways shadow states, replicating a milieu in which ordinary people matter less than their mainly hypothetical rights and opportunities.

Human security debates have attempted to remedy this, from a policy and academic perspective. Human security is mainly associated with the work of non-state actors, quasi-state agencies, and especially NGOs. Such actors are engaged in constructing a version of the liberal peace at the grassroots level59 and have been widely accepted in key policy circles, as well as ‘global civil society’. This linkage between civil society, NGOs, international agencies and international organisations, donors and international financial institutions60 allows for the subjects of security to be redefined from the ‘state’ to the ‘individual’. Since their emergence human security oriented approaches and actors
offer a vision of the liberal peace in which social welfare and justice can be incorporated into parallel constitutional and institutional projects for peace. While this concept and these types of actors seem to provide a challenge to the traditional conceptions of the international system, most humanitarian actors, NGOs and associated non-state actors must, for their very existence, work within the confines of the dominant institutions and regimes of the states-system. This tempers the challenge that they create somewhat, though most commentators agree that non-state actors and agencies are a vital and key part of peace-building, and also that global governance would not be possible without their cooperation. For example, one of the side effects of the human security oriented role of NGOs has been that the provision of basic needs of populations in conflict zones has been privatised, following the neo-liberal model of franchise and branding of the liberal peace’s components. By the end of the 1990s most countries dispersed 25 per cent of their overseas aid through NGOs. This dispersal has effectively created a market situation where NGOs have to compete for funds, and must respect the conditionalities imposed upon them by donors intent on constructing the liberal peace.

However, this development has led into thinking about indigenous peace-building and local participation in conflict zones, as ways of ensuring that any peace created is not only sustainable, but is self-sustaining. The argument on local participation, put forward by Chopra and others, suggests that peace cannot be foisted on others, even if it is done so by an international and multilateral set of actors, without their consent and their participation in the process. This begs the question of whether the liberal peace allows for local participation, or instead leads to the cooption of local actors. Another possibility is that this peace is vulnerable to being coopted by locals. A further dimension to this debate has been a discussion of indigenous peace practices and processes, working from the bottom up, and founded upon local culture and traditional practices. This debate has revolved around a tendency to romanticise the indigenous contribution as necessarily peaceful, pragmatism about its possible replication of negative practices, and a rejection of the local as corrupt, deviant, traumatised and schooled in cultures of violence. This has often displaced a genuine engagement with an indigenous peace. Thus, the notion that a bottom-up and localised, even indigenously based peace from a fourth generation perspective, is also problematic, especially as it is far from clear whether the liberal peace framework can adjust itself sufficiently to incorporate such dynamics without necessarily losing whatever institutional integrity it may carry. In this context, difference is only acceptable when it operates within the liberal framework. This ‘romanticisation of the local’ consists of four types: Orientalism in which locals are seen as exotic (or indeed quixotic) and unknowable, thus justifying blueprint top-down and illiberal approaches rather than local engagement; an assertion of a lack of capacity in which locals are seen as unable to play a role because they are effectively helpless, again justifying top-down illiberalism; or an assertion of local deviousness and incivility; or through which they are seen to be a repository of indigenous capacities that internationals might coopt. This reflects the liberal culture of
peacebuilding, and its hegemonic engagement with the local rather than an equitable engagement. Thus, liberal peacebuilding is guilty of such moves in order to propagate a specific neo-liberal practice, and to defer responsibility for the welfare of the local. Its cultural engagement is little more than instrumental.

From the fourth generation perspective, the liberal peace project is ontologically incoherent. It offers several different states of being – for a state-centric world dominated by sovereign constitutional democracies, a world dominated by institutions, and a world in which human rights and self-determination are valued. The only way in which this peace system can be coherent is if it is taken to be hierarchical and regulative, led by hegemons which set political and economic priorities, and this provides the framework in which human rights and self-determination can be observed. Democracy provides the political system in which this process is made representative. The trouble with this is that the individual is subservient to the structure and system, which may be enabling in some contexts but in others it may not. Where the gaze of the guardians of the liberal panopticon cannot reach, abuses may follow, often committed by those elites who control the various systems that make up the liberal peace. Effectively this means that the individual who is relatively powerless is required to perform ‘liberal peace acts’ such as voting, paying taxes, engaging in the free market, and exercising rights, to keep the international gaze satisfied but not to expect that this performance carries any actual weight. Quite clearly, the assumptions which go with the liberal peace are contested across the world, in Islamic settings or those of other religions, in authoritarian states, in tribal and clan settings, and societies where traditional and cultural practices exist which do not fit with the Western conception of human rights and democracy. At a very basic level, muted by the preponderance of the liberal–international system, the very ontology and related epistemology of the liberal peace are being disputed by local communities, not necessarily on an ideological basis, but quite often because of its inefficiencies, its distant directors and executors, its cultural biases, and its failures to provide sufficient resources to support the everyday lives of such communities.

As a result of the critical turn in peace and conflict studies, state-building and its association with (or probably cooption of) the liberal peace, has been identified as a massive, interventionary, process of social, political and economic engineering. It represents the hegemonic domination of political norms in IR by a core group of actors, led primarily by the US and its associated ideologies. In practice there is a clear tendency to brush over its deficiencies meaning that the liberal peace is in practice a ‘virtual peace’ reflecting Baudrillard’s third aspect of hyper-reality – where the copy is more real than reality itself, especially to external viewers. Because the liberal peace values institutions, power and resources, through a rational engineering process, societies and polities are expected to mould themselves to the liberal peace model. Thus positivist, rational approaches to IR succeed in building the institutional aspects of the liberal peace, but it is difficult to see in this liberal peace the roots of a sustainable polity in conflict situations, which has the depth in particular to redress cultural and welfare related aspects of conflict. There are echoes of Said’s ‘Orientalism’
‘Primitive’ polities, so the argument goes implicitly, need to be governed directly while subjects are trained in the ways of the liberal peace. Once this has been completed, Western rationalism dictates that progress will mean that peace almost inevitably follows. These assumptions are recycled endlessly in the policy and academic literatures on peace as a form of print capitalism. This disguises the fact that the liberal peace is strongly contested by actors who want to determine their own peace. In the context of liberal peacebuilding, the omission of the landscape of everyday life, including its welfare aspects, cultural activity and recognition, and increasingly significant environmental base, form a core blindspot negated by neo-liberalism but vital to any sustainable peace. This agenda would require that individuals and families have sufficient welfare and resources to enable them to enter into stable relationships with their neighbours, as well as with the institutions of government and state. Their cultural and identity dynamics would be recognised rather than negated, and their environment would be preserved and improved such that it also contributed to stable relationships within the locale and state. Security, shelter, food, income, transport, cultural and educational facilities, provide continuity on which an emancipatory peace, or indeed an ontology of peace might then be built.

From a fourth generation perspective this underlines how the concepts incorporated into the liberal peace have become brand names, outsourced to agencies and NGOs who import them into conflict zones with little regard for the economic capacity of individuals to enter into this market. Indeed, where liberal peacebuilding focuses on neo-liberal strategies it rapidly becomes regarded by local communities as predatory, feeding elite corruption, and indeed this perception is also aimed at the international community. Thus, not only does this neo-liberal approach undermine the social contract between communities and their leaders, but it undermines the social contract between international peacebuilders and their targets, whether elites or local communities. At the root of this problem lies a cultural barrier whereby internationals are imbued with a trust in liberal ideologies, liberal political institutions and neo-liberal economic processes which disables much of their engagement with local conflict environments other than with similar elite actors.

From a fourth generation perspective, a preliminary assertion can be made for a new agenda for peace based upon emancipation as upon developing an understanding of its ontologies – approximating what Patomaki equates with Bourdieus’s *heterodoxa*, which indicates a pluralist, critical and self-reflective approach. This might start from the exercise of agency of individuals and groups, leading to a democratic process of representation, but one not necessarily encapsulated by the Westphalian state. Individuals and groups must also be able to represent themselves. In this context the right to opportunity for a productive life, not just with respect to labour, but with respect to emotions, culture and learning, must be expressed. This may result in a universal form of peace in the fashion proposed by critical theory’s approach to emancipation and it would certainly open up the broader range of issues associated with understanding an ontology of peace as a discourse.
Conclusion

The first three generations of thought within peace and conflict studies outlined above can be placed within the liberal tradition, and rest upon a liberal–realist hybrid. First generation approaches within a Westphalian epistemological system tend to replicate the flaws of that system and its tragic ontological assumptions and problem-solving methodological limitations. Second generation, conflict resolution and transformation approaches tend to be constrained by the prevalence of official discourses and by a tendency toward social engineering, though they offer an ontology that is much more positive about peace. They offer an epistemology and method that engages with individuals, the local, and with society and its issues (though it does this in a limited way and tends not to be able to cope with illiberal local and individual discourses). Third generation approaches represent ‘normalising’ governance activities involving the transfer of liberal epistemology into conflict zones. This offers an ontology in which peace is plausible and positive within a framework of liberal governance, regulation and freedom, and a methodology in which its construction is simply a rational and technical problem-solving matter. Fourth generation approaches develop a powerful critique of the liberal peace, and offer an account of peace based upon emancipation and the development on an understanding of the ontologies of peace.

In these terms, the construction of peace through peacebuilding strategies of a both top-down and bottom-up nature reflects the liberal–realist theoretical hybrid. Liberal approaches, critical theory and constructivist approaches all concur on the necessity of the incorporation of the subjective and objective, of force and freedom, of the state as the key actor which is motivated by power and interest, and on the moderating and ‘civilising discourse’ of universal liberal norms, which may both be universal and relatively subjective. Hence, peace is constructed through the reform of governance. Governance frameworks enforce compliance on the basis of prior agreements, though these agreements are often negotiated externally to the conflict environment being addressed, and almost certainly by external actors. This is generally taken to imply that there is a universal basis for the construction of peace agreed by the vast majority of the world’s actors, states, organisations, governments, administrations and communities. Yet, as fourth generation approaches illustrate, the liberal peace is mainly experienced in post-conflict zones as a shallow ‘virtual peace’, which in fact accentuates the gap between an international custodians’ aims, capacities and interests, and those of local actors. This effectively is a simulated peace though the hope is that it will eventually become self-sustaining rather than sustained from afar. State frameworks that emerge as a result of liberal peacebuilding tend to house ‘empty’ institutions which are, at least in the short to medium term, of little benefit to individuals and society in terms of their everyday life.

As this chapter has shown, mainstream approaches to peace and conflict theory assume that the liberal peace unquestionably forms the objective of both theorising the ending of conflict and ensuring that it does not occur again. The
differences between them mainly lies in the emphasis they place on various aspects of the liberal peace – whether this is the use of force, diplomacy, democratisation, human rights and the rule of law, development (in either its neoliberal or social justice oriented forms), and whether or not they see the Westphalian states-system as requiring major or minor reform. This determines the issues, actors, and concepts of peace that they reproduce in post-conflict environments.

Many of the authors, policymakers and officials who have worked in this area have an understanding of peace generally encompassed by the liberal peace. There is a consensus on the creation of the liberal peace as being viable and eventually self-sustaining: many advocate an illiberal transitional period resting on international intervention before such a peace arises, though this is rarely made explicit. Many academics working in the field draw on the conceptualisations presented by Wright, Mitrany, Deutsch, Burton and Galtung, and also follow Grotius and Kant. The fact that there is little debate upon the underlying ontological and epistemological implications of peace, its nature and achievement, other than in the indirect way that would emerge from any discussion about the ending of conflict (with the exception of those writing on fourth generation approaches), is extremely problematic. Of course, there is a major research agenda on the democratic peace within peace studies and in North American liberal intellectual circles, which has also become one of the foundational assumptions of orthodox IR theory in general. As Dunn has argued, the overall contribution of peace and conflict studies has been to develop the parameters for any concept of peace, which should include ‘self-realisation, emancipation … and the satisfaction of needs, not the contesting of rights’. The following chapters outline how IR has taken up this challenge.
Part II

Post-positivism and peace
6 Critical contributions to peace

Introduction: from critique to peace

From a critical perspective the main theoretical patterns through which peace is imagined, theorised and practised and deployed within orthodox, liberal–realist-oriented IR theory, encompasses a discursive imaginary of world politics and of the mechanisms, institutions, actors and methods required to entrench the liberal peace. This is achieved through governance in international, state or private life, as patterns and frameworks of global, local and regional interaction. Indeed, the language that this provides to discuss peace is very limited. This orthodoxy of peace is claimed to be not just a representation, but also a presentation of truth or fact in IR. This is far from consistent given the broad range of issues that addressing the concept of peace, even solely within the context of orthodox IR theory, raises. Orthodox theories indicate that peace can be conceptualised and theorised as positive or negative, as spatial or temporal, in opposition to perceived threats, a victor’s peace, or externally projected or internally constituted. It might be top-down or bottom-up, represent a specific political framework or ideology, a specific international framework, or an economic or social framework. Of course, the frameworks that emerge from orthodox theory indicate that peace is strongly contested and subjective, despite the attempts to offer its liberal orthodoxy as an ‘end of history’. Critical contributions to IR theory offer a more sophisticated conceptualisation of peace as well as a powerful critique of the liberal orthodoxy and the neo-liberal overtones that it increasingly has adopted, particularly in the form of hyper-liberal state regulation, economic rationalism, individualism and, of course, its truth claims to represent objective fact. It aims to theorise a post-Westphalian peace, in which territorial sovereignty and its ontology no longer disfigures the global normative landscape and political cartography. Given the immediacy of the politics of everyday life, the liberal peace is simply not responsive enough to the demands made upon it by states, officials and communities, particularly in the sphere of social welfare, culture and identity. This is a result of the limitations of orthodox IR theory and the methods and epistemology it suggests, as well as the ontological compromise it promises between tragedy and progress. This is also part of a wider questioning of the enlightenment project and its key precepts that objective
knowledge is possible, that societies and individuals are part of a natural order, and that knowledge can only be gained through experience. All of these indicate that there may be a natural order of peace, of which an objective understanding can be built. Critical approaches seek to offer broader methodologies and ontologies that contribute to the opening up of the epistemology of peace and the often liberal assumptions that characterise it, leading to a renewal of an emancipatory concept of peace. This is predicated upon the structural provision of emancipation, and the possibility of self-emancipation and agency. Given the inherent universalism that underlies some critical contributions to IR, questions arise as to whether these approaches simply seek to rescue liberal peace approaches, or significantly redress its problems.

The emergence of the critical impulse in IR theory, drawing upon critical social theory, has perhaps been one of the most important developments in IR theory over the last generation. This reflected a widespread dissatisfaction with both realism (read Popperian rationalism in IR), Kantian derived liberalism as a more normative response, and structurally determinist approaches derived from Marxism. Different strands rested partially upon a rejection of the objective and subjective divide and a ‘linguistic turn’. Following Wittgenstein, the latter opened up the possibility of the social construction of language and all that followed, rather than an essentialisation of the world. This allowed for a broader discussion of IR (though it also failed to connect knowledge and power in the way that later Foucaultian debates did). For orthodox thinking in IR, the hermeneutic tradition remained unblemished in that the recovery of fixed meanings and truths continued to be the focus of realist, liberal and structuralist thinking. A critique of this tendency can be drawn from Gadamer, among others, on the basis of his focus on critical hermeneutics and the relationship between texts, context (or history) and language, but modified by an acknowledgment that reason is historically and culturally situated.

This made possible the critical debates that have developed in contemporary IR theory. The process of ‘critique’ has taken two main forms: a discussion of formal critical theory and its attempt to move beyond problem-solving approaches inherent in orthodox IR theory, derived from the Frankfurt School, and thinkers such as Gramsci, as well as post-structuralism. These have provided a platform through which IR has been opened up to a much richer set of influences and debates than ever before – feminism being one major example. This raised a monumental question contested amongst critical theorists of all hues, relating to the validity of Enlightenment foundations for the redevelopment of IR – accepted by most critical theorists working in the context of Frankfurt School debates – or the need to begin reconstructing the discipline, and IR more broadly, anew – the view of post-structural theory (which is critical, but not associated with Frankfurt School critical theory). In the context of these developments, a complex concept of peace, relating to an emancipatory project, reflecting the everyday life of all, men, women, children, suddenly became part of the discipline. This chapter investigates the implications and dynamics of critical theory in this context.
An emancipatory, everyday, empathetic, peace

With respect to the development of critical theory, as Linklater has written: ‘Critical theory has enlarged the parameters of the discipline by showing how efforts to reconstruct historical materialism offer direction to International Relations in the post-positivist phase.’ This, he argues, reopens the emancipatory project associated with Marxism, but moves far beyond a simple concern with class as its main obstacle. For this branch of critical engagement with the discipline, knowledge is socially constructed and inter-subjective, and ‘enlightenment and emancipation’ are aims that can now be achieved without falling into the ‘familiar pitfalls of idealism’, or indeed of Marxism, and certainly not of constructing a value free science in a problem-solving mode. Critical theory of this type has been very influential both in IR and across disciplinary boundaries. The aim, through discourse ethics, is to develop an understanding of the moral significance of the ordering systems of, and to approach an understanding of post-sovereign, IR, raising the possibility of a ‘post-sovereign peace’ based upon a critique of problem-solving approaches and the development of discourse ethics, leading to a greater freedom and emancipation.

Emerging in several different strands as part of a ‘third great debate’ in IR, this impulse posited a concern with ethnicity, norms and justice, the distribution of resources, presentation and representation, discourse, power and knowledge, and a deeper concern with the ‘hidden hand’ of hegemony, patriarchy and domination. The target was the claim to represent reality and truth as something more than simply objective, sending shockwaves through what was essentially an elitist, rationalist, patriarchal and state-centric discipline in which power and war, rather than peace and justice, were the key obsessions. Cox, in particular, realised that theory is always socially and politically biased in favour of one set of interests or another, rather than neutral and eternal, as realism or liberalism implied. Of course Marx had long ago urged philosophers to remake the world, rather than merely comment upon it. This move was based upon an attempt to empathise with other human beings (verstehen) through the medium of IR in their everyday contexts as well as histories and states, but not solely the latter.

