Herbert A. Simon is among the most eminent social scientists to emerge in the United States during the past sixty years. Simon earned his doctorate in political science in the 1930s at the University of Chicago. However, his research and publications have evolved over time to include organization theory, economics, computer science, psychology, and the philosophy of science. In recent decades he has received acclaim as a pioneer in the development of artificial intelligence, and one of his most important achievements has been the prestigious Nobel Prize in economics, which he was awarded in 1978.

While his works comprise a far-ranging intellectual voyage, there are specific core themes that incorporate aspects of his research experience in various fields of academia. These basic themes center around a particular type of organizational rationality and individual instrumental decision-making processes via his celebrated notions of "bounded rationality" and the criterion of "satisficing" as a mode of reasoning.

These themes provide the foundation for Simon's work on administrative rationality and behavior during the 1940s and 1950s. But analyses of these key issues are found throughout his writings and, as such, provide the impetus for his current reputation. As late as the early 1990s, as his autobiography documents, Simon characterizes his professional life as one involving a career-long search for the "Holy Grail of truth about decision-making."
This chapter critically examines the phenomenon of "rationality" as variously used by Simon in his writings. A particular concern, therefore, is to analyze critically the type(s) of human action presented by his perspective. Consequently, a central thrust of this analysis focuses on evaluating the ability of Simon's model to facilitate those aspects of human action needed for establishing authentic public organization. Before the public organization issue can be addressed, however, the specific types of rationality comprising Simon's administrative theory warrant closer inspection.

RATIONALITY OF THE ORGANIZATION

The concept of rationality occupies a place of central importance in Simon's literature. His use of the term rational varies depending on the level of his analysis. For example, on one level he uses rationality as concerned with the organization's rationality. But on a second, central level of analysis, Simon speaks of rationality in terms of individual behavior within the organization.

In the first context, it is important to understand Simon's perspective on rationality as an equivalent expression for "efficient" organization. More than three decades ago, Simon, along with co-authors Donald Smithburg and Victor Thompson, argued that in its broadest sense "efficiency" is "often used as a virtual synonym for rationality." While this definition of rationality as efficient operations is a prevalent conceptualization, Simon's writings do not foreclose consideration of other issues. For instance, in direct opposition to Luther Gulick, Simon rejects efficiency as the normative value of organization. Instead, Simon sees efficiency in terms of results, as a phenomenon assessable as a fact.

Interestingly, in contrast to both Simon and Gulick, Dwight Waldo notes that while objective and descriptive uses of efficiency have validity, such uses are possible only within a framework of consciously held value commitments. Indeed, Waldo states that "it should also be clear that 'effects' or 'results' is a normative conception." One of the enduring lessons of political theory is that practice follows theory, or actions follow values or priorities. Efficiency always serves someone or some specific goals, whether or not these higher goals are articulated or unarticulated, according to Waldo.

Over the past several years, other scholars in such diverse areas as organizational development, critical theory, public choice, and so on generally follow the thinking put forth by Waldo, Robert Dahl, and others. It is not that there is too much emphasis nor a lack of emphasis placed on efficiency in organization. Rather, efficiency must share consideration with other concerns. At the same time, Robert Golembiewski, among others, sees other equally important facets, such as moral organization, as thus requiring moving beyond efficiency.

AUTHORITY, BOUNDED RATIONALITY, AND MEANS-ENDS ANALYSIS

In addition to the organizational rationality, there are other key dimensions to Simon's model. These include: (1) understanding how the structure of authority in organization influences or is influenced by decisions of individuals; (2) examining how administrative rationality qualifies as a limited or bounded rationality; and (3) investigating how administrative rationality of individuals is grounded in means-ends cognitive reasoning processes.
Individual Decisions and Organizational Authority

In the analysis of any type of political or organizational theory, traditionally central consideration is given to the role of authority within (as well as external to) the organization. Simon sees the "exercise of authority in organization" as taking place under conditions where an individual "allows his decisions to be guided by decision premises provided him by some other person."9 Furthermore, according to his logic of organizational rationality (i.e., efficient operations), this authority is plainly that of organizational (or administrative) management.

