

JS - 6

**FILED: 4/13/12**

cc: see G - 75 attached

**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

*In re: Lavarro Taylor and Teresa  
Delphine Taylor,*

**Debtors,**

**CASE NO. EDCV 11-1879-GHK**

**MEMORANDUM**

*Lavarro Taylor, et al.,*

**Debtors/  
Appellants,**

**v.**

*Rod Danielson,*

**Trustee/Appellee.**

This matter is before us on Appellants Lavarro Taylor and Teresa Delphine Taylor’s (“Appellants”) Appeal from Bankruptcy Court (“Appeal”). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). We have considered the papers filed in support of and in opposition to this Appeal and deem this matter appropriate for resolution without oral argument. L.R. 7-15. As the Parties are familiar with the facts of this case, we will repeat them only as necessary.

1  
2  
3  
4  
5  
6  
7  
8  
9  
10  
11  
12  
13  
14  
15  
16  
17  
18  
19  
20  
21  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28

## I. Background

On May 11, 2011, Appellants filed a voluntary petition for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code. (Excerpts of Record (“ER”) 1). In their Chapter 13 plan (“Plan”), Appellants proposed to cure the arrearage owed on their home mortgage. (ER 3-4). On June 29, 2011, the Bankruptcy Court held a confirmation hearing regarding Appellants’ Plan. During the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court expressed concern that the Plan “seem[ed] unfeasible on its face.” (ER 3). Nonetheless, Appellants’ attorney represented that the Plan was feasible, stating: “[T]here is definitely enough income over expenses to make the plan feasible. I would ask that [Appellants] be given a chance by the Court either to confirm it today or put it out to October.” (ER 5).

The Bankruptcy Court continued the confirmation hearing to October 5, 2011. At the same time, the court issued an “OSC re dismissal of the case as of October 5th.” (ER 5). The court explained that if Appellants failed to make their Plan payments or post-petition mortgage payments until the next hearing, or if they failed to comply with the provisions of the Local Bankruptcy Rules, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, or the Bankruptcy Code, the case would be dismissed with a bar to refiling. (ER 5).

On October 4, 2011, Appellants filed a “Notice of Conversion of Bankruptcy Case from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7” (“Notice of Conversion”). (ER 11). On October 5, 2011, the Bankruptcy Court held the rescheduled confirmation hearing. At the hearing, Appellants’ attorney promptly informed the court that the case “was . . . converted to Chapter 7 yesterday.” (ER 13). The court responded: “No, it wasn’t. Confirmation denied. Case dismissed. 109(g) applies.” (ER 13). The purported reason for dismissal was Appellants’ failure to make payments and failure to timely file a secured debt payment history declaration. (ER 13).

## II. Question Presented

1 According to Appellants, this Appeal presents a single question: “Did the  
2 [Bankruptcy Court] err in denying the effect of [Appellants’] Notice of Conversion from  
3 chapter 13 to chapter 7 and subsequently dismissing [Appellants’] chapter 13 case?”  
4 (Appellants Opening Brief (“AOB”) 2).

## 5 **II. Standard of Review**

6 We review the Bankruptcy Court’s “findings of fact for clear error and its  
7 conclusions of law de novo.” *In re Jan Weildert RV, Inc.*, 315 F.3d 1192, 1196 (9th Cir.  
8 2003). The Bankruptcy Court’s alleged failure to give effect to Appellants’ Notice of  
9 Conversion presents a legal question that is subject to de novo review.

## 10 **III. Discussion**

11 Appellants argue that 11 U.S.C. § 1307(a) provides debtors an “absolute right” to  
12 convert a case filed under Chapter 13 to a Chapter 7 proceeding and, therefore, the  
13 Bankruptcy Court erred in denying the effect of their Notice of Conversion and  
14 subsequently dismissing their Chapter 13 case. In the alternative they argue that even if  
15 the right to convert under § 1307(a) is not absolute, and can be forfeited by bad-faith  
16 conduct, the Bankruptcy Court still erred in dismissing the case because it did not make  
17 any explicit finding of bad faith.