Thought the ‘reflectivist’ realisation of IR that self-consciousness implies inter-subjectivity has crucial implications in particular its relationship with ‘truth’ and ‘power’, critical theory interrogates these issues while retaining a notion that there is a universal dialectic or ethic underlying IR. An emphasis upon reflection requires a rigorous and disciplined encounter with underlying assumptions often held to be sacrosanct. In this sense critical approaches provide an excellent tool for a critique of realist, liberal and structural accounts of peace, and well as providing its own, positive epistemology of peace. Critical theory has been at the forefront of opening up and indeed developing an ideational aspect, emphasising culture, identity and difference, communications and inter-subjectivity in IR theory. The representations these approaches offer of the world are far more complex than those in more parsimonious theoretical approaches. Arising from this move, the revitalisation of a post-Marxist
emancipatory discourse of peace, famously described by Hoffman as the ‘next stage’, opened up a need for a broader consideration of dynamics, issues and actors, moving beyond the strategic and diplomatic focus of orthodox IR theory and the many binaries it rested upon. It becomes necessary to reflect upon historical, cultural and linguistic contexts, upon the position of the self in order to open up a fuller discussion of peace as an inter-subjective concept, method, ontology and epistemology. As all knowledge can be seen to be ideological – even critical theory and post-structuralism – all theory is intimately associated with interests and social practices, and thus requires complex modes of understanding. This discursive praxis means that thought, theory, culture, ideology and practices are closely entwined. Theory and practice are in a relationship which is such that neither can be assumed to dominate the other, yet both inevitably create a praxis which demands a far greater sensitivity to underlying assumptions, direct and indirect effects and structural violence than previous theoretical approaches. Given the inherent idealism and legitimacy generally associated with the concept of peace as a source of truth, power and legitimacy, these aspects of critical theory represent a major step forward in an understanding of peace and how to achieve it.

The ambition to build a universal framework for a legitimate peace via emancipation reflecting an empathetic approach to IR is derived from Horkheimer’s argument that critical theory transcends the mere explanation of social laws or patterns by attempting to transform social systems. In doing so it elaborates a position in the agency–structure debate that posits the plausibility of human resistance and the subsequent reform of oppressive structures, however powerful. In other words, immutability is not the key characteristic of IR, but instead individuals make their own history (in opposition to the realist assertion that power and anarchy defines the international and defines peace). Social movements, NGOs and civil society actors are also significant actors in these terms, as well as states, international organisations and international financial institutions. All such actors, along with individuals, are engaged in the critical emancipatory project of peace, relating as Linklater has argued to the active creation of ‘moral communities’, states or otherwise. Power and anarchy are consequently simply expressions of the failure of this discursive project, but do not mean it is an implausible project.

This overlaps with normative theory in the sense that peace is consequently based upon a broader cosmopolitan ethic. In this sense, critical theory’s implications for the understanding of the concept of peace and its practices represents, overlaps and extends idealist, liberal, structuralist and normative thinking, but also offers to uncover the conditions in which reflective and emancipatory approaches to IR might arise – giving rise to the possibility, as idealism might have hoped, that this form of peace could become the actual ontology of IR. Yet, this also means that this contribution depends upon the universality of its claims, and upon the nomination of an omniscient third party able to take responsibility for the enactment of emancipation and hence peace in the different contexts of IR for those who lack their own agency. However, because critical theory, drawing key
early social theorists like Marx and Weber, regards itself as social theory, this has enabled it to open up IR to social, cultural, communicational and discursive factors as implicit factors of peace. What is more, its unashamedly transformative agenda requires more than merely a focus on investigating the possibility of human emancipation from oppressive relationships. With this as a starting point, critical theory attempts to negotiate a way around the determinism of realism, liberalism and structuralism’s stances on the issue of humanity as relatively lacking in agency in the face of power, interest, institutions and structures. Its focus is on actors and groups that comprise both the human subject and the human agent, which are seen to be central to IR both as subjects and agents; in this way they have some autonomy from the states in which they live. This offers a reflective rationalism, which aims at emancipation through a recognition of culture and identity as well as material concerns. Critical theory may concur in a limited sense with liberal approaches about the value of free markets, democracy, human rights and self-determination, but it also sees that class systems and capitalist economies have impacts that in communicative, cultural and material terms are not conducive to the emancipatory peace that it seeks, as is also illustrated by the critical, neo-Gramscian turn in IPE, which examines how economic practices shape IR.

Indeed, as social theory, this is indicative of the experience of society as often hierarchical and exploitative, meaning that the challenge of reforming the international space (which also has similar qualities) dictates a parallel engagement with social space. This has also been accentuated by a critical feminist turn, which has uncovered how gender has shaped IR, and has used critical approaches, including critical theory, to provide a pragmatic and discursive emancipation from gendered determinism in, and of, IR. In particular, this later approach has underlined the dynamics of an active and pragmatic project of an empathetic and everyday peace that goes far beyond merely critique or even the overturning of class, or economic and political processes of marginalisation.

The issues of marginalisation, exclusion, domination and inequality provide an important focus then, in the critical quest to reconstitute IR as a site of a search for an emancipatory peace rather than deterministic and rationalistic institutional governance, oppression or revolution. Indeed, critical theory extends the notion of emancipation, often thought of in liberal or Marxist terms as directed by the privileged for the benefit of the marginalised, into the realm of a search for the requirements of ‘self-emancipation’ instead of merely emancipation by others. This has sophisticated and complex implications for a critical re-conceptualisation of peace, delineated by the move beyond its Marxist origins, through which critical theory acknowledges debates relating to culture, ethnicity, gender and other forms of identity, while at the same time acknowledging that the state and other institutions play a more traditional role of supporting the global economy. There is, of course, an uneasy tension between the ideational framework that opens up these often unexamined areas, and the workings of these more traditional sites of interest in IR, where states, institutions and social forces are in IR’s orthodox story, engaged in a struggle either to support a status quo or to undermine it.
Because critical theory offers a normative view of the world in which an emancipatory peace should be the objective of IR, this means that nature of the system, social structures and human nature are not immutably rooted in dynamics and cycles of violence, enabling its transformative agenda to transcend that of disciplinary and regulative liberal agendas. At the same time, this accepts that modernity and the Enlightenment-derived course of progress to be a positive epistemology of peace, which aims at developing peaceful change while avoiding the darker aspects of modernity. Deploying both Weberian and Marxist frameworks, the Frankfurt School has developed an approach which can be described as a direct attempt to engage not just with the problems of IR, but also to develop a perspective of an international order that would be both acceptable and desirable to all – from within everyday life to states, institutions and incorporating issues such as identity and security. In this vein, critical theory has developed an interest in what has been termed ‘counter-hegemonic forces’ and in particular the role of social movements that endeavour to challenge global capitalism and effect social change on a large scale, moving beyond both positivism and capitalism as structures that determine IR and social relations.

Habermas defines several key areas for this attempt, including the attempt to control nature and society, the question of how to create and maintain order, and to emancipate communities from unnecessary constraints. For Habermas, drawing on the work of both the later Wittgenstein and Gadamer, both positivism and capitalism, though offering scientific rationality, distort everyday life by removing or at least reducing their key ethical, social and political dimensions. This led Habermas to a ‘linguistic turn’ from which he developed the concept of ‘communicative action’, enabling his engagement with a democratic and dialogic enterprise, aimed at the creation of communication without domination, and within which inter-subjectivity was maintained rather than disguised or delegitimated. This project has in turn focused on the question of how to develop an institutional framework that can promote a dual equation of a peace engendering human emancipation in a consensual manner in locations that transcend both the local and the global. This necessitates the adoption and spread of open dialogue in democratic polities, aimed at the promotion of human understanding and justice, perhaps by emulating an ideal speech framework in which all can participate regardless of their identities. This framework would allow for the consideration of others as well as one’s own, interests. In Habermas’ view these are pragmatic reasons for his claim that communication can lead to consensus, which in turn has prompted a research agenda in IR that has endeavoured to develop these ideas in the context of building a peaceful and just international order in discursive terms.

Even so, discourse ethics and communicative action have been criticised by post-structural thinkers who reject both its connection with universalism and rationalism, and their associated meta-narratives. Despite this, they share similar questions (though they differ on their responses) about the legacy of Western modernity for understanding the self and the world; about how knowledge and power relate, especially in a discursive context; about the impact of
the Western, Enlightenment-based meta-narrative of scientific rationality. They are both concerned with the claims of sovereign rational actors, and how dissent and resistance are framed, especially by marginalised actors. Indeed, in turn Habermas sees major problems with post-structuralism, which he argues does not create space for change, but instead focuses on the violence inherent in institutions and associated counter-narratives that inevitably represent the world in an ontology made up of a fragmented, forever fluid, pessimistic and tragic existence. Instead, he seeks to build upon the Enlightenment tradition by developing the potential of rational, ‘everyday practices of communication’. Post-structuralists counter that Habermas is simply reifying the inherent violence of institutionalised everyday life by persisting in the emancipatory project of the Enlightenment, and its obsession with ascribing rationality with universal qualities. Critical theorists counter that post-structuralism reifies its own binary – that of modernism/post-structuralism from which all such binaries stem: these are represented as sealed units, which instead require opening up to each other. Indeed, such approaches cannot afford to produce closure or their own reductionism while criticising more orthodox approaches on such grounds.

The dimensions of an emancipatory peace

Gramsci offered the key concept of hegemony which is often used by critical theorists, as provides an important dimension for understanding how peace might be interpreted by different groups in different contexts. Hegemony is maintained through an ideology that promotes ‘ruling class’ interests, which can be disguised in political, cultural, social, economic, as well as theoretical and epistemological terms. Ideology could also be used to overthrow these interests and a ‘counter-hegemony’ would come about through the development of alternative social models. What is important about this approach is that hegemony also rests on a broad level of consent (which might be read by some as cooption) from its subjects. Thus, this provides a critique of the capitalist system, which favours the few over the many even though the vast bulk of any given population accept it as the only economic system they could operate within. Hegemons retain their position as a result of this logic, meaning that an oppressive social order becomes internalised even by its victims. Neo-liberalism is often taken to provide a good example of this hegemonic project where victims of such an economic framework rarely are in a position to resist it. The contemporary liberal peace can be critiqued from this perspective as a post-Gramscian plural hegemony, in which multiple hegemonies coalesce around a single dominant notion of peace. This perspective acknowledges that the liberal peace may have both problem-solving and emancipatory dimensions, according to the multiple agendas of its key participants. These are able to act on behalf of others in order to bring them peace, but may also disguise their own hegemony and drown out the voices of the marginalised. The liberal peace remains a virtual and aspirational peace, until it begins to engage with the everyday, emancipatory and self-emancipatory, empathetic dynamics that critical theory suggests. This
requires that actors are able understand what is required in order to emancipate others, and to put this into action (or to empower individuals to emancipate themselves).  

These are themes that were also developed by Cox, who argued that social forces could overcome such hegemonic projects by seeking greater political, economic and social participation, and freedom. While much of this seems to echo some aspects of the work done by liberal thinkers on international institutions and the democratic peace (also amplified by more critical scholars working on constructivist approaches), the critical conception of world order extends into an ambitious agenda for peace, transcending state and social boundaries, and liberal political and economic systems. Cox argued that economic elites had organised themselves transnationally in order to retain their power whereas traditionally disadvantaged groups had fragmented. Whether this can be borne out by a contemporary analysis of globalisation, for example, is open to debate, though few would deny that globalisation has both a dark side often connected to the dystopia of modernity as well as bringing benefits. Perhaps what was more important was Cox’s connected insight that theory is ‘always for someone and something’, meaning in essence that even the act of organising thought about IR or IPE is subject to hegemony in social, economic and political praxis.

Underlying this insight was a fairly explicit emancipatory agenda, which also implies reflexive universalism. Such arguments also touch upon post-colonial critiques of IR, which in themselves open up completely different perspectives of a critical peace in IR from the point of view of former colonial subjects and through the perspective of the implicit continuation of colonial subjugation. This occurs through the workings of the global economy, hegemony, and increasingly the export of liberal norms through decolonialisation and now state-building and peacebuilding processes. These approaches critique modernity’s claims about knowledge as well as culture and the disciplinary representation of political, social and economic relations within orthodox IR theory, contained within institutions, communication, and the subtle continuation of a colonial mindset, though it may still aspire to a weak form of universalism in IR.

Linklater contributes to such insights, particularly by drawing on Habermas, in order to focus more explicitly on the institutional frameworks that could be developed in this context and their particular normative aspirations and implications. Linklater has developed an explicit form of Kantian progressivism. He perceives IR as being made up of ‘moral progress, universality, human subjectivity, and autonomy’. In his later work, he adopted a more critical tone, predicated on both the notion that liberalism could enable a Kantian style states-system, and that Habermasian approaches allowed for a revitalisation of Marxist concerns with progress and emancipation. For Linklater the nation state in particular is indicative of a moral contradiction between self-determination, inclusion and equality for some and exclusion of other others (minorities, for example). This reiterates the questions of identity in IR, of boundaries and limits of the state and of political community, particularly in moral terms.
For Linklater (following Habermas) if an emancipatory version of peace is to be constructed – leading to a post-Westphalian order transcending realist notions of territorial sovereignty – it would be based upon, and revolve around, forms of communication designed to facilitate emancipation, both for the individual and for others. This discourse ethic requires that principles be established through a dialogue which does not exclude any person or moral position. All boundaries and systems should be examined through this process to avoid exclusion.46 This would facilitate the recognition of the inter-subjective nature of knowledge even in instrumental areas such as the workings of the global political economy. It would be derived from the evolution of social learning; from pre-conventional morality in which laws are obeyed because of fear of punitive consequences of not doing so, conventional morality where norms exist within a specific and limited moral community, and post-conventional morality where actors and individuals seeks norms that have universal appeal and consequently lead to a universal moral community.47 Thus, an emancipatory notion of peace in everyday terms also requires a normative consideration.

Linklater’s work in this area implies that pre-conventional morality represents a limited form of peace – a negative epistemology – relating to the realist’s negative or victor’s peace. Conventional morality moves towards a positive epistemology reflecting the liberal peace in that it is more broadly agreed and shared, though its boundaries still cause tensions and raise security issues with other groups. This means that though the liberal peace offers a positive epistemology, it may still rest on an ontology that presupposes the inherency of violence in humans and in IR, as with realism, rescued only by the possibilities offered by rational institutions and liberal democracy. Post-conventional morality offers what Galtung might have described as a positive peace, extended to develop an ‘ethical reflectiveness’;48 this also suggests an ontology of harmony and cooperation in IR, which is reflected by its institutions and dynamics, rather than simply created by rational processes to combat its inherent violence. Thus, on this basis, critical theory offers perhaps the most sophisticated position in IR theory so far considered on peace, reflecting the agendas of idealism, claiming the pragmatism of liberalism, as well as the insights of normative theories and many other post-Marxist approaches, as well as methodological and ontological complexity.

This is encapsulated by the ‘life world’, which is a key representation of this inter-subjective knowledge which rests upon negotiation norms and rules, based upon ethics and justice rather than instrumental and rational interest calculations.49 As Linklater has argued, this leads to a discursive ethic revolving around human rights and the requirements of a just international order that becomes the driving force in IR, rather than state interest. This would establish a form of peace in IR that would revolve around everyday emancipation rather than survival and fear or hegemony, based upon Grotian and Kantian foundations but extended far beyond them.50 Indeed, as Hoffman claims, critical theory is also able to resist universalism as a form of hegemony, and is engaged in a constant reappraisal of knowledge allowing for a more representative form of universalism.51
These intellectual debates have also been able to provide pragmatic positions for the reshaping of IR. Held, for example, has argued that emancipation can emerge through ‘global social democracy’. This is aimed at weaving together the process of globalisation, integration, solidarity and justice through ‘multi-centric governance’ according to Held, and moving beyond the assumptions associated with embedded liberalism. This recognises the dangers of hegemony, and of ignoring the basic needs of individuals in societies in favour of governments, states and elites. It seeks to develop a universal framework through the development of global social democracy and multi-centric governance flavoured by social democracy, welfare and needs in which a more just international order, and so peace, can be built. This is a very important project in that it rests upon the need for broader, deeper and wider representation, moving beyond liberal hegemony, and the need to construct a global social contract. Held is specifically interested not just in the governance aspect of IR, but also its social aspects, through the recognition of the priority of human needs, welfare, society, and devolved governance in which the local is represented globally, as suggested by the broader interests of critical theory. Held is also very clear that the limits of the liberal–international order have now been reached and need to be surpassed, though states and elites continue to play a role and, he argues, internationalism is still a valid concept. This appears to be close to liberal approaches, though Held argues that neo-liberalism is deeply problematic. Indeed, the sustained challenge to neo-liberalism from many thinkers contributing to critical approaches or interested in emancipatory thinking offers another avenue for the critique of the liberal peace, focusing on the predatory nature of neo-liberalism towards the disadvantaged and marginalised.

Underlying critical approaches is a concern with boundaries and an understanding of difference and the dynamics that these produce. Critical theory is implicitly engaged with understanding human needs and their satisfaction without harming others, in the context of an adherence to a belief that there is a universal set of values and principles that are common to all. In order to develop such frameworks and reaching the necessary understandings, a free and open form of dialogue is required which transcends boundaries and recognises difference. In pragmatic terms these dialogues, or communicative frameworks, are currently taking place in global public fora, such as the UN, in global NGO networks where civil society is thought to reside, and have the effect of developing the sensitivities of its participants to difference while at the same time enhancing a universally negotiated ethic. Yet, it is also clear that dominant states project their ideology towards other communities and states, as well as towards transnational issue areas in these contexts. Despite this, the fluid nature of hegemony and ideology means that this results in a broad negotiation of norms even if it is weighted towards preponderant actors. This negotiation has allowed for emancipatory discourses to become influential and for critical transitions to occur as the notion of a ‘universal communication community’ might suggest. The development of human rights discourses, and of international humanitarian law, as well as private actors, social movements and NGOs, are often held to be
exemplars of such transitions that favour the weak over the strong. However, and as Linklater argues, if these potentials are to be fully realised, an adoption of an anthropological understanding is required\textsuperscript{60} to understand the dynamics of everyday life and what this means for a critical project of peace, both in terms of its underlying ontology and the way peace is made, methodologically, and through a critical epistemology.

**Conclusion**

Critical theories offer a vision of an emancipatory, everyday and empathetic form of peace in the context of a post-conventional, post-Westphalian IR. This is a post-sovereign peace, though it extends aspects of idealist, liberal, structuralist and pluralist debates (a common peace system and emancipation), to produce a powerful critique of the liberal peace and its underlying liberal–realist problem solving framework which rests on territorial sovereignty. It is driven by an intellectual question about what form emancipation would take in material and discursive terms, and how it can be achieved. It offers an account of a systemic process of emancipation built into the communicative institutions of IR, as well as an attempt to show how individuals can achieve emancipation within such moral communities. This implies a negotiated but universal peace through a radical reform of politics, attainable through dialogue in various fora. This positive epistemology of peace suggests an overall ontology of peace (as opposed to an institutional, class-based, or balance of power ontology): emancipation is both plausible and pragmatic, and an epistemic basis and methodology to realise this is possible, despite the age-old problems related to entrenched understandings and discourses of interests and difference. This form of peace may only come about when the inherent contradictions of capitalism, of the nation state, self-determination and identity, and the requirements for free universal communication, are resolved, along the lines of the methods offered by critical theories. Indeed, these suggest very pragmatic agendas when put into the context of the post-sovereign, emancipatory and everyday form of peace that this engenders (far from a relapse into ‘relativism’ or an impractical inability to establish a basis for action and thought, as many orthodox theorists suggest). Indeed, the notion of an empathetic, everyday peace implied by critical theory also links with debates about peace as a form of care in its different IR contexts – representing a more active and interventionary form of peace.\textsuperscript{61}

These debates reflect some of the impulses of idealism, liberalism, normative theory and constructivism, among others, in reconceptualising security as emancipation along the lines offered in critical security studies,\textsuperscript{62} aiding in the shifting of the referent of security from the state to the individual. Booth has argued ‘emancipation, theoretically, is security’.\textsuperscript{63} This is defined as: ‘the freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from the physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do.’\textsuperscript{64} This has also been reflected in the development of the concept of human security as both a liberal notion resting upon institutional provision and a concept suggesting a
more critical form of emancipation and self-agency. As Laclau has argued, emana-
cipation inevitably has to skirt between the twin dangers of relativism and universal-
salism, and indeed he argues that emancipation is merely a stage leading to an even wider freedom, which may be beyond the common currency of democracy and self-determination. A universalism which recognises that individuals create their world – or in this case, forms of peace – may well be a sufficient response to this problem, though of course, liberalism, neo or otherwise, constrains this authorship which should entail emancipations rather a singular emancipation.