In other words, it is not the free-will volition of individual members that directly influences their own decisions. Instead, behavior is deliberately molded by management. For example, the goal identification of an employee is a product of the individual's location within the organization because being an organizational member "alters an individual's behavior by altering the factual premises that underlie his or her choices and decisions."10 Employees are thus expected to orient their behavior toward those goals that are organizational objectives. As Simon put it, "a decision is 'organizationally' rational if it is oriented to the organization's goals."11 But this creates a psychological environment where members must adapt to managerial goals (irrespective of their own idiosyncratic needs or choices).12 So Simon's rational individual is clearly an institutionalized and organized person.13

Limited, Bounded Rationality and Satisficing

Simon further argues that organizational members engage in rational behavior only to the extent that the consequences of action can be predicted and evaluated.14 In *Models of Man*, he describes economic man as one who is basically grounded in global rationality. This economic man has relevant knowledge of his environment, has a well-organized and stable system of preferences, and can calculate for alternative courses of action. Global rationality simply permits economic man to optimize his preference.

By contrast, administrative or organizational man is also calculatively rational but only in a "limited" context. Simon's theory of intended and bounded rationality is the model of human behavior of those who *satisfice* because they lack the wits to *maximize*.15 By satisficing, Simon's organized individual "looks for a course of action that is satisfactory or good enough."16 Moreover, satisficing decisions are not restricted to individual employees but also include management.17

Means-Ends, Instrumental, or Calculative Rationality

Whether attention is directed to limited rationality or global rationality, both forms are fundamentally cognitive rationality processes. Both are, in short, characteristic of a purposive, instrumental, or calculative form of reasoning. This form of reasoning has been thoroughly and lucidly analyzed by Max Weber and others since the turn of the century. Later sections critically assess instrumental rationality's prospects for achieving the moral-political reason needed for authentic public enterprises. At present, the task is briefly to outline instrumental, means-ends rationality.

In the first place, means-ends forms of analyses and problem solving are purely cognitive processes where thought is assumed to precede man's social experience. That is, it is a calculative process of the personal mind whereby the individual "matches" one of several "means" to a "given end(s)" as specified by management. This means-ends thinking, as Simon reiterates, "is a key component of human problem solving skill."18 Moreover, in *Administrative Behavior* he points out that the ends of individuals are merely instrumental to more ultimate goals. Thus rationality "has to do with the construction of means-ends chains of this kind."19 Therefore, according to Simon, means-ends rationality is essential to administrative choice.

THE RATIONAL MODEL AS A PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONAL PERSPECTIVE

Herbert Simon's organizational approach has sometimes been designated as a generic model of organization, that is, a model with corporate or government sector applicability.

This section critically evaluates Simon's approach to organization in terms of the criteria he provides (or fails to provide) to promote
public action — action necessary for viable public organization. This includes investigating: (1) the fundamental concern of Simon's model; (2) his theory's cognitive forms of means-ends rationality; and (3) the basic authority foundation in his perspective.

By examining each of these three considerations, Simon's rational model is elucidated as serving as an obstacle, rather than as a facilitator, to everyday democratic interaction among participants. Simultaneously, his model is explicated as impeding the type of actions necessary to designate the workplace genuinely as a public environment.

**Basic Concern of Simon's Rational Model**

Earlier it was noted that Simon asserts that "efficiency is what is meant by 'good' administration." He has also stated that "efficiency must be the guiding criterion" of organization. Moreover, this efficiency was previously elucidated as resting in the rationality of organizational or administrative management. In other words, this is an efficiency that is extended to each organizational member insofar as each member responds to the administrative management's stimulus. Therefore, in a very crucial sense, the basic concern for efficient operations serves substantively to establish perimeters for the types of politics that will take place in the daily work environment.

While Simon's organizational perspective does not explicitly adhere to the old orthodox/neo-orthodox "politics/administration dichotomy" of Woodrow Wilson, Luther Gulick, and others, his focus and preoccupation with efficiency as a guiding criterion of organization serve practically to eliminate moral-political reasoning and consideration of other values. In short, Simon does not explicitly advocate the old politics/administration dichotomy. At the same time, his articulated theoretical priorities separate (by exclusion) political matters from administrative concerns in organization. In short, administrators as identified political actors in organization are omitted in Simon's model. As with Gulick's theory, Simon sees organization very fundamentally as almost exclusively an administrative province. While Simon is quite knowledgeable about the influences of Paul Appleby, Harold Lasswell, and others on the issue of discretion, choice, and politics in all human affairs, Simon's idea of choice is evidently a realm limited to administrative management. That is, his focus on decision choices, in the absence of other articulation, takes place outside the processes of democratic interaction and is not treated as a democratic political criterion.