18 Section 1307(a), which governs conversion of Chapter 13 cases, provides: “The  
19 debtor may convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 of this title at any  
20 time. Any waiver of the right to convert under this subsection is unenforceable.”  
21 “Bankruptcy courts within the Ninth Circuit have historically considered the right to  
22 convert from chapter 13 to chapter 7 as ‘absolute’ . . . .” *In re DeFrantz*, 454 B.R. 108,  
23 113 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases). However, “[w]hether the right to convert  
24 from chapter 13 to chapter 7 is truly ‘absolute’ has been called into question by the  
25 Supreme Court’s decision in *Marrama* [*v. Citizens Bank of Mass.*, 549 U.S. 365 (2007)].”  
26 *Id.*

1 In *Marrama*, the Court examined 11 U.S.C. § 706(a), which allows a debtor to  
 2 convert a case commenced under Chapter 7 to a Chapter 13 proceeding. The language of  
 3 § 706(a) is nearly identical to that of § 1307(a).<sup>1</sup> Although some courts had previously  
 4 treated the right to convert under § 706(a), like the right to convert under § 1307(a), as  
 5 absolute, in *Marrama* the Court held that the right to convert from Chapter 7 to Chapter  
 6 13 could be forfeited by bad-faith conduct. 549 U.S. at 1111-12. The Court’s decision  
 7 rested largely on its construction of the language of § 706(d) in conjunction with  
 8 § 1307(c). Under § 706(d), a Chapter 7 debtor may not convert to another chapter  
 9 through § 706(a) “unless the debtor may be a debtor under such chapter.” Under §  
 10 1307(c), a bankruptcy court may dismiss a Chapter 13 proceeding or convert it to Chapter  
 11 7 “for cause,”<sup>2</sup> which courts have “routinely” interpreted to include bad-faith conduct.  
 12 *Marrama*, 549 U.S. at 373. Reading these two provisions together, the Court reasoned  
 13 that a Chapter 7 debtor who has proceeded in bad faith and wishes to convert his case to  
 14 Chapter 13 is not eligible to “be a debtor” under Chapter 13 because his case would be  
 15 subject to dismissal or reconversion to Chapter 7 pursuant to § 1307(c). *Id.* at 373-74  
 16 (“In practical effect, a ruling that an individual’s Chapter 13 case should be dismissed or  
 17 converted to Chapter 7 because of prepetition bad-faith conduct, including fraudulent acts  
 18 committed in an earlier Chapter 7 proceeding, is tantamount to a ruling that the individual

19 \_\_\_\_\_

20 <sup>1</sup> Section 706(a) provides: “The debtor may convert a case under this chapter  
 21 to a case under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this title at any time, if the case has not  
 22 been converted under section 1112, 1208, or 1307 of this title. Any waiver of the  
 right to convert a case under this subsection is unenforceable.”

23 <sup>2</sup> Section 1307(c) provides, in relevant part: “[O]n request of a party in  
 24 interest or the United States trustee and after notice and a hearing, the court may  
 25 convert a case under this chapter to a case under chapter 7 of this title, or may  
 26 dismiss a case under this chapter, whichever is in the best interests of creditors and  
 27 the estate, for cause.” Although the statute provides for conversion “on request of  
 28 a party . . . or the . . . trustee,” the Ninth Circuit has concluded that the Bankruptcy  
 Court may also convert or dismiss on its own motion. *In re Rosson*, 545 F.3d 764,  
 771 n.8 (9th Cir. 2008).

1 does not qualify as a debtor under Chapter 7.”). Thus the Court concluded that “[t]he text  
2 of § 706(d) . . . provides adequate authority for the denial of [a] motion to convert [on the  
3 grounds of bad faith].” *Id.* at 374. Finally, the Court emphasized that “the broad  
4 authority granted to bankruptcy judges to take any action that is necessary or appropriate  
5 ‘to prevent an abuse of process’ described in § 105(a) of the Cod . . . is . . . adequate to  
6 authorize an immediate denial of a motion to convert filed under § 706 in lieu of a  
7 conversion order that merely postpones the allowance of equivalent relief and may  
8 provide a debtor with an opportunity to take action prejudicial to creditors.” *Id.* at 375.

9 One year later, in *In re Rosson*, 545 F.3d 764 (9th Cir. 2008), the Ninth Circuit  
10 held that *Marrama*’s “rejection of the ‘absolute right’ theory as to § 706(a) applies  
11 equally to § 1307(b),” the provision which provides debtors the right to voluntarily  
12 dismiss a case filed under Chapter 13.<sup>3</sup> *Id.* at 773. In sum, the Court held that “in light of  
13 *Marrama* . . . , the debtor’s right of voluntary dismissal under § 1307(b) is not absolute,  
14 but qualified by the authority of a bankruptcy court to deny dismissal on grounds of bad-  
15 faith conduct or ‘to prevent abuse of process.’” *Id.* at 773-74.

