Political Sorting in Social Relationships:

Evidence from an Online Dating Community

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Abstract

How do political predispositions shape the social relationships individuals create? While an extensive literature examines the influence of individuals' social environments on their political attitudes and behavior, we know little about the degree to which *ex ante* shared political preferences and beliefs affect the creation of social networks. This is because most existing data describe relationships *after* they have formed, when common preferences may arise from sorting or, alternatively, attitude conversion, shared environment, or other mechanisms. Leveraging a novel dataset from a large, national online dating community, we examine how three types of political characteristics—political identity, issue positions, and political engagement—affect people's initiation of social relationships. We find evidence for both *overall* and *direct* sorting based on political predispositions. With respect to overall sorting, people with similar political beliefs are more likely to "match" in the dating community, providing the first evidence that pre-match political characteristics produce political homophily. We also find that shared political characteristics explain online communication decisions even after accounting for a broad range of factors that explain patterns of online communication, suggesting that this sorting on politics is direct. Our results have important implications for the study of political polarization and other important topics.

Beginning with the Columbia School's landmark studies in the 1940s (e.g. Lazardsfeld, Berelson and Gaudet 1944; Berelson, Lazardsfeld and McPhee 1954), scholars have analyzed how individuals' social environments affect their political attitudes and behavior. A fundamental thrust of this research is that "personal influence" (Lazarsfeld and Katz 1955) is powerful. More generally, individuals' discussion networks influence what information they are exposed to, their attitudes, and even their voting decisions (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). At the same time, individuals' social networks are not politically diverse (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Mutz and Martin 2001) and Americans appear increasingly likely to live near like-minded citizens (Bishop 2008). One particularly important type of social relationship, marriages, also exhibits high degrees of political homogeneity (Jennings and Niemi 1968; Stoker and Jennings 1989, 2005; Alford et al. 2011). This tendency toward politically homogenous social interactions may risk reinforcing political similarity if it prevents exposure to alternative viewpoints (Mutz 2002; Mutz and Mondak 2006). Overall, social sorting[1] according to political predispositions has been an important factor used to explain a myriad of attitudinal and behavioral outcomes.

At the same time, important questions about the origins of political networks remain unanswered. First, we know little about the degree to which *ex ante* shared political preferences and beliefs affect the creation of social networks. This is because most existing data describe relationships *after* they have formed, when common preferences may arise from sorting or, alternatively, attitude conversion, shared environment, or other mechanisms. Second, if new networks reflect such *ex ante* similarity, we do not know if they originate in direct—or explicit—sorting on political matters or instead reflect indirect sorting on other characteristics that nonetheless yield political homogeneity. To answer these questions, this paper examines whether and how individuals' political characteristics influence the initial formation of social relationships. We focus on an especially important subset of social relationships, romantic relationships, which often create households, an influential context in which children are politically

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[1] We contrast our conception of "sorting," in which members of the mass public choose which other individuals to interact with, to Levendusky's (2009) exploration of partisan sorting in attitude formation. Levendusky examines individual-level polarization in attitude formation in response to clearer signals being sent by partisan elites, whereas we model polarization in the formation of social relationships, a bottom-up phenomenon.

socialized. This research therefore examines the creation of social networks, rather than the consequences of those networks, which has been the focus of most prior research.[2] Of note, although we do not examine marriages directly, we study online dating interactions as a means of peering into the origin of social relationships, a process that is generally very difficult for social scientists to observe.[3] Moreover, the decision to communicate with a stranger online is similar to interacting with an unfamiliar individual offline. Therefore, if people condition their online interactions on shared political beliefs, it is likely that the composition of their general social networks (i.e., their acquaintances and friends in addition to their romantic partners) is also influenced by political considerations.

Leveraging a novel dataset from a large, national online dating community, we find evidence for both *overall* and *direct* sorting based on political predispositions. Specifically, we examine how three types of political characteristics—political identity, issue positions, and political engagement— distinguish online dating pairings from the entire online user population. This behavioral measure of social discernment is important because it provides evidence not just of stated preference for political similarity, but also that individuals are willing to act on that preference when making real and consequential decisions.[4] We define *overall,* or *aggregate, sorting* as the greater degree of political similarity in pairings where individuals communicate compared to all potential pairings. This sorting may arise directly or indirectly. We define *direct sorting* as evidence that shared political characteristics predict online communication after accounting for a broad range of other factors affecting online behavior, while *indirect sorting* arises because individuals condition their search for partners on other

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[2] Importantly, to assess the consequences of social context for attitudes it is important to first identify the degree of attitude congruence in those networks before they form. Without such a measure, it is impossible to discern the effect of those contexts from their initial status.

[3] Other scholars have also examined politics in the context of online dating markets. Klofstad et al. (2011) study public online dating profiles to examine why some people decide to report their political attitudes in searchable profiles. They do not, however, observe communication behavior among members of the online community. Economists (Hitsch, Hortacsu and Ariely 2010; Fisman et al. 2006) and sociologists (Sautter, Tippett and Morgan 2010; Skopek, Schulz and Blossfeld 2011; Robnett and Feliciano 2011) have leveraged online dating to study sorting behavior outside the political context.

[4] Importantly, this behavioral confirmation of preferences for political similarity addresses one standard criticism about the artificiality of the survey environment. Because participants of the online dating website likely did not anticipate that their activities would be subject to analysis by researchers as they would in a survey or laboratory setting, these data are less subject to "Hawthorne effects," in which people change their behavior because they know they are being monitored.

factors that are also correlated with shared politics. We find that men are more likely to message a women if they share these key political traits with her, and women are similarly more likely to respond to a man's message if they share these traits with him. Cumulatively, the online pairings in which both members communicate show markedly higher rates of shared political preferences than expected by chance. In some cases, these effect sizes approach those of key physical and demographic attributes upon which people often select mates—education, height, race, and age.

Thus, regardless of whether this political sorting is direct or indirect, our first key result is that people with similar political beliefs are more likely to "match" in the dating community, thereby producing homogenization. Importantly, these shared preferences exist prior to the formation of relationships. Additionally, this creation of polarized social relationships likely has important implications for subsequent polarization if ideologically homogenous social enclaves reinforce this initial sorting. We also find that shared political characteristics explain online communication decisions even after accounting for a broad range of factors (e.g., education, race, religion, age, reasons for dating, personality measures, etc.) that explain patterns of online communication, suggesting that this sorting on politics is direct. Showing that individuals consider politics when choosing potential relationship partners therefore instantiates the notion that shared politics—and the possibility of disagreement if such sorting does not take place ahead of time (Gerber, Doherty and Dowling 2012)—affects individuals' decisions about who they will interact with socially.

Social scientists have long studied the role of politics on the formation of social relationships, both generally and among mates. This work builds on a larger literature (see McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001) for an extensive review) documenting the similarity of individuals' social networks on the basis of demographic characteristics such as age, gender, and class as well as personality and attitudinal traits (e.g. Bouchard and McGue 1981; Capsi, Herbner and Ozer 1992). Such homophily extends beyond non-romantic social relationships into marriages and dating as well (e.g., Burgess and Wallin 1943). Focusing on politics, adult social relationships are characterized by high levels of political similarity (e.g., Verbrugge 1977, 1983; Knoke 1990; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). It is unclear,

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however, whether such similarity predates the formation of these relationships since previous data collection efforts measured political beliefs well after people met. Additionally, in summarizing the literature on political homophily, McPherson, Smith-Lovin and Cook (2001) argue that a key limitation of this work is that it is "unclear whether this homophily is due to actual political similarity or similarity on other social characteristics that are correlated with political beliefs" (429).

Focusing more specifically on marital relationships, Jennings and Niemi's (1968) influential study of political socialization found a great deal of similarity between husbands and wives with respect to political beliefs, an association confirmed by numerous subsequent studies (e.g. Stoker and Jennings 1989, 2005; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; Kenny 1998; Mendez and Osborn 2010; Osborn and Mendez 2011). Recent research by Alford et al. (2011) shows that the correlation between spouses' political beliefs exceeds the correlations between other personality and physical traits. As with the literature on social relationships more generally, extant research has convincingly shown a strong correlation between the political beliefs of romantic partners, but cannot distinguish selection from conversion and shared environment. This is because existing studies analyze datasets of couples after they have met, formed a relationship, and ultimately married.[5] Nor have prior studies been able to decompose overall sorting into its direct and indirect components. The key advantage of our novel dataset is that we observe online dating participants' stated political preferences and beliefs, as well as a plethora of other non-political characteristics, before they interact with one another. We can therefore examine how those characteristics predict subsequent efforts to form dating relationships.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. We first provide an overview of the literature on sorting in social relationships, laying out our original contributions and constructing hypotheses. Next, we describe the online dating site and how individuals interact within it, as well as describing the sample and format of the data. We then present the behavioral dependent variables, the political independent variables, and control variables. We first present results from a baseline analysis assessing the degree of

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[5] As we discuss more fully below, Alford et al. (2011) undertake additional tests to distinguish initial sorting from conversion.

overall political sorting in social relationships. We then conduct a series of analysis to distinguish direct and indirect political sorting. Our first set of results explores men's messaging behavior, subjecting our findings to numerous robustness checks. Next, we conduct similar analyses to study how women respond to men's initial messages. We also examine the effects of political and other variables on the joint probability that a man and woman both communicate. We conclude by discussing the limitations of our analysis and the implications of our results.

Studying Political Sorting in Social Relationships

The dominant mode of analysis in studies of homophily in social relationships is leveraging survey data to compare the level of trait concordance among those who have formed social relationships (friendships, marriages, etc.) to those who have not. When those traits are not subject to influence by those one chooses to associate with (e.g., age, height, prior educational attainment, etc.), then comparisons of formed relationships to unformed relationships are straightforward. However, if the traits one is interested in are potentially affected by one's relationship partners (as is the case with attitudes), then comparisons of the similarity of relationship partners to those not in relationships will be unable to distinguish initial sorting from the influence of relationship partners on one another. So, for example, if spouses influence each other's political beliefs because of (1) shared family interests (e.g., employment or family characteristics create political interests), (2) common environments (e.g., those living in the same area are subject to similar community or political influences), or (3) simple persuasion (e.g., one spouse convinces the other or it is simply easier to reach agreement than to face regular disagreement with one's spouse), then political similarity in marriages may be a consequence of marriages forming rather than a source of those relationships. Additionally, setting aside these sources of post-marriage conversion, another concern is that absent a great deal of information about the reasons marriages might form, it is difficult to distinguish direct political sorting from political homogeneity that arises because individuals choose mates based on factors correlated with shared political beliefs (e.g., people may only be exposed

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to potential mates of similar socioeconomic status or religious beliefs, which may be correlated with having shared political beliefs).

To address these concerns, this paper adopts a research design in which we observe individuals' political preferences (and numerous other characteristics) before they initiate efforts to form relationships. That is, using political preferences measured prior to relationship formation, we examine whether online dating pairings in which individuals reach out to one another exhibit greater levels of political homophily than those in which individuals do not attempt to communicate. Finding such concordance would provide evidence supportive of the hypothesis that social relationships are initially stratified on politics because we can rule out post-sorting factors that explain political congruence.[6] Additionally, the dataset we use for our analysis includes numerous measures of individuals' characteristics, attitudes, and preferences apart from their political leanings. Accounting for this large range of other factors improves our ability to distinguish direct from indirect political sorting. If shared political characteristics continue to predict efforts to from relationships after accounting for these other factors, we argue that this is stronger evidence for direct political sorting than is provided in prior research.

In an important recent paper, Alford et al. (2011) document the similarity in mates' political preferences. They then conduct additional tests designed to distinguish initial political similarity from post-relationship conversion arising due to the different mechanisms outlined above. Most importantly, they show that the correlation between spouses' political beliefs does not vary by the length of marriage. They argue that this suggests post-partnering spousal influence is minimal, because people who have been married longer should exhibit greater homogeneity if such conversion occurs over time. While suggestive, this evidence is indirect. For example, it could be that partners bring their views into agreement quickly rather than over time. Alternatively, because the analysis relies on comparing marriages at one point in time that originated in different eras, the similar levels of concordance for new and old marriages could

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[6] An additional advantage of this comparison of dyads in which individuals communicate with ones in which they do not is that we construct the entire universe of potential relationship dyads, thereby allowing us to compare formed relationships to all feasible (counterfactual) relationships in these data. We can therefore rule out homogeneity as arising due to truncation in the range of available relationship partners.

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reflect persuasion over time coupled with changes in mating markets so that newer couples are more likely to have shared political beliefs from the outset (a variant of the classic age-time-cohort problem).[7] By observing relationships before they form, we can rule out post-relationship conversion. Additionally, because we have data on relationships that do not form, we can account for the universe of potential online relationships to compare online dyads where communication takes place to all counterfactuals, thereby also allowing us to estimate the level of political homophily that would arise simply due to truncation in mating markets.

The Online Dating Data

Increasing Importance of Online Dating

Online dating has become an increasingly important means by which Americans search for romantic partners. According to a Pew Study conducted in 2005, 74% of single Americans seeking partners reported using the Internet to facilitate dating (Madden and Lenhart 2006; also cited by Klofstad et al. 2011).[8] Among paid content, online dating is the third largest driver of Internet traffic behind music and games (Jupiter Research 2011). A substantial number of marriages also result from interactions started online. For instance, a Harris Interactive study conducted in 2007 found that 2% of U.S. marriages could be traced back to relationships formed on eHarmony.com, a single online dating site (Bialik 2009).

The Online Dating Site

Our data come from a major, national online dating site, which we refer to as "the site." Users interact with the site using an internet web browser, and can also choose to be notified about activities on the site by email. Details of how the site operates and how users interact within it appear in Part I of the supplemental appendix and are summarized here. When a user first joins the site, he or she constructs a

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[7] Sweeney and Cancian (2004) report increased sorting over time in marriages on the basis of earnings potential, while Schwartz and Mare (2005) find increased sorting over time on the basis of educational attainment. These results are reflective of a more general pattern of men and women seeking more similar partners (Kalmijn 1991a, 1991b, 1998). If people are increasingly sorting on politics or any other factor correlated with political beliefs, contemporary comparisons of marriages originating in different periods will be less informative.

[8] Given the 16% revenue growth in the online dating industry since then (Jupiter Research 2011), this figure has likely increased throughout the decade. Further, about a quarter of all Internet users—regardless of age or marital status—visit an online dating site in any given month (Jones 2011).

public profile, which can include a photograph and a free-form textual description. After reporting this public information, the user then has the option of answering other questions about his or her personality, interests, and opinions about relationships. These items are referred to as "match questions," distinct from the profile questions that are part of setting up an account. These questions, which include both items submitted by users and the operators of the site, are eclectic. The site operators indicated to us that in constructing questions, they sought to mimic the types of conversations people might have on dates. Example items include: "Regardless of future plans, what's more interesting to you right now?" (response options: "sex," "true love"), "Could you date someone who was really messy?" (response options: "yes," "no"), and "Which makes for a better relationship?" (response options: "passion," "dedication"). Users also report how important each question they answer is to them in mate choice on a five-point scale ("mandatory," "very important," "somewhat important," "a little important," and "irrelevant"). Answers to these questions are not made public unless the user specifically requests that this occur, which we are told is rare. As we describe in greater below, our new political questions were included in this list of non-profile questions and placed near the top of the list. Finally, as part of their profile users can list a series of attributes that they are looking for in their potential mates: sexual orientation, relationship status, age, location, and what the other use is looking for (e.g. causal dating, a serious relationship, etc.). These non-match items are public.

After completing a profile, a user can then search for other users based on the profile characteristics mentioned above. Users can also filter based on whether their potential match has a photo as well as recent account activity. The site also presents suggested matches to respondents based on what they state they are looking for in their profile. Additionally, the site creates a "match" score based on the anonymous match questions answered by the user, taking into account the user's stated importance of each of the questions. (For example, if a user states a particular question is mandatory and another user's response is different, the site will rank that other user less highly than if the other user agreed with the first user. This effect on ranking will be higher for items rated as more important by both users.)

Our analysis here focuses on the acts of sending a message and responding to it, which is a means by which individuals can converse with one another and, if desired, arrange interactions outside of the online dating environment (e.g., private email communications, phone calls, or dates). These interactions do not reveal any additional private information about the user beyond the user's login name and his/her chosen message content (e.g., the user's email address is not revealed).

Sample and Dataset Overview

We obtained a list of all users who were registered on the site for the period between October 1, 2010 and December 15, 2010. We began by removing from this list users whose site membership was revoked for inappropriate behavior, who withdrew from the site before the end of the sample period, or who resided outside the 50 U.S. States or the District of Columbia. Additionally, for reasons of analytic tractability, we restricted our analysis to heterosexual men and women age 18 to 64 who reported being single and seeking heterosexual opposite sex partners.[9] Finally, to eliminate inactive users and low quality profiles, we removed all men who never sent a message or were never replied to and all women who were never sent a message or never replied to a message. These restrictions yield 170,413 men and 132,081 women.

The final dataset for our analysis is a series of dyads, in which for a given geographic area, we include a selected subset of men and woman and form all possible pairwise comparisons between each man and each woman.[10] Geographic areas are identified by 2-digit zip code (e.g., 60, which includes all zip codes from 60000 to 60999), which is the lowest level of geographic reporting provided to us by the site and which is chosen so that users could meet in person if they wanted to. We restrict our attention to the twenty 2-digit zip codes for which the most users are available in our dataset, which leaves us with

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[9] We set aside the handful of users whose age is less than 18 to comply with imposed human subjects requirements. The number of users over 64 is very small. We exclude those already in a relationship because some of these users may not be seeking relationship partners. Our focus on heterosexual men and women is driven by the relatively small number of bisexual and homosexual users in certain geographic areas, which makes it difficult to construct a sufficiently large set of potential messaging partners in these areas. An important avenue for future research is to ascertain the nature of political sorting in non-exclusively heterosexual dating networks.

[10] For example, if we selected three men, X1, X2, and X3, and three women, Y1, Y2, and Y3, we would create 9 dyads: X1Y1, X1Y2, X1Y3, X2Y1, X2Y2, X2Y3, X3Y1, X3Y2, and X3Y3.

74,316 women and 90,896 men.[11] We require selected men and women to have answered a certain number of the seven political questions we fielded (the exact number varies across specification, as we detail below), and prioritize in sample selection those individuals who have answered more of these questions (ties are broken randomly). After creating these dyads, we then recheck the resulting dataset to make sure that all chosen men and women exhibited variation in their message sending and receiving behavior to the other selected users.

Outcome Measurement

We conduct three types of analysis. In the first, we examine the factors that predict whether a man sends a message to a particular woman in a shared geographic area. While both men and women send messages, men overwhelmingly initiate on-line conversations[12], and so we begin by exploring men's initial efforts to reach out to women. In this analysis, we first select 600 men and 600 women in each of the twenty selected geographic areas requiring that any selected individual have answered at least 4 of our 7 political items. After eliminating cases where there is no variation in a man's or woman's messaging behavior among this subset of users, this yields a dataset of 1,864,247 unique dyads formed from 6,195 men and 5882 women.[13] In this dataset, men on average send messages to 1.4% of the women in shared dyads. Summary statistics for this analysis, broken down separately for men and women, appear in Table 1 (complete summary statistics appear in Table A1 in the appendix).

Our second analysis examines each woman's messaging behavior in response to a man having sent her a message. Given the relative sparseness of men's messaging behavior in the initial dataset, we adopt a different sampling scheme to construct this dataset. Here, we begin by taking all cases where a man sent a woman a message in the same geographic area and select men and women who appear in this dataset more than once and where there is variation in the woman's responding behavior and whether

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[11] These twenty zip codes are 02, 10, 11, 19, 20, 30, 33, 48, 55, 60, 77, 78, 80, 85, 90, 92, 94, 95, 97, and 98.
[12] In our dataset, men initiate outreach 88% of the time and start 84% of conversations in which both parties participate.
[13] We first selected 600 men and 600 women in each zip code, which yields an initial dataset of 7.2 million observations and 12,000 men and 12,000 women. By requiring variation in message sending and receiving behavior, we eliminate many men and women from this set, which explains our much smaller final dataset.

