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THE PIETY OF THE HADITH FOLK

One of the most remarkable surveys of Islamic history and civilization remains Marshall G. S. Hodgson’s *The Venture of Islam*, published posthumously in 1974. For an introductory text, it has some bad faults—namely, a very dense style. Moreover, it has inevitably fallen out of date at many points. For example, one may admire Hodgson for coming up with his own critique of modernization theory in volume 3, but modernization theory has fallen so completely before other critiques that we hardly need Hodgson any longer. However, Hodgson has had some permanent effects on the way scholars approach Islamic history. For example, we may not have adopted many of his neologisms, but he certainly has made us self-conscious when we use the traditional terminology. The mere mention of “Jama'i-Sunni,” “Islamicate,” “Arabist bias,” and other special terms immediately alerts us to the dangers of some customary approaches to Islamic history.

One of Hodgson’s most notable challenges was to the traditional periodization. Instead of dividing Islamic history according to Sunni dogmatic preferences—mainly, the Rightly Guided Caliphs (to 661), then the Umayyads, excluding ‘Uthman (to 750), then the Abbasids (to 1258)—Hodgson proposed a primitive period running up to the advent of the Marwanids (685), then a classical period running up to the advent of the Buyids (945), then a high middle period to the Mongol conquest. One of the main objects of this essay is to identify more precisely the elements that went into the Sunni synthesis that crystallized in the early 10th century—in particular, competing forms of piety.

Piety was important to Hodgson, for part of his enterprise was to show why it was fair to call a civilization “Islamic” (hence his subtitle, “Conscience and History in a World Civilization”). As a Quaker, he assumed that Muslims also had their inner lights, which must be taken seriously. His description of what he calls the “Shari’ah-minded” is unsurpassed as an account of one party’s basic worldview. These were the Muslims who elaborated and transmitted the revealed law and thought that the law, more than custom, good taste, personal experience, or anything else, should mold the lives of the faithful. Yet clearly Hodgson’s own sympathies lay mainly with Sufi mystics, whom he treats at much greater length. Accordingly, further sympathetic attention to the “Shari’ah-minded” seems in order, especially in the formative 9th
century. Can we be more precise about who constituted the “Shari’ah-minded?” Can we say more precisely how their piety differed from other forms on offer, particularly Sufism and *adab* (narrowly, polite letters; more broadly, the culture of courtiers)?

The theological map of the 9th century has been sketched in some detail now. The important new attention has also been paid to the evolution of Islamic law in that century. The Sufis and their precursors have been the subject of much work, too, although any widely accepted historical overview of the early period apparently is still lacking. Yet one of the century’s most influential juridical-theological movements has scarcely been studied at all from the side of piety, mainly what Hodgson called the “Hadith folk.” Hodgson’s “Shari’ah-minded” comprised the “host of pious men and women who came to be called the ulama, the ‘learned,’” gradually professionalized from the 8th century to the 10th or later, and certainly cut across multiple theological lines. It is much easier to study the hadith folk than the “Shari’ah-minded,” for they were a self-conscious party, precisely identifiable, with distinctive programs in theology, law, and devotion.

Hodgson proposed “Hadith folk” as a substitute for the older “traditionalists,” and I use it here in tribute to him. “Hadith” plainly indicates what they recognized as the chief source of religious authority alongside the Qur’an. “Hadith folk” avoids the suggestion of “traditionalist” that their program was older than the programs of their adversaries, which is doubtful. I will nevertheless continue to use “traditionalist” because “hadith folk” does not have convenient singular and adjectival forms (although Hodgson tried “Hadithi”). The Baghdadi hadith folk have sometimes appeared in modern scholarship as “Hanbalis,” but I prefer to avoid that term in discussing the movement before the formation of a specific school of law in the next century.

The 9th-century hadith folk’s own preferred term for themselves was *ahl al-sunna*. It is not convenient for us to call the hadith folk “Sunnis” because that term now calls to mind the great tripartite division of Sunnis, Shi’is, and Kharjijis. At least for the 9th century and earlier, a mere tripartite division is simplistic and practically impossible to document. To begin with, 9th-century definitions of Shi’ism were considerably different from those of later times; for example, traditionalist *rijal* critics regularly distinguished between *tashayyu’*, a special regard for ‘Ali and his house that the hadith folk were willing to overlook, and *rafid*, the rejection of Abu Bakr and ’Umar that they thought put one outside the Muslim community. With equal emphasis, the 9th-century hadith folk distinguished themselves from Qadariyya, Murji‘a, Mu’tazila, and other theological parties not accounted for by a simple, anachronistic dichotomy between Sunnis and Shi‘is. The polarity of Sunni and Shi‘i was not strong until the mid-10th century, and full Sunni mutual recognition and self-awareness appeared only in the 11th century. Finally, modern scholars should avoid endorsing the hadith folk’s own estimate that they were the overwhelming majority, as calling them “Sunnis” might do. The significance of their calling themselves *ahl al-sunna* is not that their views were identical to those of the later, great Sunni community, which they were not, but that the later community deliberately identified them as its forebears. We need to understand their piety.