The common understanding of peace that is offered through critical theory is not therefore unproblematic, given its reliance on a specific and claimed universal set of human norms and discourse ethics, but these have brought a much richer set of issues and dynamics to the debate. As Barkawi and Laffey have argued, even critical security studies, an attempt to move beyond Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian frames of reference by focusing on emancipation, actually rely on underlying liberal–realist discourses, often replicating their Western-centric ordering claims about international relations. Thus, critical theory is in danger of falling back into the familiar territory of liberal thinking about peace and its dependence upon rational states and institutions which progressively provide emancipation from above, with only limited engagement with those being emancipated. This critique indicates that peace is close to a ‘messianic’ liberal ideal form (redeemed only in the future), or what the utopians or idealists of the early part of the twentieth century might have imagined, but more thoroughly negotiated through discursive strategies that arrive at consensus rather than an implicit hegemony of liberal norms. Indeed, it is these latter qualities that prevents critical theory from following the liberal urge toward colonialism and imperialism as a way the liberal peace might be consolidated. It certainly claims to offer an attractive framework for the creation of an everyday, emancipatory peace, though from this perspective, even critical theory is in effect a search for rationalisable form of peace, given a universal identity. This is also at risk of representing critical IR as a white, male, Euro-centric, possibly racist, and interventionary endeavour, even if it is aimed at achieving an emancipatory peace, raising the question of who is peace for, who creates it, and why. For Hobson, for example, Western hegemony has been the unfortunate starting point by which history, and by implication, peace, has been understood, even within critical theory.

The notion that a Leviathan looms even in critical theory, in a benevolent form, focusing on communicative ethics and social justice, is perhaps an unfair criticism: critical theory attempts to establish a via media and modus operandi for debate about an emancipatory politics of consensus, which in particular includes the voices of individuals who are not part of officialdom or state institutions. However, what this means is that emancipation in critical theory still often depends upon the agency of others, normally elites or institutions, to provide the communicative systems through which individuals can then be empowered, despite its aim to provide the means of self-emancipation. Peace depends upon the development and implementation of those systems, and their adoption by societies. This reflects the liberal model, but in a far more sensitised form.
Herein lies its weakness according to some critics. For post-structuralists, this very vision makes it susceptible to hegemony and domination, and it does not fully interrogate the flawed notions of universality it rests upon, nor does it offer an acceptance of difference and otherness except with a set of assumed confines which reflect the norms of liberal thought. Indeed, for post-structuralists, the very attempt to establish law-like scientific statements about human society\(^70\) is inevitably tinged with hegemonic interests, even if they are unselfconscious, unrealised, and held with the best of intentions. Indeed, George calls this a ‘site of discursive primitivism’ based upon the ‘scattered textual utterings of the Greeks, Christian theology, and post-Renaissance Europe’.\(^71\) In its liberal–realist form, this discourse is packaged within Anglo-American interests, epistemological and ontological approaches, though in its more critical forms, this is extended by the tradition of scepticism and the search for a universal form of justice and emancipation. For post-structuralists, even this is tinged by vested, foundationalist interests and a myopia towards claimed representation, identity, ethnicity, religion, language, class, gender, the environment, resources, and other related issues. Many post-structuralist or post-colonial thinkers would argue that a cosmopolitan ethic, for example, would inevitably involve discrimination against those who have not yet acquired or attained this higher order or ethic. For some thinkers this smacks of subtle colonialism; and instead critical theorists should embrace diversity rather than attempt a social engineering project by way of universal homogenisation based on shared norms and values. Indeed, as Jabri has argued, there needs to be a ‘politics of peace’ which are indicative of solidarity and a struggle for a just social order comprising individuals as agents in themselves, rather than merely subjects of governance frameworks, and who express solidarity over their rights and needs.\(^72\)

While critical theory implies that a modification of the existing world system and social relationships within it are plausible and pragmatic, its more radical relative – post-structuralism – tends far more towards anti-foundationalism, indicating that the Enlightenment edifice of rationalism, securalism, a belief in the value of scientific thought and progress, cannot be sustained without leading to injustice. This is predicated upon methodological pluralism, which has become a generally accepted objective for researchers across many disciplines who want to avoid parochial constraints on how research engages with significant dilemmas, and upon the growing calls for more creative approaches to examining the great questions of IR.\(^73\) Post-structural approaches, as the next chapter illustrates, problematise even the critical version of peace.
Sovereign, law, and prohibition formed a system of representation of power which was extended during the subsequent era by the theories of right: political theory has never ceased to be obsessed with the person of the Sovereign. Such theories still continue today to busy themselves with the problem of sovereignty. What we need . . . is a political philosophy that isn’t erected around the problem of sovereignty, nor therefore around the problems of law and prohibition. We need to cut off the king’s head.1

Introduction: beyond emancipation

Post-structuralism is a second wing of the critical front that has focused on interrogating, undermining, and moving beyond the positivist and rationalist theoretical frameworks2 that had dominated orthodox approaches to IR in the Western academy and policy world. Its attack is more concerted than that of critical theory, given its anti-foundationalist stance against Enlightenment meta-narratives of progress, structural determinism, or tragedy. Orthodox theories are ontologically and methodologically flawed, as Foucault himself argued.3 While critical theory extends the well-known Enlightenment search for an emancipatory peace, post-structuralism opens upon radically new possibilities for an ontology, or ontologies, of peace, for methodology, and towards an understanding of the relationship between knowledge and power. These, post-structuralism indicates, are merely confirmed by orthodox ‘re-search’, which repeats and tests the narrow parameters of reductionist and parsimonious orthodoxies in liberal institutional settings, rather than exploring new areas of understanding not determined by pre-existing conventions. Thus, a post-structural understanding of peace negotiates with the powerful criticism of the discipline that rational theory effectively reifies a ‘liberal empire’ that rests upon the residue of liberal imperialism by offering meta-narratives and grounded facts or truths which are in effect simply the interests of the powerful. In effect, this is an attempt to escape the illiberalism that is inherent in the liberal–realist imaginary of the Leviathan, or the determinism of structures, through which hegemony is expressed (perhaps through ‘foreign policy’, ‘international trade’, peacebuilding and state-building, through governance and liberal institutions, and through the orthodox discourses
and assumptions of the discipline). Though this raises the question of whether peace is a concept or framework that can have any currency at all in post-structural theory, it clearly points to the inadequacies of theory developed to explain IR and the world (let alone peace) via white, Western, male, Christian, developed, liberal and neo-liberal political settings. Given its resistance to meta-narratives, post-structuralism does not offer a theory, approach, or concept of peace.

Underlying the post-structural turn in IR is a ‘differend’. Lyotard identified this as the dilemma of institutions and frameworks that even when operating with good faith and consensus, still produce injustices for their members or components. This can be termed a ‘peace differend’, as opposed to the liberal claim of a ‘peace dividend’. Critical or post-structural thinkers (including Habermas and Foucault) have also attempted to address a range of similar problems, including the relationships of knowledge, discourse and power, and have effectively aimed at the construction of a more ambitious and far-reaching understanding of peace which transcends the differend post-structuralism identified in its implied discussion of peace. For post-structuralists, the differend is a key obstacle to an understanding in, and through, IR of peace and its dividends. This underlines the importance of moving across boundaries of knowledge, as Feyerabend suggested in the context of his own epistemological debates. This chapter examines the implications of such insights and the development of the post-structural agenda of ‘peaces’ and the subsequent issue of developing a via media between these differing concepts of peace. Far from opening a relativist gulf unable to contribute to a meaningful discussion of peace in IR, post-structuralist approaches have proved very fertile: they have offered, and are still producing, a wide range of insights into peace and what sources of knowledge and understanding contribute to it. Its underlying objective implicit in terms of peace is to move beyond even critical offerings on peace as emancipation.

Post-structuralism in IR and peace

Nietzsche was of the view that any consensus would never be more than a momentary pragmatic truce. An expectation of moral implications was utopian in his view. Post-structuralism, through the work of Foucault, Derrida and others, veers between this nihilist perspective and the claim that it offers a greater understanding – and so an ontology that transcends the critical version of emancipation – purely based upon individual agency understood in all of its emotional, aesthetic and cultural dimensions, rather than rational elite or institutional agency. In the context of IR, it interrogates the relationship between knowledge and its expression, and power, through an investigation of the logoscentrism present in universal, rational claims to know about order, truth, war and peace, and the production of binaries about each that suggest good versus evil. Post-structuralism questions representations of history as a linear and selective
story: the impact of Enlightenment-derived rationality; the modern subject and rational sovereignty, and uncovers the subaltern, marginalised and powerless. It deploys methods derived from genealogy and deconstruction.

This type of approach arose out of earlier critiques of modernity, such as that of Heidegger, and of the inherent tensions of the so-called Enlightenment project. These revolve around several different dynamics, from the development of the centralised, secular nation state, with specific concepts of reciprocal territorial sovereignty, to the belief in progress, scientific rationality and the capacity to solve any problems faced through such methods. This was seen to be a major step forward from an epoch where religion, a fear of change and progress, and feudalism marked the political terrain. This Enlightenment project also had a ‘dark side’ in which industrialisation, war, genocide, dehumanisation, inequality and environmental degradation occurred seemingly without control. Post-structuralism argued that these were the results of aspects of the Enlightenment project. Scientific rationality and a valuing of ends over means meant that an essential humanism had been displaced. As Foucault wrote, illegitimate knowledge is presented by contrast to ‘true knowledge’, which effectively censors other alternatives while making objective claims appear to be pre-existing and eternal. Foucault was particularly interested in the relationship between power and knowledge, and the way in which oppressive and hegemonic actors could camouflage their domination through categorisation and discourses in particular in relation to Western and liberal value systems. More specifically, the attempt to characterise different social organisations and cultural practices as better or lesser than others with reference to this value system means that through these discourses are expressed Western domination and hegemony over others. Indeed, for Foucault, a discourse was a site of power and knowledge in itself, laden with assumptions about self and others. In this context, it was also important to develop an understanding of the way such discourses developed through a varied set of influences rather than through a linear manner based upon historical events:

Discourses are not once and for all subservient to power or raised up against it, any more than silences are. We must make allowance for the concept’s complex and unstable process whereby discourse can be both an instrument and an effect of power, but also a hindrance, a stumbling block, a point of resistance and a starting point for an opposing strategy. Discourse transmits and produces power; it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it possible to thwart it.

Discourses can be uncovered through a genealogical approach, which allows for the complexity and breadth of a concept, issue or dynamic, and in particular the way political, social and knowledge hierarchy are built and maintained, to be better reflected rather than subsumed by reductionism. This means that no type of knowledge can take priority over another, reality lies only in discourse and representation, and that orthodox assumptions and approaches to IR simply
mask hegemony and interests. Much depends upon the agency of individuals to interrogate orthodoxies and to resist hegemony, and to understand the meta-narratives and claims of universal truth. However, underlying most post-structuralist insights is an implicit faith in individual agency and society to construct a discursive consensus eventually.

In addition, in his work on the ‘differend’, Lyotard, as previously mentioned, identified the dilemmas of institutions and frameworks that, even when operating with good faith and consensus, still produce injustices for their members or components. For him, even august (liberal) institutions which had broad support and legitimacy (meaning the consensus of those they affect) were problematic. Even where such institutions were used in good faith by all participants, they would inevitably marginalise some participants, depending upon the underlying ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions and frameworks they represent. These would inevitably favour participants with similar assumptions. As a response to such dangers, Feyerabend favoured theoretical pluralism as a way of contending with claims of representation and escaping the monotonous certainties and eternal truths sought by positivism. In his letters to Imre Lakatos, and his writings ‘Against Method’ he addressed the problem of how formalism in method led to methodological rigidity and to ontological and epistemological assumptions that might lead to the failure of science.

Consequently, post-structuralism offers IR a genealogical, deconstructive approach, which claims to help navigate around orthodox cartographies designed to impede interpretation by substituting an ‘Archimedean point’. Around this point are grouped dualities such as realism–idealism or domestic–international which prejudge explanation in specific ways that reproduce forms of power and juxtapose illegitimate forms against these. As a result ‘the post-Enlightenment “will to knowledge” has quite literally become the “will to power”’. Deconstruction allows IR to be ‘read’ as a text, opening up a reflective debate on meaning, knowing and the problems caused by logocentrism and the binary oppositions that emerge from liberal and positivist epistemologies. Such binaries are culturally and historically defined according to post-structuralist thinkers, who perceive declarations of fixed meaning as camouflaging privileged meaning, self-interest and ‘violent hierarchies’. This represents a concern with how social meaning is constructed discursively through language in a Derriderean sense. What is particularly important in the post-structural canon is the way in which power relations are exposed, particularly in what were once thought to be ‘private’ spheres of life through these sorts of deconstructive strategies that aim at uncovering age-old assumptions that are so foundational that they are normally thought to be timeless and concrete rather than subjective and exploitative.

Thus, post-structural approaches to IR theory indicate that knowledge is discursively produced and reproduced, rather than objective, and that discourses of power and truth merely represent hegemony and interests, rather than neutral, value-free and universal theories. They view liberal–realism as ‘primitive positivism’ which disguises the fact that power and knowledge are intricately
entwined, as are theory and practice. This moves away from the claim made by critical theorists that emancipatory potential does in fact exist in the rational, communicative terms they suggest, because even this would merely disguise forms of hegemony. This is a powerful critique, particularly of the liberal peace.

Ashley helped open up this discussion in the context of IR theory, taking his queue from thinkers such as Foucault, Kristeva and Derrida, in order to develop a critique of IR’s orthodoxy. This started by illustrating how the modernist discourse of IR is itself internally contested:

[the] modernist discourse is open in principle to a variety of interpretations of the sovereign man that it puts at its centre and whose voice it speaks. The liberal’s ‘possessive individual man’, the Marxist’s ‘labouring man’, the romantic ecologist’s ‘man in harmony with nature’, the Christian humanist’s ‘man in brotherhood with man’.

Ashley offers an array of the achievements of post-structuralism, which open up the question of a how a deeper, representative, reflexive, inclusive, flexible and self-sustaining peace may be achieved. He argues that post-structuralism offers the only possibility of critique in IR, because it is not associated with offering any other alternatives. As an anti-foundationalism approach, rejecting the Enlightenment basis that critical theory, for example, sought to salvage, post-structuralist approaches to IR recognise the regimes of knowledge that Foucault suggested all claims of knowledge made. Yet, even by this most critical of voices, peace is not directly alluded to, though of course many dimensions of peace are enabled by the uncovering of the relationship between power and knowledge, the hidden binaries of orthodox theory and increasingly fertile sites of research in areas such as gender, memory, film, music and aesthetics.

Vasquez has succinctly outlined ‘post-modernism’s’ challenge: modernity is arbitrary; truth is actually choice; reality is a social construction; conceptual frameworks produce self-fulfilling prophecies; and identity and identification are forms of power open to abuse. For Lyotard, communities create their own meaning, and for Baudrillard, simulation, not representation, is possible. These represent themes taken up by Campbell, Walker and others (who have been responsible for importing post-structural debates into IR). However, Vasquez has argued that these themes also represent a ‘grand assertion’ about history leading to post-structuralism’s ‘logical refutation’ – that it rejects rational and linear versions of an objective history while at the same time tending to offer immutable truths of its own about what such an attempt represents.

Yet, post-structural approaches are aware of this issue, as indicated by their attempts to avoid just such a meta-narrative that they criticise in other approaches. As Walker has written, IR theory is problematic in terms of:

the bankruptcy of established intellectual traditions, the untidy proliferation of research strategies, an unseemly dependence on the interests of specific states and cultures, and the hubris of empirical social science.
These qualities are valorised within IR’s orthodoxy to support a specific set of historical and spatial claims, in particular related to sovereignty, which is viewed both as a basic building block of peace and the basis for most conflicts. Similarly, orthodox IR theory reflects such a valorisation and has become a mechanism of interest and power, at least in Western policy circles, rather than a discourse of peace. As Walker shows, it is precisely with the recognition of these problems in orthodox theory that the key question of the ethics of IR is given new life. But this reaches beyond states and the strategically defined international, and engages with the nature of peace and its multiple forms as an ethical commitment to others within IR. This means going beyond or building upon the codes, norms, principles and rules upon which ‘liberal utilitarian’ institutions have so far been constructed. Walker is clear that ethics are an ‘ongoing historical practice’ and institutions and concepts that are constructed with this in mind should be able to respond to this requirement of flexibility if they are to achieve a level of emancipation unconstrained by liberal institutionalism or exclusive claims about a sovereignty that rests upon interpretation and representation rather than modernity’s claims of an empirical world. It is ironically in this world that ‘idealistic’ claims about a universal peace are often refuted by reference to particularistic notions of nationalism and national self-determination. Post-structural approaches uncover problems with both sets of claims, and with the associated ethical debates, or lack of, that are linked, especially in the context of the interpretative task of creating ‘peaceful change’ in a fluid environment in which individuals and their everyday lives should be a key priority. As Walker points out, the ‘great traditions’ of IR are unsuited to this sort of project.

Probably the easiest targets for post-structuralism are the claimed ‘timeless wisdom’ of realism and the universal claims of liberalism. This also lays bare the claims of sovereignty equated with state power and territorial control, in which the state is a rational actor as a response to anarchy. In particular, the claim of a post-Kantian, privileged, universal and rational meaning to history, politics and society that was just waiting to be uncovered by those who had access, is discounted as logocentrism. A Western meta-narrative of ‘timeless wisdom’ represents war and violence as an inevitable aspect of political actors’ interactions, and tends to be extremely conservative in its representation of peace, though it also acknowledges that a normative framework for peace exists. However, the way realism is deployed in IR and in the policy world more generally accepts security as the main priority before all other objectives can be seriously addressed. Post-structuralists would argue that this means that the states’ obsession with security becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy of surrealist proportions. Similarly, this critique can be extended to liberal claims about states, internationalism and international society whereby such universal norms are represented as fact, but actually merely disguise the interests of powerful actors. So much energy is taken up with the consideration of the often negative connotations of realism, for example, that little time and energy is put into any discussion of transformative agendas relating to emancipation, or to understanding
difference. Liberalism claims that transformation can take place as long as it is universally constructed, effectively disguising the interests of its most powerful supporters. What is worse, for many social groups that do not conform to the mainstream representation provided by the state, exclusion occurs. In this sense race, gender, identity, class and environmental discrimination are inbuilt into a system which depends on coercive homogenisation and assimilation, and does not recognise the alternate cartographies produced by such dynamics and issue areas.