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each man's messages yield responses. To gather a sufficient sample, we also reduce the threshold of required political questions from 4 to 3. This yields a final dataset of 465,928 observations composed of 35,410 unique men and 32,116 women in which women respond to 31.7% of the messages sent to them.[14] Summary statistics for this analysis, once again presented separately for men and women, are shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1 (complete summary statistics appear in Table A1).

Finally, our third analysis examines the joint occurrence of a man messaging a woman and a woman replying. Insofar as bilateral communication is required to continue and develop a social relationship, this analysis provides us with a means to assess the cumulative effect of a man's initial messaging and a woman's replying behavior on the formation of potentially enduring relationships. This analysis employs the same 1.8 million dyad dataset used in the first analysis. In 0.62% of dyads both parties send a message.

Independent Variables

In predicting the different outcomes discussed above, we draw on a range of information provided by users of the online dating site as well as measures of their behavior. Most novel and of greatest interest are a set of seven new political questions fielded by the site in cooperation with us. These seven questions tap three overarching individual political characteristics: (1) political identity; (2) issue positions; and (3) political participation. Our goal is to analyze how well responses to these political questions predict sorting on the site. These questions were presented to users in the larger set of potential "match" questions during the period covered by our study. As with any other match question, users had the option to decline to answer any of these new questions. We sought to use standard question wording from existing surveys (e.g., the American National Election Studies) where possible, but negotiations with the site and technical concerns affected the final set of questions that were fielded. The three constructs (and associated seven questions) were:

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[14] Excluding women not sent messages or men not responded to by any women likely improves the quality of the analysis by eliminating lower-quality candidates (e.g., those with out-of-date profile descriptions, missing photos, etc.).

Political Identity: Three questions were asked to tap various aspects of political identity, or how individuals describe themselves in political terms. In addition to partisanship and liberal-conservative ideology (two traditionally-studied identities in political science), we also asked about a respondent's media choice, which might indicate political orientation in a less-explicit manner.

1. *Political Partisanship*. "How do you think of yourself politically?" (response options: "as a Republican," "as a Democrat," "as an Independent/Something else," "I don't think of myself in these terms/I don't live in the U.S.").

2. *Political Ideology*. "How would you describe yourself politically?" (response options: "liberal," "centrist," "conservative," "N/A").

3. *Media Choice*. "Which of these news sources do you turn to first for information about what is going on in politics?" (response options: "Fox News," "MSNBC," "CNN," "none of these").

Issue Positions: In addition to measuring a respondent's broad political orientation, we also asked them about their positions on specific issues, one economic and one social/cultural.

1. *Fiscal Policy Position*. "What do you think is the best way for the government to balance the budget?" (response options: "Cut services and keep taxes at the same level," "Raises taxes and keep services at the same level").

2. *Social Policy Position*. "What is closer to you view of the role of religion in government?" (response options: "There should be a strict separation between church and state, "A nation's policies should reflect the religious beliefs of the majority").

Political Engagement: Finally, we asked two questions designed to tap users' political engagement—how important politics is to them personally and the level of participation they expect of other citizens.

1. *Importance of Politics*. "How important are your political beliefs to you?" (response options: "very," "somewhat," "a little," "not at all").

2. *Civic Duty to Vote*. "Generally speaking, do you believe that people have a civic duty to vote?" (response options: "Yes, people ought to vote in every election," "No, people should vote only when they are interested").

These questions, while not exhaustive of political identity and beliefs, covered a broad range of elements of political identity and orientation towards politics.

In addition to these seven new questions, we also used site participants' responses to a range of other questions included in either the non-anonymous profile or anonymous match portion of the website to account for user preferences and characteristics. The public profile variables include age, height,

education, race, what the user is looking for on the site, tobacco/alcohol drug use, whether the use has/wants kids, length of short textual description, and religion. The coding of these responses is presented in Part II of the supplementary appendix. We also include anonymous responses to 40 existing match questions selected by the site operators in cooperation with us. These questions were chosen either because they might be correlated with political concerns (e.g., beliefs about gender roles, sex outside of marriage, and contraception) or because they were widely answered and/or exhibited high discernment (defined as individuals differing in their responses and rating the question as important). Examples include the importance of God, thoughts on drug/tobacco use, preference for a same race partner, whether they think that a good relationship is based on passion or dedication, whether they think flag burning should be illegal, whether they think only intelligent people should procreate, etc. We also attempt to account for respondent intelligence by including responses to various verbal and mathematical intelligence questions asked by the site (e.g. analogies, number series, etc.). Responses to these match questions are listed in Appendix Table A1 and full question wording and response options appear in Part III of the supplementary appendix.

Two features of these match questions are worth noting here. First, we were not provided access to the weight participants gave to any match question. For this reason, while we can account for a respondent's answer to any given question, we cannot assess how important the participant believed the question was relative to any other question. These importance weights factor into the match score that subsequently affects the order in which profiles are presented to users when they are logged onto the site, and therefore likely affect which other users a site member will contact if he/she does not conduct a customized search or browse nearby listings on the basis of other factors (e.g., age).[15] These weights do

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[15] Politics plays a role in the calculated match score, but it is unlikely to be large unless a user gives these questions larger weights than other questions or refuses to answer other non-political questions. Mitigating against a disproportionate weight on the political items in the construction of a set of potential messaging partners is that age, gender, race, and other factors have a large influence on search behavior. Additionally, the match scores account for answers to all other match questions. In our sample, the median number of the 40 non-political match questions answered by a user is 34, 95% have answered 27 or more questions, and 99.5% have answered at least 19. Thus, for nearly all users, political questions are a small minority of the questions both available to us and included in the bundle used to calculate match scores.

not affect the information presented to a user when they are told that another user has contacted them and must choose whether or not to respond, and so they cannot directly influence a women's responding behavior.

Second, respondents' answers to all match questions, including our political questions, were overwhelmingly private. This means that users could not explicitly search on the basis of answers to these political questions (or any other match questions) apart from giving them greater weight when answering the match questions. Political factors, or any other trait, can be searched for indirectly if they are correlated with age or other public profile characteristics. Additionally, users may choose to display signals of their political traits in the text of their public profile descriptions or when sending a message to another user.

In addition to this information about users' characteristics and preferences, we also harvested information about their behaviors in the online dating market. In particular, for men, we accounted for the rate at which they sent messages to women (as a measure of choosiness and activity) and the rate at which their messages were replied to (a proxy of their effort in constructing messages and overall "attractiveness" or desirability). For women, we similarly accounted for the rate at which they were sent messages (again, as a measure of overall desirability) and the rate at which they replied. We detail the uses of these measures across different model specifications below.

Summary statistics for selected characteristics of the men and women in our sample are presented in Table 1. Although the sample is not representative of the US population, it is diverse in terms of various demographic and political characteristics and appears to represents the pool of individuals likely to be active in on-line dating market (e.g., it is younger, etc.).[16]

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[16] These are also characteristics of people most likely to be in offline mating markets. Hence, online users' behavior is informative of the general process by which people select romantic partners. By contrast, it would be inappropriate and insufficient to draw a representative sample of the entire U.S. population because only a minority of those people would be actively seeking mates.

Overall Political Sorting: Baseline Analysis

We begin by examining the overall level of political and non-political sorting in online dating markets. This provides a means by which to assess the relative prevalence of political homophily, but not whether it arises due to direct or indirect political sorting. We compare dyads in which parties communicate to the entire set of dyads in each geographic area to help account for the possibility that homophily arises solely due to homogeneity in geographically constructed dating markets. As with our statistical analysis below, we focus on three outcomes: men's initial messaging behavior, women's replying behavior (conditional on having been sent a message), and the joint probability a man sends a woman a message and she replies. We do so separately for three non-political characteristics on which individuals may seek to match (height, race, and religion), and the three categories of political questions mentioned above. The non-political characteristics provide a baseline with which to calibrate the effects of political predispositions.

In Table 2, we compare homophily in the population of eligible dyads to those in which our outcome of interest occurs. So, for example, the first row of Table 2 begins by displaying the proportion of all dyads in which men and women are in the same height quintile. By this calculation, 24.5% of all dyads match rather being mismatched on this measure of height similarity. Among those cases in which a man sends a message, however, height is matched 26.6% of the time, a proportional increase in height homogeneity of about 8.6% [(26.6-24.5)/24.5]. (Not surprisingly given the large number of observations in our dataset, all differences between dyads that message and those that do not, for each messaging outcome, are statistically significant at $p < .001$. For this reason, we focus our discussion here on the magnitudes of these effects.) The second group of numbers is for the universe of dyads included in the woman's replying analysis (i.e., cases where a man first messaged a woman). Here, 25.5% of all dyads match on height, a number that increases to 26.7% among cases where women reply, a proportional increase of about 5%. In other words, women are reinforcing the initial sorting based on height performed by men. Finally, the rightmost set of numbers is the same dataset as used for the man sending analysis,

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but here the outcome studied is joint messaging behavior. We find the cumulative effect of shared height is even larger: it increases the probability both parties send a message relative to all dyads by 11.7%.

As this table makes clear, matching on height is not an anomalous case. Additionally, sorting appears to occur both in men's initial choices to send a woman a message and in women's replying behavior conditional on such initial messaging.[17] (For the woman's replying data shown in the middle set of columns, all of the numbers are positive for the proportional increase in match rate.) Focusing on the remaining non-political items, shared race increases in cases of joint messaging by 7% and shared religion by 39% relative to the baseline of all dyads. In comparison, the political items vary considerably in their discernment. At the low end, shared beliefs about the role of religion in shaping policy (1.6% proportional increase) and the duty to vote (4%) are modestly associated with joint messaging, while common ideology (19%), partisanship (11%), levels of political interest (14.5%), media preferences (11%), and ideas about how to balance the budget (11%) are substantially more frequent in dyads where both parties communicate.

While we focus here on the rate at which men and women match across the entire range of response options for each measure (e.g., each of 5 height quintiles), we find similar results in analysis shown in the bottom panel of Table 2 that is restricted to particular outcome measures (e.g., both individuals in the top or bottom height quintile or both individuals liberal or conservative on ideology). Additionally, it is notable that there is substantial variation in baseline match rates across different measures. For example, 88% of all dyads match on beliefs about church-state separation, a figure that is driven both by the relatively high prevalence of support for church-state separation and the geographic segmentation of beliefs about the appropriate link between religion and policymaking. Despite these relatively high initial match rates, we continue to find substantial increases in match rates even for this measure. For example, the match rate increases by .7 percentage points in those cases where a man sends a woman a message. In fact, the average absolute increase in similarity among dyads where a man sends a

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[17] We discuss more fully in the following section that men may be sorting in anticipation of women's sorting, in which case woman might not appear to be sorting because men are doing so anticipation of their behavior.

message is 2.7 percentage points (6.8%). For the women's replying behavior the average is 1.5 percentage points (3.6%), and for the joint messaging behavior it is 4.1 percentage points (10.4%).

Overall, these data provide strong evidence of increased political homogeneity in the subset of online dyads in which men message, women respond to an initial message, and both parties send a message. Documenting this association is novel because it is direct evidence that political predispositions as measured prior to relationship formation explain the initial formation of relationships. Thus, it is not simply that social relationships generate shared political beliefs but instead that shared political beliefs lead to the generation of new relationships. What remains uncertain, however, is whether these associations originate in direct or indirect political sorting. To more fully explore that question, we next turn to multivariate statistical analysis.

Distinguishing Direct and Indirect Political Sorting

Having documented an increase in political homophily in the online pairings in which communication takes place, our next task is to assess the relative importance of direct and indirect sorting in explaining this overall pattern. Our basic approach is to predict (1) whether a man messages a woman, (2) whether a woman responds conditional on having been sent a message (i.e., among cases where a man first sent a message), and (3) whether both a man messages a woman and she responds as a function of characteristics of the man and woman in a given dyad. As we explain above, these dyads are constructed by pairing a selected set of eligible men with all similarly selected eligible women in a given geographic area.

The initial statistical analysis we undertake uses equation (1),

(1) $Send_{ij} = \gamma \Sigma \mathbf{m_i w_j} + \beta M_j + \eta R_j + \Omega_i + \varepsilon_{ij}$,

where i indexes men and j indexes women, $Send_{ij}$ is a dichotomous variable taking on the value 1 when man i sends an initial message to woman j and 0 otherwise, $\mathbf{m_i w_j}$ represents a vector of personal characteristics of the man ($\mathbf{m_i}$) and woman ($\mathbf{w_j}$)—including the political match questions introduced above, and ε_{ij} represents the stochastic error. The model also controls for a woman's received messaging

rate (M_j), the proportion of time a woman is messaged that she responds in the dataset (R_j), and man fixed effects (Ω_i). The man-specific fixed effects account for all static characteristics of a man, including his overall desirability, choosiness, and rate of messaging. The woman's received messaging rate (M_j) is included as a proxy for her overall attractiveness—women who receive more messages should, on average, be more desirable conversation partners than those who receive fewer messages. The woman's rate of replying (R_j) is included to account for the possibility that men are strategic and more frequently contact women who reply at higher rates (see Hitsch, Hortacsu and Ariely 2010).[18] To assess the robustness of our findings, we also estimate a model that includes woman fixed effects and proxies for male attractiveness. Formally, that model is,

$$(2)\ S_{ij} = \gamma\Sigma\mathbf{m_i}\mathbf{w_j} + \beta N_i + \eta S_i + \theta_j + \varepsilon_{ij},$$

where N_i is a man's rate of sending messages, S_i is the rate at which a man's messages are replied to, and θ_j is a woman specific fixed effect.

In order to avoid making any functional form assumptions about the effect of the different response profiles included in $\mathbf{m_i}\mathbf{w_j}$ on outcomes, we created a series of indicator variables representing each possible response to each item, including whether the response was missing where appropriate. For example, when examining the effect of liberal-conservative ideology on men's messaging behavior, one $\mathbf{m_i}\mathbf{w_j}$ variable would be "Ideology: Man Liberal, Woman Liberal" and another would be "Ideology: Man Liberal, Woman Conservative." (Where feasible, the omitted category was set to the case where the woman's response was missing.) The test of the linear combination of "Man Liberal, Woman Liberal" minus "Man Liberal, Woman Conservative" is therefore the estimate of how much more likely a liberal man is to message a liberal rather than a conservative woman after accounting for all other factors included in the model.

We estimate equations (1) and (2) via OLS, clustering standard errors by man for models with man fixed effects and by woman in the models with woman fixed effects. We present OLS models

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[18] Alternatively, instead of including M_j and R_j, we could account for all static characteristics of each women using woman fixed effects. Unfortunately, given the size of the dataset, including them simultaneously with the man fixed effects is computationally impossible.

because of the ease of analytical interpretation and speed of computation. Selected models estimated using logistic regression are available upon request and provide substantively similar results.

For the analysis examining the probability a woman responds to a man's message, we again use equations (1) and (2), substituting as the dependent variable $Reply_{ij}$ for $Send_{ij}$. $Reply_{ij}$ takes on the value 1 when woman j sends a message to man i after having received a message from him and 0 otherwise (as a reminder, this analysis is restricted to cases in which man i first sent a message to woman j). Finally, for the analysis examining the joint probability that both a man sends a message and a woman replies, the dependent variable is $BothSend_{ij}$, which takes on the value 1 when man i sends a message to woman j and she replies and 0 otherwise (i.e., either the man did not send a message or the woman did not reply despite the man having sent a message).

As with any observational analysis, the estimates obtained from equations (1) and (2) will be biased if there is any factor correlated with a man's or woman's expressed political beliefs that also explains his/her overall or, conditional on a man's (woman's) characteristics, a woman's (man's) desirability. If these effects originate only in average desirability of a given man or woman, however, analysis employing fixed effects or proxies for a man's or woman's overall desirability (e.g., the empirically observed rate at which the person receives messages) should minimize this concern. More pernicious is a problem in which an omitted factor differentially affects the desirability of a woman (man) for a man (woman) with different personal characteristics. For example, suppose (1) Democratic men find women who prefer certain attire more attractive than Republican men do and (2) that Democratic women are more likely than Republican women to choose that attire. Our analysis does not account for men's clothing preferences or women's displayed attire in their profile photographs. In this hypothetical case, finding that Democratic men prefer Democratic women would originate not in direct political sorting, but instead in an omitted variable (attire choices and preferences) not included in the model.

In addition to acknowledging this concern, we address it in two ways. First, if evidence of direct political sorting still arises after accounting for all the other factors included in our model, it increases the likelihood that this is due to direct political sorting rather than selection on those other factors that are

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included in or correlated with variables in our models (e.g. religion). In particular, we test the sensitivity of our estimates to the inclusion of responses to a large number of additional match questions. Insofar as our estimates of the effect of shared politics persist after accounting for our original control variables as well as 40 different ways in which individuals may express mate preferences (and which site users view as important), it suggests omitted variables are less likely to be a concern. Indeed, our extremely large set of 40 match questions (answered anonymously) is extremely unique and is generally not found in standard surveys. Second, we benchmark the magnitude of the estimated political effects we observe to other characteristics that prior scholarship has identified as important in explaining dating choices. This provides a means, albeit imperfectly, to assess the reasonableness of the magnitude of estimated political effects relative to these important non-political factors.

Our analysis examines the rates of messaging, responding, and joint messaging among geographically defined dyads formed from all eligible men and women. However, the relative performance of this method of analysis is unknown, in particular its sensitivity to false positive results (this could originate in overly precise standard error estimates). For this reason, for both the men's sending and women's replying analysis, we also conducted a form of a placebo test in which we pseudo-randomly simulated the behavior of interest and then estimated the model specified above to estimate empirically the distribution of coefficient estimates and standard errors that this near-random messaging would produce. Those placebo tests, which are similar to exact randomization tests, are described more fully below.

Men's Messaging Behavior

We begin by analyzing men's decisions to initially message a woman. Column (1) of Table 3 reports selected statistics from regression models predicting men's messaging with only the public profile variables. Columns (2)-(8) report selected statistics from regression models that include profile variables and each of the seven political match questions individually. (Complete results showing all the included variables can be found in Appendix Table A2).

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To help situate these results, we begin by discussing the selected dichotomous race variables characterizing the dyads in the third horizontal panel of the table. The coefficient on "M race white, F race white" indicates how much more likely a white male is to message a white female compared to the baseline (the case in which the woman's race is in the "other" category). As shown in Column (1), the coefficient estimate indicates that being a white-white dyad increases the probability of male messaging by 0.2 percentage points. Note that the coefficient on "M race white, F race black" is -0.002, meaning that compared to the baseline dyad, a white male is less likely to message a black woman by .2 percentage points. We can then conduct a linear hypothesis test for the difference between these two coefficients (.002 - -.002 = .004) to estimate that a white man is 0.4 percentage points more likely to message a white woman than a black woman, controlling for a large set of other demographic covariates. A Wald test indicates that this 0.4 percentage point effect is highly significant ($p < .001$, two-tailed). Black men also appear to distinguish based on race; they are 3.9 percentage points more likely to message a black woman than a white woman (.032 − -.007 = .039, $p < .001$).

How large are these results in substantive terms? The bottom of Table 1 reports that the average man's messaging rate is .0147. Consequently, an effect of .004 for white men corresponds to a 27% increase in messaging probability, which is substantively large. For black men, the effect size of .039 is extremely large, with same-race status increasing the probability of messaging a woman by 2.65 times (265%).

For ease of presentation, we present the remainder of our analysis graphically. Figure 1 displays the linear combination of coefficients (point estimates) and uncertainty of those estimates (95% confidence intervals) from the column (1) specification for each selected pair of non-political characteristics (Panel A). We use the estimates from columns (2)-(8) for the political match questions (Panel B). For instance, the row labeled "Race: Man White, Woman White vs. Black" reports the point estimate from the linear hypothesis test (and associated 95% confidence interval) of whether white men are more likely to message white women compared to black women. As mentioned above, white men are about .4 percentage points more likely to message a white woman than a black woman and this effect is

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statistically distinguishable from zero. The extremely large 3.9 percentage point effect of black men being more likely to message black women vs. white women is shown in the row below.