Their adversaries preferred not to call them *ahl al-sunna* and proposed various other terms. Al-Jahiz disparaged the *nābīta*, those who sprouted up like weeds to extol the enemies of ‘Ali and to promulgate such crass ideas as assigning God an
imaginable body (tajṣīm, tašwīr). Other writers attributed similar errors to the hash-wiyya (vulgar). The hadith folk complained that the Murji`a called them shu kullāk (doubters) for saying, “I am a believer, God willing,” while the Qadariyya called them mujbira or jabriyya for upholding divine predestination. To use any of these terms for the hadith folk would mean taking sides as much as it would mean calling them ahl al-sunna, which is needless for modern scholars.

There were hadith folk in all the great centers of Islam. The traditionalist leader of Nishapur wrote to traditionalist leaders in Ray and Baghdad to warn them against Dawud al-Zahiri, who alleged that the Qur`an was muhdath (i.e., there had been a time that the Qur`an was not). Hadith folk in Baghdad warned those of Nishapur against the famous traditionalist Bukhari, whom they then drove from the city for suggesting one’s pronunciation of the Qur`an was created. But the center about which we are best informed is certainly Baghdad, where the hadith folk looked above all to Ahmad ibn Hanbal as their imam. The material for this study will come mainly from Baghdad in the late 9th century. For the piety of the hadith folk, it will often draw on quotations of Ahmad himself. It is difficult to say how precisely these quotations record Ahmad’s own views. A cursory reading of a book such as Kitāb al-Wara` (‘the book of carefulness,’ meaning care to avoid everything possibly illicit) shows that it was assembled by others, even if Ahmad’s name is on the title page. As products of a school rather than of an individual author, however, such books are all the more useful in characterizing the piety of a school. Indeed, it arguably would be more difficult to characterize the piety of Ahmad himself than that of the party around him.

Two salient features of traditionalist piety were unremitting seriousness and an overwhelmingly moralistic conception of the Islamic community. Hostility to specialization (also, perhaps, to political involvement) distinguished traditionalists from Mu`tazili ascetics and early Sufis. Their unremitting seriousness and a certain intellectual austerity distinguished theirs from the asceticism (zuhd) popular in high literary circles. However, the different parties shared enough to undergird a united Sunni community in later centuries.

SERIOUSNESS

The first salient feature of the piety of the hadith folk I have alleged is unremitting seriousness. One example of this is refusing to laugh. This was fairly common among ascetics of the late 8th century. Al-Fudayl ibn Iyad (d. 803) discouraged laughing and was never seen laughing by an associate of thirty years. The Antiochian Yusuf ibn Asbat (d. 810–11) did not laugh for thirty years or jest (yamzahu) for forty. The famous Syrian ascetic Abu Sulayman al-Darani (d. 830–31) advised, “The laughter of the knower (‘ārif) is smiling.” This was also common in later traditionalist circles. Bishr al-Hafi (d. 841) is often loosely associated with Ahmad ibn Hanbal. He is said to have warned a laugher he would not die in such a state. Isma`il ibn ‘Ulayya (d. 809?) was angry with his disciples for laughing when Ahmad was in his circle. ‘Abd al-Wahhab (d. 865?) was the ascetic whom Ahmad is said to have named his successor. His son related that he had never seen him laughing—only smiling. When he once came across his son laughing with his mother, he asked, “Does a master of the Qur`an laugh in this manner?” Muhammad ibn Dawud al-Qantari (d. 871–72) and
al-'Abbas al-Turqufi (d. 881?) were two other Baghdadi traditionists who were never seen laughing or smiling. It is probably a measure of how traditionalist were some, at least, of the 9th-century Shi'is that the Kufan traditionist 'Ubayd Allah ibn Musa al-'Absi (d. 829) was never seen laughing.

This is not to say that all hadith folk refused to laugh. Some did laugh, and all related hadith reports by which the Prophet would laugh until his molars showed (although usually with the gloss that his laughing was really smiling). If all had refused to laugh, those who refused to would not have been noteworthy. However, it does show that refusal to laugh was admired, while it is rare for the biography of a traditionalist to observe that he liked to joke and laugh.