It is within the confines of post-structuralism that the critiques that began to emerge in English School thinking, constructivism and critical theory of realist liberal versions of peace have become fully realised as being in danger of perpetrating a form of structural violence, and carrying undertones of domination, hegemony and oppression. Again, this is not an implicit posture as there is very little in the post-structural literature which directly addresses the concept of peace – nor could it given its opposition to prescription. The post-Enlightenment ‘good life’ from this perspective is not innocent or naive about its perception of emancipation and universalism, but rather represents a cynical move to camouflage the selective manner by which these are spread across the world. Thus, for example, liberal peace can be seen as a concept that it is very unlikely to be satisfactorily defined or achieved for all. This version of peace sees it projected from a central sponsor, and even the efforts of liberals and critical theorists are critiqued on the basis that one can never fully understand another’s peace. The liberal peace represents biopolitical governance of a disciplinary nature, from this perspective. Thus, symbolism, language and other modes of representation must be suspected of camouflaging interests and dominance, and peace ultimately becomes a vehicle through which ideology, legitimacy and identity are contested territorially, sovereignly and existentially in order to exert biopolitical control over its subjects. At the same time, it must also be noted that such critiques are also served and made possible by the systems that they attack.

From this perspective much of IR’s orthodoxy is anti-peace. Even liberal or idealist accounts effectively favour a discursive and hegemonic framework derived from Western/developed ontologies and interests. Its isolated reduction and abstraction of human life within ‘international relations’, instead made up of ‘actors, anarchy, interdependencies, threats, rationality’, power and interests leads to dangerous rational calculations that ultimately sacrifice human, everyday life and the chance of peace. IR represents its knowledge systems as universal, when in fact they are local to the west/north. Such representational habits and knowledge systems are prone to isolating themselves in order to maintain their belief in universality. For example, Sylvester has shown how Waltzian neo-realism led to a form of IR in which ‘parsimonious explanatory power traded off the gender, class, race, language, diversity, and cultural multiplicities of life’. Similarly, Watson has shown how a large percentage of the world’s population – children – are surprisingly absent from IR for similar reasons.

From this perspective, orthodox IR is obsessed with defining and redefining itself, in relation to a narrow understanding of what is important, and which
actors are significant. It fails to communicate over disciplinary boundaries because of the energy that has been expended within the narrow liberal–realist debates, and their associated ontological, methodological and epistemological traditions. IR is, as Sylvester has argued, mainly a distant, elitist discipline which ignores the experience and lives of people, and any sense of everyday life for most of the world’s inhabitants. Because of these characteristics orthodox IR theory perpetuates what Walker has described as its key binaries – inside/outside, self/other, universal/particular and civilised/barbarian, upon which it constructs a hegemonic order in the interests of key liberal states and actors. This implies that IR theory has, in its mainstream, become an exercise in camouflage or trickery. This is derived from the attractions or benefits of speaking acceptable truth to power, though this entails presenting inter-subjective opinion as truth through orthodox IR theory so power can be exercised rationally through coercive and bureaucratic administration of human life in return for the benefits derived from contact with the executors of power.

In contrast to such ‘mimetic approaches’ and following Derrida, Bleiker has called for an aesthetic approach to IR to critique and complement the Enlightenment-derived logocentrism (and also for us to ‘forget IR theory’), to extend the post-structural turn and to help recognise that the space between the claimed representation and the represented is the ‘very location of politics’. Indeed, Bleiker shows how a range of thinkers from Foucault to Deleuze effectively challenge the attempt of orthodox theory and methodology to represent and interpret through an appeal to a narrow range of scientific approaches which mimics a hegemonic aesthetic and claim it as truth.

Another body of work has extended the post-structural critique into a development context. For example, orthodox approaches to development studies aim to develop living standards and prosperity in the developing world, using Western knowledge and technology rather than indigenous approaches. Its focus explicitly prioritises the economic over the social and cultural. As a result development work often has little connection with local culture but rather focuses on material gain as it is conceptualised by Western governance. This has been heavily criticised not just from the point of view of being counterproductive, but also inherently violent and a way of monopolising the ‘developing’ body and mind in order to homogenise polities within the broader liberal community of states. This neo-colonial/imperial critique requires that local knowledge and culture be reconfigured within a democratic, neo-liberal state-building process entirely controlled by liberal peacebuilders. As Sylvester has argued, this is in danger of creating ‘bare life’ for those who are being ‘developed’, whereby their inter-subjective existence is not valued unless it corresponds to the objective liberal project. As Agamben writes, bare life comes about because of the Western political habit of exclusion that simultaneously claims to be inclusive. Thus bodies are managed and governed and resistance is not tolerated. Opposition is described as terrorism or corruption, and those who then police the liberal system are counter-described as fascists. Even if society aspires to the liberal project, however, neo-liberalism means bare life for many who suffer from
poverty even despite their aspirations for a liberal state. For many critical and post-structural influenced thinkers, what appears to be developing as a result of the liberal–realist IR project follows similar lines to the critique that Fanon adopted of the post-colonial state, particularly Algeria. He argued such states were economically defunct, could not support social relations, and resorted to coercion to control unfulfilled citizens. As Fanon indicated, economic, social and cultural life are interlinked, and cannot be divorced in the way that [neo] liberal versions of IR assume.

This connects to another set of debates emanating from post-colonial theory that represent Western liberalism as constantly juxtaposing itself with others who are identified as ‘barbaric’ again the liberal norm. Barbarians are noted only for their violence and because those who are not engaged in violent acts of resistance or terrorism are essentially the pupils of liberalism they are invisible until they have graduated into the school of mature liberal societies and states. For Said, of course, the cultural implications of this denote ‘Orientalism’ in which liberals discursively dominate and dehumanise the non-liberal, non-Western subject. For some this means death through conflict, humanitarian intervention, preventive war, torture, genocide, human rights abuse, with little direct concern from the liberal–international community. The liberal modernisation project clashes with the local where identity and cultural concerns defy rational progress towards liberal governance. Indeed, some have argued, following Polyani, that capitalism and its inculcation into multilateral development institutions is indicative of a disciplinary approach in which social relations are dismembered if they impede neoliberalism. Polyani argued that fascism was the outcome of neo-liberalism’s failure, whereby civil society’s resistance was disciplined by the capitalist state. On a larger scale, this sort of disciplining has become part of global governance whereby the role of IFI-imposed strategies would lead to bare life.

For some thinkers these and similar dynamics associate the liberal peace with imperial projects. For Hardt and Negri, empire best describes the result of global social, economic and political processes leading to the liberal peace. This is characterised by a subtle form of exploitation, derived from a Marxist inspired reading of international politics. Hardt and Negri see global, post-structural, civil society oriented movements organising resistance to this tendency in international politics, and aiming at what would presumably be a peace characterised by a lack of hegemony, a lack of oppression, and something approaching a socially just international system with the necessary redistributive capacities to make all human life equally meaningful. This reflects what they call an ‘international disciplinary order’, which is emancipatory rather than hegemonic. This praxis is intended to prevent the reproduction of an international disciplinary order. This relates closely to the liberal view of the international system, and the requirement for hegemons to establish and police the parameters of freedoms and regulations, as well as the disruption of their projection of biopower and an increasingly deterritorialised Empire (as they put it, the ‘non-place’ of Empire). Empire appears to be benevolent in keeping with the tenets of the liberal peace, but, of course, in Hardt and Negri’s neo-Marxist terms it rests on
This only becomes obvious because its victims can be seen: in other words, peace is disrupted by the presence of the victims, who seem to be random victims of unidentifiable forces – geography, climate, war and violence, poverty and underdevelopment. These are viewed not as being purposefully created and driven, but as structures about which little can be done. As with Marxism, the opposition and the structural problem disrupting a peace incorporating social justice can now be identified, and resistance organised. Yet, they posit this resistance in familiar terms – a ‘counter-Empire’ – in which the exploited become active agents able to pursue justice and develop resistance to the liberal peace. Effectively, Empire is presented as an end to history; resistance to it is a way of preventing the utter hegemony of this understanding and projection of international politics as the ultimate form of peace. Underlying this discussion, though not often voiced in contemporary writings by Marxists, Gramscians, Foucauldians and the broad coterie of post-structural thinkers, is of course the question of how to move beyond emancipation to achieve a sustainable peace, rather than through the imperial or quasi-imperial approaches offered by more traditional modes of thought and their associated practices.

The significance of gender debates

Gender debates, which have formed a crucial wing of this post-structural movement, offer a critique of theoretical, methodological and ontological approaches to IR that obscure the significance of gender and marginalise individuals on this basis. Gender has emerged as far more than a new perspective in an otherwise liberal debate – it has been instrumental in opening up a perspective which has begun to tackle the inbuilt exclusion of women and gender issues in IR (and also in studying IR). Though some crude theories on feminism offer a notion of a gendered peace, and also equate patriarchy with war and women with peace, this latter view has long been discredited as essentialist. Indeed, Sylvester illustrates how feminist studies have followed orthodox theory:

liberal feminism sought to make liberal rights of men applicable to women without querying what the men had built and bequeathed and would still manage for us: Marxist feminism put women in the market place, where social relations of production would activate a worker consciousness, without dealing with patriarchy … radical feminism lambasted patriarchy and then reified its notions of women by lumping all such biologically determined people together as keepers of a mysterious submerged wisdom; socialist feminism sought to assault capitalism and patriarchy through progressive cross-cultural alliances.

These debates were all universally grounded, but also reflected the need for a more reflective approach to feminist theory. Gender debates do not offer direct insights into a particular concept of peace associated with gender, but as with post-structural debates they have uncovered
the systems, structures and frameworks inherent in IR that bias praxis against women and propagate the assumption that patriarchy is normal. For example, Tickner has reformulated Morgenthau’s realist principles through feminism, arguing that principles and concepts such as objectivity, national interest, power, morality and autonomy, can be read in far more pluralist ways through feminist approaches. This means that objectivity has both cultural and gender biases: that national interest requires cooperation over issues such as war, the environment and welfare; power should not be domination but empowerment; that morality cannot be separated from politics; a national morality cannot be universalised though common moral aspirations can be negotiated; and politics cannot be separated from the full range of social life and experience. Feminist insights such as these have played a key role in uncovering practices of domination, marginalisation and hegemony that reproduce conflictual practices in IR.

Drawing on such insights, feminist studies of IR have made the cogent point that the obsessive depiction of an anthropocentric, androcentric and logocentric world are interwoven with rational authority and institutionalism. These are a result of the Enlightenment project and its association with a minimalist version of peace offered by the states-system and territorial sovereignty. This focus excludes other approaches to knowing and being such as those that would arise from a more gendered and equal approach to knowledge, something which post-structuralist scholars have also highlighted. This represents alternative epistemologies and ontologies in IR, relating to different forms of identity, of which perhaps gender is one of the most extensively theorised. Indeed, these may mean that theory itself is politically motivated, or ideological.

This highlights the concern that much orthodox theorising, especially of the liberal–realist positivist ilk is designed for ideological purposes – hence its vagueness about the sort of peace it envisages. This has highlighted the tendency of traditional IR theory to focus on official concerns, to the detriment of unofficial actors outside of the global political system and global economy. The vast majority of these affected actors are, of course, women and children (though there are also many men) who exist in a subsistence economy or are subject to political and structural violence, and of course, men who are not marginalised actors in IR can also be said to have a gendered view of the world.

Feminist approaches emphasise post-structural concerns an ontology of peace and resistance to marginalisation and the public/private dichotomy. Similarly, critical feminist approaches focus on the expansion of individual (in this case, female) agency and control over one’s own life. This offers another dimension of peace that critiques the wealthy, male-dominated views of power and the priorities that are embedded in the international system itself. As with other emancipatory projects in IR and other humanities and social science disciplines, the feminist project (or projects) seeks various routes to recognise both the intersubjectivity of gender and identity, but also to understand the power relations that attempt to objectify and marginalise them. Again, critical and post-structuralist accounts of feminism contest whether emancipation will be achieved through universal, hybrid, or far more diverse understandings of IR.
Clearly, making both women and gender a central issue in understanding has significant ramifications for the attempt to conceptualise peace through IR theory, though this debate is reflected in the critical and post-structural debates more generally. However, clearly, it should not be forgotten that making women and gender/power relations, as well as the public/private binary, central to any understanding of peace should be a natural part of any attempt to imagine peace in any particular context. As Enloe has argued, the ‘private is international’ the personal is also political, and so peace must reflect the discursive frameworks of all of those groups, actors, issues and dynamics it encounters. Yet, the discipline of IR deals mainly with masculine interpretations of its subject matter, defined and theorised in these terms.

As Sylvester has shown feminist theorising makes clear that gender indicates the need to engage with everyday life, indeed that there is an ‘everyday realm to international relations’ where ‘empathetic cooperation’ has potential. Effectively this means that peace is multilayered, comprising many issues, identities and representational claims. Thus, it cannot be static, or even characterised in the timeless snapshot style of superficial positivist approaches, or even with the universalism inherent in Critical theory, but must be regarded as fluid, forever being developed, and the most significant objective of any discursive intervention in IR, from theorists, subjects, individuals or elites and policymakers.

An ontology of peace through discourse

Post-structuralism subverts orthodox IR theory, particularly the state-centric and sovereign orthodoxy offered by realism, idealism and liberalism, and takes the project that Critical theory offers much further than the latter’s claims of universalism would allow. Indeed, in comparison to post-structuralism, Critical theory begins to resemble liberal approaches in that it ultimately rests on moral universalism, and an assumption that all individuals, states and actors would, if they could, opt for both freedom and restraints on this basis. Because post-structuralism focuses on the problems of modernity which arise from the Enlightenment project it also offers a powerful critique of this project, without necessary offering an alternative. It implies that an ontology – or multiples of peace – however, could be uncovered through language, genealogy and deconstruction, which instead uncovers the violence of the disciplinary liberal–realist project.

It is not only such radical insights that are significant about post-structural readings of peace, but also the insights they provide in methodological terms, and the sensitivities they engender in ontological terms. These illustrate how orthodox IR theory represents the world mimetically, giving rise to a repetition of the ‘lessons of history’ in a self-fulfilling prophecy. To gain a multidimensional understanding of IR post-structuralists argue one needs to unsettle and embrace anti-mimetic approaches to representation that recognise universal subjectivity, rather than trying to replicate an eternal truth or reality. Post-structuralism offers a clear idea of what intellectual and methodological approaches can uncover that is wrong with the world, and its discursive
construction. They have a sense of a notion of an ontology peace in which all should benefit, but little notion of the methods required to construct this peace in the pragmatic terms demanded by policymakers or orthodox theory. It also, of course, offers a sophisticated reading of the ontologies of violence. Post-structuralism poses the question: can a vocabulary that transcends even the critical notion of an emancipatory form of peace be found, given the deep-rooted nature of problematic assumptions, discourses and practices which mark political relations? It is unable to accept meta-narratives that offer universal truths, and in this way, its vision of peace is fundamentally different – based upon an ontology, a methodology, and episteme that rejects meta-narratives – to that of the other approaches discussed so far.

This implies a claim to give rise to an understanding of peace which is pluralist and free of violence, while viewing other, especially state-oriented or universalistic theoretical approaches with a powerful scepticism designed to unmask the way they effectively legitimate an unjust status quo. What is more, and what differentiates post-structuralism from other more conservative perspectives, is that they accept that pluralism and relativism may mean that there are no truths, no universal norms and no eternal or timeless characteristics of behavioural traits that may determine the present or the future. This offers a more subtle form of emancipation, incorporating an understanding of the politics of resistance, solidarity and indigenous movements (perhaps through a consideration of international political sociological dynamics) rather than following the conceptualisations offered through elite intellectual and interventionary practices and action in top-down hegemonic institutions. Thus, it could be said that post-structuralism implies an ontology, or multiple ontologies of peace as discourse, not through active and material intervention of elites, as even Critical theory suggests, but through the laying bare of the disciplinary and biopolitical nature of liberal–realist discourse, allowing for a broad ranging empathy and a purer form of self-emancipation. This ontology of peace through discourse cannot in any way be connected with disciplinary biopolitics, assumptions of the inherency of violence due to nature or structure, and certainly not to the Enlightenment meta-narrative of rational progress, which it rejects as engendering and disguising violence and oppression. It must at all costs avoid becoming a differend.

A post-structural version of peace is rather difficult to define as either a concept or theory. A schism exists between the post-Enlightenment liberal–realist agenda which blithely assumes it is peace, and these alternative agendas which seek to illustrate how much violence, structural and direct, the liberal peace reproduces, and to address the question of an alternative agenda for peace. This certainly represents emancipation, not just from hegemony, but also from logo-centrism, phono-centrism, from meta-narratives, from the Enlightenment project of rational, teleological progress, and from universal claims – ontologies of peace through discourse. But, of course, this also means abandoning these frameworks, which also provide the basis from which many post-structuralists, like Foucault, operate. Yet, responding to these challenges extends the notion of peace far beyond what emerges from previous debates, though this
also calls into question whether there can ever be a common peace based upon cooperation and a unity of norms, rules and views.

One avenue that offers a perspective on how an ontology of peace may be thought of is derived from the notion of hybridity as developed by Bhabha. This implies the overlay of multiple identities and ideas, and their transmission without necessarily resulting in the domination of one core identity or idea. In this sense, social movements and alternative spaces which are not necessarily delineated or patrolled by states (such as the internet) are crucial. Walker argues that ‘critical social movements’ are able to operate and develop in new issue areas and find new spaces in, and methods with which to open up these areas for debate. This results in radical challenges to the mainstream orthodoxies of politics and IR and, effectively, new forms of political and human community. This means that peace itself is radically reconceptualised, not necessarily as an objective but as a method and process, and never a final end state. In this context difference is accepted, others are acknowledged, but not at their own expense or that of hybridity. Uncovering hybridity – the fluid and intersecting identities shared by all – forms a via media between difference.

This requires the acceptance of difference as a method for peace, rather than an emphasis on sameness or universality. The process of handing agency to critical social movements, for example, and providing ways in which they are empowered to develop their voices, identities and ideas, moves towards indicating a post-structural methodology for achieving a more inclusive and less predatory form of peace. This points to a need for international actors and institutions, such as the UN, EU, World Bank, USAID, state donors and major NGOs to think and operate in terms of local ownership of the peace projects that they engage in, which must be focused on developing the agency of those actors on their own terms. This might be the closest approximation that can so far be made on an ontological, discursive peace. This also highlights the need to move beyond institutional thinking about politics, power, sovereignty and representation and to engage with emotive, aesthetic, linguistic and cultural representations. This ontology of peace is dispersed, multi-centred, indicative of agency, and anti-hegemonic, and requires a complex interrogation of sites of power, resistance and marginalisation, in order to achieve its ontological ambitions.