As illustrated in the figure, we find strong evidence for assortative mating based on a host of non-political characteristics that previous studies using online dating data have also uncovered. All of these effects are also statistically significant at $p < .05$. For instance, as shown at the top of the figure, men are more likely to message women slightly younger than them than those who are slightly older (0.9 percentage points, $p < .001$). A tall (short) man is more likely to message a tall (short) woman. Similar sorting effects are found for education and religion, as well as more social variables such as desired length of relationship, drinking habits, and desire for children. These results demonstrate the face validity of the data and our method for analyzing it.

As shown in panel B, direct sorting based on political characteristics also appears to be strong and prevalent. We begin with the measures of *Political Identity*. The top of the figure illustrates that both liberal and conservative men are more likely to message women of similar political ideology. A liberal man is 0.45 percentage points more likely to message a liberal woman vs. a conservative woman, a nearly 31% increase over the baseline messaging rate ($p < .001$). Conservative men behave in an even stronger assortative fashion (.70 percentage points, 48%, $p < .001$). Partisanship exhibits a significant effect as well. Republican males prefer Republican females over Democratic females by 0.67 percentage points ($p < .001$, 45%), with Democratic males exhibiting a preference for Democratic females over Republican females by 0.44 percentage points ($p < .001$, 30%). Media outlet preferences have smaller correlations with messaging: The effect of shared preferences for Fox News increases the probability of messaging by .26 percentage points ($p=.04$; 17%), but the .19 positive effect of shared preferences for MSNBC is statistically insignificant ($p = .14$). Hence, we find strong evidence of political social sorting based on traditional measures of political identity (party identification and liberal-conservative ideology), but men appear less likely to base their messaging behavior on shared media choice.

Beliefs about *Issue Positions* also provide evidence of direct sorting. Men believing that church and state should be separate are .07 percentage points more likely to message a similarly-minded woman

compared to a socially conservative one ($p = .06$). For socially-conservative men the effect exceeded the baseline messaging rate by 40% (.59 percentage points, $p < .001$). Positions on fiscal issues also influenced men's messaging behavior. The total effect of common beliefs about how to balance the budget on sorting is 0.24 percentage points ($p<.001$, 16%) for those preferring spending cuts and 0.21 percentage points ($p<.001$, 14%) for those preferring raising taxes.

Finally, men also appear to be sorting on *Political Engagement* in their messaging behavior. A politically-interested man (i.e., one for whom politics is personally very important) is 0.48 percentage points more likely to message a woman expressing similar interest in politics vs. a woman expressing no interest ($p < .001$, 33%). Politically-disinterested men exhibit a similar effect (.65 percentage points, $p <.001$, 44%). For the other political engagement variable—the "duty to vote" question—effects are more modest but still significant. Men who believe that voting is a civic duty are less likely to message women who do not believe it is (.05 percentage points, $p = .04$), and men who do not believe that voting is a duty are less likely to contact women who believe it is (.14 percentage points, $p < .001$).

In column (9), all seven political match questions are included simultaneously. These results are affected by the collinearity of the various political variables being measured. Nonetheless, as shown in the table, the results are fairly stable across specifications in term of directionality. With respect to statistical significance, most of the relationships illustrated in Figure 1B remain significant with a few exceptions. Sorting on the basis of shared views about the duty to vote, a preference for church/state separation, and media preferences are no longer statistically significant once we account for the range of other political factors individuals may be selecting on in the dating market, suggesting those preferences are correlated with other political measures included in our model on which individuals appear to directly condition their messaging behavior. However, the very strong effects uncovered in columns (2)-(8) (e.g., ideology, partisanship, fiscal policy positions, personal importance of politics) are robust to the inclusion of all seven political questions.

What do these results reveal about the relative importance of direct and indirect sorting in generating political homophily in social relationships? Most clearly, even after accounting for all the non-

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political factors included in the column (1) specification (which also takes into consideration the range of available messaging partners in a geographic area), shared political characteristics are strong predictors of efforts by men to reach out to women. If the non-political factors included in the model capture the range of characteristics on which men may be screening women and which may also be correlated with shared politics, then the estimates in columns (2) through (9) are evidence of direct political sorting by process of elimination. In terms of magnitudes, Table 4 displays the proportion of dyads matching on key political characteristics among all dyads (column 1), as predicted by the model accounting for all the non-political factors included in the column (1) specification from Table 3 (displayed in column 2 of Table 4), and as predicted by the model accounting for all political characteristics (shown in column 3, estimates based on Table 3 column 9 specification).[19] Column (4) contains estimates of direct political sorting, which is the increase in the proportion of dyads matching on key political characteristics from the political-based predictions relative to the non-political ones.

The column (4) numbers range from about .5 percentage points to 4 percentage points. The column (5) and (6) calculations show that these are substantively large figures. In column (5) we calculate the importance of direct political sorting relative to indirect political sorting and find that direct political sorting accounts for between a minimum of 61% of indirect political sorting (media preferences) to 100% of political sorting (partisanship). There is only one case in which direct political sorting is predicted to be less important than indirect sorting. Column (6) is the estimated proportion of observed political sorting (column 1) that is direct in nature. (In other words, it is the predicted rate of sorting from the model accounting for political and other factors minus the predicted rate of sorting from the baseline model. That estimated rate of direct political sorting is then divided by observed sorting.) These figures range from about 1% to 51%, with an average of around 17%. For the three political identity items, the proportion of political sorting that appears to be direct is between 14 and 22%. For policy preferences, it

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[19] Because of the extremely low average predicted messaging score (a function both of the sparseness of the data and the use of OLS), for the column (2) and (3) model prediction calculations we code as predicted messaging cases (predicted messaging = 1) those observations in which the predicted probability of messaging is more than twice the observed rate of messaging ($p > 2*.0147$).

ranges from 1 to 9%. Finally, for political engagement, effects are between 5 and 51%. Overall, then, subject to model specification concerns, it appears that direct political sorting is an important determinant of the observed rate of political sorting.

Robustness of Results

We also undertook a number of additional steps to assess the robustness of these results. First, in column (10), we estimated a model including woman fixed effects instead of man fixed effects. To account for male attractiveness and choosiness, we control for a man's messaging rate (the proportion of women he sent messages to) and the proportion of time a man received a response to his initial contacts. We obtain similar coefficient estimates in this specification. The similarity of results from this model to results from the model that controls for a woman's received messaging rate implies that the received messaging rate is an acceptable proxy for a woman's overall desirability as a messaging party.

Second, we also estimated a model that accounts for responses to a much broader range of match questions. In particular, the specification reported in column (11) accounts for users' answers to a series of 40 additional match questions described above. We note that some of these items have explicit or implicit political content (specifically, views on same race and same sex partners, opinions about flag burning and abortion, ideas about gender roles, and rankings of economic versus social issues as more important) that are likely correlated with our political match questions. As such, including them should be expected to diminish the effect of the remaining political items. As the regression results (and linear combination of coefficients plot shown in Appendix Figure 1) make clear, however, we continue to find evidence for direct political sorting in men's messaging behavior. Across the political items shown in Figure 1 that were previously statistically significant at $p<.05$ or better, including responses to the 40 additional match questions reduces estimate average coefficients by an average of about 54%. Additionally, four results that were previously significant at $p<.05$ are no longer significant: the effect of Republicans preferring Republicans ($p=.18$), shared preference for Fox News ($p=.60$) and religious-based policy ($p=.12$), and shared belief in the duty to vote ($p=.35$). Given the general saturation of this model

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with many covariates, we view it as highly conservative. Nonetheless, it continues to produce evidence of direct political social sorting.

Third, we altered our criteria for inclusion of users by rerunning our analysis including only those who answered at least 5, 6, or 7 of the 7 political questions. With these more restrictive question filters, we also included more geographic areas when considerations of sample size allowed it. This analysis, which is available upon request, produced results highly similar to those shown in Figure 1 and demonstrate that our results are not driven by the particular geographic areas we selected or the sorts of individuals who answered at least 4 political questions rather than a higher number.

Fourth, we estimated a logistic regression model predicting male messaging.[20] The marginal effects, available upon request, were again similar to those found using OLS, implying that our results are not due to model selection.

Finally, we also conducted the Monte Carlo placebo simulation discussed in the previous section.[21] This allows us to compare the estimated effects of political attitudes on messaging in the observed data to the estimated effects when we randomly simulated men's messaging based on each man's overall sending rate and each woman's overall receiving rate. Results of this placebo test are displayed in Figure 2. For each item (marginal effect), we plot the observed linear combination of coefficients estimate from the column (9) specification as the vertical line. The kernel density is the range of estimated coefficients using 100 independently simulated random messaging datasets. We also calculate the empirical *p*-value of the estimated coefficient, which is the proportion of estimated coefficients from the simulated data that are larger than the coefficient estimate from the observed data.

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[20] Here we forgo fixed effects and instead use proxies for both men's and women's desirability.

[21] For the Monte Carlo analysis, we proceeded as follows. We conducted simulations of initial contact within a dyad after taking into account a man's overall messaging rate and a woman's overall receiving rate. In other words, given random messaging, a dyad between a man who sends a lot of messages and a woman who receives a lot of messages should have a higher probability of being assigned a "1" compared to a dyad with a man who messages little and a woman who receives few messages. We can then assess where our estimated political effects lie in this distribution of randomized messaging. If direct political sorting is occurring, then our coefficient estimates (whenever statistically significant) should lie in the far tails of this simulated distribution. We can perform a similar Monte Carlo analysis of woman's responding behavior by simulating response in the dataset of dyads restricted to cases where a man initially sends a message. In this case, we base our simulations of random responses on: (1) how often a woman replies to men's messages and (2) how often a man's initial contacts are replied to.

So, for example, the upper left cell of panel A shows that the estimated increase in the probability a 30-34 year old man messages a woman 25-29 rather than one who is 35-39 is near 1%, which is larger than *all* 100 simulated messaging estimates ($p = 1/101 = .01$). Turning next to the estimated effects of the political characteristics shown in panel B, the results largely confirm the regression results. As in the regressions, we find null effects here ($p>.05$) for media preferences and duty to vote (for men saying there is a duty). These results suggest our statistically significant results are not driven by standard error estimates that are incorrectly precise.

Women's Replying Behavior

We next analyze whether women's political attitudes and dispositions affect their decisions to reply to a man's initial communication. Here, it is important to note two differences from our prior analysis. First, we now consider the probability a woman responds to a man's message depending on whether or not she matches the man who sent her a message. So, for example, we consider whether a white woman is more likely to respond to a white man than a black man who has sent her a message (by contrast, the earlier analysis of men's behavior held constant the man's behavior and considered variation across women).

Second, and of greater theoretical importance, our predictions depend on our hypotheses about men's strategic behavior. In particular, if men are accurately predicting a woman's likelihood of responding—that is, if they understand the factors on which women distinguish among potential dating partners and message those woman who are more likely to respond—then we would expect whether or not a woman matches a man on that trait to have *no additional* effect on her probability of responding. More concretely, suppose that on average white women are more likely to respond to white men then black men. (Presumably, in such a situation, exceptions would involve cases in which other factors made a white man a less desirable conversation partner or a black man a more desirable conversation partner.) If, as a consequence, black men on average message white women less than do white men, we might

observe few differences between the rates at which white women respond to black and white men because all of a woman's anticipated discernment is already accounted for by the men.

For these reasons, given the relatively robust and positive direct political sorting we find in our analysis of men's messaging behavior, it is useful to think of three potential patterns of coefficient in this analysis: (1) positive coefficients would indicate that women are reinforcing the initial political sorting created by men's; (2) negative coefficients would mean that women are undoing men's sorting; and (3) null effects suggest that women are not contributing to sorting above and beyond what men have done (perhaps in anticipation of women's behavior or because women do not consider these factors at all).

Once again, we present our analysis both in tabular form (selected regression coefficients in Table 5, complete regression analysis in Appendix Table A2) and graphically in Figure 3. The base model specification here employs women fixed effects, although we also consider the robustness of our results to the inclusion of man fixed effects. Interestingly, as shown in Figure 3A, for some demographic variables, women are reinforcing men's initial sorting whereas for others they are undoing them. For example, white women are more likely to respond to messages from white men than from black men, despite the fact that our earlier analysis showed that white men were far more likely to send messages to white than black women and black men exhibit a similar same-race preference (estimated effect of 5.5 percentage points, $p<.001$). White women are therefore sorting on race above and beyond the manner in which men are doing so. By contrast, black women are less likely to respond to messages from black men than white men (estimated effect: -5.3 percentage points, $p<.001$), thereby undoing some of the sorting black and white men are doing when considering whether to send a message to a black women in the first place. How big are these effects in substantive terms? As shown in Table 5, women reply to a message sent to them 25% of the time, meaning that matching on race increases the probability a white woman responds by about 22% while decreasing it by 21% among black women.

What is the effect of political predispositions on predicting women's replying behavior? As shown in panel B of Figure 3, in most cases, women either modestly reinforce men's political sorting or appear to simply accede to it. Across the 14 marginal effects presented in Figure 3B, we estimate 11

positive coefficients (half are significant at $p<.10$, and six at $p<.05$) and 3 negative, insignificant ones (minimum $p>.50$). There are notable statistically significant and positive results for each of the three political constructs. With respect to political identity, liberal women reinforce sorting based on political ideology. Liberal women are 2.0 percentage points more likely to reply to liberal men's initial messages than conservative men, an increase in the baseline reply rate of about 8% ($p < .001$). (Conservative women exhibit a smaller and statistically insignificant preference for conservative men, $p=.28$. Sorting on the basis of partisanship is also estimated to be positive, but the effects are not statistically significant ($p = .06$ for Democratic women preferring Democratic to Republican men.) As with men, political identity in the form of media preferences appears to have little effect on women's political sorting. For issue positions, women who take the liberal position on church-state separation are more likely to respond to socially-liberal men (1.3 percentage points, 5.4%, $p < .001$). (The effect for conservative women is negative and statistically insignificant.) Similarly, regarding how to balance the budget, fiscally liberal women respond more to fiscally liberal men (1.1 percentage points, 4.4%, $p<.01$), while the effect among fiscally conservative women is also positive but statistically insignificant. With respect to political engagement, politically-interested women are more likely to reply to politically-interested men (2.8 percentage points, 11.3%, $p < .001$) and less politically interested women behave similarly (1.5 percentage points, 6.2%, $p<.01$). Finally, women who do not think that voting is a civic duty are more likely to respond to similarly less civic-minded men (0.9 percentage points, 3.5%, $p< .01$). These results are similar in a model including all seven political variables (see column (9) of Table 5).

The robustness checks confirm this evidence of direct political sorting by women. First, estimating the model with man fixed-effects and controls for female attractiveness generates similar coefficient estimates (see column (10) of Table 5). Second, the results are robust to the inclusion of additional attitudinal match questions (see column (11) of Table 5 and appendix Figure A2). We also obtain similar results when re-estimating the models using logistic regression, or fourth, restricting analysis to those who answered more than four of the political questions. Fifth, the placebo messaging Monte Carlo estimates displayed in Appendix Figure 3 show that for the political items for which the

regression results are statistically significant in the all political items specification (column 10), the coefficient estimates from the actual data are also in the far tails of the distributions of coefficients from simulated random messaging behavior (based on men's and women's reply rates and conditional on actual male initial messaging).

Overall, these results show that for some important political factors, women are reinforcing men's initial political sorting. Further, women never undo men's initial sorting. This means that direct political sorting is not solely driven by men, nor is it driven solely by the inclusion of the political characteristics in the match statistics that men may be taking into account when choosing which women to contact.

Predicting Joint Interaction

As a final analysis, we examine whether both a man and a woman communicated with one another in a given dyad. In other words, did a man send an initial message *and* did the woman reply? This analysis combines the previous two analyses to produce a single estimate explaining joint interaction. The coefficient estimates from the model are presented in Table 6. We again calculate marginal effects for the non-political factors based on the column (1) estimates and for the political variables based on the models including the seven political variables individually (see columns (2)-(8)). As shown in Figure 4A, several key non-political variables significantly affect joint sorting. These include age, height, education, race, preference for long- or short-term dating, religion, and attitudes toward children. Apart from the effect of shared race for black men, which has an estimated effect of 2.3 percentage points (or nearly 383% of the baseline rate of 0.6% for joint messaging), the remainder of these non-political variables have an average effect of 0.26%, or about 40% of the observed rate of joint messaging.

In the case of the political variables, we again find evidence for political social sorting based on political identity, issue positions, and political engagement. For the *Political Identity* measures, liberal dyads and conservative dyads are more likely to consummate contact compared to mixed dyads. For example, a liberal man-liberal woman pair is 0.25 percentage points ($p<.001$) more likely to jointly message than a liberal man-conservative woman pair. Although this point estimate appears small, note

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from Table 1 that the baseline probability of joint messaging is only 0.6%. Hence, shared political ideology results in a 42% increase in the probability of joint interaction. The effect for conservative man-conservative woman pairs is similarly large (0.31 percentage points, 50%, $p<.001$). We also find that shared partisanship also influences sorting. A Republican-Republican pair is .32 percentage points more likely to jointly message compared to a mixed pair ($p = .01$). The same is true for Democratic-Democratic pairs (.22, $p<.001$). As before, the effect of shared media preferences is small and never statistically significant.

In terms of *Issue Positions*, shared views about how to balance the budget are associated with an increase of 0.15 (cut service match; 25%, $p<.001$) and .10 (raise taxes match, 17%, $p<.001$) percentage point increase in the probability of joint messaging. For attitudes about church state separation the effects are roughly as large, .05 (separate religion from policy, 8.4%) and .26 (allow religion to shape policy, 42%) percentage points, but have larger p-values (.04 and .01, respectively).

Finally, for *Political Engagement*, stated personal importance of politics also appears to shape the likelihood of bilateral communication. Shared high interest (0.28 percentage points, 46%, $p<.001$) and shared low interest (.38 percentage points, 62%, $p<.001$) increase the probability of both parties sending a message. The effect of views about the duty to vote are minimal (both users saying that people do have a duty exhibits an effect less than .02 percentage points, $p>.10$; both users saying that people do not have a duty exhibits an effect of .11 percentage points, $p<.001$).

Robustness checks support these results: (1) models including female fixed effects (see column (10) of Table 6); (2) models including additional match variables (see column (11) of Table 6 and Appendix Figure A4); and (3) models employing logistic regressions. Of particular note, including 40 additional match questions, some with political content, reduces somewhat the estimated effect of some of the political variables, but ideology (for dyads with liberal men), political interest, and beliefs about economic policy remain clearly statistically significant.

Discussion

The analysis presented here provides strong evidence of political social sorting in the formation of social relationships. In the aggregate, dyads in which men message women, women respond, and both men and women communicate, are all more politically similar than if messaging took place randomly. This is strong evidence of overall political sorting because we show that shared political preferences precede relationship formation rather than following from it. Additionally, we provide strongly suggestive evidence that this sorting is direct. Even after accounting for all the other factors included in our statistical model, men are more likely to message women if they share: (1) the same political identity (partisanship and ideology); (2) positions on economic and social issues; and (3) level of political engagement. In many cases, women reinforce sorting across these three political characteristics in their replying behavior and never undo it. Finally, dyads of users are more likely to jointly message if they exhibit shared political characteristics.

These findings have important implications for major research areas in the study of American political behavior. Contributing to the extensive sociological literature on homophily and homogamy, we find that online dating pairings where communication takes place display greater political polarization than the population as a whole. We strengthen this extant literature by documenting that shared political preferences precede relationship formation and showing that these political preferences directly explain the decision to communicate. Hence, we provide a more direct test of the claim that polarization originates in political sorting because our results are not confounded by post-relationship formation influences. Moreover, we provide behavioral evidence of this political sorting outside the survey context. Finally, our findings speak not only to assortative mating based upon politics, but also to the effect of political predispositions on the formation of social relationships more broadly.