What occurs, therefore, with the supremacy of rationality is the relegation of other concerns (such as democracy, justice, and equality) to secondary status. Other criteria do not and cannot compete where the priority of efficiency as rationality predominates among humans. Long ago Robert Dahl pointed out that efficiency is not a neutral criterion. Furthermore, where it assumes dominance, it no longer competes against concerns such as individual responsibility or democratic morality.

**INDIVIDUAL COGNITION IN MEANS-ENDS RATIONALITY**

The use of means-ends analysis in problem solving is, according to Simon, essential to administrative choice. However, the emphasis on the means-ends model of rationality conceals a more universal form of reason. We have seen how instrumental rationality operates to maximize organizational efficiency via individual satisficing. But instrumental rationality simultaneously operates to attribute a "thing" status to the organization. Also, as applied to individual members themselves, instrumental rationality (e.g., means-ends thinking processes) imputes mechanistic properties to employees as "functionaries." This mechanistic dimension is indicative of the process of reification. This issue follows Luther Gulick's theory of organization's
process of homogeneity as reified activity as put forth in Chapter 1.

Simon's purposive means-ends analysis is thus a restricted view of rationality. It is limited as the scope of reason is reduced simply to cognitive calculation. It is also further limited as it is confined to determining procedures for achieving the primary organizational goal -- efficiency. At the same time, in critically assessing this mode of rationality, "issues such as whether a particular goal reflects the need, the morality, the expressed intentions, the subjective desires of various participants, or are reasonable have little consequence." These situations take place as the organizational instrument is consciously designed and "managed" so "as to structure abstract, purposive rationality into the behavior of its members."27

Where instrumental rationality dominates, as in bureaucratic structures, the more traditional and universal understanding of reason is obfuscated, if not concealed outright. What instrumental rationality specifically conceals is the understanding of rationality "as a force not only in the individual mind but also in the objective world."28 The focus of universal reason is not on mechanically matching behavior and purpose. Rather it centers upon the problem of human destiny and on realizing ultimate goals.29

Instrumental rationality does indeed provide problem solving and choice to certain "means" to given managerial-designated "ends." On the other hand, deliberative choices based in human reflection on broad policy issues are restricted for employees in Simon's perspective. In particular, means-ends rationality lacks the evaluative component inherently found in traditional reason.

The rationality of Simon's model can also be described from another vantage point. The rational human, in Simon's perspective, employs a calculative rationality in which means and ends are explicable, but not the ends themselves. This is so because, in the administrative model of organization, "ends" are a province of management. Obviously, therefore, employees have no prerogatives in the formulation of these "ends." This holds not only for policy but also for tasks, positions, or functions of the organization. Reasoning is thus reified. That is, while universal reason involves meaning in multiple dimensions, means-ends rationality reduces reason to simply a "mental process of the personal mind and it is further limited to calculating relationships between means and ends." In a word, "reflection on and consideration of various moral/political criteria are absent."30 This creates a dilemma for individuals in everyday work life. Specifically, adopting this means-ends rationality in daily work situations contributes to the bureaucratization of work life. In becoming the everyday mode of reflection and activity, this rationality is the impetus for the process of the rationalization of existence that stems from the relationship between means and ends.

Indeed it was Max Weber who originally pointed out that what "was originally a means (to an otherwise valuable end) becomes an end unto itself, actions intended as means become independent rather than goal-oriented and precisely thereby lose their original 'meaning' or 'end', i.e., their goal-oriented rationality based on man and his needs."31 It is precisely this reversal of means and ends, that "marks all modern culture... its institutions and enterprises are rationalized in such a way that it is these structures, originally set up by man which now encompass and determine him like an iron-cage."32 Therefore, adhering to means-ends rationality (i.e., as the primary mode of personal analysis) encourages acceptance of what appears to be inevitable destiny, or a form of determinism. Consequently, the only meaningful action for employees within this universal bondage is merely to engage in self-responsibility. Under rationalization (or bureaucratization), this takes place as "understanding of freedom and meaning" is restricted to what is "relevant to the inner man."33 In other words, freedom and meaning are limited to personal cognition and subjectivity.

In sum, means-ends analysis does certainly promote self-responsibility. However, it does not permit awareness of how one's self and others are fundamentally social and political creatures. Furthermore, it does not facilitate understanding and subsequent political action for member participation in the organization. So the prospects for true public organizations are nil in the absence of processes for practical participation.