The point of not laughing was mainly, I think, that one should restrict one's attention to solemn, religious matters. Remembered William James's definition of "divine" as "such a primal reality as the individual feels impelled to respond to solemnly and gravely, and neither by a curse nor a jest." Jurisprudents of all tendencies debated whether laughter during one's ritual ablutions or prayer would invalidate them. These traditionalists simply extended the ban on laughter to the rest of everyday living. Hodgson speaks of "devotion to the One expressed in the Qur'an, and to its moral demands," which nothing should be allowed to weaken.

Single-minded devotion manifested itself in many ways—for example, in traditionists' hostility to chess. Ahmad's close follower Abu Bakr al-Marrudhi (d. 888) related the hadith report from the Prophet, "He who plays chess is accursed, and whoever watches them is like the eater of pork." Other hadith reports had the Prophet calling on God to curse whoever played chess or reporting that God already had cursed them. What did they have against chess? Jurisprudents commonly objected that chess might be the subject of betting. Some Kufan traditionists considered chess to be involved with Magianism. The qadi Abu Yusuf (d. 798) was said to have disallowed the testimony of one who had bet on chess or let it distract him from his prayers. (Hanafiyya such as Abu Yusuf were not hadith folk, of course, and stories of their piety show mixed attraction and repulsion. Take, for example, two accounts from 11th-century sources. According to the first account, Abu Hanifa was never seen laughing, merely smiling; according to the second, Abu Hanifa used to joke a great deal. Gambling was forbidden, but fear that the chess player would forget his prayers agrees with hostility to other diversions, such as playing musical instruments.

**The Moralistic Community**

Another salient feature of the piety of the hadith folk was to conceive the community of Muslims moralistically. Many observers have been struck by the importance to Muslims of the community. Hodgson describes membership in the community of Muslims as moving one to a special plane: "Only in that community was there truth and validity; but whoever shared in its allegiance was by that fact not only socially but cosmically on a plane above those who refused allegiance, on a plane where the only true difference among the faithful was in degree of piety." W. Montgomery Watt asserts, indeed, that Muslims have characteristically felt that their membership in the community is what saves them, so that the point of the holy law ultimately has been not so much to govern every detail of life as to mark out the community that saves.
Evidence of concern for the larger community comes out in, for example, the way traditionalist victims of the Inquisition of 833–52 explained their resistance. Ahmad said he had held out because someone had to. Bakkar ibn al-Hasan (d. 852–53?), almost expelled from Isfahan for refusing to admit the Qur'an created, held out for the same reason. So did Shafi'i's follower, the Egyptian Buwayti (d. 846?), who suffered imprisonment and death in Iraq. One cannot say that Ahmad or any contemporary ever expressly declared that salvation came by membership in the community, or that the primary significance of the law was to mark out the Islamic community. Yet Ahmad did insist that sins (violations of the law) do not put one outside the community, only wrong beliefs (rejecting the Qur'an and hadith, in Watt's terms the markers of the community).

Watt traces back the importance of the community to the Arab experience of tribalism. Hodgson allows that the needs of the early Islamic militia decisively informed the developing shari'a, alongside the needs of cosmopolitan merchants. However, one now recognizes the preponderant influence of the urban setting in which classical Islamic culture evolved and doubts whether it was crucially influenced by memories of life in the desert. The hadith folk in particular were no Rechabites. Ahmad himself rejected the nomadic life; for example, he recommended that one live in the city except when there was civil strife. Watt's formula of the charismatic community does little, in any case, to characterize the Islamic community. For example, it does not predict the famous qualified communalism of Islamic ritual prayer: all face in the same direction, make the same gestures, and say the same words, with none standing for his fellows as a Christian priest would stand for the congregation, nor with any mystical joining of those at prayer, but only a salutation at the end.

The community as conceived by the hadith folk seems to have flowed mainly not from the exigencies of life in the desert but from a stress on obedience to a transcendent God as opposed to communion with an immanent God—that is, in Max Weber's terms of ideal types, an ascetic (moralistic) orientation rather than a mystical one. For example, it has most of the earmarks of a contractual community, whose membership is voluntary and within which there is substantial equality. Voluntary membership and equality flow from a stress on morality, which continually makes the individual choose to do one thing and not another; it also tends to demand the same choices from all individuals. By contrast, mystics tend toward an organic conception of community, accepting hierarchy and specialization, for some will be found closer to God than others. Perhaps, to give Hodgson his due, it was indeed the exigencies of commercial life in cities that pushed the hadith folk in the direction of morality rather than mysticism—and he does speak of "the Shari'ah-minded guardians of the single godly moralistic community." For example, it has most of the earmarks of a contractual community, whose membership is voluntary and within which there is substantial equality. Voluntary membership and equality flow from a stress on morality, which continually makes the individual choose to do one thing and not another; it also tends to demand the same choices from all individuals. By contrast, mystics tend toward an organic conception of community, accepting hierarchy and specialization, for some will be found closer to God than others. Perhaps, to give Hodgson his due, it was indeed the exigencies of commercial life in cities that pushed the hadith folk in the direction of morality rather than mysticism—and he does speak of "the Shari'ah-minded guardians of the single godly moralistic community."