Post-structural approaches offer at the very least an ‘enhanced reflexivity’ particularly in view of embedded assumptions and norms, for both the restructuring of IR theory and therefore for peace. It questions the possibility of a universal ethic of an emancipatory approach to peace as offered by Critical theorists. It problematises the claim of IR theory to be able to interpret, catalogue and organise on behalf of the other. It engenders resistance to an accepted norm and institutional approach to knowledge, and the privilege that the discipline’s orthodoxy claims in order to interpret the ‘unknowable other’. It raises the question that Dillon has asked about how one knows one is emancipated, and furthermore, how one can assume legitimately the privilege of knowing the mind of the other (a privilege that orthodox approaches claim unquestioningly) so their emancipation can be facilitated?
Conclusion

For post-structuralists peace involves accepting difference, rejecting all sovereignties (cutting off the king’s head) and making space for hybridity without resorting to power or coercion, this producing ontologies and discourses of peace through what might be equated with Bourdieu’s *heterodoxa*. Critical theory emphasises an underlying sameness that forms a basis for an emancipatory form of communication. Both critical and post-structural approaches appear to offer an abstract and distant notion of peace existing in some ideal future when the necessary discursive and communicative reforms and processes have been developed. Of course, both critical theorists and post-structuralists would argue that the discursive is also the pragmatic, and therefore to deal with such issues at the discursive or abstract level will lead to more ‘practical’ changes and reforms. But clearly, though these approaches are often thought of as leading in similar directions, the peace they project is fundamentally different – a universal peace versus diversified and fragmented peaces. Both offer the emancipation of the individual and try to establish an understanding of how the individual can resist hegemonic politics, though post-structural approaches try to avoid any resort to a hegemonic institution or actor to assist and insert its own agendas into the process.

Without such approaches the interrogation of areas such as gender, identity, the subaltern, post-colonialism or Orientalism, for example, might have remained marginal to the discipline – and indeed to any notion of peace and its politics. This would have meant that IR would have remained a very narrow discipline, unable to communicate beyond its own limited confines, and of little interest (other than to politicians, generals and diplomats) to the academic or policy world outside of these areas. It would have remained focused upon the state, officialdom, and military power controlled by sovereignty and special forms of sovereign knowledge, and encapsulated within a territorial cartography that inevitably favours certain, pre-existing social, economic and political elites, for as long as they control the institutions of power and knowledge. The development of critical, and especially post-structural approaches, has emphasised the growing breadth of the discipline, and the importance of its connection with other disciplines and discourses, if viable and sustainable versions of peace are to reach towards discursive, empathetic, ontologies.
Conclusion
An agenda for peace in an inter-disciplinary IR

The future lies with those who can resolutely turn their back on [the past] and face the new world with understanding, courage and imagination.¹

Introduction
That orthodox IR, and the liberal peace that it supports, is in crisis is illustrated by its underlying struggle over a concept of peace. But the failure of one universal notion or ontology of peace to triumph over others, whether it is a victor’s peace, an idealist or liberal peace, an emancipatory peace, or plural ontologies of peace, is indicative of the growing vibrancy of IR in this context, as Carr himself thought.² Indeed, the many dimensions of contemporary IR theorising, drawing on many disciplines and sites of knowledge, the broad range of approaches and issues, the increasing level of reflection and self-awareness, are necessary for a consideration of peace. IR is perhaps no longer the ‘backwards discipline’ – in some quarters at least.

Indeed, the dilemma for orthodox IR theory is that the focus on worst case scenarios, pragmatism, rationalism, state frameworks and interests, means that the challenge of critical and particularly post-structural approaches cannot afford to be ignored. It is a contradiction that orthodox theory, adept at claiming its capacity to respond to ‘real’ worst case scenarios, rejects the claim that its approaches replicate the roots and issues that lead to violence – any risk of this should be responded to within this realist ontology (perhaps explaining why the liberal peace has become so ubiquitous). Mainstream IR has become associated with closure, the proscription of dissent, and with the distancing of everyday life.³ This is especially so in the contemporary world where conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan, the ‘war on terror’, weak or failing peacebuilding projects in many other countries, as well as poverty and environmental dangers, appear to have dispersed the so-called post-Cold War liberal ‘peace dividend’. Despite the inference that the liberal peace is a ‘civilised’ compromise between idealism and realism, the discourses and practices associated it are often more representative of the dystopian than the moderated utopian. This is particularly so in its application and experience outside of its Western roots, and in the current
applications of a recently evolved muscular liberal peace, which can be observed in the state-building attempt in Iraq. The attempt to mimic the liberal state in Iraq has done much to discredit the universal claims of the transferability of the liberal peace in political terms, adding to the obvious failures of its neo-liberal components, which have been observed in a wide range of case from the UN assistance mission in Cambodia in the early 1990s to the return of UN peacekeepers to East Timor after the crisis of 2006. Thus, the liberal peace spans both civil and uncivil forms of peace, being based on international consensus, but often on a much weaker local consensus. Indeed, the rhetoric of local ownership, participation and consent is often a disguise for non-consensual intervention, for dependency and conditionality, there being little space for empathy, emancipation or indigeneity in the liberal peace framework, other than through a romanticised view of the local.

Though orthodox IR theory has missed an important opportunity through the evolution of the discipline to speak truth to power about its replicating tendencies in terms of war and conflict, this challenge has been broadly carried forward by critical approaches, which offer a much clearer ontological acceptance of pluralist agendas for peace. This is not to say, as Jackson has pointed out, that an account of IR should exclude states or ‘hard’ security issues, though acknowledging the self-replicating dangers of such discourses should be part of any discussion of the latter. An acknowledgement of new agendas is necessary, rather than remaining slavishly chained to the old, or to excessively ‘rigorous’ methods, which are often designed to support particular research agendas and their implicit ideologies.

This is necessary to develop a better understanding of IR’s implicit perspectives on peace, which have been ensnared by liberal–realist theories and a Western-centric view of the world, in particular elevating governmental elites and institutions over societies and everyday life. Cultural neutrality and a failure of recognition mean that liberal peace is often equated by its recipients as colonial or hegemonic. This indicates that emancipation is absent, certainly that it fails to achieve any form of empathy or care, and that it fails to facilitate an understanding of the ontologies of peace. The liberal peace is unable to communicate across cultures, rests upon a legalistic framework, disassociates law from norms, rests upon preserving the pre-existing liberal order, and claims a problematic universality. As a result of this failure, it often fails to provide even the ‘thin recognition’, let alone mutual consent and recognition that are often claimed, given the paucity of local consent. What is missing here is a discussion of dialogue and communication – indeed a discourse ethic – of notions of emancipation and care, and an understanding of the ontologies of peace. The liberal concept of toleration, and liberalism’s link with sovereignty and the state, as well as its homogenising tendencies, and its failure to engage with issues such as culture and welfare, provide obstacles for this broader engagement leading to what Williams has argued is an ‘auto-ambivalence’, which disguises the negative consequences of the liberal peace. Yet, even ‘enlightened’ debates on the concept of peace which generally tend to draw on approaches such as
Galtung’s negative/positive framework, the notion of a ‘just peace’, even an emancipatory approach, or the widely used concept of human security, tend to draw on, either by mimicking, extending or contesting, the liberal–realist paradigm, where peace is theorised as something which is at best institutionally constructed around states to engage with individual needs and emancipation, or in its more limited form a postponement of the tragedy of IR. Even critical and post-structural contributions revolve around the defence or attack of universalist principles and norms of peace.

Making peace explicit in IR

There are several key dimensions to sketching out an explicit analytic framework through which one can understand the concept of peace inherent in each of IR’s theoretical debates. The first is to note that there is either implicitly or explicitly a concept of peace inherent in each and every debate, though this is rarely acknowledged. Indeed, if every debate acknowledged this as well as the usual discussion of casual adjustments or preventive measures, the concepts of peace might have been less obscure and thus would have been factored into policy decisionmaking where it is linked to prescriptive forms of IR theory. In other words, if intellectual and policy approaches considered their implications for specific concepts of peace in conceptual, theoretical and methodological terms, as well as their underlying ontologies, this would provide them with a clearer approach to assessing their implicit construction of an epistemological framework to support an ontology of peace, its institutions, its emancipatory claims, its empathetic capacities, in an everyday context. It would also, of course, hold to account theories and decisions and in particular would probably focus research and policy far more closely on how to create a self-sustaining peace.

Related to this are debates over different methods by which the type of peace extant can be evaluated. Clearly it is inadequate to merely research the nature of the international or a society through its documents and codification. There needs to be a normative and philosophical investigation. Ethnographic methods might be deployed in order to deepen the understanding of the multiple dimensions of peace in social, cultural, aesthetic and environmental terms. Clearly, the broader the understanding of the multiple dimensions of peace, from levels of analysis, actors and issues, to methodological, ontological and epistemological issues, the more plausible it is to talk of a self-sustaining peace, as opposed to a hegemonic peace through external governance coloured by its interests and biases. Critics may warn that this is too complicated an approach to have any policy relevance, requiring instead prioritisation and parsimony, yet re-applying the same solutions in the hope that they may finally work runs the risk of unanticipated consequences for the lives of really existing individuals that IR’s orthodoxy appears to prefer to hide. Yet, in a globalising and democratising world they can no longer be hidden beneath the state, its associated institutions, or statistical descriptions.
Approaches to peace able to consider such dimensions would then become another basis upon which IR theory can be evaluated, and on which policy and practice can be formed. This would also make explicit the agendas of those who claim to represent power and truth, who claim to have privileged knowledge of the international, and claim the capacity to discursively represent and change the world through political, economic and social policy. The reclaiming of peace as a key component of the IR project would have major implications for the sustainability of peace as it is experienced across the world. This would just relate to a Western normative framework, but the negotiation of forms of peace that reflect local ontologies as well as the need for emancipation, and self-sustainability in a broader global context, far beyond the often colonial mentality of aspects of the Western IR academy and the reflection and perpetuation of an Enlightenment and liberal project sharpened by Western strategic interests.

What are the different possibilities for peace arising from interdisciplinary research? First, if realism’s tragic postulation that peace is very limited and narrowly conceived at best is rejected, and liberalism’s claim that both institutional regulation and individual agency are required is problematised, and the need for a discursive framework for emancipation, plural ontologies and hybridity, is accepted, then this opens up several different areas of research of peace. Institutional regulation has received much attention already in terms of law, justice, IOs, global governance and constitutional frameworks. Individual agency has received rather less attention so far, mainly because it involves engagement with a potentially non-Western, non-liberal other. This raises difficult ontological and epistemological questions about institutions and their associated knowledge systems in relation to peace within the liberal framework, and certainly produces a tension with the privilege claimed by the discipline to be able to speak, rationally or otherwise, for the other. The liberal framework claims that individuals attain freedom through institutional regulation. Because Marxist-oriented approaches to class and economic frameworks have been discredited, and because the US projected contemporary neo-liberal approach underpins much of the peacebuilding practice around the world, the liberal peacebuilding project of the contemporary era tends to conceptualise individual freedoms as political freedoms in practice. This means the freedom to vote, rather than economic welfare and access to a decent level of facilities and economic opportunity (though neo-liberalism ironically presents this as free-trade, marketisation and economic freedom). The dominance of US neo-liberalism is hardly surprising, even despite the fact that many major donors practice social forms of democracy in their own states (such as Britain and the Scandinavian donors). This is also coloured by neo-liberal development arguments, which follow similar lines in creating free markets that provide modernisation and opportunities for the labour force. However, liberal approaches are constrained by their universal normative ontology and a methodology that prioritises officialdom and institutions, which make it extremely difficult to move beyond their main focus (which is always on institutions and states) towards the everyday life of individuals. This means that the freedom of the individual is by far a lesser priority in orthodox theorising of
peace than international order – at best defined as a narrow peace. Peace between states is the priority; far outweighing any negative impacts this might have on some individuals within states who are sacrificed on the pragmatic and painful alter of ‘order’. These are questions that the liberal framework cannot resolve, partly because of the inflexibility of the orthodoxy of IR theory, though it may be able to develop a heightened sensitivity to them by adopting some of the insights of constructivism and Critical theory. Constructivism also tends to rely on states and liberal institutional structures as the vehicles through which individual subjective and objective existences are inscribed.

Critical theory is more focused on the emancipation of the individual and an ontology of emancipation, and draws on a range of political philosophy and social theory in order to construct a discursive framework in which a politics of peace can be constructed and embedded. This has, however, been criticised for resting on Western norms and traditions, not least for envisioning a world in which basic norms, structures and frameworks can be found or developed which are common to all, and claiming that this process can be insulated from the dangers of hegemony and institutional capture. Critical theory’s response has been to problematise universality while at the same time seeking a way to retain it. Post-structural approaches to IR theory seek to take this process much further, both drawing eclectically on a range of representations of the political and international space, through the investigation of the discursive modes of power/knowledge that are deployed by elites to protect their power, and which can be unravelled in order to develop peaceful discourses. The resultant juxtaposition of different methods, disciplines and modes of analysis and representation within IR enable an engagement with ontologies of peace as a way of circumventing some of the limitations with Critical theory’s emancipatory peace. This *via media* is inter-disciplinarity.

Table 1 outlines the implications for peace of the main approaches to IR.

In addition, various sub-disciplines and areas imply other dimensions of peace.

Placing peace at the centre of the discipline indicates that to fully engage with the international, IR theory needs to embrace (through critical ‘verstehen’ approaches to social action) its complexity rather than avoid it. This means it should also have some sense of the peace that it implies (see above) to avoid the accusation that IR has become complicit in these oversights in order to support a hegemonic and essentially liberal order. Though the liberal peace offers a form of emancipation this is potentially hegemonic, and perhaps reflects what Rorty has described as a ‘liberal utopia’. As Walker has argued, IR theory fails when it attempts to present a truth as anything other than a ‘historically specific spatial ontology’. But there is an additional problem. If peace is assumed to be a goal of discursive approaches to the IR, not defining it in advance, perhaps in relation to a specific theory, sheds doubt on that intention. Defining it in advance without a careful negotiation of peace through an inter-subjective process offers a more sophisticated discursive framework, but also is rather instrumentalist in the light of Walker’s argument that all IR theory is linked to specific moments and places in history. This is the paradox of thinking about peace in orthodox IR – it creates
### Table 1: Main contributions of IR theory to peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IR theory</th>
<th>Concept of peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Idealism</strong></td>
<td>Positive epistemology of peace (harmony and cooperation are inherent in human nature and society/states: offers a utopian ontology of ethical harmony; depends upon disarmament, pacifism, internationalism, international institutions (civil and institutional peace), carried out by social movements and states. Peace represents an absence of any form of violence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Liberalism</strong></td>
<td>Positive epistemology of peace, but more guarded upon ontological grounds than idealism with respect to its reflection of the inherency of violence in human nature. Proper social and political conditions need to be established to achieve a positive peace through standardised democratic governance that depends upon the capacity of states and their organisations to determine the appropriate mixture of freedom and constraint required to promote and police a positive, liberal form of peace. Peace represents an absence of physical and structural violence for the majority in each state and can be constructed through liberal peacebuilding.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Pluralism</strong></td>
<td>Peace is found in a transnational world society, which represents a positive epistemology of peace derived from an ontology determined by human needs. This can be developed through conflict resolution approaches. Peace represents a distribution of human needs adequate for all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Realism(s)</strong></td>
<td>A victor’s peace, or a negative peace, derived from a negative epistemology of peace, arises through security dilemmas, the balance of power between states, and an inherent ontology of violence and fear. Absence of inter-state war is enough to denote peace, though imperial hegemony based upon victory would be an optimum version of peace. Contracts between states and between states and citizens rest upon fear, but for as long as such contracts survive this can be called peace. Conflict management is the best that can be achieved in this environment. Peace is the space between wars.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Structuralism(s)</strong></td>
<td>Structural frameworks such as capitalism and class block peace as social/economic justice for individuals. Peace represents progressive emancipation. Ontologically, a classless, socially just peace is plausible, given the correct methodology, upon discovery of which it eventually becomes inevitable even if revolutionary change is the only way it can occur. However, it is also assumed that structural and physical violence occurs in the interaction between classes, leading eventually to revolution via which an emancipatory peace emerges.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>English School</strong></td>
<td>Drawing on both realism and idealism/liberalism, ‘civilised/liberal’ states create a stable ‘international society’, resting upon a balancing of both a positive and negative epistemology of peace in their domestic and international settings. Both negative and positive epistemologies of peace are present, but negative epistemologies are more visible in an international setting – though they are also manageable.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Normative theory</strong></td>
<td>Peace lies in a recognition of universal normative system and individuals as ends in themselves, reflected either in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
an instrumentalist need for theory and practice to offer progress from a war system to peace system in advance of its engagement with a specific conflict context, meaning that great care must be taken to separate this intention from an alien, blueprint approach to peace that is then transplanted into conflict zones. This raises the broader question of how IR can engage with the other without falling into a ‘white man’s burden’, Orientalist and coercive syndrome, while assuming that a specific epistemology of IR and peace is superior and can be transplanted into any location without regard for context. Thus ‘peace’ as a process offers a contradiction – it requires a method, ontology and epistemology which are negotiated locally, but prompted externally by agents who must engage with the other, but cannot know one another, at least in a short time and at the depth of detail required for such ambitious relationships. These concerns underline the possibilities offered by critical approaches to peace.

They also point to one of the key problems with orthodox IR’s engagement with peace – or indeed with its lack of it. This is the result of a methodological weakness, which has both ontological and epistemological implications. The discipline’s deeper contest is over how far its right to interpret the other, who may be unknowable at least without a deep investigation of more than simply political and state level structures, extends. This raises the questions of legitimacy and intervention. The privileged claim to know the mind of the other was

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IR theory</th>
<th>Concept of peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cosmopolitan or communitarian institutions and norms. A positive epistemology of peace depends upon toleration, recognition, and also a recognition of the dangers of unethical behaviour.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constructivism</td>
<td>As with liberalism and English School thinking: in addition a balance of identity, ideational tolerance and state cooperation or hegemony promotes a peaceful order moving towards that offered by critical theory (below).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental theory</td>
<td>Offers a radical critique of state-centric IR theory, often drawing on critical approaches to IR theory; a concept of peace that requires the structural prioritisation of the environment and its preservation for future generations. Only in these terms is an environmental ontology of peace possible.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical theory</td>
<td>Offers a positive epistemology of an emancipatory peace resting upon empathy and possibly active care, and a concern with both institutions and everyday life. A post-Westphalian, emancipatory peace may arise through discourse ethics.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>Using critical approaches, this develops a positive epistemology of peace incorporating both gender critiques and sensitivities in order to develop an understanding of alternative, social and political ontologies of peace (and barriers to these).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-structuralism</td>
<td>Offers a positive epistemology of post-sovereign ontologies of peace through a pluralist, genealogical examination of the broad range of issues and dynamics that lead to or constitute identity difference, and hybridity.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
increasingly contested as the discipline moved through realism toward critical and post-structural approaches. Yet, it is on this basis that many of the assumptions inherent particularly in orthodox IR theory are derived – and through which many of the disciplines’ stereotypes about power, sovereignty and identity, as well its silences, are reproduced. But this right is so valuable, particularly in a context of an environment in which peace is defined by hegemons, that it is important to problematise it so that IR theory does not merely reaffirm and replicate the very problems it is supposed to address. It is through addressing the problem of peace directly that these problems might be responded to.