**Authority in Organizations**

Not only is Simon's employee "clearly an organized and institutionalized individual"34 but also an individual who "allows his decisions to be guided by the decision premises of others."35 On close examination, these "others" explicitly refer to management.
Sheldon Wolin has described how Simon's rational perspective "carries broader implications than merely the coordination of different operations for a prescribed end." Indeed, its objective "is to create a special environment which will induce the individual to make the best decision . . . a decision most helpful to the needs and ends of the organization." Wolin vividly elucidates how the authority structure in Simon's model poses barriers to democratic or public interaction. For example, the basis of authority in Simon's theory "can rightly be called Hobbesian." In Simon's writings, "the discussion of authority centers upon the ability to command subordinates." There are no concessions made to "elicit consent or agreement among the members." The "superior does not try to convince his underling. Rather, his purpose only is to obtain his acquiescence." Plainly "there is a nonsense quality about authority" and "its presence is felt whenever a subordinate accepts the decision of a superior" while simultaneously suspending his own critical faculties. Simon's no-sentimentalizing approach, Wolin points out, is without the need to create a sense of participation and belonging.

THE RATIONAL MODEL AND REIFIED EFFICIENCY

Herbert Simon's model of organization has been described as "rational" in the sense that it operates to maximize "efficiency." Nonetheless, Robert B. Denhardt says that Simon's use of "efficient," that is, "rational," does not mean that organization serves moral purposes or political ends. Instead, the use of "efficiency" by Simon as applicable to the organization more closely follows Luther Gulick's concept of efficiency, which was shown in the previous chapter to be a reified activity. Therefore, "organizational efficiency" in Simon's similarly reified context poses obstacles to human growth, democratic participation, and public action for organizational members in everyday work situations.

In a brief review of efficiency as ideology, two fundamental problems are posed by this reified activity. In the first place, it acts as a barrier to the political, social, and psychological development of humans in the workplace. Second, it acts as an interpersonal obstacle between people in daily organizational existence. Specifically, it serves as an obstacle in inhibiting democratic interaction and dialogue among the work force. In this context, reified efficiency effectively neutralizes prospects for more genuine "public" organizational existence. Since this type of activity constrains the range of choice among human participants, public organization is consequently blocked. As such, efficiency as reified activity places a limitation on human action by which both shared and individual problems can be responded to or alleviated in the work environment.

Thus Simon's "efficiency" as ideology (or reified activity) follows the concept of efficiency found in Gulick's theory of organization: efficiency at the level of organization refers to instrumental modalities that mystify social relations in human consciousness. It is activity, specifically, that is confined to the functional roles of humans in organization because it "limits work to the sheer exercise of abstract calculation and manipulation of means and ends appropriate to one's task in the organizational environment." Moreover, it has been pointed out that reified activity can be understood as the autonomization of a social activity, for instance, "efficiency" and subsequently treating people merely as impersonal objects. In a word, reified activity is activity detached from the intentionality of actors. So reified activities appear "as if such activities existed in and of themselves." In effect, this concept of efficiency reflects, but simultaneously distorts, the everyday work environment. It also directly serves as an ideology because it automatizes calculative conduct as the only prescribed manner of thought and action. Furthermore, and at the same time, it reinforces these modes as the taken-for-granted reality of organizational life. Thus consciousness toward other values or other modes of thinking and acting will appear utopian. As such, this results in reified efficiency's deceptive appearance as inevitability.

The work environment that results from this type of efficient activity creates a social structure whereby employees are induced to make decisions that are most helpful to the needs and goals of organizational management. Subsequently this creates alienation to members of the organization. Moreover, an alienated environment poses a serious problem to employees as it facilitates existential circumstances where both the organizational world and the self are perceived as atomistically closed and mutually exclusive.
POLITICS OF THE RATIONAL VS. PUBLIC ORGANIZATION

In a very important sense, Simon's model can also be critically evaluated in terms of the politics his perspective provides for everyday work situations. An effort to comprehend the nature of politics in Simon's model first entails understanding that organizational problems are considered an exclusive province of management. Second, it requires coming to terms with administrative theory as a covert political theory (i.e., politics in terms of allocating/distributing resources and values in Easton's context or Lasswell's: "who gets what, where, how, etc.").