Further, our findings have important implications for the growing literature on the effects of social networks and the contextual environment on attitudes and behaviors, both in the political domain and outside of it (e.g., McClurg 2006; Christakis and Fowler 2007, 2008; Klofstad 2007; Heaney and McClurg 2009). We clearly show that the social environments individuals form—including their romantic

attachments—are not random and are instead inclined toward shared political characteristics. Although the criticism that homophily is a confounder of results positing social contagion is not new (see, e.g., Cohen-Cole and Fletcher 2008; Noel and Nyhan 2011; Fowler et al. 2011), our analysis reinforces this concern, particularly in the study of politics, by showing that shared preferences precede the creation of those relationships.

Moreover, our findings speak to the literature on political polarization in the United States. In addition to documenting greater political homophily in online dating pairings, we also provide evidence that people are directly selecting mates based on shared political characteristics. This sorting reduces political disagreement within the household, which risks creating homogenous political enclaves. Homogenous political environments may in turn increase polarization and decrease political tolerance (Mutz 2002). In particular, homogenous parents may produce more ideologically extreme children via socialization because the transmission of attitudes from parents to children is believed to be heightened when parents share similar beliefs (e.g. Jennings and Niemi 1968; Jennings et al. 2009).[22] Additionally, if political attitudes are partially the result of genetic transmission (Alford et al. 2005), then the lack of mixing of highly-variant traits will also result in less-moderate offspring. Finally, evidence of assortative mating increases support for genetic explanations of variation in political attitudes.[23]

Our analysis also lays the groundwork for future research. The next step is to examine the entire process of political socialization. In this analysis, we show that political attitudes influence social sorting, thereby shaping individuals' contextual environments. However, if the social environment affects political attitudes as well, greater initial homogeneity in relationships may feedback into additional preferences for greater sorting in subsequent generations. Studying this complex process requires longitudinal data, in which we can examine how people's social environments and attitude change over

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[22] Further, transmission is more likely in politicized households (Jennings and Niemi 1968; Jennings et al. 2009). Therefore, if sorting also occurs with respect to political interest, then homogenization will be even more powerful.
[23] The standard methodology of twin studies assumes that parents share none of their genetic material (meaning that fraternal twins share exactly 50% of the same genes). If instead mates are selecting each other based on political characteristics, the genetic components of political attitudes that have been found in twin studies are actually underestimated. This is because the differences in political characteristics between fraternal and identical twins—the measure of the effect of genetic similarity—will be biased downwards in the presence of assortative mating.

time.[24] Such data would also allow us to explore conversion, or how people can affect each other's political beliefs. Additionally, future research can examine the effect of pre-match characteristics on social interactions besides dating, such as friendships and workplace relationships.

Subsequent analyses can also address the issue of causality more directly. We argue that our statistical models testing direct political sorting provide evidence that such sorting takes place. As with all observational analysis, our work rests on an untestable assumption about omitted variables bias. Building on this work, one could imagine running a field experiment (in the online dating context or otherwise) where an individual's expressed political characteristics are manipulated. The researcher can then measure the characteristics of people who are attracted to the subject. Similarly, one could build on prior research (Nickerson 2005; Duncan et al. 2005; Kremer and Levy 2008) using randomly assigned college roommates to study the effect of shared political characteristics on the formation of social relationships and the effect of those relationships on subsequent beliefs.

A second limitation of our work is that we do not know the precise mechanism by which direct political sorting takes place within the site. For example, it could be that political predispositions affect the match score, which then influences men's initial messaging. Alternatively, it could be that political predispositions are reflected in the profile text or in the content of messages. However, we know that for the women's replying behavior, it is not the match score driving the sorting because the man has already made the initial contact and the match score is not displayed to those who receive a message. This concern aside, no matter the precise underlying mechanism, we find strong evidence of overall political social sorting, yielding homophily. Third, we examine only online dating behavior and not marriages, limiting our ability to show how initial political sorting in dating shapes the pool of subsequent marriages. However, by not solely focusing on marriages, we believe our data are more informative of non-romantic social relationships more broadly in which initial, casual interactions between people form the basis for subsequent social interactions.

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[24] Of course, studying such environmental effects is likely to be difficult if those environments are themselves the function of different preferences for shared political characteristics.

These limitations notwithstanding, this analysis features several strengths in studying political social sorting compared to previous research. First, we leverage a novel dataset characterized by actual behavior and not survey reports. Second, we are able to observe and measure pre-match individual characteristics, allowing us to disentangle the effects of sorting, conversion, and shared environment. Third, our findings are robust to an extensive and diverse set of covariates rarely found in public opinion surveys. Fourth, we conduct an extensive number of robustness checks, underscoring the strength and stability of the findings. Fifth, we calculate meaningful benchmarks, comparing the effects of political sorting to sorting based on demographic characteristics such as race and religion. This allows us to more straightforwardly interpret our results in substantive terms. Finally, because we are analyzing a set of users in the same environment, we control for the pool of potential mates.

Although political socialization has a longstanding intellectual tradition in political science, the rise of online social networking has reinvigorated the study of the effect of social context on political attitudes and behavior. Accordingly, an important preliminary question is: Do political predispositions influence how people select their social relationships to begin with? With a unique dataset and approach, we have addressed this important question. People do seem to construct their social lives around politics, and such sorting appears, in part, to be direct. Of continuing importance, this finding may help explain polarization as well as the increased homogenization of political beliefs within social networks.

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Table 1: Selected Summary Statistics for Men and Women Included in Data Analysis

	Cases included in Men's Messaging Behavior and Joint Messaging Analysis		Cases included in Women's Replying Behavior Analysis	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
People	5882	6195	32116	35410
Minimum number of Political Questions Answered (of 7)	4	4	3	3
Men Sampled per 2-digit zip code	600	600	600	600
Women Sampled per 2-digit zip code	600	600	600	600
Political Questions Answered	6.551	6.554	5.159	5.129
	[.4974]	[.4971]	[1.2098]	[1.1958]
Man's messaging rate (prop. women in dataset sent message)	0.014	0.014		
	[.0126]	[.018]		
Proportion of dyads where both sent messages	0.006	0.006		
	[.0049]	[.0058]		
Prop. of time man messages that woman responds in dataset	0.589	0.633	0.312	0.339
	[.3125]	[.3142]	[.1952]	[.1827]
Age in Years	29.402	30.481	29.006	29.701
	[9.3356]	[9.0767]	[8.5297]	[8.4876]
Height, Quintiles	0.247	0.745	0.221	0.710
	[1.4941]	[1.5124]	[1.484]	[1.5341]
Educ = H.S.	0.049	0.068	0.044	0.065
	[.2155]	[.2511]	[.2056]	[.2469]
Educ = Assoc. Degree	0.085	0.102	0.070	0.092
	[.2784]	[.3029]	[.2551]	[.289]
Educ = College	0.529	0.508	0.524	0.502
	[.4992]	[.5]	[.4994]	[.5]
Educ = Grad.	0.221	0.181	0.237	0.175
	[.415]	[.3851]	[.425]	[.3802]
Educ = Null	0.117	0.141	0.126	0.166
	[.321]	[.348]	[.3313]	[.372]
Race = Black	0.041	0.042	0.039	0.041
	[.199]	[.2002]	[.1942]	[.1993]
Race = Hispanic	0.056	0.055	0.054	0.061
	[.2292]	[.2284]	[.2265]	[.2384]
Race = White	0.680	0.696	0.658	0.661
	[.4665]	[.46]	[.4743]	[.4734]
Race = None	0.072	0.058	0.083	0.078
	[.2581]	[.2331]	[.2764]	[.2679]
Race not White, Black, Hisp., None	0.151	0.149	0.165	0.159
	[.3584]	[.3564]	[.3711]	[.3661]
Looking for Friends	0.871	0.873	0.855	0.878
	[.3356]	[.3334]	[.3522]	[.3276]
Looking for Long-term Dating	0.807	0.853	0.798	0.825
	[.3945]	[.3542]	[.4017]	[.3801]
Looking for Short-term Dating	0.583	0.747	0.578	0.727
	[.4931]	[.435]	[.494]	[.4453]
Looking for Activities Partners	0.390	0.558	0.350	0.519
	[.4877]	[.4967]	[.477]	[.4996]
Looking for Penpal	0.156	0.192	0.116	0.155
	[.363]	[.3937]	[.3205]	[.3618]
Looking for Sex	0.015	0.072	0.015	0.084
	[.1214]	[.258]	[.1222]	[.277]
Religion = Atheist/Agnostic	0.246	0.301	0.204	0.245
	[.4309]	[.4587]	[.4032]	[.43]
Religion = Other	0.189	0.188	0.190	0.185
	[.3917]	[.3904]	[.3922]	[.3884]
Religion = Null	0.219	0.212	0.275	0.278
	[.4138]	[.4085]	[.4464]	[.4481]
Religion = Christian	0.232	0.206	0.211	0.189
	[.4219]	[.4044]	[.4077]	[.3918]
Religion = Catholic	0.114	0.094	0.121	0.102
	[.3173]	[.2918]	[.3256]	[.3032]
Q Pol Ideology? Liberal	0.525	0.391	0.508	0.354
	[.4994]	[.4879]	[.5]	[.4781]
Q Pol Ideology? Centrist	0.102	0.173	0.097	0.147
	[.3025]	[.378]	[.2958]	[.3539]
Q Pol Ideology? Conservative	0.086	0.119	0.071	0.106
	[.2809]	[.3238]	[.2572]	[.308]
Q Pol Ideology? None	0.197	0.255	0.196	0.274

Table 1: Selected Summary Statistics for Men and Women Included in Data Analysis

	Cases included in Men's Messaging Behavior and Joint Messaging Analysis		Cases included in Women's Replying Behavior Analysis	
	Women	Men	Women	Men
People	5882	6195	32116	35410
Minimum number of Political Questions Answered (of 7)	4	4	3	3
Men Sampled per 2-digit zip code	600	600	600	600
Women Sampled per 2-digit zip code	600	600	600	600
Q Pol Ideology? Missing	0.089	0.063	0.128	0.120
	[.3981]	[.4358]	[.397]	[.4459]
Q Pol PID? Republican	0.043	0.070	0.022	0.030
	[.2851]	[.2429]	[.3344]	[.3246]
Q Pol PID? Democrat	0.271	0.229	0.153	0.104
	[.2029]	[.2553]	[.1449]	[.1711]
Q Pol PID? Indpt./Else	0.205	0.369	0.111	0.177
	[.4444]	[.4199]	[.36]	[.3055]
Q Pol PID? None	0.036	0.058	0.021	0.029
	[.4036]	[.4826]	[.3143]	[.382]
Q Pol PID? Missing	0.445	0.274	0.693	0.659
	[.1873]	[.2343]	[.1446]	[.1681]
Q Prefer Info Source? Fox News	0.091	0.108	0.066	0.084
	[.497]	[.4461]	[.4612]	[.474]
Q Prefer Info Source? CNN	0.273	0.221	0.227	0.181
	[.2876]	[.3104]	[.2479]	[.2767]
Q Prefer Info Source? MSNBC	0.105	0.088	0.079	0.068
	[.4456]	[.4148]	[.4186]	[.3854]
Q Prefer Info Source? None of these	0.507	0.574	0.382	0.468
	[.3062]	[.2828]	[.2704]	[.2514]
Q Prefer Info Source? Missing	0.024	0.009	0.246	0.200
	[.5]	[.4945]	[.4859]	[.499]
Q Role Gov't? Church state separate	0.925	0.933	0.793	0.806
	[.154]	[.0955]	[.4308]	[.3998]
Q Role Gov't? Majority Religion shape policy	0.060	0.061	0.040	0.049
	[.2631]	[.2497]	[.4049]	[.3952]
Q Role Gov't? Missing	0.015	0.006	0.166	0.144
	[.2372]	[.2394]	[.1967]	[.2166]
Q How balance budget? Cut Services	0.312	0.458	0.130	0.207
	[.1214]	[.076]	[.3724]	[.3514]
Q How balance budget? Raise Taxes	0.441	0.460	0.179	0.190
	[.4633]	[.4983]	[.3364]	[.4052]
Q How balance budget? Missing	0.247	0.082	0.691	0.603
	[.4965]	[.4984]	[.3831]	[.3919]
Q Pol Impt? Very Impt.	0.262	0.232	0.208	0.180
	[.4313]	[.2744]	[.462]	[.4892]
Q Pol Impt? Somewhat Impt.	0.397	0.394	0.388	0.363
	[.4395]	[.4218]	[.4057]	[.3839]
Q Pol Impt? A Little Impt.	0.207	0.223	0.220	0.230
	[.4893]	[.4887]	[.4872]	[.4808]
Q Pol Impt? Not at All Impt.	0.127	0.147	0.129	0.176
	[.4052]	[.4161]	[.4142]	[.4209]
Q Pol Impt? Missing	0.007	0.005	0.056	0.052
	[.3334]	[.3537]	[.3349]	[.3807]
Q Duty vote? Yes	0.764	0.713	0.692	0.624
	[.0832]	[.0717]	[.23]	[.2212]
Q Duty vote? No	0.225	0.280	0.201	0.283
	[.425]	[.4524]	[.4617]	[.4844]
Q Duty vote? Missing	0.012	0.007	0.108	0.093
	[.4175]	[.4491]	[.4004]	[.4504]
	[.1077]	[.083]	[.3097]	[.2906]

Mean with standard deviations in brackets

Table 2A: Observed Homogeneity for Selected Characteristics, for all potential dyads and those in which communication occurs

	Men's Sending Behavior			Women's Replying Behavior			Joint Communication Behavior		
	Proportion Matching			Proportion Matching			Proportion Matching		
Characteristic	Among All Dyads	If Man Sends First Message	Proportional Increase in Match Rate	Among All Dyads Where Man Sent First Message	If Woman Replies	Proportional Increase in Match Rate	Among All Dyads	If Man Sends Message and Woman Replies	Proportional Increase in Match Rate
Match Height Quintile	24.5%	26.6%	8.6%	25.5%	26.7%	4.6%	24.5%	27.3%	11.7%
Match Race	58.8%	60.4%	2.7%	58.8%	62.8%	6.8%	58.8%	63.1%	7.4%
Match Religion	28.9%	37.4%	29.5%	35.9%	38.8%	8.1%	28.9%	40.0%	38.5%
Match Ideology	34.5%	38.7%	12.2%	39.6%	41.9%	5.7%	34.5%	41.1%	19.3%
Match Partisanship	36.9%	40.0%	8.3%	39.5%	41.1%	4.1%	36.9%	41.0%	11.2%
Match Media Preferences	38.8%	40.9%	5.3%	40.6%	42.9%	5.5%	38.8%	43.1%	11.0%
Match Role of Church	88.3%	89.0%	0.8%	90.0%	90.9%	1.0%	88.3%	89.7%	1.6%
Match How Balance Budget	52.0%	56.1%	7.8%	55.4%	57.3%	3.4%	52.0%	57.8%	11.1%
Match Political Interest	29.0%	31.8%	9.4%	30.8%	32.2%	4.6%	29.0%	33.2%	14.5%
Match Duty to Vote	62.1%	64.2%	3.4%	62.7%	63.2%	0.7%	62.1%	64.7%	4.2%

Note: Cell entries in each block (e.g., Men's Sending Behavior) are first the proportion of dyads that match for a given row variable (e.g., both heights in the same quintile), second the proportion matching for the subset of dyads in which the outcome of interest occurs (e.g., the man sends the woman a message), and third the proportional increase in matching from the first to the second. All differences between dyads in which the outcome of interest takes place and the remaining dyads are significant at p<.001 (t-tests). For race, religion, and each of the political variables, all statistics exclude individuals who did not provide a response (there are no missing cases for height quintile).

Table 2b: Observed Homogeneity for Selected Binary Characteristics, for all potential dyads and those in which communication occurs

	Men's Sending Behavior			Women's Replying Behavior			Joint Communication Behavior		
	Proportion Matching			Proportion Matching			Proportion Matching		
Characteristic	Among All Dyads	If Man Sends First Message	Proportional Increase in Match Rate	Among All Dyads Where Man Sent First Message	If Woman Replies	Proportional Increase in Match Rate	Among All Dyads	If Man Sends Message and Woman Replies	Proportional Increase in Match Rate
Match Height Quintile (Tall-Tall or Short-Short)	3.1%	3.4%	10.4%	3.9%	3.6%	-7.3%	3.1%	3.4%	9.9%
Match Race (White-White or Black-Black)	55.5%	55.1%	-0.7%	52.4%	56.7%	8.2%	55.5%	58.5%	5.5%
Match Religion (Christian-Christian or Athiest/Agnostic-Athiest/Agnostic)	21.3%	28.5%	33.7%	24.3%	26.7%	10.1%	21.3%	30.3%	42.5%
Match Ideology (Liberal-Liberal or Conservative-Conservative)	26.1%	29.2%	11.9%	29.3%	30.5%	4.0%	26.1%	31.0%	19.0%
Match Partisanship (Democrat-Democrat or Republican-Republican)	17.4%	20.0%	15.0%	19.6%	19.8%	1.2%	17.4%	20.5%	18.0%
Match Media Preferences (MSNBC-MSNBC of FOX-FOX)	2.3%	3.0%	31.0%	2.6%	2.7%	4.1%	2.3%	3.0%	32.7%
Match Role of Church (binary)	88.3%	89.0%	0.8%	90.0%	90.9%	1.0%	88.3%	89.7%	1.6%
Match How Balance Budget (binary)	52.0%	56.1%	7.8%	55.4%	57.3%	3.4%	52.0%	57.8%	11.1%
Match Political Interest (Very-Very or Not at all-Not at all)	8.4%	10.7%	27.1%	9.0%	9.9%	10.2%	8.4%	11.4%	35.4%
Match Duty to Vote (binary)	62.1%	64.2%	3.4%	62.7%	63.2%	0.7%	62.1%	64.7%	4.2%

Note: Cell entries in each block (e.g., Men's Sending Behavior) are first the proportion of dyads that match for a given row variable (e.g., both heights in the top or bottom quintile), second the proportion matching for the subset of dyads in which the outcome of interest occurs (e.g., the man sends the woman a message), and third the proportional increase in matching from the first to the second. All differences between dyads in which the outcome of interest takes place and the remaining dyads are significant at p<.05 (t-tests) except for the three cells with thick black outlines. For race, religion, and each of the political variables, all statistics exclude individuals who did not provide a response (there are no missing cases for height quintile).