The ascetical (moralistic) character of the hadith folk's conception of community comes out clearly in their reaction to tawakkul, the endeavor to live entirely by what came without one's seeking it. Ahmad said, "Tawakkul is good; however, a man must not be a charge on others. He should work, in order that he make himself and his family independent." Weber observes that the mystic depends on others' remaining in the world for him to leave it, provoking the ascetic's indignation. Weber was presumably thinking of early Protestant polemics against monasticism, but one could not find a clearer illustration than Ahmad's wariness of tawakkul. Likewise, indeed, the
examples of concern for the community quoted earlier from some who resisted at the Inquisition stress individual choice: it is not that the community must rise or fall as a body, but that Ahmad, Bakkar, and Buwayti were setting examples for other individuals to follow.

Concern about maintaining community can look like hostility to excellence. Hodgson says of the shari'a as it was elaborated in early 'Abbasi times:

Its heritage of respect for the cultural homogeneity of Medina and then of the Marwani Arabs now became a pressure for all Muslims to conform to a bourgeois pattern of life, a pattern necessarily adapted to the average man. Shar'i Islam required no "religious athletes" and discouraged any other special callings. The bold experimenter was required to show, at least externally, the face of mediocre propriety.50

Hence, although the hadith folk admired deliberate austerity, they characteristically disapproved of extremes. Barefootedness is a convenient example, as Maher Jarrar recently devoted a special study to it.51 Barefootedness connoted humility and was especially practiced in connection with collective pious enterprises such as seeking hadith and walking in funeral processions.52 Bishr al-Hafi's barefootedness at all times and in all places connoted humility before God at all times and in all places.53 But the hadith folk were mistrustful.54 A lesser expression of humility—probably the one I have encountered most frequently in the sources—is going on foot as opposed to riding. For example, Ahmad ibn Hanbal's five pilgrimages are counted separately: those he performed on foot and those he performed riding.55 Thus, in common with the extreme ascetics, the hadith folk admired humility but favored a less extreme form of it.

A major concern was evidently to keep ideal decorum within everyone's range. As Ahmad complained, having heard of someone's saying that worry about one's provision for the morrow would be counted a sin, "Who is so strong as this?"56 Against Hodgson, I tend to doubt whether the point was to preserve the cultural homogeneity of ideal Medina. How did they know it was homogeneous? More important, what made that feature so attractive to them? I would say the point was rather to respect the nature of moral demands. A moral demand is necessarily the same for everyone, in every place, at every time. For example, adultery is not sometimes forbidden and sometimes allowed but always forbidden; supporting one's family is not sometimes required and sometimes omissible but always required. If someone did something not everyone might do, such as never worrying about his provisions for the morrow, it was evidently not in response to a moral demand from God. It rather had the nature of a stunt: "look what I can do." As such, it necessarily appeared to the hadith folk as frivolity, a reprehensible distraction from the performance of universal religious duties. Ibn Kathir suggests as much in his explanation of Ahmad's and Abu Zur'a al-Razi's disapproval of Muhasibi and his fellow proto-Sufis: "their talk of austerity . . . and far-reaching, minute self-observation was something concerning which no command had come."57