This indicates that a focus simply on a negative peace and a balance of power, or an institutional framework for peace is not enough. These reproduce

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sub-discipline</th>
<th>Theory of peace</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>War studies</td>
<td>Peace is limited – victor’s peace or negative peace (realist approach).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace studies</td>
<td>Peace should engender social justice, but at the very least achieve an absence of violence between states (structuralist or liberal approach/also as in peace studies).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democratic peace</td>
<td>Peace is represented by democratic states and free trade as in the Kantian Project (liberal approach).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security studies</td>
<td>Peace is derived from watertight pre-emptive security measures (realist/liberal approaches).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical security studies</td>
<td>Peace is emancipation (critical approaches).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict studies</td>
<td>Negative peace/basic security (realist).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conflict management</td>
<td>Positive peace/human needs (pluralist).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding/state-building</td>
<td>Liberal peace/governance (liberal–realist hybrid approach).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fourth generation approaches</td>
<td>Emancipation and ontology of peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPE/Dependencia</td>
<td>Drawing upon liberalism or structuralism, free trade or global economic equality and social justice leads to peace. Implies a positive epistemology of peace once either international institutions have been perfected or global capitalism has been modified or defeated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International law</td>
<td>Peace should be based upon a normative rule of law respected by all states.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International political sociology</td>
<td>Opens up an understanding of the dynamics of peace in an otherwise marginalised interdisciplinary area of sociological investigation of the international.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development studies</td>
<td>Locally sustainable, emancipatory development or modernisation models based upon the liberal–realist/neo-liberal hybrid.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-colonial studies</td>
<td>Peace should contend with the dangers of subtle neo-colonial hegemony and domination through discursive and material means of liberal governance.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
bare life, peace needs to become embedded within everyday life and the societies it affects. This may seem naive to many working within a more orthodox tradition, but to others who are working beyond these traditions, orthodox approaches seem naive – destined to repeat the traumas of liberal–realist ‘history’. Again, this indicates the need for an engagement with the political, social, economic, cultural and environment dynamics of everyday life, if an everyday form of peace is to replace a negative epistemology of peace. This clearly prioritises the individual, their identity, difference and consent, as well as stable and peaceful relations between them. Jabri has articulated a useful conceptualisation of peace in contemporary IR. She argues that:

The politics of peace, the capacity at once to both resist violence and struggle for a just social order, is not just within the purview of the liberal state or indeed international civil service, but it located primarily with individuals, communities and social movements involved in critical engagement with the multiform governance structures, as well as non-state agents, they encounter in their substantial claims for human rights and justice. The politics of peace must then rely on a conception of solidarity that has a capacity to transcend the signifying divide of state and culture, while at the same time recognising the claims of both.

This represents a critical rendition of the concept of peace, to which can be added the need for empathy. In addition, according to Allan and Keller, justice through peace is preferable to justice through war and the most marginalised provide guidance to the powerful in understanding what peace means, requiring respect for free speech and human rights. This means that individuals have primacy over states in terms of their rights, freedoms and participation, recognition is central, as is the way in which categorisations are made to include or exclude others. Recognition implies empathy, care and, thus, solidarity and reconciliation, but the latter cannot occur before the former. The language of Western liberal institutionalism, or of sovereignty is, as Allan and Keller argue, not a basis for a ‘just peace’, because these offer obstacles to the recognition of certain others, favour liberals, and continue the process of marginalisation. Reconciliation cannot stem from this (hence the inability of many liberal states to recognise even their own native peoples). Allan adds to this analysis an element of ‘care’ which he argues extends the concept of peace beyond its positive connotations. This global care ethic supersedes a positive peace, drawing on the eponymous feminist concept. Tolerance and solidarity coalesce within care, according to Allan, in that difference and uniqueness are accepted, and sympathy for the difficulties of others and a willingness to assist are present.

Pluralism requires a methodological breadth and interdisciplinarity. Gender debates, and advocacy, can be read as requiring a radical restructuring of representation across political, social, professional and economic spheres, and within the public–private/agency–structure debate. Similarly, environmental readings of IR generally point to the unsustainability of many political,
economic and social practices that lead to the consumption of non-renewable resources, and reflect an unequal demography of consumption. Focusing on marginalised actors such as children raises the question of their agency within the broader adult-dominated structures of IR, and whether and how they can be represented. The problem of poverty has of course been linked to a tendency for violence, relative deprivation and frustration aggression. This illustrates the need to expand the scope of any consideration of peace to include social, political, economic and cultural dynamics and sustainability, and a wide range of actors not merely determined by their official status, on an ontological rather than merely interest-oriented basis.

Related methodological issues also arise. This is one of the key problems of IR in that while it tends not to embrace inter-disciplinarity, the sheer scale of the issues it faces require it to do so, and especially require the ensuing diversity of method. One of the crucial outcomes of the grand experiment in creating peace around the world, from Westphalia to the League, the UN, and post-Cold War peacebuilding is that more depth and breadth is required if the peace created is to be sustainable. Parsimony is not conducive to a sustain-

**Table 3 Alternative contributions and issues**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Children/education</td>
<td>Representation, rights and needs for current and future generations are required as well as opportunities for education.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty/development</td>
<td>This should move beyond modernisation and neo-liberal strategies and provide both welfare and opportunities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmentalism</td>
<td>Environmental and inter-generational sustainability is required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feminism</td>
<td>Gender equality and ways of knowing need to be incorporated into an understanding of peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous society/ difference/culture/pluralism/hybrideity</td>
<td>These need to be recognised and respected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law frameworks</td>
<td>Constitutions, international law, human rights and post-conflict justice should not merely be empty institutions, but must coincide with and be embedded via, indigenous perspectives on peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Literature/arts/aesthetics</td>
<td>Recognises the significance of the subjective and emotive nature of peace and its hybridity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public space/architecture</td>
<td>These should be negotiated with reference to local cultures, interest groups, and a representation of a pluralist global peace.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconciliation</td>
<td>Recognises that a healing process is needed far beyond a political agreement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law/human rights/civil society</td>
<td>These need to be negotiated with culture, indigeneity, and the negotiation of international norms in mind.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sustainability</td>
<td>In the longer term any emancipatory peace should be self-sustaining rather than externally supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism/guerrillas/militias</td>
<td>The use of violence is inimical to any ontology of peace, but this does not preclude a search for inclusion and reconciliation in order to bring about the rejection of violence by such groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
able, ontological peace. Yet, the renegotiation of this broader peace means that there is a certain ‘ontological insecurity’ in the resulting scale and scope of the peace project. It has become so wide and complex that it cannot be investigated through one discipline, or created by one institutional framework, as the above Tables show. This necessitates the diversification of the discipline, both in inter-disciplinary and methodological terms, as has now occurred. Even where a liberal peacebuilding consensus exists about the range of issues, frameworks and actors involved, it opens up the problem of universal versus pluralist versions of peace: but an engagement with an empathetic, emancipatory peace and its multiple ontologies navigates around the problem of a narrow version of peace for a majority leading to the tyrannising of the minority. This responds with breadth and equity to the question of whom and what peace is for. But this can only be achieved through inter-disciplinary work across disciplines where the dynamics of peace have rarely received attention.

Economics, law and philosophy have long been seen to be key disciplines that contribute to the IR project of understanding war and violence. Other related areas have also now become crucial. These include development and cultural studies, post-colonial studies, gender, anthropology and sociology, as well as psychology and the arts. Each of these bridges into other areas have often indicated to IR scholars how problematic its orthodoxy is in its security–state–institution oriented ontology, and have provided fruitful methods for investigation in the context of the transnational and international spaces that IR is now concerned with. Development studies has opened up a discussion about how development of states and societies should proceed in post-conflict settings. Cultural studies has allowed for a consideration of identity, ethnicity and culture in IR as a challenge to the belief that power, interests and states dominate the international space. Post-colonial studies, with its particular emphasis on the discursive ways in which colonial power is perpetuated, has brought up the issue of marginalisation of often underdeveloped states, as well as a wealth of literary and historical sites of knowledge that would otherwise have been ignored. Gender studies have opened up an understanding of patriarchy in IR, in association with sociological studies that have interrogated the power/knowledge relations within and between societies. Psychology has contributed to the study of the behaviour of states, officials and individuals in various states of being in the international, from peace, diplomacy or war to terrorism. It has also pointed to the replicating nature of overt and structural violence suffered by individuals from childhood onwards, and the issues of ‘self-actualisation’ and ‘emotional intelligence’ in developing the necessary self-reflection required to avoid actions that may spark violence, elucidation a concern with social justice. Anthropology has opened up methodological and ontological debates about how one understands individual and group dynamics at the grassroots. International political sociology opens up social theory to IR without the dominance of states, and environmental studies indicate the significance of inter-generational sustainability.
Perhaps the methodological question is the most controversial in that it raises important epistemological questions about how research interrogates the foundations of political organisation, whom it favours, and what it is constructed for. In particular it opens up the question of who the discipline privileges, how the construction of IR and society interact, and the type of knowledge that is required to understand this. Of course, in the realm of IR, and in particular relating to peace, this demands that policymakers are able to influence IR correspondingly in order to reproduce a specific approach to peace. Thus the methods used to investigate IR, and the question of peace, are vital in this epistemological circle, in which knowledge is produced and passed on to policymakers to act upon, or at least to modify their policies. This also relates to the problematic claims of the orthodoxy of IR towards a value-free approach to politics, when basic assumptions about human nature (peaceful or violent), about the nature of political organisation, about political, social and economic ideologies, are related to the interests of societies, groups and polities. For this reason, a single peace, whether institutional or emancipatory, translatable across all such groupings, interests and ideologies is unlikely to stand up to an inter-disciplinary investigation.

Clearly, different methodologies reproduce different concepts of peace. The traditional positivist methods sees peace as being a concept that lies in the creation of specific domestic and international frameworks, which can be engineered, and in which rational calculations can be made about how this is done. A value free, neutral and universal peace can be reproduced. Yet, because positiv-
ism is often associated with the liberal–realism hybrid, the paradox is that peace is limited to simply the removal of overt violence while at the same time building for a more ambitious form of peace built on governance. Where some positivist/rationalist approaches are more ambitious, such as the peace research school, the focus is on the democratic peace as a universal, rational and practical framework. Positivist approaches tend to be fundamentally materialist, relating interests with resources, which need distributing in order to consolidate even limited frameworks of peace. These approaches are dominated by a methodology that focuses on officialdom, on a hierarchy of administrative and bureaucratic actors, and therefore by a focus on methods used to interrogate the actions of states as essentially rational actors. The onus is on states to create or provide peace, which is by necessity a product of state politics and interests, of which the optimum configuration is a democratic state if the crudest forms of violence are to be avoided. The notion of ‘sovereign man’ controlling a peace that is fragile because of the vast numbers of powerful interests that need to be incorporated, is representative of the tragedy of orthodox IR. More pluralist approaches, drawing across disciplines, manage to escape these limitations. The incorporation and study of the inter-subjective nature of issues such as identity, power, and knowledge has necessitated methodologies that facilitate research in these areas, and in particular examine how individuals, societies and communities operate within this context. For example, the adoption of discourse analysis and ethnography allow for greater access to everyday life, and to facilitate a clearer understanding of how norms and institutions and their creation or development have an impact upon the individual in discursive terms. The sort of ethnographic work conducted in anthropology and sociology, which is self-reflective, aware of the corruption of data from ‘informants’, often spans an entire academic career spent examining one or two small areas. Methodologically speaking, post-positivist and ethnographic approaches to IR do try to emulate this level of attention.29 This is an area where a clearer understanding of what motivates individuals and social groups to enter into conflict, criminality

Table 5 Methodology and peace

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Methodology</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positivism/rationalism</td>
<td>Focus on reductionist strategies, elites, officials and states as actors, rational calculations of interest, and assumptions of power; peace relates to state power and its exercise and the reification of a liberal domestic/international system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnography</td>
<td>Focus on societies, communities, individuals, human needs and security, and everyday life and its needs and influences; peace rests on indigenous frameworks for societal harmony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-positivism</td>
<td>Produces a critique of positivism and rationalism through discursive insights into the disguising of power and interest; understanding assumptions, structural violence, and the needs and dynamics of individuals and societies, often through discourse analysis and/or ethnography; focuses on peace as emancipation/an everyday ontology of peace</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and black markets, or to contribute to a more harmonious existence with their neighbours, can be acquired to understand how emancipation and ontologies of peace might emerge.

This raises the question of how the voices of IR from outside of the developed world and its institutions and academies can express their understanding of the indigenous or everyday, and contribute (indeed, be heard) on equal terms to this discussion in the context of IR. This requires such alternative methodologies as derived from inter-disciplinarity, but it also requires that local academies and policymakers are enabled to develop approaches to understanding their own predicaments and situations as well as those of the West, or developed world, without these being tainted by Western, liberal and developed world orthodoxies, which cannot be easily transferred without inserting their own agendas and shortcomings. In other words, to gain an understanding of the indigenous factor for the overall IR project of building peace, liberal or otherwise, a via media needs to be developed between emergent local knowledge and the orthodoxy of international prescriptions and assumptions about peace (which, in knowledge terms – and even in the context of critical theory – has become hegemonic because of the weight of so many actors, institutions and academies that assume the liberal peace to be potentially universal).

This indicates a response to the question of what and whom peace is for, and why. Peace is constructed for the good of all, for ‘others’, but it normally also favours a specific in-group. In the case of the liberal peace, this is the society of developed liberal democracies. This is hardly surprising given IR theory’s mainstream focus on states, officials and governments, and in the short, medium, and long-term they all benefit the most. An everyday ontology of peace, on the other hand, would enable political, social and economic organisations and institutions that respect the communities they are in a contractual relationship with in its specific circumstances and environment, requiring also the flexibility to respond to any changes. As a consequence, this notion of peace would be locally owned, would be self-sustaining, socially, politically, economically and environmentally, and would provide a via media between different identities and interests. As far as possible, these interlocking and interrelated versions of peace would also provide justice and equity, and avoid violence both direct and structural. There are indications of these requirements in the evolving frameworks of peace in an emerging interdisciplinary version of IR.

An inter-disciplinary agenda for peace

In order to capitalise on the emerging pluralist debate on peace some preliminary assertions can be made. Ontologies, epistemologies, theories, concepts and methods should be broadly representative of all actors at multiple levels, public and private, gendered and aged, and of multiple identities. Its identities should be clearly understood and any claimed boundaries, rules, rights, freedoms and norms must be generally recognised and consented to by all including the most marginalised. This means also considering the endeavour of gaining the consent
of those who are willing to use violence. Bottom-up, social ontologies developing an empathetic account on emancipation based upon mutual ontologies and methods of peace should shape institutions. This does not preclude peace being legitimate and formalised in governmental, institutional or constitutional structures and legal frameworks, or a social contract, but these must rest on consent and an engagement with difference and hybridity. It should provide social, economic and political resources sufficient to meet the demands made upon it by its local constituencies and an international community of which it should be a stakeholder. Any viable concept of peace that conforms to the above conditions must not displace indigenous legitimacy with preponderant institutions that are inflexible and actually obscure the indigenous. Interdisciplinary and cross-cutting coalitions of scholars, policymakers, individuals and civil society actors can develop discursive understandings of peace and its construction in this context. By placing the study of multiple concepts of peace at the centre of IR:

1. a research agenda is implied to develop multiple conceptions of peace, focused upon the everyday life of their constituents in the context of an institutional framework and social contract, together with;
2. a *via media* between them.

Recognition of these requirements are crucial to counter the inherent tendency of any utopian, liberal critical, and emancipatory institutional attempts to create a single and universal blueprint for peace, which recent experience from Cambodia to East Timor shows rarely succeeds. As Schmid claimed research aimed at facilitating peace: ‘should formulate its problems, not in terms meaningful to international and supranational institutions, but in terms meaningful to suppressed and exploited groups and nations.’30 This opens up claims to emancipate the subaltern from structures of oppression, be they state, military, or derived from social, economic or class structures. It allows for a negotiation of a discursive practice of peace in which hegemony, domination and oppression can be identified and resolved. This pluralist approach to peace may be more sensitive to the changing pattern of grassroots needs and objectives, in the context of institutions and hierarchy, and ultimately open up a concern with the self-sustaining nature of any attempt to create a process or dynamic of peace. Peace should not become a differend, it should not be utopian, and therefore unobtainable, but it also should not be dystopian, and therefore lack legitimacy amongst those who are subject to it. Furthermore, it must be able to mediate across its own boundaries, without dominating, but at the same time upholding its own internal logic, norms, legitimacy and standards for all to see and understand.

From the above discussion a number of issues arise in any attempt to start developing a more coherent agenda for peace in IR. These rest upon the following:

1. An assumption of a priori local ownership of a local, regional and global process of peacemaking, or of an agreement.
2 An assumption of a priori local decisionmaking processes to determine the basic political, economic and social processes and norms to be institutionalised.

3 Discursive international support for these processes, guidance on technical aspects of governance and institution-building without introducing hegemony, inequality, conditionality or dependency.

4 An economic framework should be determined locally. Internationals can assist in free market reform and marketisation/privatisation, but they should also consider a socioeconomic safety net immediately to bind citizens and labour to a peaceful state (rather than to war-making, a grey/black economy, or transnational criminal activities).

5 Any peace process must cumulatively engage with everyday life as well as institutions from the bottom-up.

6 Any peace process and indeed any peace should rest on uncovering an ontology, on empathy and emancipation, and recognise the fluidity of peace as a process.

7 1–6 should result in a process whereby an indigenous peace is installed that includes a version of human rights, rule of law, a representative political process that reflects the group and their ability to create consensus as well as international expectations. This may also involve the renegotiation of international norms of peace.

In addition, the above agenda requires the following from IR theory and from peacebuilding actors.

1 Peacebuilding actors should not work from blueprints but should develop strategies based upon multi-level, multi-issue consultation in each case. They should endeavour to see themselves as mediatory agents of empathetic emancipation, whereby their role is to mediate the global norm or institution with the local before it is constructed. This involves an exploration of different and hybrid ontologies of peace. IR theory should avoid overstating the applicability of blueprint-type models.