Table 2: Observed Homogeneity for Selected Characteristics, for all potential dyads and those in which communication occurs

Characteristic	Men's Sending Behavior			Women's Replying Behavior			Joint Communication Behavior		
	All Dyads	If Man Sends First Message	Proportional Increase in Match Rate	All Dyads Where Man Sent First Message	If Woman Replies	Proportional Increase in Match Rate	All Dyads	If Man Sends Message and Woman Replies	Proportional Increase in Match Rate
Match Height (Both quintile 1 or 5 among dyads with each)	56.2%	62.4%	11.1%	60.0%	62.3%	3.8%	56.2%	63.4%	12.9%
Match Race (Both White or Black among dyads with each)	89.7%	93.6%	4.4%	93.3%	94.8%	1.6%	89.7%	94.6%	5.5%
Match Religion (Both Atheist/Agnostic or Christian among dyads with each)	53.0%	68.6%	29.5%	68.5%	72.1%	5.4%	53.0%	72.1%	36.2%
Match Ideology (Both Conservative or Liberal among dyads with each)	71.7%	78.7%	9.8%	79.5%	82.7%	4.0%	71.7%	82.3%	14.9%
Match Partisanship (Both Democrat or Republican among dyads with each)	56.3%	66.8%	18.7%	63.0%	68.7%	9.1%	56.3%	71.7%	27.4%
Match Media Preferences (Both Fox or MSNBC among dyads with each)	73.3%	79.8%	9.0%	80.1%	83.3%	3.9%	73.3%	83.0%	13.2%
Match Role of Church (Both shape policy or separate among dyads with each)	62.1%	64.2%	3.4%	62.7%	63.2%	0.7%	62.1%	64.7%	4.2%
Match How Balance Budget (Both Cut Spending or Raises taxes among dyads with each)	88.3%	89.0%	0.8%	90.0%	90.9%	1.0%	88.3%	89.7%	1.6%
Match Political Interest (Both Very or Not at all among dyads with each)	53.0%	57.6%	8.7%	56.3%	57.5%	2.2%	53.0%	58.8%	10.9%
Match Duty to Vote (Both Yes or No among dyads with each)	52.0%	56.1%	7.8%	55.4%	57.3%	3.4%	52.0%	57.8%	11.1%

Note: Cell entries in each block (e.g., Men's Sending Behavior) are first the proportion of dyads that match for a given row variable (e.g., both heights in the quintile 1 or 5 versus one in each) relative to all dyads involving members with those characteristics (e.g., all dyads where men and women are height 1 or 5), second the proportion matching for the subset of dyads in which the outcome of interest occurs (e.g., the man sends the woman a message), and third the proportional increase in matching from the first to the second. All differences between dyads in which the outcome of interest takes place and the remaining dyads are significant at p<.05 (t-tests).

Table 3: Selected Regression Results for Models Predicting Men's Messaging Behavior

Dependent variable is man's messaging behavior (1=first sent message to woman, 0=no)	(1) Fixed Effects for Man	(2) Fixed Effects for Man	(3) Fixed Effects for Man	(4) Fixed Effects for Man	(5) Fixed Effects for Man	(6) Fixed Effects for Man	(7) Fixed Effects for Man	(8) Fixed Effects for Man	(9) Fixed Effects for Man	(10) Fixed Effects for Woman	(11) Fixed Effects for Man; All questions
M age 30 to 34, F age 25 to 29	0.014 [0.001011]***	0.014 [0.001012]***	0.014 [0.001015]***	0.014 [0.001012]***	0.014 [0.001011]***	0.014 [0.001012]***	0.014 [0.001015]***	0.014 [0.001013]***	0.014 [0.001021]***	0.019 [0.000753]***	0.014 [0.002522]***
M age 30 to 34, F age 30 to 34	0.017 [0.001149]***	0.017 [0.001150]***	0.017 [0.001152]***	0.017 [0.001150]***	0.017 [0.001148]***	0.017 [0.001149]***	0.017 [0.001152]***	0.017 [0.001150]***	0.017 [0.001156]***	0.017 [0.001290]***	0.017 [0.002546]***
M age 30 to 34, F age 35 to 39	0.004 [0.001029]***	0.005 [0.001150]***	0.004 [0.001030]***	0.004 [0.001028]***	0.004 [0.001027]***	0.005 [0.001027]***	0.004 [0.001026]***	0.004 [0.001027]***	0.005 [0.001031]***	-0.001 [0.002024]	0.005 [0.002584]*
M educ college, F educ hs	0.000 [0.000563]	0.000 [0.000564]	0.000 [0.000563]	0.000 [0.000563]	0.000 [0.000563]	0.000 [0.000563]	0.000 [0.000565]	0.000 [0.000564]	0.000 [0.000565]	-0.002 [0.001036]**	0.000 [0.000656]
M educ college, F educ assoc	0.000 [0.000513]	0.000 [0.000513]	0.000 [0.000513]	0.000 [0.000513]	0.000 [0.000513]	0.000 [0.000513]	0.000 [0.000513]	0.000 [0.000513]	0.000 [0.000514]	-0.003 [0.000866]***	0.000 [0.000550]
M educ college, F educ college	0.001 [0.000392]***	0.001 [0.000392]***	0.001 [0.000392]***	0.001 [0.000392]***	0.001 [0.000392]***	0.001 [0.000392]***	0.001 [0.000392]***	0.001 [0.000393]***	0.001 [0.000392]***	0.001 [0.000381]**	0.001 [0.000405]**
M race white, F race white	0.002 [0.000328]***	0.002 [0.000328]***	0.002 [0.000327]***	0.002 [0.000328]***	0.002 [0.000328]***	0.002 [0.000328]***	0.002 [0.000328]***	0.002 [0.000328]***	0.002 [0.000327]***	0.001 [0.000330]***	0.001 [0.000313]***
M race white, F race black	-0.002 [0.000455]***	-0.002 [0.000455]***	-0.002 [0.000457]***	-0.002 [0.000460]***	-0.002 [0.000456]***	-0.002 [0.000455]***	-0.002 [0.000455]***	-0.002 [0.000454]***	-0.002 [0.000461]***	-0.003 [0.001227]	-0.002 [0.000613]***
M race black, F race white	-0.007 [0.001571]***	-0.007 [0.001572]***	-0.007 [0.001572]***	-0.007 [0.001570]***	-0.007 [0.001572]***	-0.007 [0.001570]***	-0.007 [0.001568]***	-0.007 [0.001571]***	-0.007 [0.001568]***	-0.004 [0.000614]***	-0.007 [0.001227]***
M race black, F race black	0.032 [0.004788]***	0.032 [0.004788]***	0.032 [0.004789]***	0.031 [0.004776]***	0.032 [0.004788]***	0.032 [0.004787]***	0.032 [0.004788]***	0.032 [0.004788]***	0.031 [0.004776]***	0.034 [0.003310]***	0.031 [0.002059]***
Q Pol Ideology? M Liberal F Liberal		0.002 [0.000482]***							0.001 [0.000500]**	0.002 [0.000535]***	0.000 [0.000544]
Q Pol Ideology? M Liberal F Centrist		0.000 [0.000585]							0.000 [0.000596]	0.001 [0.001058]	0.000 [0.000666]
Q Pol Ideology? M Liberal F Conservative		-0.003 [0.000590]***							-0.002 [0.000617]***	-0.003 [0.001061]***	-0.002 [0.000723]**
Q Pol Ideology? M Liberal F None		-0.001 [0.000521]***							-0.002 [0.000543]**	-0.003 [0.000809]***	-0.001 [0.000599]*
Q Pol Ideology? M Centrist F Liberal		0.000 [0.000736]							0.000 [0.000749]	0.001 [0.000547]**	0.000 [0.000771]
Q Pol Ideology? M Centrist F Centrist		0.001 [0.000929]							0.001 [0.000929]	0.002 [0.001148]*	0.001 [0.000953]
Q Pol Ideology? M Centrist F Conservative		0.001 [0.000977]							0.001 [0.000981]	0.000 [0.001123]	0.001 [0.000989]
Q Pol Ideology? M Centrist F None		-0.001 [0.000757]							-0.001 [0.000768]	-0.003 [0.000830]***	-0.001 [0.000844]
Q Pol Ideology? M Conservative F Liberal		-0.004 [0.000851]***							-0.003 [0.000874]***	-0.001 [0.000613]**	-0.002 [0.000901]*
Q Pol Ideology? M Conservative F Centrist		0.000 [0.001064]							0.000 [0.001074]	0.002 [0.001313]	0.000 [0.001111]
Q Pol Ideology? M Conservative F Conservative		0.003 [0.001190]***							0.002 [0.001209]**	0.003 [0.001245]**	0.001 [0.001114]
Q Pol Ideology? M Conservative F None		0.002 [0.000987]*							0.002 [0.001004]*	0.001 [0.000943]	0.002 [0.000972]
Q Pol Ideology? M None F Liberal		-0.001 [0.000644]							0.000 [0.000657]	0.000 [0.000537]	0.000 [0.000636]
Q Pol Ideology? M None F Centrist		0.000 [0.000778]							0.000 [0.000785]	0.002 [0.001093]	0.001 [0.000785]
Q Pol Ideology? M None F Conservative		0.000 [0.000799]							0.001 [0.000804]	0.000 [0.001091]	0.000 [0.000810]
Q Pol Ideology? M None F None		0.001 [0.000687]**							0.001 [0.000686]	0.000 [0.000846]	0.001 [0.000691]
Q Pol Ideology? M Missing F Liberal		-0.002 [0.001222]*							-0.002 [0.001227]		-0.001 [0.001214]
Q Pol Ideology? M Missing F Centrist		-0.002 [0.001544]							-0.002 [0.001544]		-0.002 [0.001517]
Q Pol Ideology? M Missing F Conservative		0.000 [0.001482]							0.000 [0.001494]		-0.001 [0.001520]
Q Pol Ideology? M Missing F None		0.001 [0.001361]							0.000 [0.001366]		0.000 [0.001321]
Q Pol Ideology? M Liberal F Missing										-0.001 [0.001111]	
Q Pol Ideology? M Centrist F Missing										-0.001 [0.001158]	
Q Pol Ideology? M Conservative F Missing										0.000 [0.001233]	
Q Pol Ideology? M None F Missing										-0.001 [0.001124]	
Q Pol PID? M Republican F Republican			0.004 [0.001818]*						0.002 [0.001850]	0.000 [0.002163]	0.001 [0.001511]
Q Pol PID? M Republican F Democrat			-0.003						-0.002	-0.001	-0.001

Table 3: Selected Regression Results for Models Predicting Men's Messaging Behavior

Dependent variable is man's messaging behavior (1=first sent message to woman, 0=no)	(1) Fixed Effects for Man	(2) Fixed Effects for Man	(3) Fixed Effects for Man	(4) Fixed Effects for Man	(5) Fixed Effects for Man	(6) Fixed Effects for Man	(7) Fixed Effects for Man	(8) Fixed Effects for Man	(9) Fixed Effects for Man	(10) Fixed Effects for Woman	(11) Fixed Effects for Man; All questions
			[0.000861]***						[0.000863]**	[0.000728]	[0.000847]
Q Pol PID? M Republican F Indpt./Else			-0.002						-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
			[0.001010]**						[0.001019]**	[0.000854]	[0.000867]
Q Pol PID? M Republican F None			0.001						0.001	0.001	0.001
			[0.001985]						[0.001978]	[0.001958]	[0.001823]
Q Pol PID? M Democrat F Republican			-0.003						-0.002	-0.004	-0.002
			[0.000783]***						[0.000812]**	[0.001301]***	[0.001001]*
Q Pol PID? M Democrat F Democrat			0.001						0.001	0.001	0.000
			[0.000483]***						[0.000490]	[0.000521]	[0.000468]
Q Pol PID? M Democrat F Indpt./Else			0.000						0.000	0.000	0.000
			[0.000504]						[0.000512]	[0.000578]	[0.000508]
Q Pol PID? M Democrat F None			0.000						0.000	-0.001	0.000
			[0.000897]						[0.000907]	[0.001125]	[0.001000]
Q Pol PID? M Indpt./Else F Republican			-0.001						-0.001	-0.003	0.000
			[0.000696]						[0.000712]	[0.001090]**	[0.000734]
Q Pol PID? M Indpt./Else F Democrat			0.000						0.000	0.000	0.000
			[0.000411]						[0.000416]	[0.000455]	[0.000377]
Q Pol PID? M Indpt./Else F Indpt./Else			0.000						0.000	0.001	0.000
			[0.000457]						[0.000466]	[0.000494]**	[0.000396]
Q Pol PID? M Indpt./Else F None			0.000						-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
			[0.000735]						[0.000739]	[0.001026]	[0.000795]
Q Pol PID? M None F Republican			-0.005						-0.005	-0.007	-0.005
			[0.001579]***						[0.001595]***	[0.001421]***	[0.001797]***
Q Pol PID? M None F Democrat			-0.002						-0.001	0.000	-0.002
			[0.001003]*						[0.001008]	[0.000754]	[0.000909]*
Q Pol PID? M None F Indpt./Else			0.001						0.000	0.002	0.000
			[0.001033]						[0.001036]	[0.000927]**	[0.000970]
Q Pol PID? M None F None			-0.004						-0.005	-0.005	-0.005
			[0.001791]**						[0.001790]***	[0.001901]**	[0.001968]**
Q Pol PID? M Missing F Republican			0.002						0.002		0.002
			[0.000854]***						[0.000868]**		[0.000792]**
Q Pol PID? M Missing F Democrat			0.000						0.000		0.000
			[0.000458]						[0.000469]		[0.000429]
Q Pol PID? M Missing F Indpt./Else			0.000						0.000		0.000
			[0.000465]						[0.000477]		[0.000448]
Q Pol PID? M Missing F None			0.001						0.001		0.001
			[0.000940]						[0.000945]		[0.000912]
Q Pol PID? M Republican F Missing										0.001	
										[0.000598]	
Q Pol PID? M Democrat F Missing										0.000	
										[0.000395]	
Q Pol PID? M Indpt./Else F Missing										0.000	
										[0.000334]	
Q Pol PID? M None F Missing										0.001	
										[0.000625]	
Q Prefer Info Source? M Fox News F Fox News				0.005					0.004	0.002	0.002
				[0.001861]***					[0.001857]*	[0.002285]	[0.001692]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Fox News F CNN				0.001					0.001	-0.001	0.001
				[0.001830]					[0.001822]	[0.001723]	[0.001583]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Fox News F MSNBC				0.003					0.003	-0.001	0.002
				[0.001892]					[0.001887]	[0.002869]	[0.001704]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Fox News F None of these				0.000					0.000	0.001	0.000
				[0.001795]					[0.001791]	[0.001138]	[0.001550]
Q Prefer Info Source? M CNN F Fox News				0.000					0.000	0.000	-0.001
				[0.001368]					[0.001374]	[0.002206]	[0.001304]
Q Prefer Info Source? M CNN F CNN				0.000					0.000	0.000	0.000
				[0.001313]					[0.001318]	[0.001710]	[0.001209]
Q Prefer Info Source? M CNN F MSNBC				0.000					-0.001	-0.002	-0.001
				[0.001349]					[0.001355]	[0.002805]	[0.001287]
Q Prefer Info Source? M CNN F None of these				-0.002					-0.002	0.001	-0.002
				[0.001273]*					[0.001278]*	[0.001127]	[0.001186]*
Q Prefer Info Source? M MSNBC F Fox News				-0.002					-0.002	-0.001	-0.002
				[0.002048]					[0.002045]	[0.002261]	[0.002080]
Q Prefer Info Source? M MSNBC F CNN				-0.002					-0.001	-0.001	-0.002
				[0.002000]					[0.001999]	[0.001755]	[0.001931]
Q Prefer Info Source? M MSNBC F MSNBC				-0.001					-0.001	-0.002	-0.001
				[0.002151]					[0.002150]	[0.002927]	[0.002049]
Q Prefer Info Source? M MSNBC F None of these				-0.002					-0.002	0.002	-0.002
				[0.002001]					[0.002002]	[0.001161]	[0.001894]
Q Prefer Info Source? M None of these F Fox News				-0.001					-0.001	-0.002	0.000
				[0.000781]					[0.000787]	[0.002097]	[0.000835]

Table 3: Selected Regression Results for Models Predicting Men's Messaging Behavior

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Dependent variable is man's messaging behavior (1=first sent message to woman, 0=no)	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Woman	Fixed Effects for Man; All questions
Q Prefer Info Source? M None of these F CNN				0.000 [0.000734]					0.000 [0.000736]	-0.002 [0.001668]	0.000 [0.000769]
Q Prefer Info Source? M None of these F MSNBC				0.000 [0.000756]					0.000 [0.000760]	-0.004 [0.002761]	0.000 [0.000816]
Q Prefer Info Source? M None of these F None of these				0.001 [0.000725]*					0.001 [0.000731]*	0.002 [0.001099]**	0.001 [0.000753]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Missing F Fox News				-0.006 [0.005437]					-0.006 [0.005387]		-0.006 [0.005734]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Missing F CNN				-0.005 [0.005467]					-0.005 [0.005463]		-0.005 [0.005390]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Missing F MSNBC				-0.004 [0.004881]					-0.004 [0.004890]		-0.003 [0.005816]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Missing F None of these				-0.008 [0.005674]					-0.009 [0.005675]		-0.008 [0.005266]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Fox News F Missing										-0.008 [0.005651]	
Q Prefer Info Source? M CNN F Missing										-0.005 [0.005819]	
Q Prefer Info Source? M MSNBC F Missing										-0.005 [0.005817]	
Q Prefer Info Source? M None of these F Missing										-0.007 [0.005557]	
Q Role Gov't? M Church state separate F Church state separate				0.000 [0.000641]					0.000 [0.000648]	0.000 [0.001175]	0.000 [0.000729]
Q Role Gov't? M Church state separate F Majority Religion shape policy				0.000 [0.000732]					0.000 [0.000740]	-0.008 [0.005257]	0.000 [0.000804]
Q Role Gov't? M Majority Religion shape policy F Church state separate				-0.002 [0.002990]					-0.001 [0.002999]	0.000 [0.001229]	0.001 [0.002492]
Q Role Gov't? M Majority Religion shape policy F Majority Religion shape policy				0.004 [0.003241]					0.004 [0.003245]	-0.004 [0.005436]	0.003 [0.002756]
Q Role Gov't? M Missing F Church state separate				-0.008 [0.008678]					-0.007 [0.008632]		-0.006 [0.008327]
Q Role Gov't? M Missing F Majority Religion shape policy				0.001 [0.010603]					0.001 [0.010631]		0.001 [0.009282]
Q Role Gov't? M Church state separate F Missing										-0.007 [0.010779]	
Q Role Gov't? M Majority Religion shape policy F Missing										-0.007 [0.011114]	
Q How balance budget? M Cut Services F Cut Services					0.002 [0.000384]***				0.001 [0.000392]***	0.001 [0.000582]**	0.001 [0.000351]***
Q How balance budget? M Cut Services F Raise Taxes					0.000 [0.000358]				0.000 [0.000362]	-0.001 [0.000544]	0.000 [0.000334]
Q How balance budget? M Raise Taxes F Cut Services					-0.002 [0.000344]***				-0.001 [0.000347]***	-0.001 [0.000559]*	-0.001 [0.000369]***
Q How balance budget? M Raise Taxes F Raise Taxes					0.000 [0.000336]				0.000 [0.000340]	0.000 [0.000524]	0.000 [0.000340]
Q How balance budget? M Missing F Cut Services					0.000 [0.000727]				0.000 [0.000726]		0.000 [0.000786]
Q How balance budget? M Missing F Raise Taxes					0.001 [0.000695]				0.000 [0.000696]		0.000 [0.000740]
Q How balance budget? M Cut Services F Missing										0.000 [0.000605]	
Q How balance budget? M Raise Taxes F Missing										0.001 [0.000579]	
Q Pol Impt? M Very Impt. F Very Impt.							0.005 [0.001494]***		0.004 [0.001494]***	0.000 [0.002242]	0.004 [0.002185]*
Q Pol Impt? M Very Impt. F Somewhat Impt.							0.002 [0.001475]		0.002 [0.001478]	0.001 [0.001658]	0.002 [0.002174]
Q Pol Impt? M Very Impt. F A Little Impt.							0.000 [0.001487]		0.000 [0.001490]	-0.003 [0.002411]	0.001 [0.002192]
Q Pol Impt? M Very Impt. F Not at All Impt.							0.000 [0.001479]		0.000 [0.001487]	0.001 [0.002893]	0.001 [0.002222]
Q Pol Impt? M Somewhat Impt. F Very Impt.							-0.003 [0.001573]		-0.003 [0.001579]	-0.001 [0.002209]	-0.003 [0.001675]
Q Pol Impt? M Somewhat Impt. F Somewhat Impt.							-0.003 [0.001550]		-0.003 [0.001556]*	0.002 [0.001630]	-0.003 [0.001666]
Q Pol Impt? M Somewhat Impt. F A Little Impt.							-0.003 [0.001585]**		-0.003 [0.001593]**	-0.001 [0.002416]	-0.003 [0.001679]*
Q Pol Impt? M Somewhat Impt. F Not at All Impt.							-0.003 [0.001584]**		-0.003 [0.001590]**	0.003 [0.002925]	-0.003 [0.001702]*
Q Pol Impt? M A Little Impt. F Very Impt.							-0.001		0.000	-0.003	0.000