Indeed, the whole notion of organization in Simon's works is understood as an artificially contrived entity. His thinking parallels that of Victor Thompson in envisioning organization as a "thing" or a technical instrument. For instance, following the work of Weber, Thompson points out that an organization is a "machinelike instrument or tool of external power." Thus it is an artificially contrived system of "rules and regulations" that "does not describe behavior, it prescribes it." Moreover, the purpose of this design instrument is to control member "units" designated as "functionaries."44

The origins of this view of organization are rooted in the political philosophy of the eighteenth-century French writer Saint-Simon. Saint-Simon said that organization was a new basis of power which permitted the exploitation of nature. He saw organization as a power over things through: (1) the rational arrangement of "functioning" parts; (2) the subordination of some tasks to others; and (3) the "direction of work by those who possess the relevant knowledge."45

Herbert Simon's works follow Saint-Simon in that human employees are basically perceived as abstract resources of the organization. Indeed, perspectives that follow such techniques in contemporary society are said to be characteristic of positivism. And Simon's organizational artifice rests squarely in positivism. For example, man is considered as an abstract category and is thus reified in two ways. First, "man is an abstract thing as an object of science to discover laws of human behavior" as in the "case of organization and administration." Second, man is a particular thing "as the object of that science applied to actual everyday situations."46

Therefore, Simon's administratively rational view fosters not only the reification of employees in daily work existence but also compartmentalizes and fragments individuals into units of the organization. As such, employees are provided a correct perimeter of choices (i.e., choices established by management). The rational model is very much a covert political theory. It is a model where only material needs of participants are legitimated since human labor is seen only as a means of human existence (i.e., a person's labor is nothing more than a means to material culture). It is, consequently, a theory that serves the politics of administration. In short, it serves the existing power structure of organization -- management.

This phenomenon occurs as preoccupation with instrumental modalities in making organizations "efficient" directs an individual's consciousness to the means of accomplishing managerial ends. So these technical means (i.e., roles, tasks, or functions) become ends unto themselves for employees.47 Moreover, perception of employees' own intentions is deflected and, as a secondary benefit to management, reinforces managerial control over employees. Additionally, concentration on management goals inhibits deliberation on the part of individuals as to how and by whom such goals are determined and whom they will ultimately benefit. Therefore, employees have limited choices because, in reified organization, the prospects for individual choice are transformed into prospects for regulation. In a very real sense, "choice" in the rational perspective results in compliance or simple obedience to superior authorities.

In this light, Simon's administrative rational theory of organization is clearly a political theory but equally it is not a democratic, public organizational theory because what is advanced as a neutral and objective approach conceals strong managerial preferences.

RECENT WORK IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION/PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

Where Simon's theory gives heavy attention to the internal, managerial considerations of organization, other scholars recently have increasingly recognized that there are other equally legitimate concerns in public administration or public management. Much of the recent literature focuses on the external interaction dimensions of government organization from perspectives informed by public management
and public policy. Among the recent work of this type are the writings of Bozeman, Rainey, Denhardt, Svara and others. Also of notable influence, over the past twenty to twenty-five years, are many writers on organizational theory who have distinguished themselves for explicitly advocating that government organizations be made more democratic and more public. Also, new perspectives in particular have arisen in the areas of phenomenology, public choice, organizational humanism/organizational development, and so on.

Many of the more recent public management publications follow in the tradition of Paul Appleby and others who recognize how government administrators are political actors par excellence in the organization and in the political system. Traditionally, in the scholarship of public administration, bureaucracies and bureaucrats are quite frequently designated as public in the analysis of the external segments of the populations served by the organization and in interaction with other political institutions such as Congress and the executive branch. On the other hand, some designate the internal aspects of bureaucracies as "public." Yet government bureaucracies are dubiously "public" in any meaningful way for employees of these organizations.

Everyday members of government bureaucracies continue to be viewed by government management in the same way that employees of corporate or nongovernmental organizations are perceived. Specifically, they are typically labeled and treated as employees (not citizens of the nation nor, more importantly, as citizens of the enterprise) who must remain ultimately subject to authority vested in undemocratic, anti-public hierarchical management.

Management legitimation, therefore, for government organization or for society at large, has problematic dimensions. According to William G. Scott, managerialism is itself "in a period of moral, psychological and economic disjunction." Along with David K. Hart, Scott has illuminated how the philosophy of management itself poses major obstacles to authentic public organization. They point out that management means control and techniques of human control are derived from specific values which shape and legitimate them. Therein lies a monumental problem, because when techniques of management are continuously and uncritically adapted, government is taken over by the basic values upon which those management techniques rest. Furthermore, management values are often incompatible with each other, and "most of them are incongruent with American regime values."
ditional democratic usage. Wolfe, Lustig, Skowronek, and other contemporary political theorists have repeatedly demonstrated how the authority structures of American government organizations are thoroughly administrative bureaucracies. Also, these organizations have internal structures that are pervasively nonpublic and frequently just plain anti-democratic in any policymaking context for the organization's membership at large.