2 Peacebuilding actors also operate on the basis of the norms and systems they are trying to develop or explore, such as democracy, equality, social justice, etc. IR theory cannot ever be beyond ethics, and must acknowledge its reflexive qualities; peacebuilding likewise.

3 IR theory and peacebuilding actors need to move from an institutional agenda to an additional everyday agenda. Putting individuals first entails a rethink of the implicit priorities of peace. In terms of peacebuilding this would place human needs, particularly economic and security needs, before free market reform. It would probably require the creation of social welfare oriented peacebuilding institutions, funded by donors and other international actors in whose interests a self-sustaining peace ultimately is.

4 It needs to be noted that in the contemporary world of globalised relationships and exchanges, conflict and poverty-creating conflict, however minor they may seem from a distance, can have major indirect impacts.
The idea that individuals and groups can live in peace, whether institutional or emancipatory and which indicates a state of something more than basic security, cannot now be rejected without abandoning a significant dimension of the entire inter-disciplinary agenda now linked to IR theory. Yet, it is also very difficult to see how this inter-disciplinary, pluralist agenda, which indicates that peace should be an emancipatory process or represent multiple ontologies, can be sustained while clinging to notions of a territorially bounded international space and concurring with liberal or neo-liberal governance. Peace should not just be governance, it should also include representation, consent and consensus, human security, equity, empathy, emancipation and everydayness. IR’s role may now be to facilitate the development of an understanding of the emancipatory ontologies of self-sustaining peace across disciplines.

The long held notion that peace is a nebulous concept, which cannot be theorised, and is methodologically and ontologically problematic, can now with some certainty be consigned to the graveyard of orthodox IR theory. If IR is to be a discipline that uncovers and inscribes an understanding of peace rather than violence upon its subjects, it should engage with the implications of this. Knowing or speaking peace always reproduces some version of it. Emerging from the inter-disciplinary, pluralist – indeed empathetic, emancipatory – research that now surrounds IR, it is clear that a debate about peace is always an implicit part of any theory, method and episteme; it may be understood, like ethics, as an ‘ongoing historical practice’. Acknowledging these dynamics is an important step towards the explicit development of the heterodox conditions of, practices of, and understanding of, a pluralist and everyday peace across diverse contexts.
Notes

Introduction

1 Desiderius Erasmus, Querela Pacis [Complaint of Peace], Chicago: Open Court, 1917 [1521].
2 Attributed to Einstein.
7 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998 [1651], Chapter V.
8 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Oxford: Norton 1975 [1922].
10 Ibid., p. 208.
13 Jim George, Discourses of Global Politics, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1994, p. x.
16 See, for example, much work in social anthropology which is generally appalled by the militant line IR takes. Douglas Fry, op. cit., pp. 184 and 193. Even if Darwin was right about natural selection, Fry argues, then we would have bred any violence out of society by the engineering of non-violence.


22 Rick Ashley, comments at a conference on his work and ‘oeuvre’, Newcastle University, 19 April 2007. He argued that the attempt to create a Kantian ‘commonwealth of peace’ was futile and motivated by the ‘fear within’.


25 Ibid., p. 8.


33 These four components of the liberal peace provide a framework for the discussion of peace in this study. For a discussion of these components see: Oliver P. Richmond, *The Transformation of Peace*, London: Palgrave, 2005, esp. Conclusion.


37 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, op. cit., p. 113.


39 Ibid., p. 57.

It is notable that there is a lack of literature in IR and related disciplines that attempts to investigate alternatives to the liberal peace and its contemporary related state-building structures. For an exception, see Roger MacGinty, ‘Reconstructing Post-war Lebanon: A Challenge to the LIBERAL PEACE?’, *Conflict, Security and Development*, Vol. 7, No. 3. There has been a lot of work outside of the discipline on so-called ‘peaceful societies’. See, among others, Douglas Fry, op. cit.; Raymond C. Kelly, *Warless Societies and the Origins of War*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000.


Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell-Smith (eds), op. cit., pp. 56–9.

Steve Smith, op. cit., p. 17.


Steve Smith, op. cit., p. 29.

Ibid., p. 30.

1 **Peace and the idealist tradition**

1 US President Wilson’s address to Congress outlining his famous 14 points, 8 January 1918. This speech is often taken the key expression of idealism, drawing on Kant’s framework for ‘perpetual peace’.


3 Even the existence of this debate is contested in that ‘idealists’ were rather more pragmatic that realists often argued, and realists more interested in norms than often idealists thought. See for example, Peter Wilson, ‘The Myth of the First Great Debate’, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 24, 1998; Lucian M. Ashworth, ‘Where are the Idealists in Interwar IR?’, *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 32, No. 2, 2006, p. 291.


6 Lucian M. Ashworth, op. cit., p. 293.


11 Alfred Zimmern, op. cit., p. 327.
12 For an interesting discussion, see C. Sylvest, op. cit., pp. 417–25.
16 Michael Doyle, op. cit., p. 207.
20 Desiderius Erasmus, Querela Pacis [Complaint of Peace], Chicago: Open Court, 1917 [1521].
26 Ibid., p. 44.
27 Iain Atack, op. cit., p. 45.
29 Thanks to Nick Rennger for these important points.
30 Iain Atack, op. cit., pp. 40–9. For an excellent discussion of Kant, and of the development of the democratic peace argument, and empirical testing see Michael Doyle, op. cit., pp. 251–300.
33 Ibid., p. 42.
37 Ibid., pp. 17–22.
Notes

43 Ibid., p. 239.
45 Richard Tuck, op. cit.
46 See ibid., p. 48.
49 Richard Tuck, op. cit.
50 Michael Howard, op. cit., p. 3.
58 Chris Brown, op. cit., p. 118.
59 As Tuck argues, the early humanist impulse was that there was an entitlement to conquer with the intention of civilising the less civilised. Richard Tuck, *The Rights of War and Peace*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 45.
63 Norman Angell, op. cit., p. 12.
65 Lucian M. Ashworth, op. cit., p. 292.
66 Alfred Zimmern, op. cit.
68 A. Ponsonby, op. cit.
71 Ibid., p. 77.
Notes

72 Iain Atack, op. cit., p. 86.
74 Iain Atack, op. cit., p. 85.
75 See also P. Brock, op. cit., p. 90.
80 Woodrow Wilson, Address to the Senate, 22 January 1917, in Arthur S. Link, op. cit., Vol. 40, p. 539.
85 Ibid., p. 121.
86 Ibid., p. 174.
87 Ibid., p. 180.
91 Paul Taylor, ‘Developing the Role of ECOSOC’, in Paul Taylor and A.J.R. Groom (eds), *The UN at the Millennium*, London: Continuum, 2000, p. 122. By the 1990s the major proportion of spending by international institutions was aimed at governance activities, including UNDP, the World Bank, USAID, DFID, and other international institutions and agencies, and not to mention the obvious case of the development of the EU and the pacification of Europe. Ibid., p. 132.
94 This debate effectively posited incommensurability between the three main paradigms of IR, which were now equally weighted, but also were indicative of the hybrid that was by then emerging in theoretical and practical terms. See for example, Michael Banks, ‘The Inter-Paradigm Debate’, in M. Light and A.J.R. Groom (eds), *International Relations. A Handbook of Current Theory*, London: Frances Pinter, 1985, pp. 7–26. When I was a postgraduate student working under the supervision of A.J.R. Groom at the University of Kent, he made much of this hybrid version as a natural evolution of the inter-paradigm debate in his IR theory lectures.
Notes


98 Ibid., p. 79.


101 Mikkel Vedby Rasmussen, op. cit., p. 112.


2 A realist agenda for peace


5 Ibid., p. 71, esp. note 8.


12 Ibid., Chapters 7–31.

13 Barry Buzan, op. cit., p. 51.


15 Ibid., pp. 44–8. See also Rousseau’s comments on the unlikelihood that prince would accept restrictions on their power.

16 Ibid., pp. 49–160.


23 Ibid., p. 25.
24 Ibid., p. 32.
32 John Locke, Two Treatises on Civil Government, Everyman, 1953 [1690].
33 Jim George, op. cit., p. 78.
37 Hans Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 22.
38 Jim George, op. cit., pp. 91–2. See also H. Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 4.
39 Ibid., p. 237.
40 Ibid., p. 259.
48 Lawrence, ‘Strategy, the State and the Weberian Legacy’, cited in Jim George, op. cit., p. 103.
49 Kenneth Waltz, op. cit., p. 185.
50 Martin Wight, ‘Why is There No International Theory?’, op. cit., p. 36.
52 Ibid., p. 33.
53 Jim George, op. cit., p. 81.
54 Hedley Bull, ‘Society and Anarchy in International Relations’, in H. Butterfield and M. Wight, op. cit., p. 35.
55 Ibid., pp. 49–50.
58 Ibid., p. 90.
63 Jim George, op. cit., p. 118.
64 Ibid., p. 15.
77 Barry Buzan, op. cit., p. 56.
80 Ken Booth, ‘75 Years on’, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski,

81 Ibid., p. 220.


3 Marxist agendas for peace


2 Ibid., p. 519.

3 For a discussion of the different types of Marxism see Michael Gurevitch, Michael, Tony Bennett, James Curran and Janet Woollacott (eds), Culture, Society and the Media, London: Methuen, 1982.


6 Of course, structuralism was later to make an appearance in the ‘inter-paradigm debate’ of the 1980s as one of the three main paradigms of IR, though the main focus of this debate was on realism and pluralism. See Michael Banks, ‘The Inter-paradigm Debate’, in M. Light and A.J.R. Groom (eds), International Relations. A Handbook of Current Theory, London: Frances Pinter, 1985, pp. 7–26.

7 Karl Marx, The Poverty of Philosophy, London: Prometheus Books, 1995 [1847], Chapter II.


9 Ibid., Chapter 1.


13 Karl Marx and Frederich Engels, Communist Manifesto, op. cit., Chapter 1.

14 Ibid., Chapter 2.


17 Karl Marx, in H. Selsam and H. Martel, op. cit., p. 519.


19 V.I. Lenin, op. cit., part VII and part IX. See also Michael Doyle, op. cit., p. 119.

20 V.I. Lenin, op. cit., part VII.

21 Ibid., p. 265.


24 Justin Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 5.

Notes

26 V.I. Lenin, *Imperialism*, op. cit., part XI.
27 Vendulka Kubalkova and Albert Cruickshank, op. cit.
28 Justin Rosenberg, op. cit., p. 3.
36 Ibid., p. 87.
39 Ibid., p. 93.
40 Ibid., p. 95.
42 Ibid., pp. 102–5.
48 Indeed, the intellectual separation between the ‘developed’ and the ‘developing world’ might be said to be indicative of structural violence, whereby the north casts the poor adrift in another ‘world’. It is easy to see how Galtung arrived at his notion of a negative and positive peace, and the dilemmas of structural violence through this mode of thought. J. Galtung, op. cit., pp. 167–91.


51 An important example of this were the demonstrations and events surrounding the G8 meeting in the UK in 2005, during which much pressure was brought to bear by well-known musicians and their followers for a cancelling of developing world debt.


53 Remarkable similarities between this relationship and the currently polarisation between the liberal community of states and radical Islamic states and terrorist movements currently exist.

54 For a similar link between this and ideology, see for example, J. Plamenatz, *Ideology*, London: Macmillan, 1970, p. 23.


4 Beyond a idealist, realist or Marxist version of peace


7 Ibid., p. 213.


12 Tim Dunne, op. cit., p. xv


15 Chris Brown, ibid., p. 65.
19 Hedley Bull, op. cit., p. 292.
20 John Vincent, op. cit., p. 130.
25 For a defence of this, see Chris Brown, ‘Selective Intervention: A Defence of Inconsistency’, Presentation at the University of St. Andrews, 11 November 2002.
28 Roger Epp, op. cit., p. 49.
32 Ibid., p. 1.
34 Molly Cochran, op. cit., p. 21.
39 See Michael Walzer, op. cit.
42 Molly Cochran, op. cit., p. 54.
55 For a detailed analysis, see Maja Zehfuss, Constructivism in IR, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
57 Ibid., p. 4.
58 It is because of these more limited ambitions that I have placed constructivism in this chapter, representing it as bridge between positivism and post-positivism, rather than formally part of post-positivism.
70 Ibid., p. 395.
76 Ibid., p. 400.
77 Fred Kratochwil, Rules, Norms, and Decisions, op. cit., p. 142.
78 Ibid., p. 142.
80 Ibid., p. 82.
83 Ibid., p. 109. Indeed in this essay Krasner notably declines to discuss Marxism.
84 Ibid., p. 111.


94 Ibid., p. 474.

95 Ibid., pp. 475–8.

96 Ian Clark, op. cit., p. 140.

97 Ian Clarke, op. cit., p. 140.

98 Ibid., p. 6.

99 Mary Kaldor, op. cit., p. 3.

100 Ibid., p. 4.


106 See also C. Thomas, The Environment In International Relations, London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992.

107 See the UN Environmental Programme for more on this: UNEP, 2005.


121 Ibid., p. 4.


125 Ole Waever, op. cit., p. 170.


128 Ibid., p. 135.


130 Markus Fischer, op. cit., p. 5.

131 Ibid., p. 13.

132 Ibid., pp. 16–43.


134 Ibid., p. 58.

135 Ibid., p. 58.


137 Joseph S. Nye, ‘Redefining the National Interest’, *Foreign Affairs*, July/August 1999.


Notes

142 Iain Atack, op. cit., p. 159.
145 Raymond Geuss, op. cit., pp. 323 and 327.
147 For a brilliant discussion of how the culture wars have challenged positivism’s attempt to make research devoid of the search, and so any creativity, see Arjun Appadurai, ‘Grassroots Globalisation and Research Imagination’, in Arjun Appadurai, op. cit., p. 8.
148 Ibid., p. 6.
149 Ibid., p. 321.
151 Ibid., p. 200.
152 It is important to note that the tradition of scepticism in liberalism has been lost in this new version of the liberal peace. See in particular, Linda S. Bishai, ‘Liberal Empire’, *Journal of International Relations and Development*, Vol. 7, 2004, pp. 48–72, 53: Beate Jahn, op. cit., pp. 177–207.
153 Linda S. Bishai, op. cit., p. 57.
157 Raymond Geuss, op. cit., p. 320.
158 Jim George, op. cit., p. 44.
159 Ibid., p. 321.

5 The contribution of peace and conflict studies

1 This chapter draws on Chapter 3 of my *Transformation of Peace*. I have included it here to illustrate the importance of peace and conflict studies to IR more generally.
8 Ibid., Chapters 2, 3 and 5.
9 For a review of these approaches see, among others, J. Bercovitch (ed.), *Resolving


For a superb discussion of this set of approaches see, David J. Dunn, op. cit.


32 John Paul Lederach, ibid., pp. 60–1.


39 Ibid., p. 235.

40 Ibid., p. 238.


Agency and Global Politics, Cambridge University Press, 2000. For a discussion of this fourth generation in more detail see also, Oliver P. Richmond, Maintaining Order, Making Peace, op. cit., Chapters V and VI.


49 Oliver P. Richmond, The Transformation of Peace, op. cit., Conclusion.


55 See for example, Preface to Francois Debriss and Cynthia Weber (eds), Rituals of Mediation, Minneapolis: Minnesota, 2003, p. xv.

56 Michael Dillon, ‘Culture, Governance, and Global Biopolitics’, in ibid., p. 135. Dillon argues that defining development in such a way allows the Bank to become involved in political issues, which is actually forbidden by its charter.


58 It is now common practice for local staff of international or regional organisations and agencies to write reports, paid for by internationals, in which they construct arguments pressing for local objectives, perhaps influenced by their contacts with local politicians and officials. Local employees’ status as employees of international actors provides them with legitimacy to do so. For example, currently in Kosovo local staff working for the World Bank are providing policy advice and reports predicated on the requirement of Kosovan [Albanian] sovereignty in order to deal with the problems of unemployment and investment. Personal Interviews, World Bank, Pristina, March 2006.


64 See in particular, Oliver P. Richmond, ‘The Culture of Liberal Peacebuilding’ and other contributions on this matter in Roland Bleiker and Morgan Brigg, Mediating Across Difference: Asian/Approaches to Security and Conflict, Hawaii University Press, forthcoming 2008.


This observation rests on my work in a wide range of post-conflict and conflict environments over the last decade or so.


**Critical contributions to peace**


7 Jim George, op. cit., p. 149.


11 Ibid., p. 279.


13 Ibid., p. 131.


17 Ibid., p. 284.


19 Ibid., p. 281.
22 David Held, op. cit., p. 25.
28 Jim George, op. cit., p. 155.
29 Ibid., p. 156.
31 Ibid., p. 196.
33 Jim George, op. cit., p. 161.
37 See for example, E. Laclau, *Emancipation(s)*, Verso, 1996.
39 Ibid., pp. 6–9.
41 Jim George, op. cit., p. 182.
45 Andrew Linklater, *The Transformation of Political Community*, op. cit.
48 Ibid., p. 286.
Notes

53 Ibid., p. 75.
55 David Held, op. cit., pp. 94–113.
56 Ibid., p. 136.
57 Ibid., p. 162.
64 Ibid., p. 319.
66 Ibid., p. 122.
70 Jim George, op. cit., p. 223.
71 Ibid., p. 223.

7 Post-structuralist contributions to peace
3 M. Foucault, op. cit., p. 63.
Notes


15 Imre Lakaros and Paul Feyerabend, op. cit., p. 295.

16 Jim George, op. cit., p. 31.

17 Ibid., p. 32.

18 Ibid., p. 191.

19 Jacques Derrida, op. cit.

20 Jim George, op. cit., p. 196.


28 John Vasquez, op. cit., p. 224.


30 Ibid., p. 50.

31 Ibid., p. 50.

32 Ibid., p. 92.

33 Jim George, op. cit., p. 201.


36 For a fascinating exposition of this insight into abstraction see Christine Sylvester,


43 R.B.J. Walker, op. cit.


45 Roland Bleiker, ‘The Aesthetic Turn in International Political Theory’, *Millennium*, Vol. 30, No. 2, p. 510; Roland Bleiker, ‘Forget IR Theory’, op. cit. Indeed Bleiker points out that increasing interest in this area in IR means there has been an ‘aesthetic turn’.


48 Ibid., p. 7.


54 Rajeev Patel and Philip McMichael, op. cit., p. 235.

55 Cited in ibid., p. 239.


57 Ibid., p. 261.

58 Ibid., p. 208.


60 Ibid., p. xv.

61 In discussing the contribution of gender here, I am mindful of Christine Sylvester’s comment that it has become fashionable to mention gender as an afterthought by many (male) scholars writing on IR, but without really engaging with the enormity of its challenge to its orthodoxy. I fear I make the same error here and neither am I in a position to develop its contribution more fully. Christine Sylvester, *The Contributions of Feminist Theory*, in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski (eds), *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996, p. 257.