More positively, one might see traditionalist hostility to special callings as concern about promoting well-roundedness. Someone told Ahmad that a man might work at Qur'anic recitation, frequent the mosque, or seek hadith, but not two of these at once. Ahmad said it was incumbent on him both to frequent the mosque and to seek hadith.58
It is something of a puzzle, then, why it was not easy to be expelled from the community as conceived by the hadith folk and why their community did not split into competing sects. These, too, are regular features of the religious community whose basis is moral, not mystical. To the moralist, unpunished adultery, for example, seems a standing insult to God, and the adulterer has removed himself from the community. The mystic, by contrast, tends to see past the individual’s adultery to, perhaps, the inner light. The easy answer must be that every piety has both ascetic (moralistic) and mystical elements. A mystical element of traditionalist piety is its refusal to expel people from the community for wrong actions, sins. More subtly, one might also say that the hadith folk managed to rank Muslims by the quality of their obedience (as Hodgson says, “the only true difference among the faithful was in degree of piety”), and so they managed to accept a degree of hierarchy by which it was not necessary to expel those who would not follow the rules, only to look condescendingly down on them. Finally, a combination of hierarchy with stress on individual obedience suggests that obedience to God, for the hadith folk, had a pronouncedly ritual character. The law was about following everywhere a revealed pattern. Such seems to be, indeed, the precise sense of shari‘a, although the word is as rare in the writings of 9th-century hadith folk as elsewhere. Traditionalist resentment of rationalistic theology would then have had to do with its threat to break loose from the received pattern; likewise, indeed, traditionalist suspicion of Sufism, and to a degree adab.

CONTRAST WITH SUFI PIETY

The value of sketching the piety of the hadith folk will be clear if it turns out, by contrast, to identify more precisely the piety of other parties. The ascetic tradition until the mid-9th century was mainly devoted to singlemindedness, and in this wise the piety of early ascetics was similar to that of contemporary and slightly later hadith folk. Yet strains were evident even before the emergence of classical Sufism under Junayd (d. 911?). The famous ascetic Bishr al-Hafi often appears in Hanbali works such as Kitab al-Wara‘ (eighteen entries there, against none for any other famous precursor to classical Sufism). However, Ahmad’s praise was qualified by criticism: “[i]f Bishr had married, his affair would have been perfect.” Massignon guesses that Ahmad’s conflict with Bishr was sharper than the biographers admit.

Ahmad’s relations with Muhasibi (d. 857-58) were much worse, and Muhasibi was forced to go into hiding. Ahmad was probably angered above all by Muhasibi’s involvement in kalām, where he was close to Ibn Kullab, however, Abu Zur’a al-Razi (d. 878) expressly repudiated Muhasibi’s ascetic works, as well. It was enough, he said, to take warning from the Qur’an and hadith. Not only was Ahmad hostile to crucially important precursors of the Sufis; he also rejected principal Sufi practices. He rejected roaming from place to place, worshiping: “Siyāha has nothing to do with Islam.” Someone told Ahmad of a group that met to pray, recite the Qur’an, and recollect God (yadhkurīna Allāh). Ahmad responded that it was enough to read from the (public) bound copy, to recollect God to oneself, and to seek hadith. Meeting in public for these purposes was an innovation to be condemned. On the whole, the Sufism of Junayd, with its regular meetings for the exchange of definitions, must have pleased him very little.
As for the two salient features of traditionalist piety pointed out earlier—seriousness and a contractual, moralistic conception of community—the hadith folk were at odds with the Sufis. As for seriousness, Junayd said, “I would rather be kept company by a good-natured debauchee than an ill-natured ascetic.”\(^{67}\) I do not recall reading about a Sufi who was never seen laughing or smiling. As for the contractual community, mystics tend toward an organic conception of community, accepting hierarchy and specialization. Junayd and his comrades clearly specialized to a greater degree than the hadith folk allowed. Although they still paid some attention to Qur’anic recitation and hadith, for example, they clearly devoted most of their time to other disciplines, and they sometimes expressly rejected the collection of hadith when it came into conflict with the demands of Sufi devotion.\(^{71}\) Junayd’s argument for mystics to respect less enlightened ascetics clearly demonstrates a hierarchical notion of the Islamic community.\(^{72}\)

However, it is clear that the classical Sufis were closer to the hadith folk than some of their predecessors had been. In particular, I think of Mu’tazili ascetics and the Karramiyya, who strongly disagreed with the hadith folk concerning kasb (gain). The Mu’tazila are most famous for their rationalistic theology, but they evidently began as an ascetic movement, the name signifying withdrawal from sinful society.\(^{73}\) They were only gradually distinguished from the general ascetic tradition in the late 8th century, scarcely any earlier than the hadith folk themselves were distinguished from the general religious movement.\(^{74}\) The term ṣuḥf was applied to Mu’tazili ascetics before it was to Junayd and his circle. Early Mu’tazili ascetics and the later Karramiyya, who more or less absorbed Mu’tazili asceticism, sometimes exalted complete renunciation of normal gain, counting it best to live off alms.\(^{75}\) The hadith folk, as noted, strongly urged that every man support himself (and his family). The Sufis around Junayd compliantly rejected outward tawakkul in favor of inward renunciation.\(^{76}\) Their position concerning tawakkul is then an example of the classical Sufis’ having moved halfway to appease the hadith folk. (The Karramiyya were locally opposed, in Nishapur, by the mystics whom Sulami calls the Malamatiyya. The latter naturally took a position similar to that of the Sufis in Baghdad, to whom they were assimilated by the second quarter of the 11th century.\(^{77}\) So far, affairs in Basra appear less clear-cut than in Nishapur; however, Sahl al-Tustari and the Salimiyya seem to have respected both classical tawakkul and working for a living.)