In order to envision prospects for more genuine public enterprise, it is critical to provide a more humane vs. a reified understanding of organization. Chester Bernard provided just such a human-grounded concept long ago in his definition of organization as "a system of consciously coordinated activities of two or more persons." This view is congruent with the public component of "communication" or "expression" of the general, common, or simply public good. Furthermore, and of more importance, the applicability of these components extends to the internal, not just the external relations, of human organization. Likewise these components are directly compatible with Aristotle's, Cicero's, and other classic formulations of the public realm.

Public concerns, according to both John Dewey and Jurgen Habermas, involve provision for the determination of the common good through mutual, open deliberations. This obviously includes participants or members within organization, that is, everyday employees beside management itself. It includes those in the organization and is not limited to those affected by the services or products of the organization. Public action based in public authority structure is consequently grounded in lateral rather than vertical, that is, hierarchical, relations among people. It is composed of citizens or those who "collaborate openly and publicly in the common union." Traditional in western political thought, a citizen is a participating policymaker with other like persons. He or she works for the establishment of the shared goals and aspirations of the common good. Thus not only is public action dependent on member participation, but it is also by participation that members contribute directly to the democratization of the organization. Orion White points out that "the question of how to achieve wisdom in public action is more of creating effective participation than it is of finding the proper scope of access for people to participate. What is crucial is the dynamic of how people relate as they address issues of public action."
opment of employees as policy participants. In the subfield of public administration commonly known as organizational development, this situation has occurred before. In the work of some scholars, the concept of psychosocial development, while marginally helping employees, serves in the long run as an effective management tool. It makes employees better employees per management needs in functions, roles, or specialization. It does indeed help individuals grow "on the job" psychologically and sociologically but not politically in any substantive context in organizational interaction.72

CONCLUSION

Herbert Simon's rational model has influenced both government and corporate bureaucracies over the years. However, his works have not in any way been concerned with or specifically contributed to a theory of public organization.

His criterion of efficiency or organizational rationality affects organization in two basic ways. First, rational decision making is ultimately concerned with that which makes for efficient operations of management goals. Second, on the level of the everyday employee, efficiency is restricted to cognitive means-ends processes of calculation used in limited or bounded rationality. In this sense, organizational members work for "satisfactory" (i.e., satisficing) solutions to problems faced in their functional work roles.

While Simon, like other administrative scholars, recognizes that there are many worthwhile, or even necessary, components to organization, the criterion of rationality or efficiency is made a priority of the organization. However, this relegates all other commitments or goals to a secondary status in both theory and practice. So Simon's efficiency as rationality as the basic "good" of organization necessarily conflicts with other criteria. Another way of expressing this is that Simon's basic "good" renders other considerations as "bad" or, at least in practice, they become less of a real concern than his priority criterion. Therefore, it is small wonder that concerns like "democracy," "common or public action," "ethics," and other criteria assume secondary importance, if they possess any real importance at all in such an organizational perspective.

An equally troublesome dimension of Simon's model is the cogni-
tive means-ends rationality that directly fosters the rationalization of existence as originally described by Weber. Its basic flaw is that it leads to preoccupation with the self and the subsequent loss of employees' own understanding of their sociality. Likewise, Simon's perspective encourages the ideology of efficiency, which creates interpersonal obstacles along with diminished prospects for democratic interaction.

Public organizations, internally and externally, require a priority on the theory and practice of public values. Certainly there is merit in other concerns or other techniques. However, a guiding ethic of organization must reside in democratic participation of the members of such an organization. It is these members who first and most directly are affected by the policies of an enterprise. Moreover, authentic public organization requires that political education be fostered and sustained among organizational members. Such education includes, but is not limited to, dereifying organization, demystifying universal reason and ideologies, promoting democratic morality, and legitimating "political" (not merely psychosocial) dimensions of growth among the work force.

A plausible starting point is the creation of a public action arena within organizations where members can address the questions of power, membership, obligation, and character of political action in democratic situations. A public organization necessitates a program of political education to encourage the process of participation or civic virtue continuously. Indeed, political education is necessary for the mutual discussion and shared determination found in any authentic public environment based in democratic participatory citizenship. In sum, public organization must recognize a very important component pointed out by R. Jeffrey Lustig. This involves distinguishing between government and more public type of entities. Specifically, this includes recognition of how democracy is in no way simply limited to institutions of government or the bureaucratic state.73

NOTES

2. Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A.