69 Cynthia Enloe, op. cit.

70 Christine Sylvester, ‘The Contributions of Feminist Theory’, op. cit., pp. 258–61. See in particular her research on women’s experiences of studying IR in a predominantly masculine environment.


76 For one such example, see Costas M. Constantinou, ‘Aporias of Identity and the “Cyprus Problem”’, draft paper for the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, April 2006. This paper shows how the Cyprus problem has been defined by conflicting ethno-nationalist Greek or Turkish notions of peace, defined in terms of sovereignty, at the expense of a hybrid identity that has long existed on the island.


**Conclusion**


2 Ibid., p. 115.
Notes


9 Ibid., p. 212.


13 See for example, the journal, *International Political Sociology*, edited by R.B.J. Walker and Didier Bigo.


16 Phillip Darby, op. cit., p. 7.


19 As Bleiker points out, this does not mean completely abandoning the realist, security focused mode of thinking, but it does involve contextualising it and seeing it as only one of many components of peace. Roland Bleiker, *Divided Korea: Towards a Culture of Reconciliation*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005, pp. 77–8.


23 Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller, op. cit., p. 49.

24 Ibid., p. 51.

25 Pierre Allan and Alexis Keller, op. cit., p. 91.


27 Ibid., p. 127.


However, there are notable exceptions, particularly amongst PhD students at institutions such as at the various centres at University of Bradford, University of Queensland, or University of Uppsalla (to name a but a few), who increasingly appear to favour in-depth local studies as part of their research, along with a group of scholars working in development, and peace and conflict studies who increasingly are moving away from, or had little association with, the formal discipline of IR. In particular, see the often ground-breaking work of anthropologist, Carolyn Nordstrom, particularly, *Shadows of War*, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.


Bibliography

Bibliography


Eramus, Desiderius, *Querela Pacis [Complaint of Peace]*, Chicago: Open Court, 1917 [1521].


Bibliography


Murphy, Craig N., ‘The Promise of Critical IR, Partially Kept’, in Nicholas Rengger and


Bibliography


Bibliography

Bibliography


Waltz, Kenneth, Man, the State and War, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.


Aaron, Raymond 37
Abbe de St Pierre 25
Adler, Emanuel 82
Afghanistan 13, 108, 149
Agamben, G. 141
Agenda for Peace 107, 108
anarchism 32
anarchy 40, 82
Angell, Norman 29, 32
anthropology 6
apartheid 63
appeasement 53
Aristotle 23
Ashley, Richard 51, 138
Augustine 45

balance of power 43, 44, 47
Balkans 105
Barnett, Michael 82
Bellamy, Alex 93
Bentham 23, 24, 26
Booth, Ken 132
Bourdieu, Pierre 115, 148
Bretton Woods system 35, 91
Britannica Republicae Synopsis 45
British Empire 45
Bull, Hedley 29, 47, 49, 75–6, 86
Burton, John 21, 35, 98, 99, 104
Buzan, Barry 41, 55, 74, 75, 76, 83

Cambodia 105
capitalism 58, 60, 61, 63, 68, 69, 87, 142
Carr, E.H. 40, 47, 74
Ceadal, Martin 37
Chamberlain, Neville 31
Clark, Ian 34
class 58, 59–63, 70, 71, 87
civil peace 37, 42, 71, 94, 103
civil society 31, 102, 111
civilisational conflict 52, 55
Cold War 34, 50, 52, 59, 62, 69, 74, 76, 79, 91
colonialism 63
communism 32, 58, 62, 63
communitarianism 78
conflict management 99–101
conflict resolution 101–4
Congo 100
Congress of Vienna 26, 37, 46
conservative thought 26
constitutional peace 37
constructivism 80–4; Adler, Emanuel 82–3; agency/structure 81; anarchism 8; Barnett, Michael 82–3; Buzan, Barry 83; communication 81; contribution of 80–1; Copenhagen School 83; critical theory 80; English School 80; Habermas 81; identity 81, 83; Kratochwil, Fred 83; language 83; liberal peace 84; and liberalism 81; Onuf, Nicholas 84; peace 81–2, 83, 84; and post-modernism 81; security communities 83; states 81–2, 84; Waever, Ole 81, 83; Wendt, Alexander 80–2
cosmopolitanism 25, 30, 77, 79, 86, 104
Cox, Robert 51, 67, 85, 123, 128
critical security studies 131
critical theory 15, 38, 69, 70, 77, 80, 87, 121–33, 155; Cox, Robert 123, 128; discourse ethics 123, 126, 129; emancipation 131; Frankfurt School 122, 126; Habermas, Jurgen 126–9; Held, David 130; and liberalism 132; Linklater, Andrew 123–4, 128–9; and peace 131; third debate 123
Cuba 66
Cyprus conflict 100
Index 215

democratic peace 2, 11, 37, 50, 53, 86, 90, 92, 97, 103, 117, 161
dependency theory 64–5; peace 65
Derrida, Jacques 137
development 64, 66, 89, 102, 141
differend 6
disarmament 32
discourse 5, 145–8
Doyle, Michael 43, 90–1
Duffield, Mark 80
El Salvador 105
emancipation 67, 68, 69–70, 72, 73, 74, 84, 85, 98, 109, 115, 122, 123–31, 129, 131, 132
embedded liberalism 35, 51, 79
Engels 60
English School 74–7, 80, 91; constructivism 80; cores of 76; Hedley Bull 75–6; human rights 75–7; humanitarian intervention 79; international society 74–7; normative approaches 78, 79; and realism 74; UN 76; Vincent, John 76
environmentalism 87–9; ecocentrism 89; ethics of 88; and liberalism 88; neoliberalism 88; NGOs 89; and post-positivism 89; and realism 88; security 88; and structuralism 88
Erasmus 20–1
ethics 88
European Peace Project 22, 24–6, 85
European Union 38, 85
fascism 32
federation 24, 25, 32
Feyerabend, Paul 135, 137
first great debate 21, 22, 40, 41–8, 56; and Marxism 59; and peace 22
First World War 29, 31, 32
Foucault, Michel 67, 134, 135, 136; discourse 5, 136
Frankfurt School 70, 122, 126
Freudian death instinct 2
Fukuyama, Francis 87, 91, 95
functionalism 85
Galtung, Johann 11, 34, 35, 64, 66, 99
Gandhi, Mahatma 32
gender 143–5
Geneva conventions 28
George, Jim 51
Giddens, Anthony 81
global civil society 87
global governance 142
globalisation 84–7
governance 110, 121
Gramsci, Antonio 67, 85, 122, 127
grassroots actors 69
Greece 27
Grotius 26, 27, 51
Haas and Deutsch 85
Habermas, Jurgen 70, 81, 89, 126–7
Hague Peace Conferences 28, 34
Hardt and Negri 142–3
Hegel 31, 45, 59–60; peace and war 45
hegemony 58, 64, 80, 91
Held, David 86, 130
Herder 26
Hinsley, F.H. 37
High Level Panel Report 108
Hitler 47
Hobbes 2, 26, 40, 41–2, 43, 46, 56; commonwealth 41–2, 44; education 44; Leviathan 2, 40, 41, 44; and peace 42, 44; state of nature 44; and war 44
Holsti, K.J. 79
human nature 42, 52, 56
human needs 35
human rights 23, 29, 37, 75–7, 92
human security 79, 104, 112–13, 131; NGOs 112, 113
humanitarian intervention 79, 93
humanitarian law 28
Huntingdon, Samuel 95
ICRC 28
idealist 14, 21–3, 21–30, 37–8, 47, 74, 80, 91
identity 81
imperialism 29, 42, 45, 70
institutions 34, 37, 80
interdependence 36, 51
International Commission on State Sovereignty 93
international community 75
International Criminal Court 86
international financial institutions 107
international humanitarian law 28, 37
international institutions 79–80
international law 23
international political economy 51, 84–7, 88; and peace 84
international relations theory 3, 9, 69, 97, 150, 153; agenda for peace 12; constructivism 80–4; critical international theory 1, 109, 121–33;
Index

international relations theory continued
debate on peace 3, 4, 8, 13; English
School 74–7; everyday life 6, 141, 149;
gender 125; inter-discipline 5; inter-
paradigm debate 36; liberalism 74;
mainstream IR 1, 3, 4; Marxism 59–64,
68; normative approaches 78; orthodoxy
68, 69, 73, 74, 80, 84, 88, 93, 98, 121,
139, 140–1, 144, 149, 150, 161; peace
83, 140; post-structuralism 134–48;
realism 4, 36, 40–57; state-centricity 69;
structuralism 58–72; third debate 68, 69;
war 4; World Society 97
international society 49, 74–7
Iraq 13, 31, 108, 149, 150
Jabri, Vivienne 133
Japan’s peace constitution 54
just war 26, 27, 74, 78, 93
Kaldor, Mary 86
Kant 23, 30, 33, 37, 39, 45, 61, 78, 84,
89–90, 94; law of peoples 25; perpetual
peace 14, 24–5; world government 25
Kennan, George 50
Keohane 73, 80, 91
Keohane and Nye 36, 51, 79
Keynes, J.M. 90
Krasner 85
Kratochwil, Fred 83
Kosovo 76
Latin America 64
League of Nations 14, 21, 28, 29, 31
Lenin 60, 61, 62, 63; imperialism 61
Leviathan 40, 41, 42, 46
liberal approaches 22, 23
liberal governance 25
liberal imperialism 134
liberal institutionalism 14
liberal internationalism 14, 93
liberal international community 27
liberal peace 4, 5, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 27,
32–9, 51, 55, 74, 78, 86, 87, 89–96, 97,
99, 101, 103, 105, 106, 110, 114–17,
122, 127, 132, 138, 141, 149, 150, 152,
153, 159; civil society 105; components
of 7, 95; constructivism 84; counter-
discourses 110–11; crisis of 4; critique
of 114; English School 78;
epistemology 37, 78, 95; framework 74;
governance 107, 110; hegemony 17, 93;
human security 113; hybrid notion of
37; and idealism 21–30; imperialism 27,
38, 46; institutions 7, 91; neoliberalism
95, 107; ontology 114; and Orientalism
115; and pacifism 30–2; post-Cold War
95; social contract 94; state building 78;
structuralism 65–6; trade 86; trusteeship
76; universalism 38; UN peace
operations 105
liberal peacebuilding 104–9, 110–12,
115
liberal–realist axis/hybrid 13, 14, 55, 74,
78, 80, 82, 83, 87, 88, 89, 91, 93, 95,
101, 102–3, 116, 132, 137, 150, 157,
161
liberal states 24, 37, 79
liberalism 14, 23–6, 74, 85, 87, 88, 89–95,
132, 140; and constructivism 81; and
humanitarian intervention 78;
international institutions 79–80; and
Marxism 60; neoliberalism 50, 51, 87;
and realism 55; and structuralism 59,
68
Linklater, Andrew 123, 128
Locke 23, 24, 37, 46
Luxemburg, Rosa 60
Lyotard, Jean-Francois 135, 127
Machiavelli 40, 43, 44
Mahan 64
Marxism 14, 34, 38, 59–64, 66, 67, 70, 84,
142; capitalism 58–64; colonialism 63;
conflict 71; elites 62; emancipation 67,
69–70; empire 63; false consciousness
70; Frankfurt School 70; and history 60;
imperialism 70; and liberalism 60; peace
60, 61, 63; popular movements 62;
structural violence 72
Marxist–Leninism 62, 69
Mead, Margaret 34
methodology 5–7, 8
Middle East 100
Mill, John Stuart 23, 26, 94
Mittrany, David 21–2, 29, 34, 85
Morgenthau, Hans 40, 45, 47, 61
Mozambique 105
multilateralism 86
Namibia 105
nationalism 26–7, 28, 33, 64, 70; economic
28
Nazism 32
neoliberalism 64, 66, 85–6, 88, 91, 95,
111, 115, 141, 142
New International Economic Order 66
new wars 92
NGOs 89, 102, 104, 105, 112–13; and conflict resolution 102
Noel-Baker, Phillip 29
non-state actors 36
non-Western thought 92
normative approaches 78
nuclear deterrence 52, 53
Onuf, Nicholas 84
orientalism 142
Orwell, George 62
Ottoman Empire 27

pacifism 30–2, 53
peace 1, 2, 7, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, 63, 66, 81, 83, 87, 90–2, 95, 98, 100, 102, 103, 104, 109, 115, 121, 131, 135, 143, 145, 146–7, 149–65; art 2; binary definition 54; care 131; centrality to IR 4, 18; children 140; concepts of 7, 14–15; conflict resolution 104; constructivism 9, 11, 81, 84; cosmopolitanism 9, 36; critical approaches 9, 12, 14, 121–33, 134–49, 155; dependency 64, 65; development 66; differend 6; dividend 6, 149; English School 12, 74–7; environmentalism 89; ethnography of 2, 151; emancipatory peace 84, 85, 98, 109, 115, 122, 123–31, 129, 131, 132, 148, 153; environmentalism 87–9; epistemology of 5, 11, 23, 28, 49, 56, 67, 79, 81, 84, 85, 87, 89, 126, 131, 157; everyday peace 4, 109, 115, 125, 129, 141, 145, 151, 157, 161, 162; failure to achieve peace 11; gender 143–5; globalisation 86; governance 96, 109; Hegel 45; history of 7–8; hybrid form 38, 163; ideal form 10, 73; idealism 9, 10, 14; indigenous forms of 113, 162; IR 8; Kant 24–5; Kant and Lenin 61; liberal peace 10; liberal theory 11; Marxism 60; Marxism and peace 9, 11, 14, 61, 63; methodology 160; negative peace 79; ontology 5, 56, 87, 93, 103, 106, 115, 116, 145–8, 157, 158, 159; post-structuralism 10, 12, 14, 123, 134–48; problem of 2; realism 9, 10, 11, 14, 41, 42, 43–57; structuralism and peace 9, 59–72, 71; sustainable peace 5, 6, 14, 74, 89; universalism 73; via media 16, 153; and war 36
peace and conflict studies 97–117; Burton, John 98–9; civil peace 103, 104; civil society 102, 103; conflict management 99–101; conflict resolution 101–4; critical approaches 109–16; generations of 99; human needs 99, 101–2, 104; and IR theory 98–9; liberal peace 116; NGOs 102; peacebuilding 104–9; peacekeeping 100–1; structural violence 102, 103
peace research approaches 9, 35
peacebuilding 103, 104–17; governance 108; justice 108
peacebuilding consensus 105; governance 106, 109; liberal peace 105, 106; neoliberalism 108; welfare 111
peacekeeping 100–1
Penn 25
perpetual peace 14, 24–5
Picasso 62
pluralism 36
Polyani, Karl 142
positive peace 35, 37, 131
post-positivism 48, 56, 64, 69; move away from 77
post-colonialism 128, 142
post-postmodernism 80, 89
post-structural approaches 14, 69, 132, 133, 134–48; bare life 141; Bleiker, Roland 141; Bourdieu 148; critical social movements 147; deconstruction 137; Derrida, Jacques 137, 141; difference 147; the differend 135; discourses 136; ethics of 139; everyday life 141, 145; Feyerabend, Paul 135, 137; Foucault 135–6; gender 143–5; Hardt and Negri 142–3; hybridity 147, 148; and liberal peace 138, 140, 141; and liberal-realism 137, 142; logocentrism 139; Lyotard, Jean-Francois 135, 127; neoliberalism 141; ontology 144, 145–8; orientalism 142; and peace 138, 140, 146–7; post-colonialism 142; Sylvester, Christine 140, 141, 143; via media 147, 153; Walker, Robert 138–9, 141
rationalism 73
Rawls, John 79, 94
realism 14, 24, 25, 32, 35, 40–57, 67, 73; alliances 47; anxiety 40, 68, 74; balance of power 43, 44, 47; Bull, Hedley 47, 49; Carr, E.H. 47; classical 41–8; Cold War 50; domestic analogy 49; and environmentalism 88; epistemology 40; ethics 49; and Hobbes 41–2, 56;
realism continued
human nature 42, 43, 55; imperialism 45; and liberalism 55; and morality 47; Morgenthau 40, 45, 47, 48; national interest 43, 44, 54; neorealism 50–2, 85; Niebuhr, R. 48; ontology 43; order 42; peace 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 49, 52–7; and positivism 56; power 40, 47, 55; as science 47, 48–52; security dilemma 43; state 40; state of nature 40; structural constraints 50; and structuralism 68; tragedy of 41; victor’s peace 40, 43, 45, 57, 71, 73; Waltz, Kenneth 49, 50–2; Wolfers, A. 48
realist–idealist axis 7
regimes 51
responsibility to protect 93
revolution 66, 68
roots of conflict 36
Rosenau, James 36
Rosenberg, Justin 63
Rousseau 40, 43, 44
Rwanda 76

Said, Edward 142
security dilemma 43
Scholte, J. 86
Schumpeter, Joseph 89–91
second great debate 50
Second World War 31, 34, 35, 48
self-determination 26, 33; President Wilson 33
slavery 28
Smith, Adam 23
social contract 24, 41, 62, 94
social justice 4, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 70, 71
social moments 28–9, 147
Somalia 101
sovereignty 29, 75
Soviet Union 50, 62
Spinoza 23
Stalinism 62
states 84
structural violence 66, 72, 103
structuralism 59–72, 74, 85; agency 64, 69; civil peace 71; dependency theory 64–5; determinism 67; elites 67; emancipation 67, 68, 69–70, 72; grassroots actors 69; and liberalism 68, 70; and neoliberalism 85; peace 65–6, 67, 70–2; power 58, 67; and realism 68; and the state 66

Sylvester, Christine 140, 141, 143
Tacitus 40
third debate 68, 69, 123
Thucydides 40, 43
Tolstoy 32
transnationalism 36, 59, 60–1, 89
Treaty of Versailles 22, 32, 37
Treaty of Westphalia 46
Trotsky 61; uneven development 61
UN 14, 31, 33, 34–5, 76, 79, 86, 107; in Angola 161; in Bosnia 105; in DR Congo 105; in East Timor 105; in Kosovo 105; peace operations 105; peacebuilding 105; peacekeeping 100–1, 105
UN Charter 25, 34, 97
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 34, 86
Universal Peace Congress 28
universalism 44
via media 74, 147, 162
victor’s peace 32, 40, 43, 44, 47, 52, 57, 67, 75, 101, 108
Vietnam 31
Vincent, John 76
Waever, Ole 81, 83
Walker, Robert 56, 138–9, 147
Wallerstein, Immanuel 64–6; core/periphery 65
Waltz, Kenneth 49, 50–2
war memorials 2
war on terror 52, 149
Weberian approach 43, 47, 49, 52, 73
welfare 23, 111, 112
Wendt, Alexander 80–2
Westphalian International System 46
Westphalian sovereignty 43
Wheeler, Nicolas 76
Wight, Martin 1, 31, 40, 49
Wilson, US President 33, 91
World Bank 38, 85
World Society 35, 97
Wright, Quincy 33–4
Zimmern, Alfred 29