Table 3: Selected Regression Results for Models Predicting Men's Messaging Behavior

Dependent variable is man's messaging behavior (1=first sent message to woman, 0=no)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Woman	Fixed Effects for Man; All questions
							[0.001849]		[0.001848]	[0.002219]	[0.002156]
Q Pol Impt? M A Little Impt. F Somewhat Impt.							0.001		0.001	0.001	0.001
							[0.001820]		[0.001823]	[0.001643]	[0.002143]
Q Pol Impt? M A Little Impt. F A Little Impt.							0.003		0.002	0.001	0.002
							[0.001824]		[0.001827]	[0.002428]	[0.002159]
Q Pol Impt? M A Little Impt. F Not at All Impt.							0.001		0.001	0.003	0.001
							[0.001879]		[0.001886]	[0.002909]	[0.002184]
Q Pol Impt? M Not at All Impt. F Very Impt.							-0.001		-0.001	-0.004	0.000
							[0.002332]		[0.002330]	[0.002225]*	[0.002632]
Q Pol Impt? M Not at All Impt. F Somewhat Impt.							0.002		0.002	0.001	0.002
							[0.002333]		[0.002330]	[0.001671]	[0.002616]
Q Pol Impt? M Not at All Impt. F A Little Impt.							0.004		0.004	0.001	0.003
							[0.002403]		[0.002403]	[0.002472]	[0.002636]
Q Pol Impt? M Not at All Impt. F Not at All Impt.							0.006		0.005	0.006	0.004
							[0.002445]**		[0.002448]**	[0.002898]**	[0.002665]
Q Pol Impt? M Missing F Very Impt.							-0.012		-0.012		-0.010
							[0.023764]		[0.023692]		[0.013390]
Q Pol Impt? M Missing F Somewhat Impt.							-0.015		-0.015		-0.013
							[0.022227]		[0.022195]		[0.013324]
Q Pol Impt? M Missing F A Little Impt.							-0.012		-0.012		-0.011
							[0.023471]		[0.023459]		[0.013433]
Q Pol Impt? M Missing F Not at All Impt.							-0.016		-0.017		-0.015
							[0.022512]		[0.022571]		[0.013619]
Q Pol Impt? M Very Impt. F Missing										-0.015	
										[0.016182]	
Q Pol Impt? M Somewhat Impt. F Missing										-0.010	
										[0.016516]	
Q Pol Impt? M A Little Impt. F Missing										-0.014	
										[0.016802]	
Q Pol Impt? M Not at All Impt. F Missing										-0.015	
										[0.016884]	
Q Duty vote? M Yes F Yes							0.001	0.001		0.000	0.001
							[0.001002]	[0.001007]		[0.001153]	[0.000937]
Q Duty vote? M Yes F No							0.000	0.001		0.001	0.001
							[0.001031]	[0.001037]		[0.002036]	[0.000959]
Q Duty vote? M No F Yes							-0.002	-0.002		0.000	-0.002
							[0.001711]	[0.001714]		[0.001158]	[0.001479]
Q Duty vote? M No F No							-0.001	-0.001		0.002	-0.001
							[0.001741]	[0.001741]		[0.002041]	[0.001509]
Q Duty vote? M Missing F Yes							-0.003	-0.002			-0.001
							[0.008322]	[0.008342]			[0.008664]
Q Duty vote? M Missing F No							-0.005	-0.004			-0.002
							[0.008944]	[0.008920]			[0.008849]
Q Duty vote? M Yes F Missing										-0.004	
										[0.009464]	
Q Duty vote? M No F Missing										-0.001	
										[0.009136]	
Woman's received messaging rate (prop. men in dataset sending message)	0.995	0.995	0.995	0.995	0.995	0.995	0.995	0.995	0.994		0.992
	[0.023451]***	[0.023459]***	[0.023445]***	[0.023448]***	[0.023461]***	[0.023470]***	[0.023449]***	[0.023457]***	[0.023485]***		[0.008352]***
Prop. of time woman messaged that she responds in dataset	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000
	[0.000423]	[0.000424]	[0.000423]	[0.000423]	[0.000423]	[0.000423]	[0.000423]	[0.000423]	[0.000423]		[0.000343]
Man's messaging rate (prop. women in dataset sent message)										0.997	
										[0.018146]***	
Prop. of time man messages that woman responds in dataset										0.000	
										[0.000455]	
Constant	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.000	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
	[0.000866]	[0.000895]	[0.000878]	[0.001018]	[0.001082]	[0.000871]	[0.001241]	[0.001223]	[0.001820]	[0.002407]	[0.002533]
Observations (Dyads)	1864247	1864247	1864247	1864247	1864247	1864247	1864247	1864247	1864247	1864247	1864247
R-squared	0.023	0.024	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.024	0.023	0.024	0.035	0.025
Number of man fixed effects	6195	6195	6195	6195	6195	6195	6195	6195	6195		6195
Number of woman fixed effects										5882	

Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the fixed effects level.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Mean of dependent variable in this sample is .0143505662071603.

Table 4: Estimated Indirect and Direct Sources of Political Sorting From Model's predicting Men's Messaging Behavior

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Proportion Matching Among all dyads	Relative to Baseline, Additional Proportion Predicted to Match after accounting for non-political factors	Relative to Baseline, Additional Proportion Predicted to Match after accounting for political and non-political factors	Direct Political Sorting (C3-C2)	Direct Political Sorting relative to Indirect Political Sorting ((C3-C2)/C2)	Proportional Increase in Predicted Match Rates by Direct Political Sorting relative to Baseline (C4/C1)
Match Ideology (Both Conservative or Liberal among all dyads)	0.2217	0.0283	0.0623	0.0340	119.8%	15.3%
Match Partisanship (Both Democrat or Republican among all dyads)	0.0685	0.0004	0.0098	0.0095	2471.0%	13.8%
Match Media Preferences (Both Fox or MSNBC among all dyads)	0.0221	-0.0015	0.0032	0.0048	* (All political sorting is direct)	21.6%
Match Role of Church (Both shape policy or separate among all dyads)	0.8628	0.0152	0.0245	0.0093	60.9%	1.1%
Match How Balance Budget (Both Cut Spending or Raises taxes among all dyads)	0.3516	0.0084	0.0385	0.0302	360.6%	8.6%
Match Political Interest (Both Very or Not at all among all dyads)	0.0831	0.0107	0.0529	0.0422	395.3%	50.8%
Match Duty to Vote (Both Yes or No among all dyads)	0.6085	0.0042	0.0341	0.0299	704.9%	4.9%

Note: Predicted matches shown in columns (2) and (3) are from models shown in column (1) and (9) of Table 3, respectively. Cases where the predicted probability of messaging is more than twice the baseline level of observed messaging (.0294) are coded as 1 for predicted messaging. All differences in predicted match rates (C2 versus C1, C3 versus C1, and C3 versus C2) are statistically significant at p<.01.

Table 5: Selected Regression Results for Models Predicting Women's Responding Behavior

Dependent variable is woman's responding behavior (1=responded to message sent by man, 0=did not respond to message sent by man; Includes only cases where man initially sent message)	(1) Fixed Effects for Woman	(2) Fixed Effects for Woman	(3) Fixed Effects for Woman	(4) Fixed Effects for Woman	(5) Fixed Effects for Woman	(6) Fixed Effects for Woman	(7) Fixed Effects for Woman	(8) Fixed Effects for Woman	(9) Fixed Effects for Woman	(10) Fixed Effects for Man	(11) Fixed Effects for Woman; All Questions
M age 25 to 29, F age 30 to 34	0.123	0.124	0.122	0.124	0.124	0.123	0.124	0.123	0.127	0.243	0.130
	[0.041727]***	[0.041832]***	[0.041677]***	[0.041713]***	[0.041727]***	[0.041760]***	[0.041820]***	[0.041732]***	[0.041874]***	[0.062710]***	[0.051249]**
M age 30 to 34, F age 30 to 34	0.141	0.141	0.140	0.142	0.141	0.141	0.141	0.141	0.144	0.186	0.145
	[0.041667]***	[0.041769]***	[0.041617]***	[0.041650]***	[0.041666]***	[0.041699]***	[0.041756]***	[0.041672]***	[0.041807]***	[0.097156]*	[0.051200]***
M age 35 to 39, F age 30 to 34	0.099	0.100	0.098	0.101	0.100	0.099	0.100	0.099	0.103	0.013	0.105
	[0.041692]**	[0.041794]**	[0.041643]**	[0.041675]**	[0.041692]**	[0.041725]**	[0.041780]**	[0.041698]**	[0.041831]**	[0.077731]	[0.051220]**
M educ hs, F educ college	-0.020	-0.019	-0.020	-0.020	-0.020	-0.020	-0.019	-0.020	-0.018	-0.017	-0.014
	[0.003680]***	[0.003679]***	[0.003681]***	[0.003686]***	[0.003680]***	[0.003680]***	[0.003680]***	[0.003681]***	[0.003688]***	[0.006266]***	[0.003848]***
M educ assoc, F educ college	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-0.016	-0.015	-0.007	-0.012
	[0.003090]***	[0.003090]***	[0.003091]***	[0.003089]***	[0.003091]***	[0.003089]***	[0.003090]***	[0.003092]***	[0.003094]***	[0.005581]	[0.003236]***
M educ college, F educ college	0.013	0.011	0.012	0.013	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.013	0.011	-0.002	0.009
	[0.002218]***	[0.002224]***	[0.002220]***	[0.002218]***	[0.002220]***	[0.002219]***	[0.002227]***	[0.002224]***	[0.002236]***	[0.002704]	[0.002264]***
M race white, F race white	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.023	0.000	0.019
	[0.001936]***	[0.001941]***	[0.001939]***	[0.001941]***	[0.001937]***	[0.001936]***	[0.001939]***	[0.001937]***	[0.001949]***	[0.002357]	[0.002007]***
M race black, F race white	-0.032	-0.032	-0.032	-0.031	-0.032	-0.032	-0.033	-0.032	-0.032	-0.019	-0.033
	[0.003706]***	[0.003708]***	[0.003709]***	[0.003707]***	[0.003707]***	[0.003710]***	[0.003714]***	[0.003709]***	[0.003723]***	[0.006592]***	[0.004061]***
M race white, F race black	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.022	0.002
	[0.013748]	[0.013744]	[0.013746]	[0.013745]	[0.013746]	[0.013748]	[0.013744]	[0.013751]	[0.013742]	[0.008263]***	[0.011671]
M race black, F race black	-0.051	-0.051	-0.051	-0.051	-0.051	-0.051	-0.052	-0.051	-0.052	0.056	-0.049
	[0.013258]***	[0.013256]***	[0.013255]***	[0.013256]***	[0.013251]***	[0.013258]***	[0.013262]***	[0.013259]***	[0.013256]***	[0.010384]***	[0.011698]***
Q Pol Ideology? M Liberal F Liberal		0.014							0.013	0.008	0.010
		[0.002656]***							[0.002746]***	[0.003313]**	[0.002803]***
Q Pol Ideology? M Liberal F Centrist		0.005							0.004	0.004	0.003
		[0.006542]							[0.006588]	[0.004531]	[0.006378]
Q Pol Ideology? M Liberal F Conservative		-0.002							-0.003	0.011	-0.001
		[0.007931]							[0.007999]	[0.005787]*	[0.007811]
Q Pol Ideology? M Liberal F None		-0.005							-0.005	0.004	-0.007
		[0.004851]							[0.004907]	[0.004085]	[0.004626]
Q Pol Ideology? M Centrist F Liberal		0.008							0.007	-0.004	0.007
		[0.003127]***							[0.003185]**	[0.005020]	[0.003238]**
Q Pol Ideology? M Centrist F Centrist		0.025							0.024	0.017	0.024
		[0.007239]***							[0.007269]***	[0.006782]**	[0.007136]***
Q Pol Ideology? M Centrist F Conservative		0.000							-0.002	0.003	-0.001
		[0.008597]							[0.008642]	[0.007813]	[0.008458]
Q Pol Ideology? M Centrist F None		-0.004							-0.005	-0.002	-0.005
		[0.005514]							[0.005545]	[0.005978]	[0.005333]
Q Pol Ideology? M Conservative F Liberal		-0.006							-0.005	-0.011	0.002
		[0.003475]							[0.003585]	[0.005690]*	[0.003782]
Q Pol Ideology? M Conservative F Centrist		0.005							0.005	0.001	0.009
		[0.007269]							[0.007323]	[0.007274]	[0.007626]
Q Pol Ideology? M Conservative F Conservative		0.006							0.004	0.012	0.005
		[0.008145]							[0.008213]	[0.007202]*	[0.007956]
Q Pol Ideology? M Conservative F None		-0.001							-0.001	0.006	0.002
		[0.005405]							[0.005480]	[0.006324]	[0.005324]
Q Pol Ideology? M None F Liberal		-0.001							-0.001	-0.004	0.002
		[0.002791]							[0.002877]	[0.003406]	[0.002942]
Q Pol Ideology? M None F Centrist		-0.006							-0.006	-0.005	-0.004
		[0.006643]							[0.006684]	[0.004615]	[0.006464]
Q Pol Ideology? M None F Conservative		-0.006							-0.005	0.006	-0.003
		[0.007327]							[0.007392]	[0.004830]	[0.007230]
Q Pol Ideology? M None F None		-0.003							-0.005	0.006	-0.003
		[0.004571]							[0.004640]	[0.003962]	[0.004449]
Q Pol Ideology? M Liberal F Missing		0.001							0.000		-0.001
		[0.005729]							[0.005788]		[0.005802]
Q Pol Ideology? M Centrist F Missing		0.006							0.006		0.006
		[0.006563]							[0.006602]		[0.006648]
Q Pol Ideology? M Conservative F Missing		0.001							0.002		0.006
		[0.006839]							[0.006913]		[0.007031]
Q Pol Ideology? M None F Missing		-0.004							-0.003		-0.001
		[0.005656]							[0.005719]		[0.005846]
Q Pol Ideology? M Missing F Liberal										-0.007	
										[0.005526]	
Q Pol Ideology? M Missing F Centrist										0.000	
										[0.007134]	
Q Pol Ideology? M Missing F Conservative										0.010	
										[0.007966]	
Q Pol Ideology? M Missing F None										0.009	
										[0.006334]	
Q Pol PID? M Republican F Republican			0.009						0.005	-0.001	0.008
			[0.016941]						[0.017047]	[0.017309]	[0.016257]
Q Pol PID? M Republican F Democrat			-0.011						-0.007	-0.007	0.000

Table 5: Selected Regression Results for Models Predicting Women's Responding Behavior

Dependent variable is woman's responding behavior (1=responded to message sent by man, 0=did not respond to message sent by man; Includes only cases where man initially sent message)	(1) Fixed Effects for Woman	(2) Fixed Effects for Woman	(3) Fixed Effects for Woman	(4) Fixed Effects for Woman	(5) Fixed Effects for Woman	(6) Fixed Effects for Woman	(7) Fixed Effects for Woman	(8) Fixed Effects for Woman	(9) Fixed Effects for Woman	(10) Fixed Effects for Man	(11) Fixed Effects for Woman; All Questions
			[0.009290]						[0.009363]	[0.009396]	[0.009693]
Q Pol PID? M Republican F Indpt./Else			-0.007 [0.010084]						-0.005 [0.010139]	-0.013 [0.010002]	-0.001 [0.010094]
Q Pol PID? M Republican F None			0.005 [0.024882]						0.006 [0.024919]	0.002 [0.023313]	0.008 [0.023592]
Q Pol PID? M Democrat F Republican			-0.012 [0.018140]						-0.013 [0.018228]	-0.009 [0.015380]	-0.011 [0.016059]
Q Pol PID? M Democrat F Democrat			0.008 [0.004717]*						0.005 [0.004761]	0.007 [0.004886]	0.005 [0.004636]
Q Pol PID? M Democrat F Indpt./Else			0.008 [0.005954]						0.007 [0.005971]	0.006 [0.006216]	0.007 [0.005844]
Q Pol PID? M Democrat F None			0.003 [0.014411]						0.002 [0.014444]	0.004 [0.013330]	0.001 [0.014515]
Q Pol PID? M Indpt./Else F Republican			0.011 [0.011025]						0.010 [0.011028]	0.013 [0.010467]	0.013 [0.010825]
Q Pol PID? M Indpt./Else F Democrat			0.000 [0.004006]						-0.001 [0.004047]	0.000 [0.003843]	-0.001 [0.004024]
Q Pol PID? M Indpt./Else F Indpt./Else			0.003 [0.004609]						0.002 [0.004645]	-0.002 [0.004554]	0.001 [0.004595]
Q Pol PID? M Indpt./Else F None			-0.014 [0.012853]						-0.015 [0.012877]	-0.014 [0.010462]	-0.014 [0.011355]
Q Pol PID? M None F Republican			-0.014 [0.023552]						-0.013 [0.023526]	-0.010 [0.023434]	-0.011 [0.024754]
Q Pol PID? M None F Democrat			-0.004 [0.008751]						-0.002 [0.008794]	-0.001 [0.009621]	0.000 [0.009087]
Q Pol PID? M None F Indpt./Else			0.007 [0.010376]						0.008 [0.010413]	0.006 [0.011195]	0.009 [0.010167]
Q Pol PID? M None F None			0.011 [0.028626]						0.011 [0.028681]	0.008 [0.026024]	0.012 [0.025399]
Q Pol PID? M Republican F Missing			-0.001 [0.003757]						0.001 [0.003909]		0.006 [0.003987]
Q Pol PID? M Democrat F Missing			-0.004 [0.002313]						-0.006 [0.002408]**		-0.005 [0.002421]**
Q Pol PID? M Indpt./Else F Missing			-0.002 [0.001885]						-0.003 [0.001966]		-0.002 [0.001973]
Q Pol PID? M None F Missing			-0.005 [0.004111]						-0.004 [0.004160]		-0.002 [0.004181]
Q Pol PID? M Missing F Republican										-0.004 [0.004842]	
Q Pol PID? M Missing F Democrat										-0.004 [0.002125]*	
Q Pol PID? M Missing F Indpt./Else										-0.008 [0.002433]***	
Q Pol PID? M Missing F None										-0.004 [0.005308]	
Q Prefer Info Source? M Fox News F Fox News				0.012 [0.008065]					0.010 [0.008155]	0.017 [0.007234]**	0.012 [0.007790]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Fox News F CNN				-0.004 [0.004436]					-0.005 [0.004541]	0.004 [0.004911]	-0.001 [0.004898]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Fox News F MSNBC				0.003 [0.008044]					0.002 [0.008103]	0.008 [0.007169]	0.007 [0.008093]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Fox News F None of these				-0.010 [0.003857]***					-0.010 [0.003962]**	-0.008 [0.004538]*	-0.005 [0.004219]
Q Prefer Info Source? M CNN F Fox News				0.000 [0.007139]					-0.001 [0.007176]	0.012 [0.005851]**	0.002 [0.007132]
Q Prefer Info Source? M CNN F CNN				-0.001 [0.003611]					-0.003 [0.003671]	0.005 [0.003479]	-0.001 [0.003874]
Q Prefer Info Source? M CNN F MSNBC				-0.004 [0.006364]					-0.007 [0.006410]	0.001 [0.005090]	-0.004 [0.006537]
Q Prefer Info Source? M CNN F None of these				-0.005 [0.003004]*					-0.007 [0.003072]**	-0.008 [0.003297]**	-0.004 [0.003229]
Q Prefer Info Source? M MSNBC F Fox News				0.000 [0.010317]					-0.001 [0.010366]	0.010 [0.009985]	0.001 [0.010001]
Q Prefer Info Source? M MSNBC F CNN				-0.010 [0.005028]*					-0.013 [0.005068]**	-0.007 [0.005994]	-0.012 [0.005235]**
Q Prefer Info Source? M MSNBC F MSNBC				-0.003 [0.008577]					-0.007 [0.008620]	-0.001 [0.008955]	-0.006 [0.008843]
Q Prefer Info Source? M MSNBC F None of these				-0.001 [0.004124]					-0.004 [0.004197]	-0.006 [0.005488]	-0.003 [0.004276]
Q Prefer Info Source? M None of these F Fox News				-0.006 [0.006504]					-0.007 [0.006553]	0.002 [0.004434]	-0.005 [0.006383]