16 Nearly three years after the Ninth Circuit issued its decision in *In re Rosson*, the  
17 Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (“BAP”) of the Ninth Circuit addressed the question posed  
18 in the instant case: “whether a debtor’s right to convert from chapter 13 to chapter 7  
19 under § 1307(a) is ‘absolute.’” *In re DeFrantz*, 454 B.R. at 114. The BAP recognized  
20 that the decisions in *Marrama* and *In re Rosson* called into question whether the right to  
21 convert from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 is absolute, but also noted that neither decision  
22 directly controlled the issue. Relying on the differences between a conversion from  
23 Chapter 13 to Chapter 7 and the situations presented in *Marrama* (a conversion from  
24

---

25 <sup>3</sup> Section 1307(b) provides: “On request of the debtor at any time, if the case  
26 has not been converted under section 706, 1112, or 1208 of this title, the court shall  
27 dismiss a case under this chapter. Any waiver of the right to dismiss under this  
28 subsection is unenforceable.”

1 Chapter 7 to Chapter 13)<sup>4</sup> and *In re Rosson* (a dismissal of a Chapter 13 case), the court  
2 concluded that the right to convert provided in § 1307(a) is in fact absolute. *Id.*

3 The Court reasoned that the *Marrama* analysis was inapplicable because when  
4 converting to Chapter 7 “the court retains jurisdiction over the debtor and the debtor’s  
5 estate” and thus “the court has continuing power to address any improprieties that may  
6 result from the change in the nature of the proceedings.” *Id.* Put another way, when  
7 converting to Chapter 7 the debtor cannot “escape the consequences of bad faith conduct  
8 or for abuse of process.” *Id.* (“[I]f bad faith is involved, chapter 7 debtors may be denied  
9 a discharge for engaging in improper conduct under § 727, including § 727(a)(4)(A)  
10 (authorizing denial of discharge for making false oath or account). There is also the  
11 possibility that a debtor may face criminal penalties under 18 U.S.C. § 152 for knowingly  
12 and fraudulently making a false oath or account in or in relation to any case under title  
13 11.”). By contrast, when a Chapter 13 case is dismissed under § 1307(b), the court loses  
14 jurisdiction over the debtor. Similarly, as noted by the Court in *Marrama*, when a debtor  
15 converts from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13, the debtor regains possession of the property  
16 from the trustee and thus has an “opportunity . . . to take actions that would impair the  
17 rights of creditors.” *Marrama*, 549 U.S. at 375 n.13. Because these concerns are not  
18 present when a debtor converts from Chapter 13 to Chapter 7, the BAP concluded that a  
19 debtor has an absolute right to convert his case under § 1307(a). *In re DeFrantz*, 454  
20 B.R. at 114; *see also In re Boni*, No. 07-00128, 2001 WL 6257202, at \*2 (Bankr. D.D.C.  
21 Dec. 15, 2011) (“As to the issue of potential debtor action prejudicial to creditors, that  
22 does not exist upon a conversion to chapter 7: in contrast to a conversion from chapter 7  
23 to chapter 13, in which the chapter 7 trustee loses control of the property of the estate and  
24 the debtor is granted possession of the property of the estate pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §

---

25  
26 <sup>4</sup> “Under Chapter 7 the debtor’s nonexempt assets are controlled by the  
27 bankruptcy trustee; under Chapter 13 the debtor retains possession of his  
28 property.” *Marrama*, 549 U.S. at 367.

1 1306(b), the conversion to chapter 7 does not place the debtor in a position to take actions  
2 prejudicial to creditors.”).

3 Finally, the BAP suggested that reaching a contrary conclusion would create an  
4 irreconcilable conflict between § 1307(a) and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,  
5 which “recognize the differences between a conversion from chapter 7 to chapter 13 and  
6 vice versa.” *In re DeFrantz*, 454 B.R. at 114. Under Rule 1017(f)(2), conversion from  
7 Chapter 7 to Chapter 13 under § 706(a) “shall be on motion filed and served as required  
8 by Rule 9013.”<sup>5</sup> “Thus, before conversion under § 706(a), a court must have the  
9 opportunity to scrutinize the request.” *In re DeFrantz*, 454 B.R. at 114. By contrast,  
10 under Rule 1017(f)(3) a “chapter 13 case shall be converted without court order when the  
11 debtor files a notice of conversion under . . . [§] 1307(a). The filing date of the notice  
12 becomes the date of the conversion order . . . .” *See also* Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1017(f)(3)  
13 advisory committee notes (1987) (“Conversion of a chapter 13 case to a chapter 7 case as  
14 authorized by § 1307(a) is accomplished by the filing of a notice of conversion.”).  
15 Therefore, the Rule treats a debtor’s right to convert under § 1307(a) as absolute insofar  
16 as it does not require notice or a hearing before the right may be exercised and does not  
17 provide the court with an opportunity to scrutinize the conversion.