**CONTRAST WITH THE PIETY OF AHL AL-ADAB**

The piety of ahl al-adab, cultivators of belles-lettres, is another to be distinguished from that of the hadith folk. As a category, zuhd (asceticism in the sense of renunciation) was equally prominent in 9th-century books of adab and collections of hadith.\(^{78}\) Perhaps no single conception of community prevailed in adab. Singlemindedness and unrelieved seriousness do seem to distinguish the piety of the hadith folk from that of ahl al-adab. As for singlemindedness, it was a favorite principle of the hadith folk that a good Muslim should leave what did not concern him. A hadith report to this effect was named by Abu Dawud al-Sijistani (d. 889), the one of the Six closest to the hadith folk, among the four reports that suffice for a man’s religion.\(^{79}\) The hadith folk may have understood “what does not concern him” to mean primarily *kalam*
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Still, stories did circulate in Iraq implying that leaving what does not concern one applied to all idle curiosity. One man punished himself by fasting for a month after he had asked when a room had been constructed; that is, expressly, “asking about what does not concern you.” Another man privately blamed himself at extravagant length for having asked what someone was doing, then reproached the man for napping; that is, expressly, “asking about what does not concern you and talking of what does not concern you.” In a broader sense, leaving what does not concern one must preclude the pursuit of encyclopedic knowledge so prominent in adab. Take the story that Abu Dawud wore a garment with one sleeve wide and one narrow. Asked why, he explained, “The wide one is for (carrying) notebooks, whereas the other is not needed.” Someone this devoted to the necessary and nothing more could not have been amused by a Kitab al-Hayawan.

Humor, then, was clearly an important category in adab, whereas to the hadith folk it betrayed a relaxation of one’s moral attentiveness and reverence for God. The Basran philologist Abu Hatim al-Sijistani (d. 869?) was generally rejected as a traditionist. The rijāl critic Ibn Hibban al-Busti (d. 965), known for his lenience, admitted that Abu Hatim was much given to playfulness (muda’aba) but argued that his hadith was sound (mustaqūm), even if it included “that which ahl al-adab are never without.” Here is a clear indication, I think, that the constraints of adab were not fully compatible with the science of hadith. It is almost enough by itself to put the Qur’an reciter Ibn Mujahid (d. 936) outside the ranks of traditionalism that he was given to playfulness (kathīr al-muda’aba). Yaqut tells the story of Ibn Mujahid’s entering an orchard with some men of religion. When someone commented on his refusing to talk seriously, he protested, “Self-restraint in an orchard is like dissipation in a mosque (ta‘āqul, takhālu’).” One could hardly ask for a clearer expression of respect for different rules in different places among ahl al-adab, as opposed to the hadith folk’s insistence that obedience is equally demanded at all times and in all places. It is not surprising that adab came to be taught mainly in homes, not mosques, and that the hadith folk should not have embraced such figures as Ibn Qutayba (d. 889?) and Ibn Abi al-Dunya (d. 894).

At the same time, 9th-century Muslims of different theological parties clearly had a great deal in common at the level of piety. For example, it was considered excellent manners among diverse parties not to lean. (What better illustration could be asked of Islamic dignity?) To start with the hadith folk, Ahmad, although ill, sat up straight when someone mentioned the Khurasani traditionist Ibrahim ibn Tahman (d. 784–85?). He commented, “It is not meet to mention the pious while reclining.” Ahmad’s successor, ‘Abd al-Wahhab, warned against leaning in the course of the ritual prayer: better that a man who feels weak should sit, then rise. Abu Bakr ibn ‘Ayyash (d. 809?), as a minor traditionist and major Qur’an reciter, stood on the border between hadith and adab. Among other austerities, it is said, he did not put his side to the ground for forty years. Salm ibn Salim (d. 810?) was a Murji’, hence not of the hadith folk, and they rejected his transmission of hadith. He was never seen to lean. Moving toward Sufism, Sari al-Saqati was never seen reclining save in his death illness. The Sufi Ibrahim al-Khawwas (d. 903–04?) was invited to lean on a pillar but said, “I refuse to lean on something created.” To sit or stand straight without leaning was plainly good form across the Islamic spectrum. Little shared
CONCLUSION