Table 5: Selected Regression Results for Models Predicting Women's Responding Behavior

Dependent variable is woman's responding behavior (1=responded to message sent by man, 0=did not respond to message sent by man; Includes only cases where man initially sent message)	(1) Fixed Effects for Woman	(2) Fixed Effects for Woman	(3) Fixed Effects for Woman	(4) Fixed Effects for Woman	(5) Fixed Effects for Woman	(6) Fixed Effects for Woman	(7) Fixed Effects for Woman	(8) Fixed Effects for Woman	(9) Fixed Effects for Woman	(10) Fixed Effects for Man	(11) Fixed Effects for Woman; All Questions
Q Prefer Info Source? M None of these F CNN				0.000 [0.003197]					-0.002 [0.003258]	0.005 [0.002579]**	-0.001 [0.003414]
Q Prefer Info Source? M None of these F MSNBC				0.003 [0.005585]					0.001 [0.005632]	0.007 [0.003726]*	0.002 [0.005653]
Q Prefer Info Source? M None of these F None of these				0.007 [0.002517]***					0.006 [0.002585]**	0.003 [0.002331]	0.005 [0.002729]*
Q Prefer Info Source? M Fox News F Missing				-0.003 [0.004413]					-0.003 [0.004509]		0.001 [0.004834]
Q Prefer Info Source? M CNN F Missing				-0.003 [0.003557]					-0.004 [0.003627]		-0.002 [0.003922]
Q Prefer Info Source? M MSNBC F Missing				-0.001 [0.004894]					-0.003 [0.004960]		-0.004 [0.005237]
Q Prefer Info Source? M None of these F Missing				-0.002 [0.003079]					-0.003 [0.003161]		-0.003 [0.003399]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Missing F Fox News										0.006 [0.005742]	
Q Prefer Info Source? M Missing F CNN										0.004 [0.003556]	
Q Prefer Info Source? M Missing F MSNBC										0.005 [0.005190]	
Q Prefer Info Source? M Missing F None of these										-0.004 [0.003310]	
Q Role Gov't? M Church state separate F Church state separate					0.005 [0.001793]***				0.004 [0.001912]**	-0.002 [0.001928]	0.001 [0.002048]
Q Role Gov't? M Church state separate F Majority Religion shape policy					0.005 [0.007831]				0.006 [0.007871]	0.002 [0.004050]	0.006 [0.007799]
Q Role Gov't? M Majority Religion shape policy F Church state separate					-0.008 [0.002998]***				-0.007 [0.003084]**	0.003 [0.005383]	-0.002 [0.003323]
Q Role Gov't? M Majority Religion shape policy F Majority Religion shape policy					0.002 [0.011944]				0.002 [0.011986]	0.012 [0.010715]	0.003 [0.011767]
Q Role Gov't? M Church state separate F Missing					0.004 [0.003816]				0.005 [0.003885]		0.003 [0.004024]
Q Role Gov't? M Majority Religion shape policy F Missing					-0.012 [0.006121]**				-0.011 [0.006167]*		-0.009 [0.006345]
Q Role Gov't? M Missing F Church state separate										-0.001 [0.003847]	
Q Role Gov't? M Missing F Majority Religion shape policy										-0.001 [0.007870]	
Q How balance budget? M Cut Services F Cut Services						0.006 [0.003730]			0.006 [0.003782]*	0.007 [0.003542]**	0.008 [0.003741]**
Q How balance budget? M Cut Services F Raise Taxes						-0.001 [0.003357]			0.002 [0.003405]	-0.003 [0.003354]	0.005 [0.003485]
Q How balance budget? M Raise Taxes F Cut Services						0.001 [0.004521]			0.001 [0.004573]	0.009 [0.004315]**	0.003 [0.004418]
Q How balance budget? M Raise Taxes F Raise Taxes						0.010 [0.003510]***			0.009 [0.003568]**	0.006 [0.003412]*	0.010 [0.003457]***
Q How balance budget? M Cut Services F Missing						-0.001 [0.001742]			0.001 [0.001835]		0.004 [0.001880]**
Q How balance budget? M Raise Taxes F Missing						-0.002 [0.001885]			-0.003 [0.001985]		-0.001 [0.002021]
Q How balance budget? M Missing F Cut Services										0.002 [0.002302]	
Q How balance budget? M Missing F Raise Taxes										-0.005 [0.002060]**	
Q Pol Impt? M Very Impt. F Very Impt.							0.004 [0.006160]		0.003 [0.006202]	0.004 [0.006438]	0.000 [0.006219]
Q Pol Impt? M Very Impt. F Somewhat Impt.							0.002 [0.004774]		0.002 [0.004819]	-0.006 [0.006321]	0.000 [0.004765]
Q Pol Impt? M Very Impt. F A Little Impt.							0.006 [0.006409]		0.007 [0.006457]	-0.003 [0.006707]	0.005 [0.006522]
Q Pol Impt? M Very Impt. F Not at All Impt.							-0.010 [0.009457]		-0.009 [0.009499]	-0.011 [0.007691]	-0.009 [0.008978]
Q Pol Impt? M Somewhat Impt. F Very Impt.							-0.011 [0.005844]*		-0.011 [0.005874]*	-0.003 [0.004689]	-0.011 [0.005963]*
Q Pol Impt? M Somewhat Impt. F Somewhat Impt.							0.003 [0.004382]		0.003 [0.004419]	0.005 [0.004438]	0.003 [0.004474]
Q Pol Impt? M Somewhat Impt. F A Little Impt.							0.006 [0.005912]		0.006 [0.005949]	0.006 [0.004668]	0.005 [0.006028]
Q Pol Impt? M Somewhat Impt. F Not at All Impt.							0.005 [0.008773]		0.006 [0.008799]	0.012 [0.005253]**	0.005 [0.008174]
Q Pol Impt? M A Little Impt. F Very Impt.							-0.011		-0.011	0.001	-0.008

Table 5: Selected Regression Results for Models Predicting Women's Responding Behavior

Dependent variable is woman's responding behavior (1=responded to message sent by man, 0=did not respond to message sent by man; Includes only cases where man initially sent message)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Fixed Effects for Woman	Fixed Effects for Woman	Fixed Effects for Woman	Fixed Effects for Woman	Fixed Effects for Woman	Fixed Effects for Woman	Fixed Effects for Woman	Fixed Effects for Woman	Fixed Effects for Woman	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Woman; All Questions
							[0.006111]*		[0.006135]*	[0.005657]	[0.006255]
Q Pol Impt? M A Little Impt. F Somewhat Impt.							-0.002		-0.002	0.003	0.000
							[0.004532]		[0.004560]	[0.005378]	[0.004641]
Q Pol Impt? M A Little Impt. F A Little Impt.							0.007		0.007	0.011	0.008
							[0.006015]		[0.006043]	[0.005598]**	[0.006165]
Q Pol Impt? M A Little Impt. F Not at All Impt.							0.004		0.004	0.012	0.003
							[0.008823]		[0.008856]	[0.006108]**	[0.008301]
Q Pol Impt? M Not at All Impt. F Very Impt.							-0.024		-0.022	-0.007	-0.014
							[0.006298]***		[0.006345]***	[0.006061]	[0.006558]**
Q Pol Impt? M Not at All Impt. F Somewhat Impt.							-0.011		-0.009	-0.002	-0.004
							[0.004624]**		[0.004682]*	[0.005631]	[0.004841]
Q Pol Impt? M Not at All Impt. F A Little Impt.							0.001		0.002	0.008	0.004
							[0.006116]		[0.006154]	[0.005789]	[0.006293]
Q Pol Impt? M Not at All Impt. F Not at All Impt.							0.005		0.006	0.014	0.006
							[0.008806]		[0.008865]	[0.006191]**	[0.008343]
Q Pol Impt? M Very Impt. F Missing							-0.004		-0.004		-0.003
							[0.012551]		[0.012565]		[0.012036]
Q Pol Impt? M Somewhat Impt. F Missing							-0.012		-0.012		-0.009
							[0.011474]		[0.011499]		[0.011377]
Q Pol Impt? M A Little Impt. F Missing							-0.015		-0.015		-0.012
							[0.011710]		[0.011723]		[0.011857]
Q Pol Impt? M Not at All Impt. F Missing							-0.020		-0.018		-0.012
							[0.011964]*		[0.011996]		[0.012210]
Q Pol Impt? M Missing F Very Impt.										-0.002	
										[0.012253]	
Q Pol Impt? M Missing F Somewhat Impt.										-0.007	
										[0.011815]	
Q Pol Impt? M Missing F A Little Impt.										-0.008	
										[0.012429]	
Q Pol Impt? M Missing F Not at All Impt.										-0.003	
										[0.013397]	
Q Duty vote? M Yes F Yes							-0.005	-0.006		0.003	-0.004
							[0.002590]*	[0.002627]**		[0.002293]	[0.002639]*
Q Duty vote? M Yes F No							-0.004	-0.004		0.001	-0.003
							[0.004797]	[0.004817]		[0.002772]	[0.004630]
Q Duty vote? M No F Yes							-0.005	-0.002		0.004	0.000
							[0.002798]	[0.002845]		[0.003397]	[0.002861]
Q Duty vote? M No F No							0.005	0.006		0.009	0.007
							[0.004981]*	[0.005018]		[0.003929]**	[0.004862]
Q Duty vote? M Yes F Missing							-0.005	-0.005			-0.003
							[0.005958]	[0.005979]			[0.005963]
Q Duty vote? M No F Missing							-0.008	-0.005			-0.002
							[0.006456]	[0.006479]			[0.006420]
Q Duty vote? M Missing F Yes										0.004	
										[0.006422]	
Q Duty vote? M Missing F No										0.000	
										[0.007498]	
Total # of women in dataset messaged by man	-0.00007	-0.00007	-0.00007	-0.00007	-0.00006	-0.00007	-0.00006	-0.00007	-0.00007		-0.00004
	[0.000007]***	[0.000007]***	[0.000007]***	[0.000007]***	[0.000007]***	[0.000007]***	[0.000007]***	[0.000007]***	[0.000007]***		[0.000008]***
Man's rate at which replied to	0.945	0.943	0.945	0.944	0.945	0.945	0.943	0.945	0.940		0.925
	[0.004567]***	[0.004573]***	[0.004570]***	[0.004567]***	[0.004567]***	[0.004570]***	[0.004569]***	[0.004567]***	[0.004579]***		[0.003846]***
Woman's reply rate										1.024	
										[0.005204]***	
Total # of times woman messaged by man										-0.00107	
										[0.000030]***	
Constant	-0.027	-0.029	-0.028	-0.027	-0.032	-0.027	-0.024	-0.023	-0.024	-0.158	-0.024
	[0.064866]	[0.064040]	[0.064337]	[0.064832]	[0.064761]	[0.064981]	[0.064763]	[0.064691]	[0.063575]	[0.035872]***	[0.088724]
Observations	465928	465928	465928	465928	465928	465928	465928	465928	465928	465928	465928
R-squared	0.163	0.164	0.163	0.164	0.163	0.163	0.164	0.163	0.164	0.207	0.167
Number of woman fixed effects	32116	32116	32116	32116	32116	32116	32116	32116	32116		32116
Number of man fixed effects										35410	

Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the fixed effects level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Mean of dependent variable in this sample is .2504657371954465.

Table 6: Selected Regression Results for Models Predicting Joint Messaging Behavior

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Dependent variable is joint messaging behavior (1=man sent, woman responded, 0=no message sent by man or woman did not respond)	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Woman	Fixed Effects for Man; All questions
M age 30 to 34, F age 25 to 29	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010
	[0.000535]***	[0.000535]***	[0.000536]***	[0.000535]***	[0.000534]***	[0.000535]***	[0.000537]***	[0.000534]***	[0.000539]***	[0.000374]***	[0.001682]***
M age 30 to 34, F age 30 to 34	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.012	0.013
	[0.000639]***	[0.000639]***	[0.000640]***	[0.000639]***	[0.000639]***	[0.000639]***	[0.000640]***	[0.000638]***	[0.000641]***	[0.000714]***	[0.001698]***
M age 30 to 34, F age 35 to 39	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.005	0.007
	[0.000672]***	[0.000673]***	[0.000673]***	[0.000672]***	[0.000672]***	[0.000672]***	[0.000673]***	[0.000672]***	[0.000674]***	[0.000810]***	[0.001723]***
M educ college, F educ hs	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.001	-0.002	-0.001
	[0.000398]**	[0.000398]**	[0.000398]**	[0.000398]**	[0.000397]**	[0.000398]**	[0.000398]**	[0.000398]**	[0.000398]**	[0.000747]**	[0.000438]*
M educ college, F educ assoc	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	-0.001	0.000
	[0.000354]	[0.000354]	[0.000354]	[0.000354]	[0.000354]	[0.000354]	[0.000354]	[0.000354]	[0.000355]	[0.000621]	[0.000367]
M educ college, F educ college	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.000
	[0.000262]	[0.000263]	[0.000262]	[0.000262]	[0.000263]	[0.000262]	[0.000263]	[0.000263]	[0.000263]	[0.000246]**	[0.000270]
M race white, F race white	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000
	[0.000215]***	[0.000215]***	[0.000215]***	[0.000215]***	[0.000215]***	[0.000215]***	[0.000215]***	[0.000215]***	[0.000215]***	[0.000212]***	[0.000209]**
M race white, F race black	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.003	-0.004	-0.003
	[0.000300]***	[0.000300]***	[0.000301]***	[0.000302]***	[0.000300]***	[0.000300]***	[0.000301]***	[0.000300]***	[0.000304]***	[0.000961]***	[0.000409]***
M race black, F race white	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.004	-0.001	-0.003
	[0.000893]***	[0.000893]***	[0.000893]***	[0.000893]***	[0.000893]***	[0.000892]***	[0.000891]***	[0.000893]***	[0.000892]***	[0.000363]***	[0.000818]***
M race black, F race black	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.018
	[0.002535]***	[0.002535]***	[0.002536]***	[0.002533]***	[0.002535]***	[0.002535]***	[0.002535]***	[0.002536]***	[0.002532]***	[0.002332]***	[0.001373]***
Q Pol Ideology? M Liberal F Liberal		0.001							0.001	0.001	0.001
		[0.000318]***							[0.000333]***	[0.000355]*	[0.000363]**
Q Pol Ideology? M Liberal F Centrist		0.001							0.001	0.001	0.000
		[0.000413]							[0.000423]	[0.000686]	[0.000444]
Q Pol Ideology? M Liberal F Conservative		-0.001							-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
		[0.000380]***							[0.000396]**	[0.000678]	[0.000482]
Q Pol Ideology? M Liberal F None		0.000							0.000	-0.001	0.000
		[0.000343]							[0.000358]	[0.000531]**	[0.000400]
Q Pol Ideology? M Centrist F Liberal		0.000							0.000	0.000	0.000
		[0.000496]							[0.000508]	[0.000376]	[0.000514]
Q Pol Ideology? M Centrist F Centrist		0.001							0.001	0.002	0.001
		[0.000664]*							[0.000673]	[0.000775]**	[0.000635]
Q Pol Ideology? M Centrist F Conservative		0.001							0.001	0.001	0.000
		[0.000647]							[0.000657]	[0.000797]	[0.000659]
Q Pol Ideology? M Centrist F None		0.000							0.000	-0.001	0.000
		[0.000525]							[0.000537]	[0.000556]	[0.000563]
Q Pol Ideology? M Conservative F Liberal		-0.002							-0.002	-0.001	-0.001
		[0.000548]***							[0.000566]***	[0.000391]*	[0.000601]
Q Pol Ideology? M Conservative F Centrist		-0.001							-0.001	0.001	0.000
		[0.000699]							[0.000711]	[0.000831]	[0.000741]
Q Pol Ideology? M Conservative F Conservative		0.001							0.001	0.001	0.000
		[0.000757]*							[0.000778]	[0.000758]*	[0.000743]
Q Pol Ideology? M Conservative F None		0.002							0.001	0.001	0.001
		[0.000650]**							[0.000666]**	[0.000656]**	[0.000648]**
Q Pol Ideology? M None F Liberal		-0.001							0.000	0.000	0.000
		[0.000391]*							[0.000398]	[0.000354]	[0.000424]
Q Pol Ideology? M None F Centrist		0.000							0.000	0.001	0.000
		[0.000517]							[0.000524]	[0.000747]**	[0.000524]
Q Pol Ideology? M None F Conservative		0.000							0.000	0.001	0.000
		[0.000512]							[0.000518]	[0.000730]	[0.000540]
Q Pol Ideology? M None F None		0.001							0.001	0.000	0.001
		[0.000486]*							[0.000484]	[0.000570]	[0.000461]
Q Pol Ideology? M Missing F Liberal		-0.001							-0.001		-0.001
		[0.000772]							[0.000781]		[0.000810]
Q Pol Ideology? M Missing F Centrist		-0.002							-0.002		-0.002
		[0.000954]*							[0.000959]*		[0.001011]*
Q Pol Ideology? M Missing F Conservative		-0.001							-0.001		-0.001
		[0.000974]							[0.000984]		[0.001014]
Q Pol Ideology? M Missing F None		0.000							0.000		0.000
		[0.000890]							[0.000898]		[0.000881]
Q Pol Ideology? M Liberal F Missing										-0.001	
										[0.000779]	
Q Pol Ideology? M Centrist F Missing										-0.001	
										[0.000816]	
Q Pol Ideology? M Conservative F Missing										-0.001	
										[0.000865]	
Q Pol Ideology? M None F Missing										-0.001	
										[0.000792]	
Q Pol PID? M Republican F Republican			0.001						0.000	0.001	0.000
			[0.001256]						[0.001289]	[0.001418]	[0.001008]
Q Pol PID? M Republican F Democrat			-0.002						-0.001	-0.001	-0.001

Table 6: Selected Regression Results for Models Predicting Joint Messaging Behavior