18 In this case, Appellants recognize that *In re DeFrantz* is not binding on this Court,  
19 *see Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, Inc.*, 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1990), but  
20 nonetheless urge us to adopt its reasoning and hold that a debtor’s right to convert under  
21 § 1307(a) is absolute. In opposition, the Chapter 13 Trustee argues that the BAP’s  
22 reasoning in *In re DeFrantz* is incorrect and that this case is governed by *Marrama*.

23  
24 While BAP decisions are not binding on this Court, we find the reasoning of *In re*  
25 *DeFrantz* to be persuasive and adopt it. *See In re Cardelucci*, 285 F.3d 1231, 1234 (9th

---

26  
27 <sup>5</sup> Rule 1017(f)(2) also governs dismissal under § 1307(b) and requires that it  
28 “shall be on motion filed and served as required by Rule 9013.”



1 Cir. 2002) (noting that BAP decisions are not binding, but nonetheless adopting the  
2 BAP’s persuasive reasoning). Specifically, we conclude that *Marrama* does not directly  
3 control this case because it addressed a different, albeit similar, statutory provision.  
4 Moreover, we conclude that *Marrama*’s reasoning does not directly translate to  
5 conversions under § 1307(a) because there is no cause for concern that a debtor may use  
6 that provision to “escape the consequences of bad faith conduct or for abuse of process.”  
7 *In re DeFrantz*, 454 B.R. at 114. Accordingly, we conclude that a Chapter 13 debtor’s  
8 right to convert to Chapter 7 is absolute. Therefore, the Bankruptcy Court erred in failing  
9 to give effect to Appellants’ Notice of Conversion and subsequently dismissing  
10 Appellants’ Chapter 13 case.

11 **IV. Conclusion**

12 The Bankruptcy Court’s October 5, 2011 Order dismissing Appellants’ case is  
13 **REVERSED**. This matter is **REMANDED** to the Bankruptcy Court for further  
14 proceedings consistent with this Memorandum.

15  
16 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

17 DATED: April 13, 2012

18   
19 \_\_\_\_\_  
20 GEORGE H. KING  
21 United States District Judge  
22  
23  
24  
25  
26  
27  
28



## NOTICE PARTY SERVICE LIST

Case No. \_\_\_\_\_ Case Title \_\_\_\_\_

Title of Document \_\_\_\_\_

Atty Sttlmnt Officer Panel Coordinator
BAP (Bankruptcy Appellate Panel)
Beck, Michael J (Clerk, MDL Panel)
BOP (Bureau of Prisons)
CA St Pub Defender (Calif. State PD)
CAAG (California Attorney General's Office - Keith H. Borjon, L.A. Death Penalty Coordinator)
Case Asgmt Admin (Case Assignment Administrator)
Catterson, Cathy (9 <sup>th</sup> Circuit Court of Appeal)
Chief Deputy Admin
Chief Deputy Ops
Clerk of Court
Death Penalty H/C (Law Clerks)
Dep In Chg E Div
Dep In Chg So Div
Federal Public Defender
Fiscal Section
Intake Section, Criminal LA
Intake Section, Criminal SA
Intake Supervisor, Civil
Interpreter Section
PIA Clerk - Los Angeles (PIALA)
PIA Clerk - Riverside (PIAED)
PIA Clerk - Santa Ana (PIASA)
PSA - Los Angeles (PSALA)
PSA - Riverside (PSAED)
PSA - Santa Ana (PSASA)
Schnack, Randall (CJA Supervising Attorney)

Statistics Clerk
US Attorneys Office - Civil Division -L.A.
US Attorneys Office - Civil Division - S.A.
US Attorneys Office - Criminal Division -L.A.
US Attorneys Office - Criminal Division -S.A.
US Bankruptcy Court
US Marshal Service - Los Angeles (USMLA)
US Marshal Service - Riverside (USMED)
US Marshal Service -Santa Ana (USMSA)
US Probation Office (USPO)
US Trustee's Office
Warden, San Quentin State Prison, CA

	<b>ADD NEW NOTICE PARTY</b> (if sending by fax, mailing address must also be provided)
Name:	
Firm:	
Address (include suite or floor):	
*E-mail:	
*Fax No.:	

\* For CIVIL cases only

	<b>JUDGE / MAGISTRATE JUDGE (list below):</b>

Initials of Deputy Clerk \_\_\_\_\_