The hadith folk emerged as a distinct group at about the end of the 8th century. They lost importance in the 10th century. Chroniclers usually refer to their 10th-century successors in Baghdad as the Hanabila or simply al-‘āmma (the general), periodically rioting against the Shi‘is. Meanwhile, their own name for themselves, ahl al-sunna, was claimed by virtually all parties except the Shi‘is. Even Mu‘tazila called themselves ahl al-sunna wa-al-jamā‘a, on the plea that if they were not actually the great majority, they ought to have been.95 (I have not compared the piety of the hadith folk with that of 9th-century Shi‘is, rewarding though such a comparison would be. At least a wing of the Shi‘i movement probably had something very close, which ought to show up in Shi‘i hadith.)

For a time, however, the hadith folk’s importance was great. The caliph Ma‘mun undertook a major effort to break them, while most caliphs from Mutawakkil forward tried to attach at least a section of them to themselves.96 It was in part because the program they articulated had such deep popular appeal that so many Muslim thinkers identified themselves with it. And although their program was an extreme form, insufficiently catholic to prevail in the long term, their piety did inform universally valid, ideal Islam ever after.97

Students of Islamic law and theology have commonly regarded the hadith folk with annoyance, considering only their dogged rejection of sophisticated theorizing. Likewise, students of Islamic mysticism have regarded the hadith folk with annoyance, considering only distrust of esoterism, while students of adab may have regarded them mainly in terms of dourness. These students have therefore misunderstood not only why the hadith folk were not captivated by sophisticated theorizing, mysticism, and letters, but why jurisprudents, theologians, mystics, and littérateurs went on to adopt so much of the traditionalist program (for example, by redefining law and theology as primarily exegetical). One must be touched by the earnestness that makes a man wear asymmetrical clothing because, strictly speaking, he needs only one wide sleeve. One has to appreciate that earnestness to make sense of Islamic civilization.

NOTES

2 Ibid., 1:234.


5Hodgson, *Venture*, 1:238.

6Ibid., 1:386. “Hadith” is not unambiguous, for it is nowadays usually taken to mean, as Hodgson himself says, “hadith reports about the Prophet,” whereas in the 9th century it normally included reports about the companions and other early jurists. On Ahmad’s frequent resorting to the practice and opinions of companions, ⇒ Susan A. Spectorsky, “Ahmad Ibn Hanbal’s Fiqh,” *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 102 (1982): 461–65. The idea that Shafī‘is’ polemics forced Muslims to distinguish sharply between hadith from the Prophet and aḥār from the companions goes back mainly to Schacht, *Origins*. More recent studies have shown that one can hardly make out the effect of Shafī‘is’ theories on wider legal thought before the last quarter of the 9th century. See most conveniently Hallaq, “Was al-Shafī‘i the Master Architect?”


Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādi, Tārīkh, 2:31.


Ibid., 8:240.

Ibid., 9:267.

Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādi, Tārīkh, 3:314 f.

Ibn Abī Ya‘lā, Tabaqāt, 1:72.


Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādi, Tārīkh, 11:26 f.

Ibid., 5:253, 12:143.

Dhahabi, Tārīkh (A.H. 211–20), 15:285. On early Shī‘i traditionalism, see Moojan Momen, An Introduction to Shi‘i Islam (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985), 74–79. Leading traditionalists (Ahmad, Abū Dawud) condemned ‘Ubayd Allāh ibn Musa for his Shī‘ism, but they related hadīth reports from him nonetheless. The distinction between “traditionist” (transmitter of hadīth) and “traditionalist” (advocate of solely scriptuary authority) we owe to George Makdisi, “Ash‘arī and the Ash‘arites in Islamic Religious History 1: The Ash‘arite Movement and Islamic Orthodoxy,” Studia Islamica 17 (1962): 49. Even in the 9th century, there were some outstanding traditionists who were not accepted as traditionalists—for example, Buhkari and Tabari.

On the hadīth literature concerning laughter, see Ludwig Ammann, Vorbild und Vernunft. Die Regelung von Lachen und Scherzen im mittelalterlichen Islam, Arabische Texte und Studien 5 (New York: Georg Olms, 1993), chap. 3. The general rule he develops is that one should never laugh except for good reason, mainly joy or wonder. He dates this rule to the beginning of the 9th century at the latest (pp. 81–84), which is to say just the time that the hadīth folk emerged from the larger movement of the “Shari‘ah-minded.”