Dependent variable is joint messaging behavior (1=man sent, woman responded, 0=no message sent by man or woman did not respond)	(1) Fixed Effects for Man	(2) Fixed Effects for Man	(3) Fixed Effects for Man	(4) Fixed Effects for Man	(5) Fixed Effects for Man	(6) Fixed Effects for Man	(7) Fixed Effects for Man	(8) Fixed Effects for Man	(9) Fixed Effects for Man	(10) Fixed Effects for Woman	(11) Fixed Effects for Man; All questions
			[0.000502]***						[0.000512]***	[0.000445]*	[0.000565]*
Q Pol PID? M Republican F Indpt./Else			-0.001						-0.001	0.000	-0.001
			[0.000553]**						[0.000563]**	[0.000532]	[0.000578]
Q Pol PID? M Republican F None			0.002						0.002	0.001	0.002
			[0.001359]						[0.001359]	[0.001496]	[0.001216]
Q Pol PID? M Democrat F Republican			-0.001						-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
			[0.000524]***						[0.000544]	[0.000778]	[0.000667]
Q Pol PID? M Democrat F Democrat			0.001						0.000	0.001	0.000
			[0.000325]**						[0.000329]	[0.000337]*	[0.000312]
Q Pol PID? M Democrat F Indpt./Else			0.000						0.000	0.001	0.000
			[0.000365]						[0.000370]	[0.000381]	[0.000339]
Q Pol PID? M Democrat F None			-0.001						0.000	-0.001	-0.001
			[0.000595]						[0.000602]	[0.000838]	[0.000667]
Q Pol PID? M Indpt./Else F Republican			0.000						0.000	0.000	0.000
			[0.000493]						[0.000502]	[0.000645]	[0.000489]
Q Pol PID? M Indpt./Else F Democrat			0.000						0.000	0.000	0.000
			[0.000273]						[0.000280]	[0.000292]	[0.000252]
Q Pol PID? M Indpt./Else F Indpt./Else			0.000						0.000	0.001	0.000
			[0.000293]						[0.000300]	[0.000339]*	[0.000264]
Q Pol PID? M Indpt./Else F None			-0.001						-0.001	-0.001	-0.001
			[0.000500]						[0.000505]	[0.000814]	[0.000530]
Q Pol PID? M None F Republican			-0.003						-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
			[0.000850]***						[0.000859]***	[0.000957]***	[0.001199]**
Q Pol PID? M None F Democrat			-0.001						-0.001	0.000	-0.001
			[0.000591]						[0.000596]	[0.000483]	[0.000606]
Q Pol PID? M None F Indpt./Else			0.001						0.001	0.002	0.001
			[0.000752]						[0.000754]	[0.000648]**	[0.000647]
Q Pol PID? M None F None			-0.002						-0.003	-0.003	-0.003
			[0.001053]**						[0.001057]**	[0.001166]**	[0.001312]**
Q Pol PID? M Missing F Republican			0.000						0.000		0.000
			[0.000508]						[0.000518]		[0.000528]
Q Pol PID? M Missing F Democrat			0.000						0.000		0.000
			[0.000270]						[0.000277]		[0.000286]
Q Pol PID? M Missing F Indpt./Else			0.000						0.000		0.000
			[0.000297]						[0.000302]		[0.000298]
Q Pol PID? M Missing F None			0.001						0.001		0.001
			[0.000620]						[0.000623]		[0.000608]
Q Pol PID? M Republican F Missing										0.001	
										[0.000383]	
Q Pol PID? M Democrat F Missing										0.000	
										[0.000261]	
Q Pol PID? M Indpt./Else F Missing										0.000	
										[0.000214]*	
Q Pol PID? M None F Missing										0.000	
										[0.000396]	
Q Prefer Info Source? M Fox News F Fox News				0.004					0.003	0.002	0.002
				[0.001016]***					[0.001031]***	[0.001576]	[0.001128]**
Q Prefer Info Source? M Fox News F CNN				0.001					0.001	-0.001	0.001
				[0.000942]					[0.000947]	[0.001203]	[0.001055]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Fox News F MSNBC				0.003					0.003	0.002	0.003
				[0.001006]***					[0.001010]***	[0.001724]	[0.001136]**
Q Prefer Info Source? M Fox News F None of these				0.001					0.001	0.000	0.001
				[0.000888]					[0.000894]	[0.000811]	[0.001034]
Q Prefer Info Source? M CNN F Fox News				0.000					0.000	0.001	-0.001
				[0.000926]					[0.000929]	[0.001515]	[0.000869]
Q Prefer Info Source? M CNN F CNN				-0.001					-0.001	0.000	-0.001
				[0.000851]					[0.000853]	[0.001182]	[0.000806]
Q Prefer Info Source? M CNN F MSNBC				-0.001					-0.001	0.001	-0.001
				[0.000898]					[0.000900]	[0.001738]	[0.000858]
Q Prefer Info Source? M CNN F None of these				-0.002					-0.002	0.000	-0.002
				[0.000845]**					[0.000847]**	[0.000785]	[0.000791]**
Q Prefer Info Source? M MSNBC F Fox News				0.000					0.001	0.000	0.001
				[0.001303]					[0.001305]	[0.001622]	[0.001387]
Q Prefer Info Source? M MSNBC F CNN				0.001					0.001	-0.001	0.001
				[0.001217]					[0.001220]	[0.001230]	[0.001287]
Q Prefer Info Source? M MSNBC F MSNBC				0.001					0.001	0.001	0.001
				[0.001323]					[0.001327]	[0.001772]	[0.001367]
Q Prefer Info Source? M MSNBC F None of these				0.000					0.000	0.001	0.000
				[0.001179]					[0.001183]	[0.000820]	[0.001263]
Q Prefer Info Source? M None of these F Fox News				-0.001					-0.001	0.000	0.000
				[0.000519]*					[0.000527]	[0.001463]	[0.000557]

Table 6: Selected Regression Results for Models Predicting Joint Messaging Behavior

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
Dependent variable is joint messaging behavior (1=man sent, woman responded, 0=no message sent by man or woman did not respond)	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Woman	Fixed Effects for Man; All questions
Q Prefer Info Source? M None of these F CNN				0.000 [0.000494]					0.000 [0.000496]	-0.001 [0.001168]	0.000 [0.000513]
Q Prefer Info Source? M None of these F MSNBC				0.000 [0.000523]					0.000 [0.000526]	0.000 [0.001703]	0.000 [0.000544]
Q Prefer Info Source? M None of these F None of these				0.001 [0.000488]					0.000 [0.000490]	0.001 [0.000784]	0.000 [0.000502]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Missing F Fox News				-0.005 [0.003965]					-0.005 [0.003939]		-0.005 [0.003823]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Missing F CNN				-0.003 [0.004149]					-0.003 [0.004150]		-0.003 [0.003594]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Missing F MSNBC				-0.005 [0.004354]					-0.005 [0.004357]		-0.004 [0.003878]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Missing F None of these				-0.005 [0.004059]					-0.005 [0.004056]		-0.005 [0.003512]
Q Prefer Info Source? M Fox News F Missing										-0.006 [0.004064]	
Q Prefer Info Source? M CNN F Missing										-0.003 [0.004227]	
Q Prefer Info Source? M MSNBC F Missing										-0.005 [0.004191]	
Q Prefer Info Source? M None of these F Missing										-0.004 [0.004176]	
Q Role Gov't? M Church state separate F Church state separate				0.000 [0.000437]					0.000 [0.000440]	0.001 [0.000705]*	0.000 [0.000486]
Q Role Gov't? M Church state separate F Majority Religion shape policy				0.000 [0.000498]					0.000 [0.000500]	-0.002 [0.003548]	0.000 [0.000536]
Q Role Gov't? M Majority Religion shape policy F Church state separate				0.000 [0.001655]					0.000 [0.001659]	0.001 [0.000738]	0.001 [0.001661]
Q Role Gov't? M Majority Religion shape policy F Majority Religion shape policy				0.002 [0.001926]					0.002 [0.001929]	0.000 [0.003678]	0.001 [0.001838]
Q Role Gov't? M Missing F Church state separate				0.001 [0.005208]					0.001 [0.005213]		0.002 [0.005553]
Q Role Gov't? M Missing F Majority Religion shape policy				0.005 [0.006135]					0.005 [0.006157]		0.005 [0.006190]
Q Role Gov't? M Church state separate F Missing										0.002 [0.005050]	
Q Role Gov't? M Majority Religion shape policy F Missing										0.002 [0.005337]	
Q How balance budget? M Cut Services F Cut Services					0.001 [0.000255]***				0.001 [0.000260]***	0.001 [0.000375]***	0.001 [0.000234]***
Q How balance budget? M Cut Services F Raise Taxes					0.000 [0.000237]				0.000 [0.000240]	0.000 [0.000351]	0.000 [0.000223]
Q How balance budget? M Raise Taxes F Cut Services					-0.001 [0.000225]***				-0.001 [0.000230]**	0.000 [0.000367]	0.000 [0.000246]
Q How balance budget? M Raise Taxes F Raise Taxes					0.000 [0.000221]				0.000 [0.000223]	0.000 [0.000348]	0.000 [0.000227]
Q How balance budget? M Missing F Cut Services					0.000 [0.000463]				0.000 [0.000464]		0.000 [0.000524]
Q How balance budget? M Missing F Raise Taxes					0.001 [0.000459]*				0.001 [0.000461]		0.001 [0.000493]
Q How balance budget? M Cut Services F Missing										0.000 [0.000370]	
Q How balance budget? M Raise Taxes F Missing										0.001 [0.000378]**	
Q Pol Impt? M Very Impt. F Very Impt.							0.002 [0.001279]*		0.002 [0.001279]*	0.000 [0.001584]	0.002 [0.001457]
Q Pol Impt? M Very Impt. F Somewhat Impt.							0.001 [0.001265]		0.001 [0.001265]	0.001 [0.001113]	0.001 [0.001450]
Q Pol Impt? M Very Impt. F A Little Impt.							0.000 [0.001272]		0.000 [0.001272]	0.001 [0.001449]	0.001 [0.001462]
Q Pol Impt? M Very Impt. F Not at All Impt.							-0.001 [0.001270]		0.000 [0.001272]	0.002 [0.001701]	0.000 [0.001482]
Q Pol Impt? M Somewhat Impt. F Very Impt.							-0.002 [0.001244]*		-0.002 [0.001246]*	-0.001 [0.001577]	-0.002 [0.001117]*
Q Pol Impt? M Somewhat Impt. F Somewhat Impt.							-0.002 [0.001238]*		-0.002 [0.001240]	0.001 [0.001099]	-0.002 [0.001111]
Q Pol Impt? M Somewhat Impt. F A Little Impt.							-0.003 [0.001252]**		-0.003 [0.001254]**	0.001 [0.001458]	-0.002 [0.001120]**
Q Pol Impt? M Somewhat Impt. F Not at All Impt.							-0.003 [0.001256]**		-0.003 [0.001259]**	0.003 [0.001710]	-0.002 [0.001135]*
Q Pol Impt? M A Little Impt. F Very Impt.							0.000		0.000	-0.002	0.000

Table 6: Selected Regression Results for Models Predicting Joint Messaging Behavior

Dependent variable is joint messaging behavior (1=man sent, woman responded, 0=no message sent by man or woman did not respond)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Man	Fixed Effects for Woman	Fixed Effects for Man; All questions
							[0.001343]		[0.001347]	[0.001585]	[0.001437]
Q Pol Impt? M A Little Impt. F Somewhat Impt.							0.001 [0.001332]		0.001 [0.001335]	0.001 [0.001122]	0.001 [0.001429]
Q Pol Impt? M A Little Impt. F A Little Impt.							0.002 [0.001343]		0.002 [0.001345]	0.003 [0.001469]*	0.002 [0.001440]
Q Pol Impt? M A Little Impt. F Not at All Impt.							0.001 [0.001339]		0.001 [0.001340]	0.003 [0.001708]*	0.001 [0.001456]
Q Pol Impt? M Not at All Impt. F Very Impt.							-0.003 [0.001872]*		-0.003 [0.001869]	-0.003 [0.001584]	-0.002 [0.001755]
Q Pol Impt? M Not at All Impt. F Somewhat Impt.							-0.002 [0.001877]		-0.002 [0.001873]	0.001 [0.001136]	-0.001 [0.001745]
Q Pol Impt? M Not at All Impt. F A Little Impt.							-0.001 [0.001905]		-0.001 [0.001901]	0.002 [0.001490]	-0.001 [0.001758]
Q Pol Impt? M Not at All Impt. F Not at All Impt.							0.001 [0.001913]		0.000 [0.001908]	0.005 [0.001728]***	0.000 [0.001777]
Q Pol Impt? M Missing F Very Impt.							0.009 [0.001521]***		0.009 [0.001548]***		0.009 [0.008929]
Q Pol Impt? M Missing F Somewhat Impt.							0.006 [0.002144]***		0.006 [0.002155]***		0.007 [0.008885]
Q Pol Impt? M Missing F A Little Impt.							0.006 [0.001671]***		0.006 [0.001668]***		0.006 [0.008958]
Q Pol Impt? M Missing F Not at All Impt.							0.004 [0.002096]*		0.004 [0.002117]*		0.005 [0.009081]
Q Pol Impt? M Very Impt. F Missing										0.007 [0.001539]***	
Q Pol Impt? M Somewhat Impt. F Missing										0.010 [0.001669]***	
Q Pol Impt? M A Little Impt. F Missing										0.007 [0.001610]***	
Q Pol Impt? M Not at All Impt. F Missing										0.009 [0.002191]***	
Q Duty vote? M Yes F Yes								-0.001 [0.000692]	-0.001 [0.000696]	0.000 [0.000751]	0.000 [0.000625]
Q Duty vote? M Yes F No								-0.001 [0.000706]	-0.001 [0.000710]	-0.001 [0.001557]	0.000 [0.000639]
Q Duty vote? M No F Yes								0.000 [0.000976]	0.000 [0.000979]	0.000 [0.000758]	0.001 [0.000986]
Q Duty vote? M No F No								0.002 [0.000999]	0.001 [0.001002]	0.000 [0.001563]	0.001 [0.001006]
Q Duty vote? M Missing F Yes								0.008 [0.001084]***	0.008 [0.001130]***		0.009 [0.005777]
Q Duty vote? M Missing F No								0.009 [0.001677]***	0.009 [0.001720]***		0.011 [0.005901]*
Q Duty vote? M Yes F Missing										0.009 [0.001237]***	
Q Duty vote? M No F Missing										0.007 [0.001416]***	
Woman's received messaging rate (prop. men in dataset sending message)	0.350 [0.009647]***	0.350 [0.009652]***	0.350 [0.009648]***	0.350 [0.009646]***	0.350 [0.009645]***	0.350 [0.009650]***	0.350 [0.009653]***	0.350 [0.009648]***	0.349 [0.009659]***		0.347 [0.005569]***
Prop. of time woman messaged that she responds in dataset	0.009 [0.000257]***	0.009 [0.000257]***	0.009 [0.000257]***	0.009 [0.000257]***	0.009 [0.000257]***	0.009 [0.000257]***	0.009 [0.000257]***	0.009 [0.000257]***	0.009 [0.000257]***		0.009 [0.000229]***
Man's messaging rate (prop. women in dataset sent message)										0.288 [0.008840]***	
Prop. of time man messages that woman responds in dataset										0.006 [0.000270]***	
Constant	-0.006 [0.000620]***	-0.006 [0.000644]***	-0.006 [0.000622]***	-0.006 [0.000707]***	-0.007 [0.000754]***	-0.006 [0.000622]***	-0.005 [0.000929]***	-0.006 [0.000836]***	-0.006 [0.001264]***	-0.006 [0.001589]***	-0.005 [0.001689]***
Observations (Dyads)	1864247	1864247	1864247	1864247	1864247	1864247	1864247	1864247	1864247	1864247	1864247
R-squared	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.011	0.012	0.012
Number of man fixed effects	6195	6195	6195	6195	6195	6195	6195	6195	6195		6195
Number of woman fixed effects										5882	

Robust standard errors in brackets, clustered at the fixed effects level.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Mean of dependent variable in this sample is .0061284797561696.

Figure 1A: Effect of Nonpolitical Characteristics on Men's Messaging Behavior
Estimates from model without political items

Age: Man 30–34, Woman 25–29 vs 35–39

Height: Man Quintile 1, Woman 1 vs 5
Height: Man Quintile 5, Woman 5 vs 1

Education: Man College, Woman College vs High School

Race: Man White, Woman White vs Black
Race: Man Black, Woman Black vs White

Looking for: Man Long–Term Dating, Woman Long–Term vs Short
Looking for: Man Short–Term Dating, Woman Short–Term vs Long

Drinking: Man Admits Drinking Lots, Woman Admits Lots vs Never

Religion: Man Athiest/Agnostic, Woman Athiest/Agnostic vs Christian
Religion: Man Christian, Woman Christian vs Athiest/Agnostic

Kids: Man Wants, Woman Wants vs Not
Kids: Man Not Want, Woman Not vs Want

−.01   0   .01   .02   .03   .04   .05
Estimate and 95% Confidence Interval

Note: Mean of DV in this sample is .0144. See Tables 3 and A02 for full regression results.

Figure 1B: Effect of Political Characteristics on Men's Messaging Behavior
Estimates from models with individual sets of political items

Ideology: Man Liberal, Woman Liberal vs Conservative

Ideology: Man Conservative, Woman Conservative vs Liberal

PID: Man Republican, Woman Republican vs Democrat

PID: Man Democrat, Woman Democrat vs Republican

News Source: Man Fox, Woman Fox vs MSNBC

News Source: Man MSNBC, Woman MSNBC vs Fox

Church State: Man Separate, Woman Separate vs No Division

Church State: Man No Divison, Woman No Division vs Separate

Balance Budget: Man Cut Services, Woman Cut Services vs Raise Taxes

Balance Budget: Man Raise Taxes, Woman Raise Taxes vs Cut Services

Importance of Politics: Man Very, Woman Very vs Not

Importance of Politics: Man Not, Woman Not vs Very

Duty to Vote: Man Yes, Woman Yes vs No

Duty to Vote: Man No, Woman No vs Yes

−.01   0   .01   .02   .03   .04   .05
Estimate and 95% Confidence Interval

Note: Mean of DV in this sample is .0144. See Tables 3 and A02 for full regression results.

Figure 2A: Placebo Test, Observed (Vertical Lines) and Hypothetical (Densities) Estimates of Marginal Effects
Non−Political Characteristics

P−values calculated from 100 simulations.Simulations for Man Fixed Effects, All Political Items Models.

Figure 2B: Placebo Test, Observed (Vertical Lines) and Hypothetical (Densities) Estimates of Marginal Effects
Political Characteristics

P–values calculated from 100 simulations. Simulations for Man Fixed Effects, All Political Items Models.

Figure 3A: Effect of Nonpolitical Characteristics on Women's Messaging Responses
Estimates from model without political items

Age: Woman 30–34, Man 35–39 vs 25–29

Height: Woman Quintile 1, Man 1 vs 5

Height: Woman Quintile 5, Man 5 vs 1

Education: Woman College, Man College vs High School

Race: Woman White, Man White vs Black

Race: Woman Black, Man Black vs White

Looking for: Woman Long–Term Dating, Man Long–Term vs Short

Looking for: Woman Short–Term Dating, Man Short–Term vs Long

Drinking: Woman Admits Drinking Lots, Man Admits Lots vs Never

Religion: Woman Athiest/Agnostic, Man Athiest/Agnostic vs Christian

Religion: Woman Christian, Man Christian vs Athiest/Agnostic

Kids: Woman Wants, Man Wants vs Not

Kids: Woman Not Want, Man Not vs Want

−.08   −.04   0   .04   .08

Estimate and 95% Confidence Interval

Note: Mean of DV in this sample is .2506. See Tables 4 and A03 for full regression results.

Figure 3B: Effect of Political Characteristics on Women's Messaging Responses
Estimates from models with individual sets of political items

Ideology: Woman Liberal, Man Liberal vs Conservative
Ideology: Woman Conservative, Man Conservative vs Liberal

PID: Woman Republican, Man Republican vs Democrat
PID: Woman Democrat, Man Democrat vs Republican

News Source: Woman Fox, Man Fox vs MSNBC
News Source: Woman MSNBC, Man MSNBC vs Fox

Church State: Woman Separate, Man Separate vs No Division
Church State: Woman No Divison, Man Division vs Separate

Balance Budget: Woman Cut Services, Man Cut Services vs Raise Taxes
Balance Budget: Woman Raise Taxes, Man Raise Taxes vs Cut Services

Importance of Politics: Woman Very, Man Very vs Not
Importance of Politics: Woman Not, Man Not vs Very

Duty to Vote: Woman Yes, Man Yes vs No
Duty to Vote: Woman No, Man No vs Yes

Estimate and 95% Confidence Interval

Note: Mean of DV in this sample is .2506. See Tables 4 and A03 for full regression results.

Figure 4A: Effect of Nonpolitical Characteristics on Joint Messaging Behavior
Estimates from model without political items

Note: Mean of DV in this sample is .0061. See Tables 5 and A4 for full regression results.

Figure 4B: Effect of Political Characteristics on Joint Messaging Behavior
Estimates from models with individual sets of political items

Note: Mean of DV in this sample is .0061. See Tables 5 and A4 for full regression results.