The only exception that occurs to me is Sāliḥ Jazāra (d. Bukhara, 906), a moderately prominent rijāl critic who grew up in Baghdad but moved to Khurasan in middle age. For examples of his joking, see Dhahabi, Tārīkh (A.H. 291–300), 22:167. Several stories develop his opposition to Shi‘ism, while nothing indicates that he took an interest in kalām (here, speculative theology). Ammann mentions the early Basran traditionist Ibn Sirin (d. 729), in Vorbild, 87 f. Laughing and joking do not appear to be an essential part of his characterization, though—for example, there is no mention of it in Ibn Ḥajar, K. al-Tashdhūb “al-Tahdhūb,” 12 vols. (Hyderabad: Majlīs Dā‘irat al-Mā‘arif al-Nizāmīyya), (A.H. 1325–27), 9:214–17.


Hodgson, Venture, 1:368.

Ahmad, Wara‘, 92.

Al-‘Uqaylī, Kitāb al-Du‘ā‘fī al-qaḥīr, ed. ‘Abd al-Mu‘tī Amīn Qal‘ajī, 4 vols. (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilimiyya, 1984), 4:261; Ahmad, Wara‘, 79. That the former report was expressly rejected does not indicate that it was contrary to traditionalist doctrine. Compare the many rejected hadīth reports by which the Prophet stated that the Qur‘ān was not created.


Al-Ṣaymārī, Akhbār Abī Ḥanīfa (Beirut: ‘Ālam al-Kutub, 1985), 44 f; Ibn Abī al-Wafā‘, al-Jawāhir al-
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38 Hodgson, Venture, 1:365.


41 The governor of Egypt was favorably disposed toward Buwayti and told him to confess privately the Qur‘ân created; however, Buwayti refused, saying “a hundred thousand will follow my example without knowing the meaning”: Dhahabî, Siyar al-dâ’lîm al-nubalâ‘, 25 vols. (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risâla, 1981–88), ed. Shû‘ayb al-Arma’ût and Şiûlî al-Sâmîr (1983), 12:61.

42 Hodgson, Venture, 2:200.


44 Hodgson, Venture, 1:344.

45 Two of the five on foot, according to al-Khallal, Hathth, 138; three according to Ibn Abî Ḥattîm, Jarîh, 1:304, and Abû Nu‘aym, Hîyâ, 9:175.


49 See Mueller, “Asceticism and Mysticism,” 104. The Muslim’s life as guided by the law and described again and again in the biographical dictionaries has most of the characters of what Catherine Bell recently identified as “ritual-like activities”: formalism,


46Louis Massignon, *Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane*, rev. ed. (Paris: J. Vrin, 1954), 231. Massignon’s comparison of Bishr to Muhasibi is not appropriate inasmuch as Muhasibi was clearly involved in *kalâm* and *usûl al-fiqh*, in which fields no one accused Bishr of meddling.

47Al-Khátîb al-Baghdâdi, *Târîkh*, 8:215 f. Earlier, it seems, Muhasibi had fled to Kufa, whence he sent back word to Ahmad that he had repented of what Ahmad had rejected, which repentance, too, Ahmad rejected: Dâhâbî, *Târîkh*, vol. 18 (A.H. 241–50), 209.


51Ahmad ibn Hanbal used to relate hadith of the Mu’tazili leader ‘Amr ibn ‘Ubayd (d. 761–62), then took to relating his hadith without naming him, and only at the end refused altogether to relate of him anything: al-Khátîb al-Baghdâdi, *Târîkh*, 12:184.


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The classic study is Reinert, Die Lehre vom tawakkul.


See Chabbi, “Remarques,” 24. Chabbi observes that the zuhd sections of books of adab dwell on the miraculous more than do the comparable sections of books of hadith.


See Abū Nu‘aym, Ḥiyya, 9:186, where Ahmad tells a man who has asked him “about what does not concern him” to consult instead Ibn Abī Duwaḍ, the Mu‘tazīli qādi.


For evaluations of Abu Ḥāfat, see Ibn Ḥajar, Tahdītb, 4:257 f.


Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, 6:110.


His name appears in five of the six books, but the rijāl critics did not record many high evaluations of his reliability. For these, see Ibn Ḥajar, Tahdītb, 12:34–37. He is quoted concerning the Qur‘ān near Ḥaṁd, ‘Uṣūl, ed. Zaghālūl, 70.

Al-Khaṭīb al-Baghdādī, Tārīkh, 14:380.

See ibid., 9:142–44.

Ibid., 5:141.


Al-Rāzī, K. al-Tadwīn fī dhikr ahl al-‘ilm bi-Qazwīn, Lālēli (Istanbul) 2010, fol. 120b.

